Patna High Court
Case Details
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 In the matter of an Application to condone the delay in filing Appeal under Article 4 of the Odisha High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna and Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 1948 *** 1. Director Horticulture, Orissa Bhubaneswar. 2. Administrative Officer, Horticulture Directorate of Horticulture Bhubaneswar District: Khordha. 3. Horticulturist, Cuttack At/P.O./District:Cuttack. … -VERSUS- Sudhanshu Mohan Mohanty, Aged about 49 years Son of Surendranath Mohanty, Resident of Village:Barasara Appellants (Opposite parties in the Writ Petition). I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 1 of 65 P.O.: Gobardhanpur P.S.: Kujang, District: Jagatisinghpur. … Respondent (Petitioner in the Writ Petition). Counsel appeared for the parties: For the Appellants : Mr. Partha Sarathi Nayak, Additional Government Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Tarun Kanta Pattanayk, Advocate P R E S E N T: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SANGAM KUMAR SAHOO AND HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN Date of Hearing : 26.03.2025 :: Date of Order : 26.03.2025 ORDER The question for consideration in the interlocutory application filed praying therein to condone the delay in filing the intra-Court appeal under the provisions of Appeal under Article 4 of the Odisha High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 2 of 65 and Rule 6 of Chapter-III and Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Odisha, 1948: is intra-Court of appeal Whether this liable to be entertained by condoning delay of 320 days in filing the writ appeal by the functionaries of the Government of Odisha, being aggrieved by Order dated 07.12.2021 passed in WPC (OAC) No.2862 of 2002, whereby and whereunder allowing the writ petition invoking power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India a learned Single Judge of this Court directed the appellants herein (the opposite parties in the writ proceeding), to consider the case of the respondent herein (the petitioner in the writ petition) in terms of the judgment dated 17.08.2021 passed in Mamata Manjari Mohanty Vrs. State of Odisha, WPC (OAC) No. 3077 of 20I4? 2. As it appears, the order impugned has been passed on 07.12.2021 and the writ appeal has been filed on 22.11.2022 and in the meantime more than eleven months have elapsed. Therefore, it is to be examined whether the appeal suffers from delay and laches as inordinate delay has occurred in preferring the remedy and this Court is called upon to investigate whether “sufficient cause” has been shown to condone the delay of 320 days in preferring the writ appeal. 3. Mr. Partha Sarathi Nayak, learned Additional Government Advocate for the appellants placed the fact leading to delay in preferring the appeal by stating that after receipt of the copy of the Order under challenge in I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 3 of 65 the writ appeal on 13.12.2021, the claim of the respondent was examined and the Director of Horticulture on 13.01.2022 requested the Government in Agriculture and Farmers‟ Empowerment Department to impart necessary instructions. The matter was sent to the Law Department for views. After receipt of the views on 19.05.2022, step was taken to file writ appeal. The writ appeal could be filed on 21.11.2022. 3.1. The decision in Mamata Manjari Mohanty Vrs. State of Odisha, WPC (OAC) No.3077 of 20141 being not applicable to the present facts-situation, it is vehemently contended by Sri Partha Sarathi Nayak, learned Additional Government Advocate that the writ appeal is required to be considered inasmuch as the order of the learned single judge warrants interference. It is, therefore, urged that considering the merit in the appeal, the eventual delay of 175 days, as reflected in the prayer of the interlocutory application, though registry has pointed out delay of 320 days, deserves to be condoned for consideration of the writ appeal on merits.
Legal Reasoning
4. Mr. Tarun Kanta Pattanayak, learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that the learned Additional Standing Counsel who made appearance before the learned Single Judge was given ample opportunity to 1
Decision
Being disposed of on 17.08.2021, challenge is made against it in W.A. No.688 of 2022, which got disposed of by Division Bench of this Court vide Judgment dated 15.05.2024. I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 4 of 65 examine whether the decision of learned Single Judge rendered in Mamata Manjari Mohanty (supra) squarely covers the case of the respondent. The learned Single Judge had, in the Order dated 07.12.2021, observed that “despite opportunity given, Mr. H.K. Panigrahi, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State had not obtained instructions”. Since the matter was old case relating to the year 2002, the learned Single Judge proceeded to dispose of the matter. 4.1. It is further submitted by Mr. Tarun Kanta Pattanayak, learned Advocate that the State does not enjoy special status in order to confer itself benefit of approaching the Court to question is veracity of the order of this Court by way of intra-Court appeal at its sweet-will. It is trite that State/Government and the private party in the matter of consideration of petition for condonation of delay are treated equally. Since inordinate delay of 320 days has not been explained, much less delay of 175 days as per computation reflected in the “prayer” in the interlocutory application, by the appellants sufficiently and mere placing certain dates would not entail condonation of delay. 4.2. He would submit that this Court in many cases has not shown inclination to entertain writ appeal filed belatedly as the same suffers from delay and laches following the view expressed in the judgment/order in the case of I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 5 of 65 State of Odisha Vrs. Surama Manjari Das, W.P.(C) No.15763 of 2021, dismissed on 16.07.2021, challenge against said order got dismissed vide Order dated 05.04.2023 by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India in SLP (C) Diary No.9259 of 2023. 5. On perusal of the record, it is revealed that the respondent has filed an affidavit dated 31.08.2024 stating therein that the cases of employees like Mamata Manjari Mohanty (supra) and one Sangram Das, retrenched without following due process of law, were considered favourably. 5.1. It is the requirement of law that for consideration of petition for condonation delay the party seeking relief is required to demonstrate “sufficient cause”/“good cause”. 6. The nomenclature of cause title of the petition for condonation of delay is styled as “An application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act”. Strictly speaking, such a petition filed under the Limitation Act, 1963, is not maintainable inasmuch as for the purpose of considering condonation of delay in filing writ appeal, special provision is available under the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948. 6.1. The writ appeal before this Court has been filed invoking provisions of Clause 10 of the Letters Patent I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 6 of 65 Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna, which stands thus: “Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court 9. And We do further ordain that the High Court of Judicature at Patna shall have power to remove and to try and determine, as a Court of extraordinary original Jurisdiction, any suit being or falling within the its superintendence, when the said High Court may think proper to do so, either on the agreement of the parties to that effect, or for purposes of justice, the the reasons proceedings of the said High Court. jurisdiction of any Court subject for so doing being recorded on to to by subject 10. And We do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Patna from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate the a Court jurisdiction superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence under the provisions of Section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 of Government of India Act and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to Section 108 I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 7 of 65 of the Government of India Act, made (on or after the first day of February one thousand nine hundred and twenty nine) in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court or of such Division Court shall be to us, Our Heirs or Successors in Our or Their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided.” 6.2. Article 4 of the Odisha High Court Order, 1948 stands as follows: “The High Court of Orissa shall have, in respect of the territories for the time being included in the Province of Orissa, all such original, appellate and other jurisdiction as under the law in force immediately before the prescribed day is exercisable in respect of the said territories or any part thereof by the High Court in Patna.” 