The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK In the matter of an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals’ Act, 1985. WPC (OAC) No.2127 OF 2018 Maheswar Baka …. Petitioner -versus- State of Odisha & Others …. Opposite Parties For Petitioner :M/s. D.K. Panda, Advocate For Opp. Parties :M/s. S. Jena, Additional Govt. Advocate PRESENT: THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of Hearing and Date of Judgment: 26.07.2024 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J. 1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Arrangement (Virtual/Physical) Mode. 2. Heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties. 3. Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition inter alia challenging the order of discharge initially passed vide order
Facts
dtd.08.11.2013 under Annexure-3, so confirmed by the // 2 // appellate authority vide order dtd.20.04.2016 under Annexure-5. 4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that Petitioner was initially engaged as a Contractual S.P.O (Special Police Officer) vide order of engagement issued on 30.01.2009 under Annexure-1.
Legal Reasoning
applicable, in view of the decision of this Court in the case of State of Orissa & Others vs. Rakesh Kumar Swain & Others. This Court in Para-5, 9 & 10 of the said judgment has held as follows:- “5. The sole question raised before this Court by the learned counsel appearing for the State of Odisha is that in course of probation there is no requirement to follow the principles of natural justice, reason being that the applicant was on probation for a period of two years and in course of probation, the principles of natural justice or regular departmental proceeding is not required to be followed by the authorities. To substantiate his argument, he has taken the help of the provisions of Rules 825(c) and 668(a) of the Police Manual. XXX XXX XXX 9. In the light of the statutory provisions and the settled proposition as referred to hereinabove, the admitted position of the instant case is that the applicant-opposite party was on probation having been sent for training to the Police Training School and after completing the training, he has been given posting before the DCP, Cuttack. While he was discharging duty under the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Cuttack, a report was sent by the Principal of the Police Training School, Nayagarh alleging therein that he was involved in series of misconducts in the training centre and accordingly, recommendation was made to take departmental action against him, in view thereof, the order of removal has been passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Cuttack. The applicant- opposite party has challenged the same before the appellate authority, i.e. before the Commissioner of Police, Bhubaneswar raising the point of violation of principles of natural justice and non-applicability of the provisions of Rule 668(a) and 825(c) of the Orissa Police Rule, but the appellate authority vide order dated 23.4.2014 has rejected the appeal on the pretext that no appeal lies as per Rule 668(a) of the Orissa Police Rule”. 10. We after appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the State of Odisha and going through the record including the relevant provision of the Orissa Police Manual and the proposition settled by the Hon'ble Apex Court with respect to taking action against a probationer, are of the considered view that the order of removal having been passed under the provisions of Rule 668(a) or 825(c) of the Orissa Police Rule is not at all not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed above and as such, the order of removal having been passed by the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Cuttack is without any application of mind. So far as the Page 4 of 17 // 5 // too when he has been posted under contention that there is no requirement to follow the principles of natural justice with respect to a probationer and on that ground the principles of natural justice has been denied, according to our conscious view, the decision taken by the authorities in this regard is not sustainable more particularly in the facts and circumstances of this case that specific allegation has been levelled by the Principal, Police Training School sending a report regarding the misconduct of the applicant before the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Cuttack after completion of the training that the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Cuttack, but the applicant-opposite party has not been given sufficient opportunity to defend. Since the order of punishment of removal having been passed on the ground of misconduct, which cannot be said to be simplicitor and as such, the argument advanced on behalf of the State of Odisha through the learned Addl. Govt. Advocate that in case of probation, the requirement of principles of natural justice is not to be followed, is not acceptable by us reason being that here in the instant case the order of punishment is punitive basing upon the misconduct alleged against the applicant-opposite party. is not Accordingly, the order of punishment of removal sustainable in the eye of law and to that effect the Tribunal is right in passing the order quashing the order of removal. Hence, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the Tribunal so far as this part is concerned. There is no dispute with the proposition that in cases where the High Court finds the enquiry to be deficient either procedurally or otherwise, the proper course always is to remand the matter back to the concerned authority to re-do the same afresh. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Allahabad Bank and others v. Krishna Narayan Tewari, AIR 2017 Supreme Court 330. However, in the given situation, the proposition as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, may not be applicable, reason being that because of long time lag or such other supervening circumstances, the writ court considers it unfair, harsh or otherwise unnecessary to direct a fresh enquiry or fresh order by the competent authority.
