Orissa High Court
Case Details
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLREV No.529 of 2024 (From the order dated 12.08.2024 passed by the Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division)-Assistant Sessions Judge (Women Court), Jeypore in G.R. Case No.159 of 2018 arising out of Jeypore Mahila P.S. Case No.08 of 2018). Prashant Sahoo @ Prasant Kumar Sahoo & Ors. …. Petitioner (s) -versus- State of Odisha …. Opp. Party (s) Advocates appeared in the case: For Petitioner (s) For Opp. Party (s) -versus- : : Mr. Ranjan Kumar Rout, Adv. Mr. Sonak Mishra, ASC CORAM: DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI DATE OF HEARING:-06.03.2025 DATE OF JUDGMENT:-28.03.2025 Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J. 1.
Facts
In this CRLREV, the Petitioners have challenged the order dated 12.08.2024 passed by the Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division)- Assistant Sessions Judge (Women Court), Jeypore in G.R. Case No.159 of 2018 arising out of Jeypore Mahila P.S. Case No.08 of 2018. The order rejected the Petitioners’ application for discharge from the charges under Sections 498A/ 294/ 323/ 506/ 34 of the I.P.C. read with Section 4 of the D.P. Act. pg. 1 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 I. CASE OF THE PROSECUTION: 2. The prosecution’s case can be summarized as follows: (i). The petitioners in this case include Petitioner No. 1, the husband of the informant; Petitioner No. 2, the father-in-law; Petitioner No. 3, the mother-in-law; and Petitioners No. 4 and 5, the sisters- in-law of the informant. The informant, who filed the complaint, is the wife of Petitioner No. 1. (ii). The informant alleged that she was subjected to mental and physical cruelty by her husband and in-laws. Her mother-in-law allegedly forced her to hand over her entire salary and use auto- rickshaws for commuting, which she refused. (iii). Sister-in-law (Sasmita Sahoo) allegedly demanded ₹1,50,000 for medical treatment and threatened the informant when she refused to pay. Later, the husband, father-in-law, and mother-in- law demanded ₹40,00,000 for purchasing a flat in Bhubaneswar. Upon refusal, the informant faced physical and mental harassment, forcing her to leave the matrimonial home and live with her parents. (iv). The informant’s family allegedly spent ₹4.8 lakhs during the marriage on gifts and cash, which they argue was forced upon them under social pressure. The police investigation found evidence of financial transactions and statements from witnesses supporting the dowry demand claim. pg. 2 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 (v). The informant alleged that the accused persons used obscene language against her in public. The prosecution claims that her mother’s statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. supports the claim of verbal abuse. (vi). The informant claimed that her husband and mother-in-law threatened her with dire consequences if she did not meet the demand for ₹40,00,000. Allegedly, they visited her parental home and threatened her behind the house. The prosecution argues that this constitutes criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC. (vii). The informant claimed she was physically assaulted by her in- laws when she refused their monetary demands. Medical reports and witness statements were cited as evidence to support this claim. (viii). The prosecution argues that all accused acted with a common intention to harass the informant. The demand for dowry, threats, and abuse were allegedly part of a coordinated plan involving all family members. II. THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT: 3. The court determined that there exists sufficient prima facie evidence against all accused persons to proceed with the trial. The charge sheet was filed, and cognizance of the offenses was taken on 20.04.2021 under Sections 498-A, 294, 323, 506, 34 IPC, and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (DP Act). The court rejected the pg. 3 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 discharge petition under Section 239 Cr.P.C., holding that the allegations and case materials warrant framing of charges. 4. The accused persons had filed a petition under Section 205 Cr.P.C. to dispense with their physical presence during the trial. The court rejected this petition, directing that all accused must be personally present at the time of framing of charges, unless explicitly exempted under the modified bail conditions. 5. The Orissa High Court modified the bail conditions for Petitioners No. 2 and 3 (Senior Citizens), allowing them to appear through their counsel unless required physically by the trial court. The remaining accused (Petitioner No. 1, 4, and 5) were directed to appear before the trial court unless they file an exemption application for any particular hearing. The trial court incorporated this modification into its order, allowing compliance with the High Court’s ruling. 