6.3. Relevant provisions contained in Chapter-III and Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948, are given hereunder: “Chapter-III 6. Appeals to the High Court under Article 4 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna from the Judgment of a Bench confirming the judgment of a lower Court under Section 98 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall be I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 8 of 65 2. heard by a Bench consisting of at least three Judges including both or either of the Judges of the Bench from whose Judgment the appeal is preferred and, if from the judgment of one Judge or a Bench of two Judges, it shall be heard by a Bench consisting of at least two Judges other than the Judge from whose judgment the appeal is preferred. Chapter-VIII to in (1) Subject to Article 12 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 every appeal to the High Court under Article 4 thereof read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or the exercise of appellate order made jurisdiction by a Court subject the Superintendence of the High Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction) of one Judge of the High Court or one Judge of any Division Court pursuant the Constitution, shall be presented to the Registrar within thirty days from the date of the judgment appealed from unless a Bench in its discretion, on good cause shown, shall grant further time. The Registrar shall endorse on the memorandum the date of presentation and after satisfying himself that the appeal is in order and is within time shall cause it to be laid before a Bench for to Article 225 of I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 9 of 65 It shall be orders at an early date. accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment appealed from together with a neatly typed second copy thereof. (2) Subject to Article 12 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 every application for a Certificate under Article 4 thereof read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna in the case of a judgment of a Single Judge of the Court deciding a second appeal shall be made orally to the Judge in question immediately after the subsequent judgment application will be entertained unless upon a duly stamped special application supported by affidavit filed within thirty days and not more from the date of the judgment the Judge is satisfied that circumstances existed rendering an immediate application impossible. is delivered. No (3) If the Judge certifies that the case is a fit one for appeal a duly stamped memorandum of appeal may be presented to the Registrar within a period not exceeding sixty days from the date of the judgment unless the Judge in his discretion on good cause shown shall grant further time for its presentation. (4) The memorandum of appeal need not be accompanied by a copy of the judgment of decree appealed from.” 6.4. Above provisions would go to indicate that the writ appeal under Article 4 of the Orissa High Court Order, 1948 read with Clause 10 of the Letters Patent Page 10 of 65 I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 constituting the High Court of Judicature at Patna is required to be presented before this Court within thirty days from the date of the judgment appealed from as provided for in Rule 2 of Chapter-VIII of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948. In the event the appeal is not preferred within the said stipulated period, it is the Bench which is empowered to use its “discretion” to “grant further time”, subject to, of course, appreciation of “good cause”. 6.5. Nevertheless, with the contents contained in the petition, bearing I.A. No.3691 of 2022, praying therein to condone “the delay caused in filing the writ appeal”, this Court now examines whether with the available material on record as provided by the State of Odisha in said petition “discretion” can be exercised to condone the delay in preferring intra-Court appeal for “good cause” shown by the appellants. Finding good cause shown, this Court by exercising discretion may condone the delay in filing the writ appeal by granting “further time”. 6.6. May it is in general connotation the word “discretion” means „prudence‟, „individual choice or judgment‟, „power of free decision‟ and „freedom to act according to one‟s own judgment‟, but in legal parlance, it is confined to the exercise of freedom to act; squeezes one‟s individual choice. It prescribes direction to the authority upon whom discretion is vested to act in conformity with I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 11 of 65 statutory provisions and rule of law. It follows that the judgment of the delegatee of power, who is vested with discretion, is his own application of reasonable, conscience mind and thought unguided and uncontrolled by opinion/judgment of others. Discretion is the power delegated specially or implied from the wordings of the statute is oft coupled with responsibility and duty. 6.7. Conspectus of propositions of catena of decisions rendered by different Courts indicates that “discretion” means use of private and independent thought. When anything is left to be done according to one‟s discretion the law intends it to be done with sound discretion and according to law. Discretion is discerning between right and wrong and one who has power to act at discretion is bound by rule of reason. Discretion must not be arbitrary. The very term itself stands unsupported by circumstances imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom and skill as contra-distinguished from unthinking folly, heady violence or rash injustice. When applied to a Court of Justice or Tribunal or quasi judicial body, it means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular. Discretion must be exercised honestly and in the spirit of the statute. It is the power given by a statute to make I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 12 of 65 choice among competing considerations. It implies power to choose between alternative courses of action. It is not unconfined and vagrant. It is canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. [See, Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 182; K.K. Gopalan & Co. Vrs. Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), (2000) 118 STC 111 (Ker)]. 6.8. In this regard, therefore, the interpretation of the expression “sufficient cause” as found in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has bearing on the question that is involved in the instant case. 6.9. It needs to be discussed the connotation of “good cause” vis-(cid:224)-vis “sufficient cause”. In Arjun Singh Vrs. Mohindra Kumar, (1964) 5 SCR 946, these two terms have been considered as follows: “Before proceeding to deal with the arguments addressed to us by Mr. Setalvad— learned counsel for the appellant, it would be convenient to mention a point, not seriously pressed before us, but which at earlier stages was thought to have considerable significance for the decision of this question viz., the difference between the words „good cause‟ for non-appearance in Order IX, Rule 7 and „sufficient cause‟ for the same purpose in Order IX, Rule I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 13 of 65 13 as pointing to different criteria of „goodness‟ or „sufficiency‟ for succeeding in the two proceedings, and as therefore furnishing a ground for the inapplicability of the rule of res judicata. As this ground was not seriously mentioned before us, we need not examine it in any detail, but we might observe that we do not see any material difference between the facts to be established for satisfying the two tests of „good cause‟ and „sufficient cause‟. We are unable to conceive of a „good cause‟ which is not „sufficient‟ as affording an explanation for non-appearance, nor conversely of a „sufficient cause‟ which is not a good one and we would add that either of these is not different from „good and sufficient cause‟ which is used in this context in other statutes. If, on the other hand, there is any difference between the two it can only be that the requirement of a „good cause‟ is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of „sufficient cause‟ and if so, this cannot help the appellant, since assuming the applicability of the principle of res judicata to the decisions in the two proceedings, if the court finds in the first proceeding, the lighter burden not discharged, it must a fortiori bar the consideration of the same matter in the later, where the standard of proof of that matter is, if anything, higher.” 