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THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLMC No.4732 of 2023 (In the matter of an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) M/s. Rashmi Cement Limited and another ……. Petitioners -Versus- State of Odisha (Vigilance) ……. Opp. Party For the Petitioners : Mr. Subir Palit, Senior Advocate Mr. Alok Ranjan Mohanty, Advocate Mr. Santunu Ghosh, Advocate For the Opp. Party : Mr. Niranjan Moharana, Additional Standing Counsel (Vigilance Department) CORAM: THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA Date of Hearing: 03.12.2024 :: Date of Judgment: 13.02.2025 S.S. Mishra, J. This petitioners under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has been preferred seeking quashing of V.G.R. Case No.05 of 2014 corresponding to Balasore Vigilance P.S. Case No.09 of 2014 pending in the Court of the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Keonjhar, the order of cognizance dated 08.02.2019 therein and the consequential proceedings arising therefrom. 2. The allegation against the petitioners in the F.I.R. is that the petitioner No.1-Company is engaged in the business of manufacture of sponge iron, cement and other allied steel products in West Bengal. The petitioner No.1, Company therefore has been procuring minerals regularly from the State of Odisha for its manufacturing activities. In this regard, the present petitioners are required to obtain licenses from the competent authority of the area under whose jurisdiction, the materials are sought to be purchased, i.e. the Deputy Director of Mines, Joda Circle, Keonjhar, Odisha ( for short ―DDM, Joda‖). On the basis of the said licenses, the Petitioner No.1, the Company has been procuring, storing and transporting minerals from various lessees and registered traders within the Joda Circle. 3. During the course of verification of the petitioners Company‘s license by the State Level Enforcement Squad (SLES) during the period 18.06.2012–17.07.2012, it was found that a license granted for procurement and transport of iron ore for self- consumption was diverted Page 2 of 28 an export. Furthermore, it was also revealed that an excess quantity of iron ore was procured than what was legally sanctioned. In light of the same, a show cause notice was issued by the Deputy Director of Mines on 29.08.2012, and the licenses dated 18.02.2012 and 29.05.2012 were suspended till further orders. A response was filed by the petitioners Company. They also approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 17942 of 2012, which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 26.09.2012 directing the DDM, Joda Circle to consider the reply and dispose of the matter within two weeks. Vide office order dated
Decision
13.03.2013, the DDM, Joda disposed of the matter by a speaking order. 4. The Petitioners Company again approached this Court by filing second Writ Petition being W.P.(C) No.6836 of 2013 seeking quashing of the order dated 13.03.2013. Vide order dated 18.07.2013, the same was quashed. The matter went up to the Hon‘ble Supreme Court as the State preferred a Special Leave Petition being SLP( C) No.813 of 2014, but the same was withdrawn at the time of hearing with leave to approach this Court. Soon thereafter, the F.I.R. dated 19.02.2014 was registered against the present petitioners and one other co-accused (who Page 3 of 28 has since deceased) which culminated in the present VGR Case No.05 of 2014 corresponding to Balasore Vigilance P.S. Case No.09 of 2014. Charge-sheet was filed on 15.12.2018 and the order taking cognizance of the offences under Sections 13(2)/13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act read with Section 21(1)/23 of MMDR Act and Sections 120-B/409/420 of I.P.C. and issuance of summons was passed by the learned trial Court on 08.02.2019. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the present petition has been preferred. As the facts leading to the instant petition have been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to summarize the contentions of the parties and the broad grounds that have been raised to seek the exercise of this Court‘s plenary jurisdiction available under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 6. Heard Mr. Subir Palit, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Niranjan Moharana, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the Vigilance Department. 7. Mr. Palit, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on following decisions of the Hon‘ble Apex Court to contend that the impugned order of cognizance reflects total non-application of Page 4 of 28 mind by the trial Court. Reliance in this regard has been placed on a series of decisions of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Devendra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, reported in (2009) 7 SCC 495; Sunil Bharti Mittal v. Central Bureau of Investigation, reported in (2015) 4 SCC 609; Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police, reported in 1985 (2) SCC 537 and State of Punjab v. Bhag Singh, reported in (2004) 1 SCC 547. 8. It is submitted by Mr. Palit, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that while passing the order taking cognizance, the Court has to apply its judicial mind. The order is liable to be set aside if no reason is given therein by coming to the conclusion that prima facie case against the accused is made out though the order need not contain detailed reasons. The discretion must be judicially exercised. A person ought not to be dragged into Court merely because charge-sheet has been filed. If a prima facie case has been made out, the Magistrate ought to issue process after recording reasons. There has to be application of mind as to whether the allegation in the complaint when considered along with statements recorded or enquiry conducted thereon would constitute Page 5 of 28 violation of law so as to call a person to appear before the Criminal Court. It is not mechanical process or matter of course. 