The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.32276 of 2025 Arun Kumar Biswal ….. Petitioner Mr. Damodar Patra, Advocate -versus- ICICI Bank Ltd., Gujarat and another ..... Opp. Parties
Legal Reasoning
Mr. Ramachandra Panigrahy, Advocate for opp. party no.1 Mr. Jateswar Nayak, Addl. Govt. Advocate for opp. party no.2 CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA Order No.
Decision
ORDER 14.11.2025 01. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SIPUN BEHERA Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 17-Nov-2025 10:55:52 arrangement (video conferencing/physical mode). Mr. Ramachandra Panigrahy, learned counsel has entered appearance on behalf of opp. party no.1 by filing Vakalatnama in Court today, which is taken on record. Heard. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner- Arun Kumar Biswal challenging the order dated 06.08.2025 passed by the Collector & District Magistrate, Page 1 of 6 Cuttack, opp. party no.2 under section 14 of the SARAESI Act, 2002 on the application filed by the Bank for taking possession of the secured assets. In case of United Bank of India -Vrs.- Satyawati Tondon and others reported in (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 110, in the case of Balkrishna Rama Tarle (dead through legal representatives) and another -Vrs.- Phoenix Arc Private Limited and others reported in (2023) 1 Supreme Court Cases 662 so also in the case of CELIR LLP -Vrs.- Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Private Limited and others reported in (2024) 2 Supreme Court Cases 1, it has been held that the High Court should not entertain the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when alternative remedy is available under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. In the case of Satyawati Tondon (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under section 13(4) or action taken under section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under section 13(4) or section 14. Both, the the Appellate Tribunal are Tribunal and Page 2 of 6 to pass empowered interim orders under sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi- judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.” In the case of Balkrishna Rama Tarle (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “18. Thus, the powers exercisable by CMM/DM under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are ministerial steps and section 14 does not involve Page 3 of 6 any adjudicatory process qua points raised by the borrowers against the secured creditor taking possession of the secured assets. In that view of the matter once all the requirements under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are complied with/satisfied by the secured creditor, it is the duty cast upon the CMM/DM to assist the secured creditor in obtaining the possession as well as the documents related to the secured assets even with the help of any officer subordinate to him and/or with the help of an advocate appointed as Advocate Commissioner. At that stage, the CMM/DM is not required to adjudicate the dispute between the borrower and the secured creditor and/or between any other third party and the secured creditor with respect to the secured assets and the aggrieved party to be relegated to raise objections in the proceedings of the SARFAESI Act, before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.” section under 17 In the case of Bafna Motors (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “110.3. In accordance with the unamended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset was available till the sale or transfer of such secured asset. In other words, the borrower’s right of redemption did not stand terminated on the date of the auction-sale of the secured asset itself and remained alive transfer was completed in favour of the auction-purchaser, by registration of the sale certificate and delivery of possession of the secured asset. However, the amended provisions of Section 13(8) of the the till Page 4 of 6 SARFAESI Act, make it clear that the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset stands extinguished thereunder on the very date of publication of the notice for public auction under Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules. In effect, the right of redemption available to the borrower under is drastically the present statutory regime curtailed and would be available only till the date of publication of the notice under Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules and not till the completion of the sale or transfer of the secured asset in favour of the auction-purchaser.” Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors. -Vrs.- Naveen Mathew Philip & Anr. reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 320 has deprecated the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act, where efficacious alternative remedy has been prescribed in the statute itself. The Hon’ble Court went on to hold as follows: “16. Approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by this Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. In the absence of any legal right, the Court cannot exercise the said power. More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non- compliance of approaching the Tribunal which Page 5 of 6 requires the prescription of fees and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative.” After hearing learned counsel for the respective parties and taking into account the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases and since the alternative and efficacious remedy is available to the petitioners to challenge the impugned order, we are not inclined to entertain the writ petition. However, the petitioners are at liberty to approach the learned DRT and pursue the matter in accordance with law. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. ( S.K. Sahoo) Judge Judge ( S. S. Mishra) 14th November, 2025 Sipun Page 6 of 6