6.10. The meaning of „sufficient‟ is „adequate‟ or „enough‟, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, word „sufficient‟ embraces no more than that which provides a platitude which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case and duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 14 of 65 of a cautious man. „Sufficient cause‟ means that the party had not acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or the party cannot be alleged to have been „not acting diligently‟ or „remaining inactive‟. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. While deciding whether there is sufficient cause or not, the Court must bear in mind the object of doing substantial justice to all the parties concerned and that the technicalities of the law should not prevent the Court from doing substantial justice and doing away the illegality perpetuated on the basis of the judgment impugned before it. “Sufficient cause” is thus the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. Therefore, the applicant must approach the Court with a reasonable defence. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and the Court has to exercise its discretion in the varied and special circumstances in the case at hand. There cannot be a straitjacket formula of universal application. [Ref.: Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 = (1962) 2 SCR 762; Lonard Grampanchayat Vrs. Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222; Surinder Singh Sibia Vrs. Vijay Kumar Sood, (1992) 1 SCC 70; Orinental Aroma I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 15 of 65 Chemical Industries Ltd. Vrs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, (2010) 5 SCC 459; Parimal Vrs. Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545; Sudarshan Sareen Vrs. National Small Industries Corporation Ltd., 2013 SCC OnLine Del 4412; State of Bihar Vrs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 94; Madanlal Vrs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC 535; Davinder Pal Sehgal Vrs. Partap Steel Rolling Mills (P) Ltd., (2002) 3 SCC 156; Ram Nath Sao Vrs. Gobardhan Sao, (2002) 3 SCC 195, Kaushalya Devi Vrs. Prem Chand, (2005) 10 SCC 127, Srei International Finance Ltd. Vrs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd., (2005) 13 SCC 95; Reena Sadh Vrs. Aniana Enterprises, (2008) 12 SCC 589]. 6.11. “Sufficient cause” has to be construed as an elastic expression for which no hard-and-fast guidelines can be prescribed. The Courts have a wide discretion in deciding the sufficient cause keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. The “sufficient cause” for non-appearance refers to the date on which the absence was made a ground for proceeding ex parte and cannot be stretched to rely upon other circumstances anterior in time. If “sufficient cause” is made out for non-appearance of the defendant on the date fixed for hearing when ex parte proceedings were initiated against him, he cannot be penalised for his previous negligence which had been overlooked and I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 16 of 65 thereby condoned earlier. In a case where the defendant approaches the Court immediately and within the statutory time specified, the discretion is normally exercised in his favour, provided the absence was not mala fide or intentional. For the absence of a party in the case the other side can be compensated by adequate costs and the lis decided on merits. [Ref.: G.P. Srivastava Vrs. R.K. Raizada, (2000) 3 SCC 54; A. Murugesan Vrs. Jamuna Rani, (2019) 20 SCC 803]. The Court, in its discretion, has to consider the „sufficient cause‟ in the facts and circumstances of every individual case. Although in interpreting the words „sufficient cause‟, the Court has wide discretion but the same has to be exercised in the particular facts of the case. See, Hira Sweets & Confectionary Pvt. Ltd. Vrs. Hira Confectioners, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1823. 6.12. In Balwant Singh Vrs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCR 597 the ingredients of “sufficient cause” for the purpose of condonation of delay has been discussed as follows: “7. *** However, in terms of Section 5, the discretion is vested in the Court to admit an appeal or an application, after the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation, if the appellant shows „sufficient cause‟ for not preferring the prescribed time. The expression „sufficient cause‟ commonly appears in the provisions of Order 22 Rule 9(2), CPC and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, thus categorically demonstrating that they are to be the application within I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 17 of 65 8. decided on similar grounds. The decision of such an application has to be guided by similar precepts. *** the averments contained In the case of P.K. Ramachandran Vrs. State of Kerala, (1997) 7 SCC 556 where there was delay of 565 days in filing the first appeal by the State, and into the High Court had observed, consideration the affidavit filed in support of the petition to condone the delay, we are inclined to allow the petition". While setting aside this order, this Court found that the explanation rendered for condonation of delay was neither reasonable nor satisfactory and held as under: „taking in „3. It would be noticed from a perusal of the impugned order that the court has not recorded any satisfaction that the explanation for delay was either reasonable or satisfactory, which is an essential prerequisite to condonation of delay. 4. That apart, we find that in the application filed by the respondent seeking condonation of delay, the thrust in explaining the delay after 12.5.1995 is: „*** at that time the Advocate General‟s office was fed up with so many arbitration matters important to this case were (sic) equally pending for consideration as per the directions of the Advocate General on 2.9.1995.‟ 5. This can hardly be said to be a reasonable, satisfactory or even a proper explanation for I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 18 of 65 seeking condonation of delay. In the reply filed to the application seeking condonation of delay by the appellant in the High Court, it is asserted that after the judgment and decree was pronounced by the learned Sub-Judge, Kollam on 30.10.1993, the scope for filing of the appeal was examined by the District Government Pleader, Special Law Officer, Law Secretary and the Advocate General and in accordance with their opinion, it was decided that there was no scope for filing the appeal but later on, despite the opinion referred to above, the appeal was filed as late as on 18.1.1996 without disclosing why it was being filed. The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the the respondent-State inordinate delay of 565 days. condonation of for 6. limitation may harshly affect a Law of particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribed and the courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained. This appeal, therefore, succeeds and the impugned order the application for condonation of delay filed in the is set aside. Consequently, I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 19 of 65 High Court would stand rejected and the miscellaneous stand shall first appeal dismissed as barred by time. No costs.‟ *** 10. Another Bench of this Court in a recent judgment of Katari Suryanarayana Vrs. Koppisetti Subba Rao, AIR 2009 SC 2907 again had an occasion to construe the ambit, scope and application of the expression „sufficient cause‟. The application for setting aside the abatement and bringing the legal heirs of the deceased on record was filed in that case after a considerable delay. The explanation rendered regarding the delay of 2381 days in filing the application for condonation of delay and 2601 days in bringing the legal representatives on record was not found to be satisfactory. Declining the application for condonation of delay, the Court, while the case of Perumon Bhagvathy discussing Devaswom Vrs. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321 in its para 9 held as under: „11. The words „sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation‟ in a should be understood and applied reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal facts and manner, depending upon circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words „sufficient cause‟ in Section 5 liberal of Limitation Act should receive a construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.‟ the I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 20 of 65 *** 15. We feel that it would be useful to make a reference to the judgment of this Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom Vrs. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321. In this case, the Court, after discussing a number of judgments of this Court as well as that of the High Courts, enunciated the principles which need to be kept in mind while dealing with applications filed under the provisions of Order 22, CPC along with an application under Section 5, Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the application for bringing the legal representatives on record. In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the Court held as under: „(i) The words „sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation‟ should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words „sufficient cause‟ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona tides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant. the (ii) the courts are more In considering the reasons for condonation of delay, liberal with reference to applications for setting aside abatement, than other cases. While the court will have to keep in view that a valuable right accrues to the legal representatives of the I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 21 of 65 deceased respondent when the appeal abates, it will not punish an appellant with foreclosure of the appeal, for unintended lapses. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decided the matter on merits. The courts tend to set aside abatement and decide the matter on merits, rather than terminate the appeal on the ground of abatement. (iii) The decisive factor in condonation of delay, is not the length of delay, but sufficiency of a satisfactory explanation. (iv) The extent or degree of leniency to be shown by a court depends on the nature of application and facts and circumstances of the case. For in making example, courts view delays applications in a pending appeal more leniently than delays in the institution of an appeal. The courts view applications relating to lawyer’s lapses more leniently than applications relating to litigant’s lapses. The classic example is the difference in approach of courts to applications for condonation of delay in filing an appeal and applications for condonation of delay in re-filing the appeal after rectification of defects. (i) Want of „diligence‟ or „inaction‟ can be attributed to an appellant only when something required to be done by him, is not done. When nothing is required to be done, courts do not expect the appellant to be diligent. Where an appeal is admitted by the High Court and is not expected to be listed for final hearing for a few years, an appellant is not expected to visit the court or his lawyer every few weeks to I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 22 of 65 the position nor keep checking ascertain whether the contesting respondent is alive. He merely awaits the call or information from his counsel about the listing of the appeal. *** that in contradistinction 16. Above are the principles which should control the exercise of judicial discretion vested in the Court under these provisions. The explained delay should to be clearly understood inordinate unexplained delay. Delay is just one of the ingredients which has to be considered by the Court. In addition to this, the Court must also take into account the conduct of the parties, bona fide reasons for condonation of delay and whether such delay could easily be avoided by the applicant acting with normal care and caution. The statutory for provisions mandate condonation of delay and applications belatedly filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation for bringing the legal representatives on record, should be rejected unless sufficient cause is shown for condonation of delay. The larger benches as well as equi(cid:2)benches of this Court have consistently followed these principles and have either allowed or in filing such declined applications. Thus, it is the requirement of law that these applications cannot be allowed as a matter of right and even in a routine manner. An applicant must stated ingredients; then alone the Court would be inclined to condone filing of such applications.” to condone the delay applications the above the delay essentially satisfy the in I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 23 of 65 6.13. In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil Vrs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448, it is observed as under: “The laws of limitation are founded on public policy. limitation are sometimes described as Statutes of “statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time laws of justice limitation are a means suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. The object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.” to ensure private 6.14. It is significant to notice the decision of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India rendered in the case of Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives Vrs. Union of India, (2023) 10 SCC 531 wherein while explaining the term “sufficient cause”, the nature of approach of the Court and the methodology in deciding the application for condonation of delay have been discussed with reference to earlier precedents. The said Court in the mentioned reported case held as follows: I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 24 of 65 “30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. these decisions notwithstanding, we However, reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to Courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. 31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the Courts must distinguish between an „explanation‟ and an „excuse‟. An „explanation‟ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an „explanation‟ from an „excuse‟. Although people tend to see „explanation‟ and „excuse‟ as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. 32. An „excuse‟ is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 25 of 65 just an „excuse‟ would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach for adjudication. the higher Courts *** (supra), Chandra Mani 34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 21st December 2011. It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Mst. Katiji (supra), (supra), Ramegowda Tehsildar (LA) Vrs. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634 and State of Nagaland Vrs. Lipok AO, (2005) 3 SCC 752 were holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of M.P. Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 is one such decision apart from University of Delhi Vrs. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745] which have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and the justice oriented approach expounded indolence in I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 26 of 65 aforesaid decisions which have been referred to above. *** 40. We can also profitably refer to State of Manipur Vrs. Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 … where the same Bench of three Hon‟ble Judges of this Court which decided University of Delhi Vrs. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745 was of the view that the impersonal nature of the State‟s functioning should be given due regard, while ensuring that individual defaults are not nit-picked at the cost of collective interest. The relevant paragraphs read as follows: „7. But while concluding as above, it was necessary for the Court to also be conscious of the bureaucratic delay and the slow pace in reaching a Government decision and the routine way of deciding whether the State should prefer an appeal against a judgment adverse to it. Even while observing that the law of limitation would harshly affect the party, the Court felt that the delay in the appeal filed by the State, should not be condoned. 8. Regard should be had functioning where in similar such circumstances to the impersonal nature of the individual Government‟s officers may fail to act responsibly. This in the turn, would institutional interest of the State. If the appeal filed by the State are lost for individual default, those who are at fault, will not usually be individually affected.‟ injustice result in to I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 27 of 65 the 41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court‟s decision to first the delay on account of condone respondent‟s inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the Courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests.” 6.15. It is reported in the decision of Privy Council in Montreal Street Railway Company Vrs. Normandin, (1917) AC 170 that: “*** The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. The cases on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th Edn., page 596 and the following pages. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this inconvenience, or duty would work serious general Page 28 of 65 I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done.” 6.16. The aforesaid observation has also been followed by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala Vrs. ITO, (1961) 41 ITR 12 (SC) = AIR 1961 SC 200. 6.17. In Bhavnagar University Vrs. Palitana Sugar Mill P. Ltd. AIR 2003 SC 511 it has been observed that: “23. It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and words by words. Recourse to construction or interpretation of statute is necessary when there is ambiguity, obscurity, or inconsistency therein and not otherwise. An effort must be made to give effect to all parts of the statute and unless absolutely necessary, no part thereof shall be rendered surplusage or redundant.” 