9. Per contra, Mr. Moharana, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the Vigilance Department submitted that there is no illegality in the order passed by the learned trial Court. It is submitted that taking cognizance is still an intermediate stage. The charge-sheet of the investigating agency in the present case discloses involvement of the accused. He has relied upon the judgments of the Hon‘ble Supreme Court in the case of Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab reported in (2014) 3 SCC 92 and in the case of Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports v. Roshan Lal Agarwal, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 139. 10. It is contended that time and again it has been held by the Hon‘ble Apex Court that a summoning order under Section 204 of Cr.P.C. requires no explicit reasoning to be stated because it is imperative that the Magistrate must have taken notice of the accusations and applied his mind to the allegations made in the police report and the materials filed therewith. Page 6 of 28 11. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record. This Court has to determine as to whether the learned trial Court‘s order taking cognizance appears to be unreasoned and passed with non-application of mind, which warrants interference by this Court. 12. In Chief Enforcement Officer vrs. Videocon International Ltd. reported in (2008) 2 SCC 492, the expression ―cognizance‖ was explained by this Court as ―it merely means ‗become aware of‘ and when used with reference to a Court or a Judge, it connotes ‗to take notice judicially‘. It indicates the point when a Court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone.‖ It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance is taken of offences and not of persons. Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Page 7 of 28 Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry or cognizance. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code. 13. A ―summons‖ furthermore, is a process issued by a court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the court on the given date and time. Willful disobedience of a summons order is liable to be punished under Section 174 of I.P.C apart from being a ground for contempt of court. 14. In this context, it is relevant to extract Sections 190 and 204 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ―the Code‖) which read as under:- “190. Cognizance of offences by Magistrates.—(1) Subject to the provisions of this Chapter, any Magistrate of the First Class, and any Magistrate of the Second Class specially empowered in this behalf under sub- section (2), may take cognizance of any offence— Page 8 of 28 (a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; (b) upon a police report of such facts; (c) upon information received from any person other than a police officer, or upon his own knowledge, that such offence has been committed. (2) The Chief Judicial Magistrate may empower any Magistrate of the Second Class to take cognizance under sub-section (1) of such offences as are within his competence to inquire into or try. *** 204. Issue of process.—(1) If in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence there is sufficient ground for proceeding, and the case appears to be— *** *** *** (a) a summons case, he shall issue his summons for the attendance of the accused, or (b) a warrant case, he may issue a warrant, or, if he thinks fit, a summons, for causing the accused to be brought or to appear at a certain time before such Magistrate or (if he has no jurisdiction himself) some other Magistrate having jurisdiction. (2) No summons or warrant shall be issued against the accused under sub-section (1) until a list of the prosecution witnesses has been filed. (3) In a proceeding instituted upon a complaint made in writing, every summons or warrant issued under sub- section (1) shall be accompanied by a copy of such complaint. (4) When by any law for the time being in force any process fees or other fees are payable, no process shall be issued until the fees are paid and, if such fees are not paid within a reasonable time, the Magistrate may dismiss the complaint. Page 9 of 28 (5) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to affect the provisions of Section 87.” 15. Section 204 of the Code does not mandate the Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a prerequisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued. 16. In Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of West Bengal reported in (2000) 1 SCC 722, the following passage held by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court will be apposite in this context:- “12. If there is no legal requirement that the trial court should write an order showing the reasons for framing a charge, why should the already burdened trial courts be further burdened with such an extra work. The time has reached to adopt all possible measures to expedite the court procedures and to chalk out measures to avert all roadblocks causing avoidable delays. If a Magistrate is to write detailed orders at different Page 10 of 28 stages merely because the counsel would address arguments at all stages, the snail-paced progress of proceedings in trial courts would further be slowed down. We are coming across interlocutory orders of Magistrates and Sessions Judges running into several pages. We can appreciate if such a detailed order has been passed for culminating the proceedings before them. But it is quite unnecessary to write detailed orders at other stages, such as issuing process, remanding the accused to custody, framing of charges, passing over to next stages in the trial.” 17. In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Ors. reported in (1976) 3 SCC 736, the Hon‘ble Apex Court held that it is not the province of the Magistrate to enter into a detailed discussion on the merits or demerits of the case. It was further held that in deciding whether a process should be issued, the Magistrate can take into consideration the probabilities appearing on the face of the complaint or in the evidence led by the complainant in support of the allegations. The Magistrate has been given an undoubted discretion in the matter and the discretion has to be judicially exercised by him. It was further held that: “5. … Once the Magistrate has exercised his discretion it is not for the High Court, or even this Court, to substitute its own discretion for that of the Magistrate or to examine the case on merits with a view to find out whether or not the allegations in. the Page 11 of 28 complaint, conviction of the accused...” if proved, would ultimately end in 18. Furthermore, in Dy. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports v. Roshanlal Agarwal reported in (2003) 4 SCC 139, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, in paragraph-9, has held as under: - “9. In determining the question whether any process is to be issued or not, what the Magistrate has to be satisfied is whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding and not, whether there is sufficient ground for conviction. Whether the evidence is adequate for supporting the conviction, can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of inquiry. At the stage of issuing the process to the accused, the Magistrate is not required to record reasons. This question was considered recently in U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Mohan Meakins Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 745] and after noticing in Kanti Bhadra Shah v. State of W.B. [(2000) 1 SCC 722: 2000 SCC (Cri) 303] it was held as follows: (U.P. Pollution case [(2000) 3 SCC 745], SCC p. 749, para 6) laid down law the „6. The legislature has stressed the need to record reasons in certain situations such as dismissal of a complaint without issuing process. There is no such legal requirement imposed on a Magistrate for passing detailed order while issuing summons. The process issued to accused cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the Magistrate had not passed a speaking order.” Page 12 of 28 19. In U.P. Pollution Control Board v. Bhupendra Kumar Modi reported in (2009) 2 SCC 147, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court, held as under: “It is settled legal position that at the stage of issuing process, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and he is only to be prima facie satisfied whether for proceeding against the accused.” there are sufficient grounds 20. This being the settled legal position, the order passed by the Magistrate could not be faulted with only on the ground that the summoning order was not a reasoned one. 21. It is, therefore, very well settled that at the stage of issuing process, the Magistrate is mainly concerned with the allegations made in the complaint or the evidence led in support of the same and the Magistrate is only to be satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. It is fairly well settled that when issuing summons, the Magistrate need not explicitly state the reasons for his satisfaction that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused. Reliance in this regard can be placed on the Hon‘ble Supreme Page 13 of 28 Court‘s judgment in the case of Bhushan Kumar v. State (NCT of Delhi) reported in (2012) 5 SCC 424, wherein it was held as under : is In Chief Officer v. Videocon Enforcement “11. International Ltd. [Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd., (2008) 2 SCC 492 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 471] (SCC p. 499, para 19) the expression “cognizance” was explained by this Court as “it merely means „become aware of‟ and when used with reference to a court or a Judge, it connotes „to take notice of judicially‟. It indicates the point when a court or a Magistrate takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of such offence said to have been committed by someone. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the initiation of proceedings by the Magistrate or the Judge. Cognizance taken of cases and not of persons. Under Section 190 of the Code, it is the application of judicial mind to the averments in the complaint that constitutes cognizance. At this stage, the Magistrate has to be satisfied whether for proceeding and not whether there is sufficient ground for for conviction. Whether supporting the conviction can be determined only at the trial and not at the stage of enquiry. If there is sufficient ground for proceeding then the Magistrate is empowered for issuance of process under Section 204 of the Code. 12. A summon is a process issued by a Court calling upon a person to appear before a Magistrate. It is used for the purpose of notifying an individual of his legal obligation to appear before the Magistrate as a response to violation of law. In other words, the summons will announce to the person to whom it is directed that a legal proceeding has been started against that person and the date and time on which the person must appear in Court. A person who is summoned is legally bound to appear before the Court on is sufficient ground the evidence is adequate there Page 14 of 28 the Code does not mandate the given date and time. Willful disobedience is liable to be punished under Section 174 IPC. It is a ground for contempt of court. the 13. Section 204 of Magistrate to explicitly state the reasons for issuance of summons. It clearly states that if in the opinion of a Magistrate taking cognizance of an offence, there is sufficient ground for proceeding, then the summons may be issued. This section mandates the Magistrate to form an opinion as to whether there exists a sufficient ground for summons to be issued but it is nowhere mentioned in the section that the explicit narration of the same is mandatory, meaning thereby that it is not a pre-requisite for deciding the validity of the summons issued.” 22. The above observations are in the context of taking cognizance of a complaint. As per definition under Section 2(d) of Cr.P.C., the complaint does not include a police report. 23. Mr. Palit, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners-accused relied upon various judgments to contend that while taking cognizance, the Court has to record the reasons that prima facie case is made out and that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused for that offence. It was contended that while taking cognizance, the Court has to record reasons that prima facie case is made out and that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused for that offence. Page 15 of 28 However, what needs to be understood is that as per the definition under Section 2(d) Cr.P.C., ―complaint‖ does not include a police report. In fact, it was also observed in Mehmood Ul Rehman v. Khazir Mohammad Tunda reported in (2015) 12 SCC 420 that ―under Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C., the Magistrate has the advantage of a police report; but under Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C., he has only a complaint before him. Hence, the Code specifies that ―a complaint of facts which constitutes an offence‖. Section 190(1)(a) Cr.P.C. provides for cognizance of complaint. Section 190(1)(b) Cr.P.C. deals with taking cognizance of any offence on the basis of police report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. ―Complaint‖ is defined in Section 2(d) CrPC which reads as under: “2. Definitions.