Orissa High Court
Case Details
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 In the matter of an Application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 read with Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 *** Sandeep Kumar Ghadei Aged about 24 years Son of Late Dilip Kumar Ghadei C/o.: Aruna Routray, Nuapada, Kunjabehari Lane, P.O.: Nuabazar … District: Cuttack -VERSUS- Petitioner 1. Secretary to Government of Odisha Department of Commerce & Transport (Commerce) Secretariat Building, Bhubaneswar At/P.O.: Bhubaneswar District: Khordha, Odisha 2. Director, Printing, Stationery & Publication Odisha, Madhupatna City & District: Cuttack 3. The Collector, Cuttack At: Collectorate Office, P.O.: Chandini Chowk City & District: Cuttack … Opposite parties Counsel appeared for the parties: For the petitioner : M/s. Manoj Kumar Panda, S.R. Nayak and Ganjan Sabar, Advocates WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 1 of 43 For the opposite parties : Mr. Ajodhya Ranjan Dash, A Additional Government Advocate P R E S E N T: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN Date of Hearing : 09.02.2024 :: Date of Judgment : 12.02.2024 J UDGMENT MURAHARI SRI RAMAN, J.— THE CHALLENGE BY THE PETITIONER: Challenging the propriety and legality of decision rejecting the application for consideration of appointment under the provisions of the Odisha Civil Services (Rehabilitation Assistance) Rules, 1990 communicated vide Letter No. PRE(N) 17/2015 (Pt.)— 5864/Com., dated 30.10.2015 of the Under Secretary to Government of Odisha in Commerce and Transport (Commerce) Department as at Annexure-7 and Letter No. Estt. Sec-1, 59/2014— 3112/PSP, dated 19.11.2015 issued by Director, Directorate of Printing, Stationery & Publication, Odisha, Madhupatna, Cuttack (Annexure- 8), the petitioner, son of the deceased Government employee, came up before the Odisha Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack by way of filing application invoking provisions of Section 19 of the WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 2 of 43 Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, registered as O.A. No.4126 (C) of 2016. 1.1. After abolition of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal by virtue of Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (Department of Personnel and Training) Notification F. No. A-11014/10/2015-AT [G.S.R.552(E).], dated 2nd August, 2019), the said case having been transferred to this Court, O.A. No. 4126 (C) of 2016 has been re-registered as WPC (OAC) No. 4126 of 2016. FACTS AS ADUMBRATED BY THE PETITIONERS: 2. The petitioner, on the death of his father, died in harness on 16.12.2012 while working as driver in the Office of Director, Printing, Stationery & Publication, Odisha, made an application on 26.03.2013 for consideration of appointment under the Odisha Civil Services (Rehabilitation Assistance) Rules, 1990 (for
Legal Reasoning
brevity, “RA Rules”), for Smt. Santilata Ghadei, the wife of the deceased employee, Late Dilip Kumar Ghadei, was found unfit to undertake Government job certified by the Standing Medical Board convened on 01.10.2013 vide Letter No. 6358, Berhampur, dated 03.10.2013 issued by the Chief District Medical Officer, Ganjam, Berhampur (Annexure-3 series). 2.1. The Director, Directorate of Printing, Stationery and Publication, Odisha vide Memo No.1854, dated 28.03.2014 having requested the Collector, Cuttack to WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 3 of 43 submit report regarding the financial status of the petitioner, after due enquiry being conducted, distress certificate in favour of the petitioner was furnished to the opposite party No.2-Director vide Letter No.2747/Gen. & Misc., dated 05.08.2014. 2.2. The said report along with other necessary and relevant documents being sent to the Government, the application for appointment under the RA Rules came to be rejected on 30.10.2015 by the Government of Odisha in Commerce & Transport (Commerce) Department citing that the claim is contradictory to the provisions of Rule 2(b) of RA Rules, as the mother of the petitioner is still alive/available for appointment. 2.3. Questioning the legal sanctity of decision taken to reject the application and asserting that such decision is beyond the weight of evidence on record, the petitioner moved the learned Odisha Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack for ventilation of grievance under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which has travelled to this Court for final adjudication. REPLIES OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES TO THE CONTENTS OF THE WRIT PETITION: 3. Having admitted the fact of Standing Medical Board declared Smt. Santilata Ghadei, mother of the petitioner unfit to undertake Government assignment, and WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 4 of 43 conceding the competent authority having submitted information regarding distress condition of the petitioner, by citing that “the applicant had not submitted any medical certificate showing that the wife of the deceased Government servant was unfit for any job” the opposite party Nos. 1 and 2 filed counter dated 22.06.2018 raised objection to the effect that “Sri Sandeep Ghadei as second in order of preference while spouse was available was not considered for appoinment under RAS as per extant Government policy”. 