The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK RSA No. 509 of 2024 [In the matter of an appeal under Section 100 of CPC from the order dated 01.07.2023 and passed by learned District Judge, Sambalpur in R.F.A. No.8 of 2019 arising out of the judgment and decree dated 22.08.2017 and 05.09.2017 respectively passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Sambalpur in C.S. No.123/37 of 2012-17] State of Odisha & Others …. Appellants -Versus- Vibgyor@Vibgyour Structural Construction Pvt. Ltd., Dhankauda …. Respondent Advocate(s) appeared in this case: For the Appellants : Mr. A.R. Dash, [Additional Government Advocate] For Respondent : Mr. G.M. Rath, Advocate CORAM: JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA JUDGMENT 11th November, 2025 SASHIKANTA MISHRA, J. The State-defendants in C.S. No. 123/37 of 2012- 17 of the Court of learned Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Page 1 of 16 Sambalpur have preferred this appeal being aggrieved by the judgment/order dated 01.07.2022 passed by the learned District Judge, Sambalpur in R.F.A. No.8 of 2019 dismissing the said appeal on the ground of limitation. 2.
Facts
For convenience, the parties are referred to as per their respective status before the trial Court. 3. The facts, relevant only to decide the present appeal are that the aforementioned suit was filed by the plaintiff for recovery of sum of Rs.41,25,295/- from the defendants. The claim of the plaintiff was allowed by the trial Court by its judgment dated 22.08.2017 followed by decree. 4. The State-defendants preferred the aforementioned appeal after a long period of delay. The appeal was accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay. 5. Learned District Judge, after hearing the parties on the question of limitation was not inclined to condone Page 2 of 16 the delay and hence, by the order impugned, the appeal was not admitted. Being further aggrieved, the State- defendants have preferred the present second appeal, which was heard extensively on the question of admission. 6.
Legal Reasoning
29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an Page 9 of 16 anticipated benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.” 12. Returning to the facts of the present case, it would be proper to refer to the explanation offered by the State as regards the delay in filing the first appeal. The first appellate Court has summarized the explanation of the State under paragraph 2 of its judgment as follows:- the “It has been submitted by learned Government Pleader appearing on behalf of the petitioners-appellants that after receipt of the certified copies of the impugned judgment and decree dated 22.8.2017 & 5.9.2017 respectively passed in CS No.123/37 of 2012-17 by the Additional Senior Civil Judge, Sambalpur on 17.10.2017, the Government Pleader sent the same to the appellant No.4 on 30.10.2017. The appellant No.4 then submitted the same the appellant No.2 on 23.10.2017 for necessary instruction in the matter, who ultimately submitted the same to the EIC-cum-Secretary to the Government of Odisha. Thereafter the Government of Odisha in Works Department intimated on 17.5.2018 to the appellant No,2 about the decision regarding filing impugned. The ofappeal against judgment the to Page 10 of 16 appellant No.2 on 21.5.2018 directed the appellant No.4 for taking up necessary action for filing of the appeal. The appellant No.4 consulted the Government Pleader, Sambalpur, who advised him to produce all the documents relating to the Civil Suit for preparation of the appeal memo. Since the dealing Clerk retired from Government service, the relevant documents of the case could not be traced out and the matter got delayed.The Executive Engineer could not contact the Government Pleader, Sambalpur to take his further advice, since the Advocates of Western Odisha went on strike from 5th September, 2018. On the situation getting little improvement from the last week of March, 2019, the appellant No.4 approached the Government Pleader in the month of July, 2019 for preparation of the appeal memo. The Government Pleader drafting the appeal memo, communicated to the appellant No.4 on 13.8.2019 with a request for approval of the same and sanction of funds for Court fee and other expenses: The appellant No.1 vide their letter dated 21.10.2019 addressed to the appellant No.2, authorised the appellant No.4 to file the appeal on their behalf. Similarly, the appellant No.2 vide its Office letter dated 19.9.2019 and the appellant No.3 vide its Office letter dated 26.9.2019 authorised the appellant No.4 to file the appeal on their behalf. Sincethe Executive Engineer (R&B) Division, Rourkela was also in-charge of NH Division, Rourkela, due to his busy schedule and work pressure he could not approach the Government Pleader for filing of the appeal. However, the Executive the Government Pleader, Engineer approached Sambalpur on 5.12.2019’ to file the appeal and which was subsequently filed on 6.12.2019.” 13. From a bare reading, it would firstly be evident that the impugned judgment was passed on 22.08.2017 whereas the first appeal was filed on 06.12.2019 i.e., after a gap of more than two years. Secondly, there is an apparent gap in the explanation between 21.05.2018 and Page 11 of 16 06.12.2019 on which date the Chief Engineer, National Highways authorized the Executive Engineer to prefer appeal. Strangely, the matter remained in limbo for a long time which is sought to be explained by stating that the case record had been misplaced. 