The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.28758 of 2025 Bishnu Prasad Behera ….. Petitioner Mr. Ramakanta Sarangi, Advocate -versus- 1. The Reserve Bank of India, Bhubaneswar Branch Office, Bhubaneswar 2. The Assistant General Manager, Canara Bank, Regional Office, Laxmi Sagar, Cuttack Road, Bhubaneswar 3. The Authorized Officer -cum- Regional Officer of the Canara Bank, Bhadrak 4. The Senior Manager, Canara Bank, Dhenkanal-I Branch, Dhenkanal ..... Opp. Parties CORAM:
Legal Reasoning
THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA Order No. Signature Not 01. Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SIPUN BEHERA Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 17-Oct-2025 18:43:42
Decision
ORDER 17.10.2025 This matter is taken up through Hybrid arrangement (video conferencing/physical mode). Page 1 of 7 The petitioner, Bishnu Prasad Behera has filed this writ petition with the following prayer: under Annexure-1 “Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case stated above, the petitioner most humbly prays before your lordships and this Hon’ble court to quash the auction sale notice Series dtd.4.9.2025 published by the Authorised Officer of the Canara Bank -cum-Regional Officer, fixing the online auction on dtd.14.10.2025 at 10.30 A.M. as absolutely illegal since it violates the principles of natural justice and no opportunity of OTS has been provided to the petitioner and nothing has been intimated to the petitioner regarding the schemes floated by the Bank from time to time with due approval of the Reserve Bank of India and also no opportunity has been provided to the petitioner and no endeavour or efforts made by the Canara Bank to refer the matter and settle the loan account through the continuous and permanent Lok Adalat and therefore, the matter may kindly be referred to the Lok Adalat for settlement for which the petitioner shall remain obliged as ever.” Mr. Ramakanta Sarangi, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though auction sale notice was fixed to 14.10.2025 for auction, but it was deferred and in the meantime, the petitioner has deposited some amount with the bank and he has undertaken to clear the total outstanding dues at the end of this month. In case of United Bank of India -Vrs.- Satyawati Tondon and others reported in (2010) 8 Page 2 of 7 Supreme Court Cases 110, in the case of Balkrishna Rama Tarle (dead through legal representatives) and another -Vrs.- Phoenix Arc Private Limited and others reported in (2023) 1 Supreme Court Cases 662 so also in the case of CELIR LLP -Vrs.- Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Private Limited and others reported in (2024) 2 Supreme Court Cases 1, it has been held that the High Court should not entertain the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution when alternative remedy is available under section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. In the case of Satyawati Tondon (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under section 13(4) or action taken under section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under section 13(4) or section 14. Both, the the Appellate Tribunal are Tribunal and interim orders under empowered sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. to pass Page 3 of 7 43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi- judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the the Constitution, a person must exhaust remedies available under the relevant statute.” In the case of Balkrishna Rama Tarle (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “18. Thus, the powers exercisable by CMM/DM under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are ministerial steps and section 14 does not involve any adjudicatory process qua points raised by the borrowers against the secured creditor taking possession of the secured assets. In that view of the matter once all the requirements under section 14 of the SARFAESI Act are complied with/satisfied by the secured creditor, it is the duty cast upon the CMM/DM to assist Page 4 of 7 the secured creditor in obtaining the possession as well as the documents related to the secured assets even with the help of any officer subordinate to him and/or with the help of an advocate appointed as Advocate Commissioner. At that stage, the CMM/DM is not required to adjudicate the dispute between the borrower and the secured creditor and/or between any other third party and the secured creditor with respect to the secured assets and the aggrieved party to be relegated to raise objections in the of proceedings the SARFAESI Act, before the Debts Recovery Tribunal.” section under 17 In the case of Bafna Motors (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: till the “110.3. In accordance with the unamended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset was available till the sale or transfer of such secured asset. In other words, the borrower’s right of redemption did not stand terminated on the date of the auction-sale of the secured asset itself transfer was and remained alive completed in favour of the auction-purchaser, by registration of the sale certificate and delivery of possession of the secured asset. However, the amended provisions of Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, make it clear that the right of the borrower to redeem the secured asset stands extinguished thereunder on the very date of publication of the notice for public auction under Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules. In effect, the right of redemption available to the borrower under is drastically the present statutory regime Page 5 of 7 curtailed and would be available only till the date of publication of the notice under Rule 9(1) of the 2002 Rules and not till the completion of the sale or transfer of the secured asset in favour of the auction-purchaser.” Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. South Indian Bank Ltd. & Ors. -Vrs.- Naveen Mathew Philip & Anr. reported in 2023 LiveLaw (SC) 320 has deprecated the interference of the High Courts in matters pertaining to the SARFAESI Act, where efficacious alternative remedy has been prescribed in the statute itself. The Hon’ble Court went on to hold as follows: “16. Approaching the High Court for the consideration of an offer by the borrower is also frowned upon by this Court. A writ of mandamus is a prerogative writ. In the absence of any legal right, the Court cannot exercise the said power. More circumspection is required in a financial transaction, particularly when one of the parties would not come within the purview of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. When a statute prescribes a particular mode, an attempt to circumvent shall not be encouraged by a writ court. A litigant cannot avoid the non- compliance of approaching the Tribunal which requires the prescription of fees and use the constitutional remedy as an alternative.” After hearing learned counsel for the petitioner and taking into account the ratio laid down in the aforesaid cases and since the alternative remedy is available to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order, we are not Page 6 of 7 inclined to entertain the writ petition. However, it is open to the petitioner to approach the bank for settlement of the loan amount. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case. Accordingly, the writ petition stands dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. ( S.K. Sahoo) Judge ( S. S. Mishra) Judge 17th October 2025 Sipun Page 7 of 7