4. To such stance of the opposite parties, the petitioner has replied by way of rejoinder dated 22.01.2019 that when it was not disputed nor denied that the mother of the petitioner, Smt. Santilata Ghadei, was examined by the Standing Medical Board and certified to be unfit to undertake Government job, it is contrary to requirement of the RA Rules to say that in terms of definition of “family member” contained in Rule 2(b), the petitioner is not eligible to seek for appointment as the mother is alive. A false statement has been made by the Establishment Officer, Directorate, Printing, Stationery and Publication, Odisha, Cuttack in the counter on “verification” that “the applicant had not submitted any medical certificate showing that the wife of the deceased Government servant was unfit for any job”. HEARING OF WRIT PETITION BEFORE THIS COURT: WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 5 of 43 5. This matter is listed on 09.02.2024 for admission. Since the petitioner has been pursuing the matter for appointment under the RA Rules and the pleadings are completed, on the consent of counsel for both sides, the matter is finally heard at the stage of “Admission”. SUBMISSIONS AND ARGUMENTS OF RESPECTIVE PARTIES: 6. Sri Manoj Kumar Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the erroneous approach of the opposite party No.1 that when the mother of the petitioner is alive, the petitioner, son of the deceased Government employee, being placed at the second in the order of preference in the categories of persons enumerated in Section 2(b) of the RA Rules, is denied his legitimate claim for consideration of his application. 6.1. Sri Manoj Kumar Panda, learned counsel furnishing a copy of the Order dated 13.01.2017 passed in O.A. No.502 of 2016 by the Odisha Administrative Tribunal, Bhubaneswar, submitted that similar context was under consideration in said application and the learned Tribunal has decided the matter in favour of the applicant-son of the deceased employee on the fact that his mother was certified to be unfit. Placing reliance on the Judgment of Division Bench in the case of Ajit Kumar Barik Vrs. State of Odisha, 2018 (II) OLR 10 and Single Bench Judgment in the case of Sunayana Panda Vrs. State of Odisha, 2022 (II) OLR 951, learned counsel WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 6 of 43 for the petitioner strenuously argued that since Rule 2(b) of the RA Rules has not restricted to extend the benefit of said rules to other legal heirs, other than spouse of the deceased Government employee, the rejection of application for consideration of the petitioner for appointment is uncalled for and untenable in the eye of law. 7. Sri Ajodhya Ranjan Dash, learned Additional Government Advocate, while admitting that the issue of tenability of rejection of claim of persons like the petitioner in the instant case citing Rule 2(b) of RA Rules has already been settled by this Court in very many cases, submitted that the object of RA Rules would be frustrated if person like the petitioner is given opportunity of employment when his mother is alive who comes within the first category in the order of preference enumerated in Rule 2(b). In the present case, immediacy of financial assistance being absent and there has been long lapse of period in the meantime since the date of death of Dilip Kumar Ghadei, deceased Government employee, on 16.12.2012, the application for appointment under the RA Rules has rightly been rejected with justification by the Government. ISSUE INVOLVED, DISCUSSIONS AND ANALYSIS: 8. Perusal of Letter dated 30.10.2015 of the Government of Odisha in Commerce and Transport (Commerce) WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 7 of 43 Department at Annexure-7 reveals the reason for denial of employment to the petitioner as: “*** After thorough discussion it has been decided that the following 19 cases are liable for rejection as per General Administration Department Letter No.25004/ Gen., dated 15.10.2015, since the sons/daughters of the deceased have applied for appointment under RAS while the spouses of the deceased are alive/available for appointment under RAS which contradicts the provision of Rule 2(b) of OCS (RA) Rules, 1990. *** Group-C Fresh Cases 1. 2. *** Shri Sandeep Kumar Ghadei, son of Late Dillip Kumar Ghadei, ex-Driver. 3. ***” 8.1. Accordingly, the petitioner was intimated by Director, Directorate of Printing, Stationery and Publication, Odisha vide Letter No.3112-Estt.Sec-1,59/2014 (Pt.)