Arguments
4.1. It is contended that while so continuing as S.P.O. and on being found suitable by the District Selection Board, Petitioner was appointed as against a regular post of Constable vide order dtd.21.01.2013 under Annexure-2. On being so appointed as a Constable, Petitioner was deputed to undergo the required training to Police Training School, S.W, Range, Koraput. While undergoing such training, Petitioner availed 2 days C.L for treatment of his ailing wife w.e.f. 26.02.2013 to 28.02.2013 and Petitioner was due to join in the Training Centre on 01.03.2013. But Petitioner overstayed the leave and joined only on 12.03.2013. But thereafter because of his suffering from certain illness, Petitioner remained on leave again from 14.03.2013 to 22.07.2013. After coming back from his leave, Petitioner was allowed to join in the Training Centre on 23.07.2013. But while continuing as such, taking recourse to the provisions contained under Rule-825(c) of the PMR, Petitioner was discharged from his services vide order dtd.08.11.2013 under Annexure-3 of Opp. Party No. 3. Page 2 of 17 // 3 // 4.2. It is contended that against such order of discharge, Petitioner moved an appeal before the appellate authority- Opposite Party No.2 and the appellate authority vide order dtd.20.04.2016 under Annexure-5 confirmed the order of discharge while rejecting the appeal. 4.3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that since Petitioner for the period from 01.03.2013 to 12.03.2013 and 14.03.2013 to 22.07.2013 remained on leave and after coming back from such leave, he was allowed to join on 23.07.2013, there was no occasion to discharge him from his services vide the impugned order dtd.08.11.2013 under Annexure-3 and that too without following the principle and natural justice and without initiation of any proceeding. 4.4. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that since Petitioner was allowed to join after remaining on leave for the period from 14.03.2013 to 22.07.2013, basing on the letter issued by the Principal of the Training School on 30.03.2013 vide Annexure-C/3-Series, Petitioner could not have been discharged on the ground indicated in the impugned order dtd.08.11.2013 under Annexure-3. 4.5. It is contended that since Petitioner by the time he was discharged from his service was under probation, taking recourse to the provisions contained under Rule- 668(a) of the PMR, Petitioner could have been discharged from his services. But it is contended that in the case in hand, provisions contained under Rule 668(a) of PMR is not Page 3 of 17 // 4 //
Decision
According to our conscious view, the present case is not coming under the parameters of the exception to the settled proposition and hence, the part of the order by which the Tribunal has directed to reinstate the applicant- opposite party seems to be not sustainable and accordingly, the same is not sustainable and in the result, the same is set aside”. 4.6. It is also contended that since Petitioner was discharged from his services, it amounts to casting stigma and the Opposite Parties without considering the fact whether such unauthorized absence from duty is willful or Page 5 of 17 // 6 // because of compelling circumstances, since discharged the Petitioner vide the impugned order, the same is also not sustainable in the eye of law, in view of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Krushnakant B. Parmar vs. Union of India & Another, reported in (2012) 3 SCC- 178. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-16 of the said judgment has held as follows:- “16. In the case of appellant referring to unauthorised absence the disciplinary authority alleged that he failed to maintain devotion of duty and his behaviour was unbecoming of a Government servant. The question whether `unauthorised absence from duty' amounts to failure of devotion to duty or behaviour unbecoming of a Government servant cannot be decided without deciding the question whether absence is wilful or because of compelling circumstances”. 4.7. In support of his aforesaid submission, learned counsel for the Petitioner also relied on another decision passed on 16.04.2019 in the case of Ashok Kumar Nayak vs. Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission and Others. This Court in Para-8, 17 and 18 of the judgment has held as follows:- “8.The aforementioned order dated 07.06.2016 under Annexure-10-A was not communicated to the petitioner. The reason for termination assigned in such order indicates that the Commission had reviewed his overall performance and was of the considered view that his performance was not satisfactory and did not warrant any further continuation in the organization in public interest. But it has not been indicated what public interest was involved in the performance of the petitioner, nor has any opportunity been given to the petitioner to improve his performance. Furthermore, in terms of the appointment, the petitioner has to remain on probation for a period of one year from the date of joining and his appointment is purely temporary and terminable at any time with a month’s notice without any compensation. But the authority, while issuing the order impugned Page 6 of 17 // 7 // dated 07.06.2016 as per the terms of the order of the appointment and Regulation 