6.18. In “Crawford on the Construction of Statutes” at page 516, it is stated that, “The question as to whether a statute is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the Legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the Legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by considering its I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 29 of 65 nature, its design, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other.” 6.19. The expression “satisfies the Court” employed in Section 5 of the Limitation Act has significance. “Satisfaction” before completion of the proceedings under the Act is a condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction. It is the satisfaction of the Court in the course of the proceedings regarding the delay in approaching the Court with sufficient reason, which constitutes the basis and foundation of the proceedings for consideration of condonation of delay. There must be something which shows from the record itself that in the course of the proceedings the Court was satisfied that there was sufficiency of reason for not approaching the Court in stipulated period and, therefore, it is a case in which the appeal deserves to be admitted for hearing on merit. To be satisfied with a state of things means to be honestly satisfied in one‟s own mind. Satisfaction is essentially a condition of the mind. It means that there is a substantial ground for the conclusion on the material available The phrase „satisfied‟ means, makes up its mind; actual persuasion; a mind not troubled by doubt or a mind which has reached a clear conclusion. 6.20. In Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762 it has been succinctly stated: I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 30 of 65 “Section 5 of the Limitation Act provides for extension of period in certain cases. It lays down, inter alia, that any appeal may be admitted after the period of limitation prescribed therefor when the appellant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period. This section raises two questions for consideration. First is, what is sufficient cause; and the second, what is the meaning of the clause „within such period‟?” *** In construing Section 5•it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light, heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be-ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna Vrs. Chattappan, 1890 ILR 13 Mad 269: „Section 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in•which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon the words principles which are well understood; Page 31 of 65 I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 „sufficient cause‟ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.‟ Now, what do the words „within such period‟ denote? It is possible that the expression „within such period‟ may sometimes mean during such period. But the question is: Does the context in. which the expression occurs in Section 5 justify the said interpretation? If the Limitation Act or any other appropriate statute prescribes different periods of limitation either for appeals or applications to which Section 5 applies that normally means that liberty is given to the party intending to make the appeal or to file an application to act within the period prescribed in that behalf. It would not be reasonable to require a party to take the necessary action on the very first day after the cause of action accrues. In view of the period of limitation prescribed the party would be entitled to take its time and to file the appeal on any day during the said period and so prima facie it appears unreasonable that when the delay has been made by the party in filing the appeal it should be called upon to explain its conduct during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed. In our opinion, it would be immaterial and even irrelevant to invoke general considerations of diligence of parties in construing the words of Section 5. The context seems to suggest that „within such period‟ means within the period which ends with the last day of limitation prescribed. In other words, in all cases falling under Section 5 what the party has to show is why he did not file an appeal on the last day of limitation prescribed. That may inevitably mean that the party will have to show sufficient cause not only for not filing the appeal on the last day but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day. In other words, in showing I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 32 of 65 sufficient cause for condoning the delay the party may be called upon to explain for the whole of the delay covered by the period between the last day prescribed for filing the appeal and the day on which the appeal is filed. To hold that the expression „within such period‟ means during such period would, in our opinion, be repugnant in the context. We would accordingly hold that the learned Judicial Commissioner was in error taking the view that the failure of the appellant to account for its non-diligence during the whole of the period of limitation prescribed for the appeal necessarily disqualified it from praying for the condonation of delay, even though the delay in question was only for one day; and that too was caused by the party‟s illness. *** It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 33 of 65 the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the Court is called upon to consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. ***” 6.21. The discretionary exercise of power amounts to something that is not compulsory, but it is left to the discretion of the person or authority involved, such as a discretionary grant. It is opposite to “mandatory”. Therefore, “discretionary” is a term which involves an alternative power, i.e., a power to do or refrain from doing a certain thing. In other words, it would be power of free decision or choice within certain legal bounds. 6.22. In S.P. Road Link Vrs. State of Tripura, (2006) 144 STC 380 (Gau) reference has been made to Kumaon Mandal Vikas Nigam Ltd. Vrs. Girja Shankar Pant, (2001) 1 SCC 182 to observe that “discretion” means when it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authorities, that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion, according to law, and not humour. It is to be, not arbitrary, vague, and fanciful, but legal and regular. Page 34 of 65 I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 And it must be exercised within the limit, to which an honest man competent to the discharge of his office ought to confine himself. 6.23. The following observations made in Lanka Venkateswarlu Vrs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 3 SCR 217 are pertinent to be referred to: “21. In the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Katra (dead) by LRs Vrs. Pramod Gupta (dead) by LRs., (2002) Suppl.5 SCR 350 = (2003) 3 SCC 272, this Court again emphasized that provisions contained in the Order 22 CPC were devised to ensure continuation and culmination in an effective adjudication and not to retard further progress of the proceedings. The provisions contained in the Order 22 are not to be construed as a rigid matter of principle, but must ever be viewed as a flexible tool of convenience in the administration of justice. It was further observed that laws of procedure are meant to regulate effectively, assist and aid the object of doing a substantial and real justice and not to foreclose even adjudication on merits of substantial rights of citizen under personal, property and other laws. In the case of Mithailal Dalsangar Singh Vrs. Annabai Devram Kini, (2003) 10 SCC 691, this Court again reiterated that inasmuch as abatement results in denial of hearing on the merits of the case, the provision of an abatement has to be construed strictly. On the other hand, the prayer of setting aside abatement and the dismissal consequent upon abatement had to be considered liberally. It was further observed as follows: I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 35 of 65 justice oriented „The Courts have to adopt a approach dictated by the uppermost consideration that ordinarily a litigant ought not to be denied an opportunity of having a lis determined on merits unless he has, by gross negligence, deliberate inaction or something akin to misconduct, disentitled himself from seeking the•indulgence of the court.‟ 22. The of liberal concepts approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh (dead) Vrs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCR 597 = (2010) 8 SCC 685 as follows: „25. We may state that even if the term „sufficient cause‟ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of „reasonableness‟ as it is understood in its general connotation. to be and adhered 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles applied should appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the is applicant, particularly when the delay I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 36 of 65 directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.