/ PSP, dated 19.11.2015 (Annexure-8), which is to the following effect: “You are hereby informed that after due consideration, Government have been pleased to reject your application for appointment under RAS as you have applied for appointment under RAS while spouse of the deceased is alive/available for appointment under RAS which contradicts the provision of Rule 2(b) of OCS (RA) Rules, 1990.” WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 8 of 43 8.2. The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised strong exception to such a reason. Sri Manoj Kumar Panda, learned Advocate has urged that the material evidence which clinches that the spouse of the deceased Government employee was examined by the Standing Medical Board and certified “unfit for holding any Government job for her illness of Chronic Paranoid Schizophrenia”, has been ignored by the Government despite the fact that relevant documents, such as copies of Death Certificate of Late Dilip Kumar Ghadei, Legal Heir Certificate of said Dilip Kumar Ghadei, High School Examination Certificate and Higher Secondary Examination Certificate of the petitioner and No Objection Certificate in shape of affidavit by other Legal Heirs were forwarded to the competent authority for consideration. As required after due enquiry Deputy Collector, General & Misc., Collectorate, Cuttack, sent the distress certificate in favour of the petitioner. However, the State Government in arbitrary exercise of power rejected the application for consideration of appointment under the RA Rules on flimsy ground. 9. It transpires from the pleadings, rival contentions and perusal of reason ascribed by the authority for not considering the petitioner eligible for appointment only question arises in the instant case for adjudication is that on the facts and in the circumstances, whether son is entitled for consideration in view of Rule 2(b) of the RA WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 9 of 43 Rules, when spouse of deceased Government employee is alive/available for appointment. 10. Before proceeding to decide the case in hand, it may be apt to refer to following relevant provisions contained in the RA Rules, 1990: “2. Definition.— these rules, unless In requires,— the context otherwise (a) ‘Deserving Case’ means a case where the appointing authority is satisfied, after making such enquiry as may be necessary: (i) (ii) (iii) that the death of the employee has adversely affected his family financially because family has no other alternative mode of livelihood; the there that is existence of distress condition in the family after death of the employee; in the employment that none of the family members of the employee who has died while in service is already of Government/Public or Private Sector or engaged in independent business with an earning capable of tide over the distress condition of the family arising out of the sudden death of the employee; and (iv) that the family does not have adequate income from the immovable properties to earn its livelihood. WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 10 of 43 Explanation-I.— The income of any earning member will be taken into account for the purpose of assessing the annual gross income of the family if his separation from the family has not been established by registered partition deed made prior to the death of the Government employee. Explanation-II.— The total annual family income from all sources excluding Family Pension and Temporary Increase must not exceed Rs.72,000 (Rupees seventy-two thousand) for a family to be in a ‘distress condition’. (b) ‘Family Members’ shall mean and include the following members in order of preference— (i) Wife/Husband; (ii) Sons or step sons or sons legally adopted through a registered deed; (iii) Unmarried daughters and unmarried step daughter; (iv) Widowed daughter or daughter-in-law residing permanently with the affected family. (v) Unmarried or widowed sister permanently residing with the affected family; (vi) Brother of unmarried Government servant who was wholly dependent on such Government servant at the time of death. (c) & (d) *** WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 11 of 43 (e) Assistance’ means the ‘Rehabilitation assistance provided under these rules to a member of the family of Government servant who died while in service; 3. Applicability.— The assistance shall be applicable to a member of the family of the Government servant who dies while in service. 4. Objective of the Scheme.— The rehabilitation assistance is conceived as a compassionate measure of saving the family of a Government servant from immediate distress when the Government servant suddenly dies while in service. The concept is based on the premises that in case of sudden death his family would not face starvation. The scheme has a direct relationship with the economic condition of the family of the Government servant. Appointment of the family member of the Government servant under these rules shall be subject to the provisions contained in Rule 9 and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. *** 6. The authority competent to make substantive appointment to the post shall be the competent authority to make appointment under these rules.” 