14. Though, it is stated that the case record was traced out, when and how it was traced has not been explained at all. Surprisingly, it is stated that even though the Executive Engineer was authorized to prefer appeal on 21.10.2017, 19.09.2019 and 26.09.2019, he being ‘busy and hard pressed due to work load’ could not approach the Government pleader for filing of the appeal. This Court wonders as to why the same authorization was given on three different occasions. Even then, the matter having already been grossly delayed, ought to have received immediate attention. Instead, it is stated that the Executive Engineer was ‘busy and hard pressed due to work load’. 15. It is needless to mention that such a lethargic approach while dealing with substantial Government Page 12 of 16 money can never be condoned. It would be worthwhile to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in Chief Post Master General & Others (supra) as quoted with approval in Shivamma (Supra) ,which read as follows:- of less (supra), “212. The law as it presently stands, post the decision is Postmaster General unambiguous and clear. Condonation of delay is to remain an exception, not the rule. Governmental litigants, no than private parties, must demonstrate bona fide, sufficient, and cogent cause for delay. Absent such justification, delay cannot be condoned merely on the ground of the identity of the applicant. 213. From a combined reading of Bal Kishan Mathur (supra) and Sheo Raj Singh (supra) it is equally manifest that the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) is, in essence, twofold. First, that State or any of its instrumentalities cannot be accorded preferential treatment in matters concerning condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The State must be judged by the same standards as any private litigant. To do otherwise would not only compromise the sanctity of limitation. The earlier view, insofar as it favoured a liberal approach towards the State or any of its instrumentality is no more the correct position of law. Secondly, that the habitual reliance of Government departments on bureaucratic red tape, procedural administrative inefficiencies as grounds for seeking condonation of invariably accepted as a delay cannot always, “sufficient cause” for the purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. If such reasons were to be accepted as a matter of course, the very discipline sought to be introduced by the law of limitation would be diluted, resulting in endless uncertainty in litigation. 214. What has been conveyed in so many words, by the decision of Postmaster General (supra) is that while excuses premised solely on bureaucratic lethargy cannot, by themselves, constitute sufficient cause, there may nonetheless be circumstances bottlenecks, or Page 13 of 16 the latter can still attract where the explanation offered, though involving bureaucratic procedures, reflects a genuine and bona fide cause for the delay. In such instances, the true test is whether the explanation demonstrates that the State acted with reasonable diligence and whether the delay occurred despite efforts to act within time. Where such bona fides are established, the Court retains the discretion to condone the delay. 215. In other words, Postmaster General (supra) does not shut the door on condonation of delay by the State in all cases involving bureaucratic processes. The real distinction lies between a case where delay is the result of gross negligence, inaction, or casual indifference on the part of the State, and a case where delay has occurred despite sincere efforts, owing to the inherent complexities of governmental decision-making. While the former category must necessarily be rejected to uphold the discipline of limitation, judicial indulgence where public interest is at stake and the cause is shown to be reasonable. 216. In this regard, the vital test that has to be employed, wherever “sufficient cause” is sought to be the ground of bureaucratic demonstrated on inefficiencies is to distinguish between whether the same is an “explanation” or an “excuse”. Although the two may appear to be one and the same, yet there exists a fine but pertinent distinction between an “excuse” and an “explanation”. 217. As illustrated in Sheo Raj Singh (supra) an “excuse” is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. An “explanation” on the other hand would demonstrate genuineness in actions and reasons assigned, and would other wise be devoid of any gross negligence, deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, or indifference or casualness in conduct. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. 218. However, equally important to note is that wherever, any explanation is sought to be given on inherent account of bureaucratic therefore, each lethargy and case Page 14 of 16 complexities of governmental decision-making, the same more often than not would invariably always is an “excuse”, as experience has shown us, depicted from a long line of decisions of this Court. It is at this stage, where the decision of Postmaster General (supra) assumes significance. It seeks to convey the messages, that court should not be agnostic, to how the State or its instrumentalities, often tend to take the recourse of condonation of delay in a casual manner. 