‟ *** 24. Having recorded the aforesaid conclusions, the High Court proceeded to condone the delay. In our opinion, such a course was not open to the High Court, given the pathetic explanation offered by the respondents in the application seeking condonation of delay. rather sarcastically, dubbed 25. This is especially so in view of the remarks made by the High Court about the delay being caused by the inefficiency and the Government ineptitude of pleaders. The displeasure of the Court is patently apparent from the impugned order •itself. In the opening paragraph of the impugned order the High the Court has, Government pleaders as without merit and ability. Such an insinuation is clearly discernable from the observation that „This is a classic case, how the learned Government pleaders appointed on the basis of merit and ability are discharging their function protecting the interest of their clients.‟ Having said so, the High Court, graphically narrated the clear dereliction of duty by the concerned Government pleaders in not pursuing the appeal before the High Court diligently. The High Court has set out the I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 37 of 65 different stages at which the Government pleaders had exhibited almost culpable negligence in performance of their duties. The High Court found the justification given by the Government pleaders to be unacceptable. Twice in the impugned order, it in the normal course, the was recorded that applications would have been thrown out without having a second thought in the matter. Having recorded such conclusions, inexplicably, the High Court proceeds the unconscionable delay. condone to 26. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as „liberal approach‟, „justice oriented approach‟, „substantial justice‟ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant judgment has been repeatedly language disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. applications consideiing in a I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 38 of 65 All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.” 6.24. In Pathupati Subba Reddy (died) by Lrs. Vrs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), (2024) 4 SCR 241 = 2024 INSC 286, having taken review of relevant earlier decisions, the principles for consideration of condonation of delay have been expounded in the following terms: “6. The moot question before us is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by limitation. *** 9. *** Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act. 12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word „shall‟ in the I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 39 of 65 aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the Court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the Courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided gives „sufficient cause‟ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the Courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish „sufficient cause‟ for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc. the proposed appellant 13. It is very elementary and well understood that injustice-oriented Courts should not adopt an approach in dealing with the applications for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice. I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 40 of 65 *** „sufficient cause‟ 17. It must always be borne in mind that while in deciding construing application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights. *** 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 41 of 65 mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been that exercise of power explained, but is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the Court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, the statutory provision.” to disregarding tantamounts 6.25. It may be of benefit to have reference to Esha Bhattacharjee Vrs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 9 SCR 782, wherein the following principles are culled out: “15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 42 of 65 (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- E oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms „sufficient cause‟ should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) (vi) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 43 of 65 (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. to its (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) (xi) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily face such a litigation. to It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 44 of 65 16. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the is base of basically subjective. individual philosophy which (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 6.26. In Amalendu Kumar Bera Vrs. State of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52 the consideration of “sufficient cause” qua official business has been perceived in the following manner: I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 45 of 65 “There is no dispute that the expression “sufficient cause” should be considered with pragmatism in justice oriented approach rather than the technical detection of “sufficient cause” for explaining every day‟s delay. However, it is equally well settled that the courts albeit liberally considered the prayer for condonation of delay but in some cases the court may refuse to condone the delay inasmuch as the Government is not accepted to keep watch whether the contesting respondent further put the matter in motion. The delay in official business requires its pedantic approach from public justice perspective. In a recent decision in Union of India Vrs. Nripen Sarma, (2013) 4 SCC 57 = AIR 2011 SC 1237 the matter came up against the order passed by the High Court condoning the delay in filing the appeal by the appellant-Union of India. The High Court refused to condone the delay on the ground that the appellant-Union of India took their own sweet time to reach the conclusion whether the judgment should be appealed or not. The High Court also expressed its anguish and distress with the way the State conducts the cases regularly in filing the appeal after the same became operational and barred by limitation.” 6.27. Having thus discussed the gamut of “sufficient cause” vis-(cid:224)-vis “good cause” with reference to the parameters of consideration of germane grounds for condonation of delay in preferring appeal, this Court feels expedient to observe that in State of M.P. Vrs. Pradeep Kumar, (2000) 7 SCC 372, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that if an appeal is time barred, the Court should either return the memorandum of appeal to the appellant to submit it along with an application under Section 5 of the I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 46 of 65 Limitation Act or should provide a chance to file application for condonation of delay. The Court cannot, under such circumstances, dispose of the appeal on merit. In S.V. Matha Prasad Vrs. Lalchand Meghraj, (2007) 14 SCC 722, it has been clearly held that while dealing with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Court cannot dispose of an appeal on merit and such a course has been disapproved by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India. However, in O.P. Kathpalia Vrs. Lakhmir Singh, AIR 1984 SC 1744, it is held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. 6.28. One of the grounds as agitated by the learned Additional Government Advocate is pandemic, which cannot constitute, in view of this Court, to be “good cause”. In State of Himachal Pradesh Vrs. Gorkha Ram, Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Diary No. 27426 of 2020, vide Order dated 23.08.2021, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made the following observation: “The SLP has been filed with a delay of 636 days. On our query as to what is the reason, learned counsel seeks to contend it is because of COVID. The order was passed on 05.12.2018 and thus, we asked the counsel as to which year was the world affected by Covid 2019 or 2020 to which learned counsel‟s answer initially was 2019, possibly to cover the delay but realizing that it was 2020, I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 47 of 65 he states that the papers were not received by him. To say the least, we are shocked at the conduct of the petitioner-State and the manner of conduct the litigation in such a sensitive matter. There is not even a semblance of explanation for delay. We however, would not like to dismiss the petition on limitation because of the seriousness of the issue involved. But that is no excuse why the State should not be made accountable of such inordinate delay and the persons responsible for the same. We thus, condone the delay but subject to imposition of costs of Rs.25,000/- to be deposited with the Supreme Court Group „C‟ (Non- Clerical) Employees Welfare Association within four fix weeks with a direction responsibility and recover the amount from the officers concerned. The certificate of recovery should be filed before this Court within the same period of time. The application for condonation of delay is allowed in the aforesaid terms.” the enquiry, to hold In the instant case nothing is brought on record by the learned Additional Government Advocate that responsible officer(s) has been proceeded with to fix accountability. 