6. Due to the absence of accused Shantilata Sahoo and Prahallad Sahoo, the court granted a 20-day adjournment for framing of charges. The accused were strictly directed to appear in person on the next scheduled date (29.08.2024). III. REVISIONIST’S ARGUMENTS: 7. The counsel for the revisionist urged the following submissions: (i). The trial court failed to exercise its judicial discretion while rejecting the discharge application. The order is non-speaking and lacks reasons for rejecting the petition. Since there are no pg. 4 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 substantial allegations, continuing the trial would be an abuse of the process of law. (ii). The mother-in-law’s suggestion to travel by auto-rickshaw does not constitute cruelty under Section 498-A IPC. Similarly, her inquiry about the informant’s salary does not amount to dowry demand, as it was a general financial inquiry rather than coercion. (iii). The informant’s parents did not confirm any specific dowry demand in their statements. The ₹4.8 lakhs spent during the wedding was voluntary and not demanded by the accused. There is no direct evidence of dowry harassment before or after marriage. (iv). The informant has not alleged any specific incident of obscene language or gestures. Her mother’s statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. is vague, merely stating, “They were showing her,” without explaining what was done. (v). The informant claims that her husband and mother-in-law threatened her at her parental home in Koraput to pay ₹40,00,000. However, she took no immediate action, later stayed in a guest house for 10 days, and only then filed an FIR. This delay and inconsistency weaken the credibility of the allegation. (vi). The informant alleges that her in-laws took her jewelry for safekeeping, but there is no evidence of misappropriation. Without proof that the jewelry was misused or withheld pg. 5 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 dishonestly, criminal breach of trust under Section 406 IPC is not established. (vii). The accused persons are alleged to have committed different acts at different times, without evidence of a common plan or coordinated effort. Thus, invoking Section 34 IPC (common intention) is unjustified. (viii). The case lacks strong evidence and is unlikely to result in conviction. Continuing the trial would cause undue harassment to the petitioners and serve no interest of justice. (ix). The petitioners request the Hon’ble Court to quash the trial court’s order dated 12.08.2024 and drop the criminal proceedings against them to prevent further legal hardship. IV. COURT’S ANALYSIS AND REASONS: 8. 9. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions of the counsel appearing for both the parties. The crux of the dispute lies in the fact that the petitioners are challenging the trial court’s refusal to discharge them in a dowry harassment case. The informant claims she was subjected to cruelty, financial pressure, and threats, while the petitioners argue that the allegations are exaggerated, inconsistent, and unsupported by strong evidence. The trial court believes there’s enough material to proceed, but the petitioners feel that forcing them to stand trial without solid proof is unjust and amounts to harassment. pg. 6 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 10. It is a well-established principle of law that while considering an application for discharge, the court must proceed on the presumption that the material presented by the prosecution is true. At this stage, the court’s duty is not to conduct a meticulous examination of the evidence as it would during trial but rather to assess whether, on the face of the material available, the essential ingredients of the alleged offense are prima facie established. The inquiry must be confined to determining whether the facts, as they stand, disclose the commission of the offense in question, warranting the continuation of proceedings. 11. There exists a wealth of judicial precedents reinforcing this principle. Notably, in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander 1, the Supreme Court unequivocally held as follows: “17. Framing of a charge is an exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court in terms of Section 228 of the Code, unless the accused is discharged under Section 227 of the Code. Under both these provisions, the court is required to consider the "record of the case" and documents submitted therewith and, after hearing the parties, may either discharge the accused or where it appears to the court and in its opinion there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, it shall frame the charge. Once the facts and ingredients of the section exists, then the court would be right in presuming that there is ground to proceed against the accused and frame the charge accordingly. This presumption is not a presumption of law as such. The satisfaction of the court in relation to the existence of constituents of an offence 1 (2012) 9 SCC 460. pg. 7 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 and the facts leading to that offence is a sine qua non for exercise of such jurisdiction. It may even be weaker than a prima facie case. There is a fine distinction between the language of Sections 227 and 228 of the Code. Section 227 is the expression of a definite opinion and judgment of the Court while Section 228 is tentative. Thus, to say that at the stage of framing of charge, the Court should form an opinion that the accused is certainly guilty of committing an offence, is impermissible in terms of Section 228 of the Code.” is an approach which 12. At the stage of framing charges, the court is not tasked with determining guilt but rather with assessing whether a strong suspicion exists that the accused has committed an offense, which, if subjected to trial, may lead to a conviction. The inquiry is limited to evaluating whether the material on record is inconsistent with the innocence of the accused. The final determination of guilt is reserved for the trial