219. Which is why, as per the ratio of Postmaster General (supra) and a plethora of other subsequent decision, the ordinary approach of the courts, in cases where delay is sought to be condoned by offering the explanation of bureaucratic lethargy or red-tapism, must be one of circumspection and reluctance. The courts ought to loathe in accepting such explanations as “sufficient cause”. They should apply their minds carefully, be slow in condoning delays on such reasons, and exceptional the explanation is found to be genuine, reflective of reasonable vigilance and promptitude in conduct, and free from gross negligence, deliberate inaction, lack of bona fides, or casual indifference, should such an explanation be accepted instances, where 16. In view of the observations of the Supreme Court above, this Court refrains from saying anything more on the issue, save and except that the explanation submitted by the State was hardly sufficient to persuade the Court to take a lenient view. 17. This Court thus finds that the first appellate Court has rightly rejected the contentions so advanced and refused to admit the appeal. In view of the foregoing Page 15 of 16 narration, this Court fully concurs with the finding and finds no reason to interfere. 18. Resultantly, this Court is not inclined to admit the appeal, which is therefore, dismissed. …………..……………. Sashikanta Mishra Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack. The 11th of November, 2025/Puspanjali Ghadai, Jr. Steno Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: PUSPANJALI GHADAI Designation: Junior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Date: 13-Nov-2025 11:37:34 Page 16 of 16
Arguments
Heard Mr. A.R. Dash, learned Additional Government Advocate for the State and Mr. G.M. Rath, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiff-respondent. 7. Mr. Dash argues that the first appellate Court did not appreciate the facts properly, rather adopted a hyper- technical approach. He further submits that the delay in filing the appeal was properly explained by the defendant- appellants by furnishing all the relevant dates showing the movement of the file from one authority to the other. Since the State is involved, no single person is authorized to take a decision regarding filing the appeal and such decision can only be collective in nature after passing through the official hierarchy. Mr. Dash further argues that the first appellate Court has not considered the practical difficulties of the concerned authorities particularly when the decretal Page 3 of 16 amount is substantial. The first appeal was preferred on substantial grounds which, is considered, would have revealed the error in the judgment/decree passed by the trial Court. According to Mr. Dash, the impugned judgment/order cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the matter needs to be remitted for hearing the appeal on its own merit. 8. Mr. Rath, on the other hand, would argue that law is well settled that State is not entitled to any preferential treatment in the matter of condonation of delay and that the same parameters as applicable to a private litigant are to be applied to it. In this context, Mr. Rath argues that there are long gaps in the explanation submitted by the State while seeking condonation of the inordinate delay of more than five years. It is well settled that for the lack of promptitude and diligence of the Government officials, a private litigant cannot be deprived of enjoying the fruit of the decree passed in his favour. Page 4 of 16 9. Before delving into the facts, it would be apposite to keep the settled position of law regarding condonation of delay in perspective. The law relating to limitation has received a fresh look by the Supreme Court recently in the case of Shivamma V. Karnataka Housing Board & Others1. As regards the question of technical considerations vis-a-vis substantive justice, the Supreme Court after examining the relevant provisions and the meaning of the expression ‘sufficient cause’ held as follows:- “ii. Technical Considerations vis-a-vis Substantive Justice. special in mind “135. In construing “sufficient cause” it must be borne that rules of procedure are handmaids of justice. Procedural rigidity should not become an instrument of injustice. In the context of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, this balance significance. Courts have assumes limitation repeatedly underscored provisions are founded on sound principles of finality and certainty, their application cannot be divorced from the overarching objective of ensuring that litigants are not shut out from the doors of justice merely on account of technicalities. 136. When technical considerations of limitation conflict with the imperative of substantial justice, the latter should ordinarily prevail. Rules of limitation are not designed to destroy the rights of that while 1 2025 SCC Online SC 1969 Page 5 of 16 it. This justice rather the cause of parties but to prevent inordinate delay in seeking remedies. Thus, the interpretation of “sufficient cause” must be liberal and purposive, aimed at advancing than defeating the courts, while is why construing applications for condonation of delay, emphasize the bona fides of the applicant over the sheer arithmetical length of the delay. 