6.29. The Supreme Court of India in State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, made it clear that, “5. A preposterous proposition is sought to be propounded that if there is some merit in the case, the period of delay is to be given a go-by. If a case is good on merits, it will succeed in any case. It is really a bar of limitation which can even shut out good cases. This does not, of course, take away the I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 48 of 65 jurisdiction of the Court in an appropriate case to condone the delay. 6. We are also of the view that the aforesaid approach is being adopted in what we have categorised earlier as “certificate cases”. The object appears to be to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue and thus, say that nothing could be done because the highest Court has dismissed the appeal. It is to complete this formality and save the skin of officers who may be at default that such a process is followed. We have on earlier occasions also strongly deprecated such a practice and process. There seems to be no improvement. The purpose of coming to this Court is not to obtain such certificates and if the Government suffers losses, it is time when the officer concerned responsible the consequences. The irony is that in none of the cases any action is taken against the officers, who sit on the files and do nothing. It is presumed that this Court will condone the delay and even in making submissions, straightaway the to address on merits without counsel appear referring even limitation as happened in this case till we pointed out to the counsel that he must first address us on the question of limitation. the aspect of bears same the for to 7. We are thus, constrained to send a signal and we propose to do in all matters today, where there are such inordinate delays that the Government or State authorities coming before us must pay for wastage I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 49 of 65 of judicial time which has its own value. Such costs can be recovered from the officers responsible.” 6.30. Taking note of State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654, in the cases of State of Odisha Vrs. Sunanda Mahakuda, (2021) 11 SCC 560; State of Gujarat Vrs. Tushar Jagdish Chandra Vyas, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3517; State of U.P. Vrs. Sabha Narain, (2022) 9 SCC 266; Union of India Vrs. Central Tibetan Schools Admin, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 119; Union of India Vrs. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 9 SCC 263; Commissioner of Public Instruction Vrs. Shamshuddin, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3518 identical view has been expressed by the Supreme Court of India. 7. Thus being delineated legal perspective for consideration of petition for condonation of delay, the decisions of the Courts as referred to supra, it is to be seen whether the petition under consideration filed by the State suggests for condonation of delay in filing writ appeal. 7.1. The cause shown by the appellants for the delay as stated in the petition, I.A. No.3691 of 2022, is quoted hereunder: “2. That, the order dated 07.12.2021 was received by the Director of Horticulture on the office of 13.12.2021 (the date of knowledge). 3. That, on receipt of the order on 13.12.2021 the claim of the petitioner/respondent was examined and I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 50 of 65 4. 5. in after examination of the matter, the Govt. Agriculture & Farmers‟ Empowerment Deptt. was requested to communicated necessary instruction/ order for taking further action on the matter on dt.13.01.2022 by the Director of Horticulture. Then the Govt. in A&FE Deptt. forwarded the matter to the Law Deptt. for their views. Thereafter, the Govt. in A&FE Deptt. communicated the view of Law Deptt. on dt.19.05.2022 to file Writ appeal. Accordingly, the draft writ appeal has been submitted to the Advocate General, Odisha on dt.10.06.2022. That the Office of Advocate General during that period was functioning with limited staffs owing to COVID-19 guidelines issued by the Government from time to time. Many of the Govt. Counsels and the staff of the office also suffered from COVID19 and this seriously hampered and affected the efficiency. Discussions/meetings and exchange of necessary documents were being carried out in a restrictive manner. In such situation delay was caused in preparing and finalizing the writ appeal, which is filed on 21.11.2022. 6. That, the delay in filing the appeal was on account of procedural delay, i. e. in obtaining approval from the higher authority. The delay caused is not intentional or deliberate.” 7.2. Cursory glance at the information given in the petition with regard to delay does not explain as to the cause of delay during 13.12.2021 (date of receipt of the impugned order) and referring the matter to the Government in the I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 51 of 65 Agriculture & Farmers‟ Empowerment Department on 13.01.2022 by the Director of Horticulture. Thereafter, there is also no indication of any explanation as to the period taken for the Government in the Agriculture & Farmers‟ Empowerment Department to communicate the view of Law Department on 19.05.2022 suggesting to file Writ appeal. There was a further delay post-COVID-19 pandemic in the year 2022 as the contention of paucity of staff in the Office of the learned Advocate General, Odisha after 19.05.2022 is unwholesome. 7.3. The position of law as discussed with regard to condonation of delay in Office of the Chief Post Master General Vrs. Living Media India Ltd., (2012) 1 SCR 1045 = 2012 INSC 105 may throw light on the issue at hand. In the said case the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India was considering with respect to inordinate delay of around 427 days caused by functionaries of the Government in filing SLPs and the said Hon‟ble Court held as follows: “12. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the plausible and of I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 52 of 65 delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are facts and of circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. view that the the in their bodies, agencies 13. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the and Government instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The Government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 53 of 65 various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay.” 7.4. This Court in Radharaman Store Vrs. Odisha Sales Tax Tribunal and Another, 1997 SCC OnLine Ori 98 = 85 (1998) CLT 657 = (1998) 108 STC 284 (Ori) has been pleased to make following observation for non-furnishing plausible explanation by the Government: “9. The question remains whether any plausible or acceptable reason was indicated by the Revenue while seeking condonation, and whether the its proper Tribunal considered perspective. The reasons indicated in the petition filed by the Revenue extracted in its entirety reads as follows: the matter in „That the delay in filing of the appeal is non- deliberate. The delay was due to the process of decision-making in Government office.‟ The Tribunal‟s order in its entirety reads as follows: in received the office of „Heard the learned Addl. S.R. for the State and the learned advocate for the assessee. The 1st appeal orders were the Commissioner of Sales Tax on December 14, 1993 and due date of filing of the appeals was February 12, 1994, but the appeals have been filed on April 4, 1994 causing a delay of 50 days. In the petition for condonation of delay it has been explained that the delay in filing of the appeal was due to process of I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 54 of 65 decision-making for filing of the second appeals. On a perusal of the administrative file it appears that the file was endorsed to the Addl. S.R. for his opinion on December 31, 1993 and decision was made on March 30, 1994 for filing of the second appeal. Thereafter the appeals were filed on April 4, 1994. So, the delay of 50 days in filing the second appeal in decision-making which was considered sufficient cause for not filing the second appeal in time. Hence, the petition is allowed and the delay is condoned. Register the appeals.