—(a)- (c) **** **** **** (d) “complaint” means any allegation made orally or in writing to a Magistrate, with a view to his taking action under this Code, that some person, whether known or unknown, has committed an offence, but does not include a police report.” 24. The procedure for taking cognizance upon complaint has been provided under Chapter-XV, complaints to Magistrates under Sections 200 to 203 of Cr.P.C. A complaint filed before the Magistrate may be Page 16 of 28 dismissed under Section 203 Cr.P.C., if the Magistrate is of the opinion that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding and in every such case, he shall briefly record his reasons for so doing. If a complaint is not dismissed under Section 203 Cr.P.C., the Magistrate issues process under Section 204 of Cr.P.C. Section 204 of Cr.P.C. is in a separate chapter i.e. Chapter XVI - Commencement of Proceedings before Magistrates. A combined reading of Sections 203 and 204 of Cr.P.C. shows that for dismissal of a complaint, reasons should be recorded. The procedure for trial of warrant cases is provided in Chapter XIX — Trial of Warrant Cases by the Magistrates. Chapter XIX deals with two types of cases (A) Cases instituted on a police report and (B) Cases instituted otherwise than on police report. In the present case, cognizance has been taken on the basis of police report. 25. In Paragraph-21 of Mehmood Ul Rehman (supra), the Hon‘ble Supreme Court has made a fine distinction between taking cognizance based upon charge-sheet filed by the police under Section 190(1)(b) of Cr.P.C. and a private complaint under Section 190(1)(a) of Cr.P.C. and held thus: Page 17 of 28 “21. Under Section 190(1)(b) of CrPC, the Magistrate has the advantage of a police report and under Section 190(1)(c) of CrPC, he has the information or knowledge of commission of an offence. But under Section 190(1)(a) of CrPC, he has only a complaint before him. The Code hence specifies that … “a complaint of facts which constitute such offence”. Therefore, the complaint, on the face of it, does not disclose the commission of any offence, the Magistrate shall not take cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) of CrPC. The complaint is simply to be rejected..” if 26. In summoning the accused, it is not necessary for the Magistrate to examine the merits and demerits of the case and whether the materials collected is adequate for supporting the conviction. The court is not required to evaluate the evidence and its merits. The standard to be adopted for summoning the accused under Section 204 of Cr.P.C. is not the same as at the time of framing the charge. For issuance of summons under Section 204 of Cr.P.C., the expression used is “there is sufficient ground for proceeding…”; whereas for framing the charges, the expression used in Sections 240 and 246 of I.P.C. is ―there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence…”. At the stage of taking cognizance of the offence based upon a police report and for issuance of summons under Section 204 of Cr.P.C., detailed enquiry Page 18 of 28 regarding the merits and demerits of the case is not required. The fact that after investigation of the case, the police have filed charge-sheet along with the materials thereon may be considered as sufficient ground for proceeding for issuance of summons under Section 204 of Cr.P.C. 27. Insofar as taking cognizance based on the police report is concerned, the Magistrate has the advantage of the charge-sheet, statement of witnesses and other evidence collected by the police during the investigation. The Investigating Officer/SHO collects the necessary evidence during the investigation and thereafter files charge-sheet under Section 173 of Cr.P.C. In appropriate cases, opinion of the Public Prosecutor is also obtained before filing the charge-sheet. The Court thus has the advantage of the police report along with the materials placed before it by the police. Under Section 190(1)(b) ofs Cr.P.C, where the Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence upon a police report and the Magistrate is satisfied that there is sufficient ground for proceeding, the Magistrate directs issuance of process. In case of taking cognizance of an offence based upon the police report, the Magistrate is not required to record any reasons for issuing the process, rather, the Magistrate is Page 19 of 28 only required to pass an order issuing summons to the accused. Such an order of issuing summons to the accused is subject to satisfaction of the Magistrate that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused on the consideration of the police report and other documents and satisfying himself. This being a case based upon the police report, the Magistrate is not required to record any reason at the stage of issuing the summons to the accused, 28. In the present case, therefore, upon perusal of order of cognizance dated 08.02.2019 in V.G.R. Case No.5 of 2014 corresponding to Balasore Vigilance P.S. Case No. 9 of 2014 pending before the Court of the learned Special Judge, Vigilance, Keonjhar, it is amply clear that the learned Magistrate has perused the F.I.R., charge-sheet, statement of witnesses and order of sanction against the co-accused of the present petitioners, apart from other documents produced by the Investigating Officer to arrive at the conclusion that a prima facie case is made out and therefore, cognizance has been taken and summons were issued. This Court finds no infirmity or illegality with the same in light of the discussion made above. Page 20 of 28 29. Inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae - to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and prevent abuse of process of law. In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1960 SC 866, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings:- (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction; (ii) where the allegations in the First Information Report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged; (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. Page 21 of 28 30. It is eminently clear that when exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of its accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge. Due process of law can‘t be curtailed in between, at the same time, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly or it would allow an accused to short- circuit the prosecution intermittently by invoking the inherent jurisdiction. 