137. Where strict adherence to these rules results in injustice, the Court is duty-bound to apply a liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause” so as to balance technical requirements with the demands of justice. A litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late and therefore, a pragmatic and justice-oriented approach must inform the judicial discretion under Section 5. This decision continues to be the most frequently cited authority for the proposition that the judiciary should incline towards justice rather than technicality. Therefore, when courts interpret “sufficient cause,” they are expected to exercise discretion in a manner that fosters justice, fairness, and equity, keeping in mind the realities of litigation. 138. When a Court of Law deals with an application to condone the delay filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, such application will have to be generally viewed in a liberal and lenient way to do substantial justice between the parties. Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be liberally construed and applied so as to advance substantial justice. It justice oriented is undoubtedly approach is necessary while deciding application under Section 5 of Limitation. However, it cannot be said that in every case delay must necessarily be condoned. It is a condition precedent for Section 5 of the Limitation Act that there must be a sufficient reason for condoning the delay. 139. However, while substantial justice must be advanced, the law of limitation is equally binding, and in “sufficient cause” must be shown substance, not in empty form. This ensures that the is not balance between skewed in favour of unmerited litigants. 140. However, at the same time, the courts must be mindful that strong case on merits is no ground for condonation of delay. When an application for justice and certainty that a true Page 6 of 16 condonation of delay is placed before the court, the inquiry is confined to whether “sufficient cause” has been demonstrated for not filing the appeal or proceeding within the prescribed period of limitation. The merits of the underlying case are wholly extraneous to this inquiry. If courts were to look into the merits of the matter at this stage, it would blur the boundaries between preliminary procedural questions and substantive adjudication, thereby conflating two distinct stages of judicial scrutiny. The purpose of Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not to determine whether the claim is legally or factually strong, but only whether the applicant had a reasonable justification for the delay. 141. Test of “sufficient cause” cannot be substituted by an examination of the merits of the case. Condonation of delay is a matter of discretion based on explanation for the delay, not on the prospects of success in the case. If merits are considered, a litigant with a stronger case may be favoured with condonation despite negligence, while a weaker case may be rejected even if sufficient cause is made out. This would lead to an inequitable and inconsistent application of the law, undermining the uniform standard that the doctrine of limitation is designed to maintain. 142. Another practical reason why merits must not be considered at the stage of delay condonation is that it risks prejudicing the mind of the court against one party even before the matter is into merits substantively heard. By glancing prematurely, the court may inadvertently form a view that colours the fairness of the subsequent adjudication. The judicial discipline required at this stage demands that only the cause for delay be scrutinized, and nothing more. This ensures that the ultimate adjudication of rights occurs in a neutral and unprejudiced setting. 143. The law of limitation is meant to apply uniformly across cases, regardless of the intrinsic strength or weakness of the claims involved. To import merits into condonation proceedings would effectively dilute this uniformity.” Page 7 of 16 10. Thus, the argument that there was merit otherwise in the first appeal preferred cannot ipso-facto be a reason to condone the delay. As regards the question whether any laxity can be given to the State, the Supreme Court, after analyzing several judgments noticed that prior to its judgment in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Others V. Living Media India Ltd. & Another2 the approach was characterized by judicial sympathy towards the State and its instrumentalities in matters of condonation of delay, owing to the peculiar nature of their functioning. However, there has been a shift in jurisprudence on condonation of delay after the decision of Chief Post Master General (supra). 11. Referring to the judgments rendered in Chief Post Master General & Others (Supra) the Supreme Court held as follows:- is not in dispute “27. It concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a the person(s) that 2 2012 3 SCC 563 Page 8 of 16 special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.