17(d) of the Regulations, 1997, terminated the services of the petitioner with immediate effect and in lieu of one month notice period is granted one month’s salary. In one hand the impugned office order indicates that reliance has been placed on the terms and conditions of the appointment order issued in favour of the petitioner, but on the other hand the appointment order clearly indicates that he shall remain on probation for a period of one year from the date of joining and also the appointment is purely temporary and terminable at any time with a month’s notice and without any compensation. But notice of one month has not been given to the petitioner, rather his service has been terminated by granting one month salary in lieu of one month notice period, which is contrary to the terms of the appointment issued in favour of the petitioner. The sequence of events clearly indicates that the authorities are after the petitioner for some reason and other and the termination itself during probation period is construed to be a punitive one which casts stigma than that of termination simplicitor. xxx xxx xxx is actually In Anoop Jaiswal (supra), the apex Court 17. held that termination of a probationer can be scrutinized by the Court by doing behind the formal order of discharge to find the real cause of action and the simple order of discharge of probationer on ground of unsuitability passed before completion of his probation upon based which period, report/recommendation of the concerned authority indicating commission of alleged misconduct by the probationer being a punitive one, which the Court should come to a conclusion it is in violation of Article 311 of Constitution of India. But the said question does not arise in view of the fact that the petitioner’s performance was not satisfactory on various grounds and on eight months of continuance of the probationer, the performance has been observed. Accordingly, the authority having not satisfied with the performance passed the impugned order. In Diptiprakash 18. (Supra) termination of service of a probationer has been taken in to consideration on the basis of the allegation made against him, where the apex Court held whether ‘foundation’ or ‘motive’ for such termination is to be Banerjee Page 7 of 17 // 8 // examined and if the allegation against the probationer held, the foundation and not mere motive for his termination, no enquiry conducted, therefore, the apex Court held that termination is held to be bad. Thus, on the basis of the facts mentioned above, it is to be examined the foundation and motive behind the order of termination issued in favour of the petitioner. This Court, after lifting the veil, found that the order of termination cannot sustain in the eye of law”. 5. Mr. S. Jena, learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State on the other hand made his submission basing on the stand taken in the respective counter affidavits so filed by Opposite Party Nos.3 and 4. 5.1. Learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State contended that after being appointed as a regular Constable vide order dtd.21.01.2013 under Annexure-2, Petitioner was deputed to undergo the training in Police Training School, SW, Range, Koraput. In terms of the direction so issued, Petitioner joined in the Training School to undergo the required training. But by making an application on 26.02.2013 under Annexure-B/2, Petitioner remained on leave for the period from 26.02.2013 to 28.02.2013. Even though the application for leave so made by the Petitioner was allowed for the period from 26.02.2013 to 28.02.2013, but Petitioner never joined on 01.03.2013 and he only rejoined on 12.03.2013 after overstaying the leave. 5.2. It is contended that after joining on 12.03.2013, when Petitioner again remained absent from the Training w.e.f. 14.03.2013, Petitioner was show caused by the Principal of the Training School under Annexure-C/3-Series on Page 8 of 17 // 9 // 14.02.2013 and the said show cause was also duly received by the Petitioner on 16.03.2013. 5.3. It is contended that on the face of such show-cause issued on 14.03.2013 with due receipt of the same by the Petitioner on 16.03.2013, Petitioner never choose to join nor filed his reply and instead continued on unauthorized leave till 22.07.2013. 5.4. Even though after coming out from leave on 22.07.2013, Petitioner was allowed to join on 23.07.2013, but taking into account his misconduct during the period he was under training and probation, Opposite Party No.3 being the disciplinary authority taking recourse to the provisions contained under Rule-668(a) and 825 of PMR issued the order of discharge vide order dtd.08.11.2013 under Annexure-3. 5.5. It is also contended that even though Petitioner has taken a plea that he remained on medical leave for the period from 12.03.2013 to 23.07.2013, but no document was ever produced before the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority, showing therein that Petitioner was on medical leave for the said period. 