31. The scope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of cases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to cognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by the Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. A note of caution was, however, added that the power should be exercised sparingly and that too in the rarest of the rare Page 22 of 28 cases. The illustrative categories indicated by the Hon‘ble Supreme Court are as follows: “(1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused; (2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code; (3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or 'complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused; (4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code; (5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific Page 23 of 28 provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party; (7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 32. As discussed above, the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide. If the power is very plenitude, great caution, is required to be exercised. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, which needs to be established by the prosecution in due course of trial. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. But it shall suffice to say here that it would not be proper for this Court to analyse the case of the complainant at this stage, rather it would be Page 24 of 28 erroneous to assess the material and conclude that the complaint/prosecution cannot be proceeded with. At this stage, it is not necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end in conviction or acquittal. On consideration of the allegations in the light of the material form part of the charge sheet if the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is motivated by mala fide design, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. In this regard this Court relies upon the Hon‘ble Supreme Court‘s judgments in Dhanalakshmi v. R. Prasanna Kumar, reported in 1990 Supp SCC 686, State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma, reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222, Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill reported in (1995) 6 SCC 194, State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan, reported in (1999) 2 SCC 651, State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma, reported in (1996) 7 SCC 705, Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, reported in (1997) 2 SCC 397, Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi, reported in Page 25 of 28 (1999) 8 SCC 728 and Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi reported in (1999) 3 SCC 259. 33. Mr. Palit, learned Senior Counsel also sought to rely on the Deputy Director of Mines‘s statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. to highlight that the explanation of irregularities being mere ‗clerical issues‘ has been accepted by the Competent Authority before and therefore cannot be re-agitated at this point. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that the export was done on a valid license, may be the license was not possessed by Company A but by Company B. Therefore, in the absence of any loss to the State Exchequer, no mens rea could be found from the transaction. It is seen from the record that when M/s Rashmi Cement had obtained a license for procurement for self- consumption vide letter No.15463, it did not possess a valid export license. The dispatched quantity of 3955.00 MT of iron fines during June 2009 and 3661.790 MT during August 2009 to Gangavaram Port was shown in the monthly return against the license No. 15463 which purportedly belonged to M/s Rashmi Metaliks, their sister concern. As such, there appears to be a prima facie flouting of license conditions. Page 26 of 28 34. This Court at this stage is consciously refraining from dealing with the contention raised by Mr. Palit, learned Senior Counsel in detail, which may prejudice the case of the petitioners before the learned trial Court, however, suffice it to say that prima facie case is established to sustain the cognizance order. In any case, the present petitioners are free to raise all their contentions before the learned trial Court in due course and thrash out the factual issues arising herein. However, at this stage, where summons have been issued and cognizance has just been taken, it is not the appropriate stage for this Court to exercise its extraordinary powers. 35. In view of the discussion made in the preceding paragraphs and keeping the settled principles of law in mind, this Court finds no infirmity, illegality or impropriety in the impugned order of the learned Magistrate, which would justify interference in the present Petition at this stage. Hence, I am not inclined to entertain this petition. 36. Accordingly, the CRLMC is dismissed. However, dismissal of the present petition shall not preclude the petitioners to resort to any other remedy available under law including filing of discharge petition before Page 27 of 28 the court below. If any such application is moved by the petitioners, the same shall be considered by the learned Court below on its own merit without being influenced by the observation made by this Court in this judgment. (S.S. Mishra) Judge The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Dated the 13th February, 2025/ Swarna Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SWARNAPRAVA DASH Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa Date: 01-Mar-2025 14:44:43 Page 28 of 28