11. It is understood from bare reading of aforesaid provisions that as per Rule 3, the “rehabilitation assistance”, as defined in Rule 2(e) of the RA Rules, is applicable to “a member” of the family of the Government servant who dies while in service. It is of WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 12 of 43 significance to notice the article “a” before the expression “member of the family”. Definition of “family member” in Rule 2(b) envisages “son” as “a member of the family”. 11.1. It is the basic principle of construction of statute that the same should be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and words by words. See Bhavnagar University Vrs. Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt. Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111. Indefinite article “a” before the expression “member of the family” in the definition of “rehabilitation assistance” contained in Rule 2(e) and Rule 3 of the RA Rules has significance. The word ‘a’ has varying meanings and uses. ‘A’ means ‘one’ or ‘any’, but less emphatically than either. It may mean ‘one’ where only one is intended, or it may mean any one of a great number. It is placed before nouns of the singular number, denoting an individual object or quality individualized. The meaning depends on the context. : Black’s Law Dictionary. ‘A’ is the first letter of English alphabet denoting the primary vowel sound. It is used before singular nouns beginning with consonants. ‘A’ may mean one of several things. : Gujarat University Vrs. Krishna Raghunath Mudholkar, (1963) Supp 1 SCR 112. Stated in Shri Ishar Alloy Steels Limited Vrs. Jayaswals Neco Limited, (2001) 3 SCC 609 that the word ‘a’ or ‘an’ has an indefinite effect and a generalizing force. It determines what particular thing is meant; i.e., what particular thing one is to assume to be meant. The WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 13 of 43 words ‘a bank’ is indicator of the intention of Legislature and refers to an indirect (indefinite) article. 11.2. Going through the provisions of the RA Rules framed by the Governor of Odisha to “regulate recruitment to the State Civil Services and posts as a measure of rehabilitation assistance” “in exercise of powers conferred by the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India”, it is but unequivocal that in the order of preference “son” comes in the second order after “wife” of the deceased Government employee who died in harness. 11.3. The word “a” appearing before the expression “member of the family” in Rule 3 read juxtaposed with Rule 2(b) would lead to only one interpretation that if person mentioned as first preference foregoes choice of employment on compassionate considerations due to inability/incapacity, there is no restriction in considering second person enumerated in the order of preference as per Rule 2(b) of RA Rules. 11.4. It is manifest from record that the petitioner is entitled to apply for the job. The documents enclosed to the writ petition and stated to be available with the Government of Odisha in Commerce & Transport (Commerce) Department being forwarded by the Director, Directorate of Printing, Stationery & Publication overwhelmingly indicate that the application of the petitioner was duly WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 14 of 43 considered in the manner provided under Rule 8 of the RA Rules. Perusal of record and reading of counter filed by the opposite party Nos.1 and 2 indicates that the Standing Medical Board comprised of Professor & Head of Department of Medicine, MKCG Medical College, Berhampur, Professor & Head of Department of Surgery, MKCG Medical College, Berhampur and Chief District Medical Officer, Ganjam have certified that the spouse suffers from ailment and she is “unfit for holding Government job”. After conducting enquiry with regard to financial condition, financial status of the family members of the deceased Government employee from all sources was ascertained and report was submitted. It is complained by the counsel for the petitioner that such vital documents having not been given due weightage while considering the case of the petitioner, the opposite party No.1 has misdirected himself. The Government of Odisha in Commerce & Transport (Commerce) Department could not and should not have brushed aside the certificate issued by the Standing Medical Board; as such, the reason ascribed by the opposite party No.1 that the case of the petitioner for compassionate/rehabilitation appointment is “liable for rejection” along with 18 others “since the sons/daughters of the deceased are alive/ available for appointment under RAS which contradicts the provisions of Rule 2(b) of OCS (RA) Rules, 1990”. WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 15 of 43 11.5. It is pointed out at the bar that such a reason is inexplicable in view of finding recorded in the certificate issued by the Standing Medical Board. Once the spouse of deceased employee enumerated first in the order of preference is incapable of or incapacitated for undertaking the appointment under the RA Rules, in view of Rule 3 a member of the family of the Government servant, who dies while in service is entitled to be considered as there is no restriction nor prohibition contained in the RA Rules to consider the “son” appearing in the list of enumerated persons in Rule 2(b) and shown to be in the second order of preference. 