stage. This principle was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Ramesh Singh2 , where it was held as follows: “4. Under Section 226 of the Code while opening the case for the prosecution the Prosecutor has got to describe the charge against the accused and state by what evidence he proposes to prove the guilt of the accused. Thereafter comes at the initial stage the duty of the court to consider the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and to hear the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in that behalf. The Judge has to pass thereafter an order either under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. If ’the Judge considers that there is no 2 (1977) 4 SCC 39. pg. 8 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for so doing’, as enjoined by Section 227. If, on the other hand, ’the Judge is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence which (b) is exclusively triable by the court, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused’, as provided in Section 228. Reading the two provisions together in juxtaposition, as they have got to be, it would be clear that at the beginning and the initial stage of the trial the truth, veracity and effect of the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce are not to be meticulously judged. Nor is any weight to be attached to the probable defence of the accused. It is not obligatory for the Judge at that stage of the trial to consider in any detail and weigh in a sensitive balance whether the facts, if proved, would be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or not. The standard of test and judgment which is to be finally applied before recording a finding regarding the guilt or otherwise of the accused is not exactly to be applied at the stage of deciding the matter under Section 227 or Section 228 of the Code. At that stage the court is not to see whether there is sufficient ground for conviction of the accused or whether the trial is sure to end in his conviction. Strong suspicion against the accused, if the matter remains in the region of suspicion, cannot take the place of proof of his guilt at the conclusion of the trial. But at the initial stage if there is a strong suspicion which leads the court to think that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence then it is not open to the court to say that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The presumption of the guilt of the accused which is to be drawn at the initial stage is not in the sense of the law governing the trial of criminal cases in France where the accused is presumed to be guilty unless the pg. 9 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 contrary is proved. But it is only for the purpose of deciding prima facie whether the court should proceed with the trial or not. If the evidence which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross- examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any, cannot show that the accused committed the offence, then there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial. An exhaustive list of the circumstances to indicate as to what will lead to one conclusion or the other is neither possible nor advisable. We may just illustrate the difference of the law by one more example. If the scales of pan as to the guilt or innocence of the accused are something like even at the conclusion of the trial, then, on the theory of benefit of doubt the case is to end in his acquittal. But if, on the other hand, it is so at the initial stage of making an order under Section 227 or Section 228, then in such a situation ordinarily and generally the order which will have to be made will be one under Section 228 and not under Section 227.” 13. Applying the aforementioned judicial precedents to the present case, it is evident that the trial court was justified in rejecting the discharge petition filed by the petitioners. The materials on record, including the statements of the informant and witnesses, provide a strong suspicion that the accused persons were involved in the alleged offenses. At this stage, the court is not required to meticulously examine the veracity of evidence but only to determine whether the allegations, if taken at face value, constitute
Legal Reasoning
the ingredients of the offenses charged. The existence of prima facie evidence is sufficient to proceed with framing charges. pg. 10 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 04-Apr-2025 18:13:17 14. The argument that there is no evidence of common intention (Section 34 IPC) or direct proof of dowry harassment is premature at this stage. The charge of criminal conspiracy or common intention need not be proved conclusively at the time of framing charges. If the evidence, even at a prima facie level, indicates a coordinated effort by multiple accused, the charge must be framed, and the truthfulness of the claim is a matter of trial. The prosecution’s case suggests that the demand for ₹40,00,000, threats, and harassment were not isolated acts but rather a pattern of behavior by the accused family members, justifying the invocation of Section 34 IPC. 15. In light of the foregoing discussion, the Revision Petition is dismissed. The trial court’s order dated 12.08.2024 rejecting the discharge petition is upheld, and the accused persons shall face trial as per law. 16. Any interim order passed earlier stands vacated. (Dr. S.K. Panigrahi ) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 28th March, 2025/ pg. 11