‟ 10. The factual backdrop and few relevant facts need to be noted. It is an accepted position that the file was endorsed to the Addl. S.R. for opinion on December 31, 1993, and he passed an order on March 30, 1994 for filing of the second appeal. No cause has been indicated as to why the Addl. S.R. took such a long time, and what transpired during that period. In fact no explanation whatsoever has been offered. Tribunal‟s reasoning is that there was delay in decision-making process and that was considered to be sufficient cause. The conclusion does not stand to reason. On the contrary, it shows non-application of mind to the germane issue. Even though a liberal approach has to be adopted, that does not mean that any plea without any plausible or acceptable basis, and not even hearing semblance of rationality has to be accepted, and delay has to be condoned. That shall be against the very spirit of law. Prescription of filing appeals would become timelimit meaningless in such event. Merely because State is involved, that does not mean that any lethargic or for I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 55 of 65 supine inaction has to be condoned or ignored, and even if no reason is indicated that would be inconsequential. The subject-matter was not very complex and rather the grounds of appeal filed appear to be of very routine nature. As has been observed by this Court in Hindustan Aeronautics Limited, Koraput Division v. State of Orissa [1976] 38 STC 538, delay caused by the concerned officer in giving his opinion, without any explanation whatsoever does not constitute sufficient ground for condonation of delay. In the aforesaid premises, the inevitable conclusion is that the Tribunal has not applied its judicial mind to the question whether delay was to be condoned. Certain interesting and relevant features are noticed on perusal of the administrative file produced. Up to end of page 2, the proposed grounds of appeal have been written in hand. Interestingly from page 3, they are typed. Except that portion, next are hand written. This aspect assumes greater importance because in the margin of page 2, the following endorsement has been made on March 25, 1994 “signature is wanting”. Whose signature was wanting and who detected it on March 25, 1994 remains a mystery. If the file was with the Addl. S.R. till March 30, 1994, how another officer handled it to notice absence of signature. That has not been explained. If records have been manipulated, it is a very serious matter and needs an enquiry by the Commissioner of Sales Tax, Orissa.” 7.5. As is apparent from the above explanation, the appellants have not given material particulars with Page 56 of 65 I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 sufficient reasons for the delay. Furthermore, there is no explanation whatsoever is placed on record to show as to why there was delay during the prescribed period of limitation in terms of the provisions for filing writ appeal under the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948. In this regard, State of Madhya Pradesh Vrs. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612 deserves to be noticed, wherein the following observations have been made by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India: in limitation, “5. The legal position is that where a case has been the the Court beyond presented petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma Vrs. Reddy Sridevi 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra Vrs. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 92 wherein, it was held as follows: „13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj Vrs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC for 81 while condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: rejecting an application „15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 57 of 65 in the presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained justified there cannot be a inactive, ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an imposing any inordinate delay by condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing the legislature.‟ disregard utter to 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake condonation in application of the present appellant.‟ dismissing delay the Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 58 of 65 expression „sufficient cause‟ cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. INSC 262, wherein, one of us 5.1. In Union of India Vrs. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489 = 2024 (J.B. Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: „24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made long and out for condonation of such a inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either the delay being condoned. This side by litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 59 of 65 the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. the 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation technical not merely consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the is a I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 60 of 65 *** 34. 35. „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High supervisory Court was jurisdiction under Article 227 the Constitution of India. exercising its of In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.‟ Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such explained inordinate satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put delay was not I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 61 of 65 forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/appeals well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal/Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the the officer(s) concerned, and penalize officer(s), who for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. responsible is/are 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 years or 3 years or 4 I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 62 of 65 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to time. No event or file circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh Vrs. State of Gujarat, (1981) 1 SCC 495 = AIR 1981 SC 733).” the appeal within 7.6. In Vedabai @ Vaijayanatabai Baburao Patil Vrs. Shantaram Baburao Patil, AIR 2001 SC 2582, the Hon‟ble Court observed that, “A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of Page 63 of 65 I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression „sufficient cause‟ the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance.” 7.7. It needs to be emphasised age-old maxim “Vigilantibus Et Non Dormientibus Jura Subveniunt”, meaning thereby equity avails to the vigilant, not the person who sleeps over his right. The Courts will not help the person who sleeps over their rights but help those who are aware of their rights. A person is said to be liable for laches when he comes to the Court to affirm rights after a reasonable delay in that respect. 7.8. To a query from the Court, Sri Partha Sarathy Nayak, learned Additional Government Advocate denied that there is glaring question of law having wide ramification involved in the writ appeal. 7.9. In the case at hand as pointed out by Sri Tarun Kanta Pattanayak, learned Advocate that even though Registry of this Court pointed out delay of 320 days, no plausible explanation has been proffered by the appellants as to seeking condonation of delay of 175 days. This Court may take cognizance of the fact that the Order dated I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 64 of 65 07.12.2021 has been passed in WPC (OAC) No.2862 of 2002 in open Court proceeding in presence of Additional Standing Counsel representing the State and the counsel for the respondent herein. 7.10. In the aforesaid enunciation of well-settled legal position, this Court has come to the irresistible conclusion that stating the dates of movement of file would not be construed as “sufficient cause”/“good cause” so as to warrant consideration of condonation of delay in filing writ appeal. 8. Under the above premises, the petition for condonation of delay does not demonstrate sufficient/good cause; as such, this Court does not deem it a fit case deserving condonation of inordinate delay in filing writ appeal. 9. In view of the above discussions on the facts and the law, the interlocutory application, being I.A. No.3691 of 2022, is dismissed. Consequently, the writ appeal bearing W.A. No.1572 of 2022 stands dismissed. (SANGAM KUMAR SAHOO) JUDGE (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN) JUDGE Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: LAXMIKANT MOHAPATRA Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 28-Mar-2025 19:59:02 High Court of Orissa, Cuttack The 26th March, 2025//MRS/Laxmikant I.A. No.3691 of 2022 in W.A. No.1572 of 2022 Page 65 of 65