11.6. At this juncture it may be apposite to refer to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ajit Kumar Barik Vrs. State of Odisha, 2018 (II) OLR 10, wherein the following observation stands recorded: “Of course, the first preference is to be given to wife/ husband of the deceased employee, then son and unmarried daughter. Howefer, nowhere it was stated that in case a family member in order of preference in the hierarchy is unfit and a medical certificate furnished to that effect, claim shall not be considered for engagement of the other eligible members in case of distress condition of the family. Therefore, the finding given by the Tribunal in the impugned order that she is not prepared to accept Group-D post and offered it to her son in ignoring the material on records is not sustainable.” WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 16 of 43 11.7. Aforesaid Judgment in Ajit Kumar Barik, was carried to the Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.L.P.(C) Diary No(s).35835/2018 by the Government of Odisha, which
Decision
came to be disposed of vide Order dated 26.10.2018: “Delay condoned. We find no reason to entertain this special leave petition, which is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.” 11.8. Identical view has also been taken by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Sunayana Panda Vrs. State of Odisha, 2022 (II) OLR 951 following the case of Ajit Kumar Barik (supra). 12. Another pertinent aspect this Court takes into consideration is this, that the definition of the term “family members” contained in Rule 2(b) begins with expression “shall mean and include the following members in order of preference”. It inter alia provided “Wife/Husband” preceding “Sons or step sons or sons legally adopted through a registered deed”. Therefore, it may be necessary at this stage to have conspectus of the term “preference”. 12.1. In Sher Singh Vrs. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 200 = (1984) 1 SCC 107, the Supreme Court examined the provisions of Section 47(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, providing for preference to the State Transport WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 17 of 43 Undertaking by grant of permit and explained the meaning of ‘preference’ as under: “The expression ‘preference’ amongst others means prior right, advantage, precedence etc. But how would it be possible to give precedence one over the other? It signifies that other things being equal, one will have preference over the others. Preference in this context would mean that with things generally appearing to be qualitatively and quantitatively equal though not with mathematical accuracy, statutory provision will tilt the balance in favour of the Undertaking.” 12.2. In Executive Officer Vrs. E. Tirupalu, AIR 1996 SC 1311 = (1996) 8 SCC 253 = (1996) 3 SCR 904, the Supreme Court held that where rules provide for preference to a particular class of candidates, that preference under the Rules cannot be applied irrespective of the merit of candidates, the inmates have to be given appointment. It means that the merit of the candidates being equal, preference would be given to the inmates of the class which is to be given preferential right and it certainly does not mean an automatic appointment without considering the cases of other candidates. Therefore, even if the rules provide for preferential right, candidates having such subjects would have preferential right only when they compete with other candidates and are found on equal footings, otherwise not. WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 18 of 43 12.3. In Secretary, Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission Vrs. Y.V.V.R. Srinivasulu, (2003) 5 SCC 341 = AIR 2003 SC 3961 = 2003 AIR SCW 2851, it has been summarized as follows: “The ‘preference’ envisaged in the Rules, in our view, under the scheme of things and contextually also cannot mean, an absolute en bloc preference akin to reservation or separate of complete precedence. *** It is not to be viewed as a preferential right conferred even for taking up their claims for consideration. On the other hand, the preference envisaged has to be given only when the claims of all candidates who are eligible are taken for consideration and when any one or more of them are the found equally positioned, by using additional qualification as a tilting factor, in their favour vis-(cid:224)-vis others in the matter of actual selection.” 