The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.A. No.997 of 2021 State of Orissa and another …. Appellants Mr. Arnav Behera, ASC for State -versus- Sangita Tripathy and another …. Respondents Mr. Sangram Jena, Advocate for Respondent No.1 CORAM: THE CHIEF JUSTICE JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO Order No. I. A. No.2465 of 2021 ORDER 22.08.2023 03. 1. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode. 2. This is an application for condonation of delay of 650 days in filing the intra-court appeal from the order dated 12th February, 2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.27147 of 2017.
Legal Reasoning
3. Heard Mr. Arnav Behera, learned Additional Standing Counsel (ASC) for the Applicant-Appellant and Mr. Sangram Jena, learned counsel for the Opposite Party No.1 (Respondent No.1). 4. Having appreciated the causes assigned, despite opposition from Mr. Jena, we condone the delay as aforestated. Page 1 of 7 5. In the result, this interlocutory application is allowed and
Decision
disposed of. W.A. No.997 of 2021 6. Heard Mr. Arnav Behera, learned ASC appearing for the Appellants-State and Mr. Sangram Jena, learned counsel appearing for the Respondent No.1. 7. There is no representation for the Respondent No.2 when the matter is taken up. 8. To challenge the order dated 12th February, 2020 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.27147 of 2017 by means of this intra-court appeal, the Appellants have stated that in the said order no date has been ascribed for granting the actual financial benefit. 9. Mr. Behera, learned ASC has submitted that the actual financial benefit shall be restricted to three years preceding the date of institution of the writ petition. In support of the said contention, Mr. Behera has placed his reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh: (2008) 8 SCC 648. In Tarsem Singh (supra), the Apex Court has given a signification direction towards understanding the doctrine of continuing wrongs Page 2 of 7 vis-à-vis delay and laches. The denial of pay, it has been held in Tarsem Singh (supra), gives rise of a fresh cause on every day but while observing in respect of stale matters, the Apex Court has observed that “if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion, etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 10. Mr. Jena, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.1 has strongly contended that there cannot be any application of Tarsem Singh (supra) in respect of the impugned order dated 12th February, 2020 (Annexure-2 to the memorandum of appeal) as the order passed by the Education Tribunal and the order passed in FAO No.327 of 2014 are unambiguous and the order in the appeal has not been challenged by the Appellants. Hence, no clarification Page 3 of 7 is called for. Even the challenge as projected on the basis of Tarsem Singh (supra) cannot be sustained inasmuch as the learned Single Judge has considered the principles of Tarsem Singh (supra). In the said order, it has been observed as follows: “On the cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts and reasons, this Court is of the considered view that there remains no justification on the part of the opposite parties in issuing the impugned order under Annexure-3 series in supersession of the order passed by the learned Education Tribunal and the order in FAO No.327 of 2014. Accordingly the condition imposed in clause-3 under Annexure-3 series restricting the benefit for a period of three years is hereby set aside with direction to the authorities to extent the benefits as has been directed by the learned Education Tribunal vide order dated 02.11.2012 passed in GIA Case No.489 of 2011. The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order.” 11. The State Education Tribunal (the Tribunal) by the judgment dated 2nd November, 2012 delivered in GIA Case No.489 of 2011 had observed as follows: Page 4 of 7 “5. It is accordingly ordered that the O.P. Nos.1 and 2 are directed to approve the appointment of the applicant w.e.f. the date of her joining i.e. 17.8.1993 and to release grant-in- aid in favour of the applicant strictly in accordance with Grant in Aid Order, 1994 along with the differential salary components within a period of four months from the date of communication of this order.” 12. The said judgment was challenged in FAO No.327 of 2014 by the Appellants herein. But their plea could not be accepted. Consequently, the said appeal was dismissed by the order dated 10th November, 2014. However, the said order was not passed on merit. The appeal was dismissed on the ground of limitation. 13. It has been stated by Mr. Jena, learned counsel that no challenge was taken forward by the Appellants herein after the appeal was dismissed. In compliance of the order dated 2nd November, 2012 as passed by the Tribunal, the Appellants issued a memorandum on the face of the contempt proceeding on 15th July, 2015 (Annexure-3 series to the writ petition) by restricting the arrears of pay to three years preceding the date of the institution in terms of Tarsem Singh (supra). The said order was challenged by the Respondent No.1 in Page 5 of 7 W.P.(C) No.27147 of 2017 and learned Single Judge has struck down Clause 3 of the said order whereby the arrears was restricted to three years preceding to the date of institution of the GIA Case holding that the Respondent No.1 is entitled to get financial benefits for the intervening period from the date when she was appointed under the Grant-in-Aid till the date on which the Respondent No.1 was granted the financial benefit of GIA Scale. 14. Since there was no challenge against the order of the Tribunal and the appeal therefrom was dismissed, it has to be inferred that the Appellants have acceded to the judgment of the Tribunal. On reading of the passage as quoted above, we do not have any hesitation to hold that the judgment intended to pay arrears in accordance with the GIA Order, 1994. There is no controversy that the effective date for applying GIA is 1st June, 1994. As such, the arrears shall be paid to the Respondent No.1 from 1st June, 1994. The entire amount on account of the arrears for the period from 1st June, 1994 to 28th February 2008, the day when the Appellants had released financial GIA pay earlier, shall be paid to the Respondent No.1 within a period of 30 days from today. Page 6 of 7 15. The Tribunal had categorically observed that the differential salary component shall be paid within a period of four months from the date of communication of the order. As in the order, the differential salary has been mentioned, it shall mean and shall only mean that arrears shall be paid from the day of the Respondent No.1’s joining under the GIA scale and she will be entitled to the differential salary. Having observed thus, we dismiss this appeal being bereft of merit holding further that the principles laid down in Tarsem Singh (supra) do not have any relevance in the case in hand. The Respondent No.1 is directed to furnish a certified copy of this order to the competent authority forthwith. There shall be no order as to costs. (S. Talapatra) Chief Justice (Savitri Ratho) Judge M. Panda Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MRUTYUNJAYA PANDA Designation: Secretary Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 25-Aug-2023 19:34:54 Page 7 of 7