12.4. In State of Uttar Pradesh Vrs. Om Prakash, AIR 2006 SC 3080 = 2006 AIR SCW 4281, the Supreme Court held that, the word ‘preference’ would mean that when the claims of all candidates who are eligible and who possess the requisite educational qualification prescribed in the advertisement are taken for consideration and when one or more of them are found equally positioned, then only the additional qualification may be taken as a tilting factor, in favour of candidates vis-(cid:224)-vis others in the merit list prepared by the Commission. But ‘preference’ does not mean en bloc preference irrespective of inter se merit and suitability. WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 19 of 43 12.5. In view of the above, it is evident that question of giving preference would arise provided the person claiming preference stands on equal footing with others, otherwise not. Similar view may be found in Abdul Hameed Vrs. Union of India, (2017) 16 SCC 346). 12.6. Since the spouse of the deceased Government employee is found unfit to undertake Government job, she cannot be compared as equal to the son who comes second in the order of preference enumerated in Rule 2(b) of RA Rules. 13. It may of interest to note that the intent of the term “family members” in Rule 2(b) of the RA Rules by employing the words “shall mean and include” is unambiguous. 13.1. In Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Limited Vrs. State of Kerala, (2013) 16 SCC 82, it has been interpreted as follows: “30. Legislature, in its wisdom, while defining the expression “public authority” under Section 2(h), intended to embrace only those categories, which are specifically included, unless the context of the Act otherwise requires. Section 2(h) has used the expressions ‘means’ and includes’. When a word is defined to ‘mean’ something, the definition is prima facie restrictive and where the word is defined to ‘include’ some other thing, the definition is prima facie extensive. But when both the expressions “means” and “includes” WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 20 of 43 are used, the categories mentioned there would exhaust themselves. Meanings of the expressions ‘means’ and ‘includes’ have been explained by this Court in Delhi Development Authority Vrs. Bhola Nath Sharma (Dead) by LRs and others, (2011) 2 SCC 54, (in paras 25 to 28). When such expressions are used, they may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which for the purpose of the Act, must invariably be attached to those words and expressions.” 13.2. In Satish Chander Ahuja Vrs. Sneha Ahuja, (2020) 12 SCR 189 it has been put forth as follows: “49. A Three Judge bench judgment of this Court in Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. Vrs. Coop. Bank Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685 had occasion to consider Section 2(bb) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which section used both the words “means and includes”. Explaining both the expressions, following was laid down in paragraph 23: ‘23. ***It is trite to say that when in the definition clause given in any statute the word “means” is used, what follows is intended to speak exhaustively. When the word “means” is used in the definition, to borrow the words of Lord Esher, M.R. in Gough Vrs. Gough, (1891) 2 QB 665 it is a “hard-and-fast” definition and no meaning other than that which is put in the definition can be assigned to the same. (Also see P. Kasilingam Vrs. P.S.G. College of Technology, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 348 = AIR 1995 SC 1395). On the other hand, when the word “includes” is used in the definition, the legislature does not intend to restrict the WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 21 of 43 definition: it makes the definition enumerative but not exhaustive. That is to say, the term defined will retain its ordinary meaning but its scope would be extended to bring within it matters, which in its ordinary meaning may or may not comprise. Therefore, the use of the word “means” followed by the word “includes” in Section 2(bb) of the ID Act is clearly indicative of the legislative intent to make the definition exhaustive and would cover only those banking companies which fall within the purview of the definition and no other.” 50. We may notice another judgment of this Court in Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Limited and Anr. Vrs. Union of India and Ors., (2019) 8 SCC 416 where this Court had occasion to consider both the In expressions, paragraph 82, this Court laid down:- “means and includes”. i.e., ‘82. ***In fact, in Jagir Singh Vrs. State of Bihar, (1976) 2 SCC 942, SCC paras 11 and 19 to 21 and Mahalakshmi Oil Mills Vrs. State of A.P., (1989) 1 SCC 164, SCC paras 8 and 11 (which has been cited in P. Kasilingam Vrs. PSG College of Technology, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 348, this Court set out definition sections where the expression “means” was followed by some words, after which came the expression “and includes” followed by other words, just as in Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vrs. Shankar Industries, 1993 Supp (3) SCC 361 (2). In two other recent judgments, Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. Vrs. Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685, SCC paras 12 and 23 and State of W.B. Vrs. Associated Contractors, (2015) 1 SCC WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 22 of 43 32, SCC para 14, this Court has held that wherever the expression “means” is followed by the expression “and includes” whether with or without additional words separating “means” from “includes”, these expressions indicate is exhaustive as a matter statutory interpretation. It has also been held that the expression “and includes” is an expression which extends the definition contained in expression words which “means”…***’ the definition provision follow that the of 51. We may notice two more judgments relied by Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel, i.e., The South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association and Anr. Vrs. The State of Gujarat and Anr., (1976) 4 SCC 601. Shri Bhushan’s submission is that use of expression “includes” in Section 2(s) has to be read as means. He placed reliance on following observations made by this Court in paragraph 5: clauses as a word ‘5. *** Though “include” is generally used in interpretation of enlargement, in some cases the context might suggest a different intention. Pottery is an expression of very wide import, embracing all objects made of clay and hardened by heat. If it had been the legislature’s intention to bring within the entry all possible articles of pottery, to add an it was quite unnecessary explanation. We have the explanation could not possibly have been introduced to extend the meaning of potteries industry or the articles listed therein added ex found that WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 23 of 43 abundanti cautela. It seems to us therefore that the legislature did not intend everything that the potteries industry turns out to be covered by the entry. What then could be the purpose of the explanation. The explanation says that, for the purpose of Entry 22, potteries industry “includes” manufacture of the nine articles of pottery named therein. It seems to us that the word “includes” has been used here in the sense of ‘means’; this is the only construction that the word can bear in the context. In that sense it is not a word of extension, but limitation; it is exhaustive of the meaning which must be given to potteries industry for the purpose of Entry 22. The use of the word is not “includes” unknown. The observation of Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps which is usually referred to on the use of “include” as a word of extension, is followed by these lines: in the restrictive sense ‘But the word ‘include’ is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to ‘mean and include’, and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions.’ 52. Next judgment relied by Shri Bhushan is Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation and Anr. Vrs. Ashok Iron Works Private Limited, (2009) 3 SCC 240. WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 Page 24 of 43 In the above case also submission was made before this court that in the definition of person given in section 2(m) of Consumer Protection Act, the expression “includes” should be read as “means”. This Court laid down that interpretation of a word or expression must depend on the text and the context. In paragraphs 14 to 17, following was laid down: ‘14. The learned counsel also submitted that the word “includes” must be read as “means”. In this regard, the learned counsel placed reliance upon two decisions of this Court, namely; (1) South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Assn. Vrs. State of Gujarat, (1976) 4 SCC 601 and (2) RBI Vrs. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd., (1987) 1 SCC 424. 15. Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Stamps Commr., the following classic 1899 AC 99 made statement: (AC pp. 105-06) ‘*** The word ‘include’ is very generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body of the statute; and when it is so used these words or phrases must be construed as comprehending, not only such things as they signify according to their natural import, but also those things which the interpretation clause declares that they shall include. But the word is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative, if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to ‘mean and include’, and in that case it may Page 25 of 43 ‘include’ WPC (OAC) No.4126 of 2016 the afford an exhaustive explanation of meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions.’