5.6. It is further contended that since on the face of the show cause dtd.14.03.2013 so received by the Petitioner on 16.03.2013, he never choose to join till 22.07.2013 nor filed his reply, that amounts to willful misconduct on the part of the Petitioner during the time he was under probation. Page 9 of 17 // 10 // Since the Petitioner during the relevant time was on probation, no disciplinary proceeding was required to be initiated in view of the provisions contained under PMR- 668-A and taking into account his misconduct while undergoing such training, he was rightly discharged vide order dtd.08.11.2013 under Annexure-3. 5.7. It is also contended that the appellate authority who happens to be the Opposite Party No.2 on due consideration of the appeal, rejected the same vide order dtd.20.04.2016 under Annexure-5. 5.8. Learned Addl. Government Advocate for the State in support of his aforesaid submission relied on the following decisions:- 1. Registrar, High Court of Gujarat and Another vs. C.G. Sharma, reported in (2005) I SCC 132. 2. State of Punjab and Others vs. Bhagwan Singh, reported (2002) 9 SCC-636. in 3. Paramjit Singh vs. Director, Public Instructions (Schools) & Others, reported in (2010) 14 SCC 416. 4. Muir Mills Unit of NTC (U.P.) Ltd. vs. Swayam Prakash Srivastava & Another, reported in (2007) 1 SCC- 491 State of Odisha & Others vs. Karunakar Biswal and 5. another. 5.9. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of C.G. Sharma in Para-43 has held as follows:- “43. But the facts and circumstances in the case on hand is entirely different and the administrative side of the High Court and the Full court were right in taking the decision to terminate the services of the respondent, rightly so, on the basis of the records Page 10 of 17 // 11 // placed before them. We are also satisfied, after perusing the Confidential Reports and other relevant Vigilance files etc. that the respondent is not entitled to continue as a Judicial officer. The order of termination is termination simplicitor and not punitive in nature and, therefore, no opportunity needs to be given to the respondent herein. Since the overall performance of the respondent was found to be unsatisfactory by the High Court during the period of probation, it was decided by the High Court that the services of the respondent during the period of probation of the respondent be terminated because of his unsuitability for the post. In this view of the matter, order of termination simplicitor cannot be said to be violative of Arts. 14, 16 and 311 of the Constitution of India. The law on the point is crystalised that the probationer remains probationer unless he has been confirmed on the basis of the work evaluation. Under the relevant Rules under which the respondent was appointed as a Civil Judge, there is no provision for automatic or deemed confirmation and/or deemed appointment on regular establishment or post, and in that view of the matter, the contentions of the respondent that the respondent's services were deemed to have been continued on the expiry of the probation period, are misconceived”. 5.10. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bhagwan Singh in Para-4 to 6 has held as follows:- “4. This aforesaid order to the extent it stated that the officer was unlikely to prove a good police officer, was in terms of the relevant Rule 12.21 applicable to the respondent. In our view, when a probationer is discharged during the period of probation and if for the purpose of discharge, a particular assessment of his work is to be made, and the authorities referred to such an assessment of his work, while passing the order of discharge, that cannot be held to amount to stigma. 5. The other sentence in the impugned order is, that the performance of the officer on the whole was “not satisfactory”. Even that does not amount to any stigma. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, contended that the reference in the impugned order to the reports of the Inspectors on the basis of which the above assessment was made, would itself amount to stigma. This again cannot be accepted. The said reference has also become necessary because the respondent was working under the said officers and it was their assessment that was referred to and that was the source for the opinion expressed by the competent authority to discharge the respondent. The learned District Judge and the High Court were, therefore in error in treating that the removal order caused stigma”. Page 11 of 17 // 12 // 5.11. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Paramjit Singh in Para-8 has held as follows:- “8. It is a settled legal position that termination of a probationer on account of his non-satisfactory performance can never be treated as `penal'. In spite of the said settled legal position, the Tribunal considered termination as `penal' and the said view was confirmed by the High Court. In the circumstances, we do not approve the reasoning of the Tribunal confirmed by the High Court that the termination of the aforestated teachers was penal in nature. As the termination was not penal in nature, no departmental inquiry was required to be conducted before the termination”. 5.12. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Swayam Prakash Srivastava in Para-44 to 46 has held as follows:- “44. Also in the case of Registrar, High Court of Gujarat & Anr vs. C.G.Sharma (2005) 1 SCC 132, it was observed that an employee who is on probation can be terminated from services due to unsatisfactory work. 45. This Court's decision in the case of P.N. Verma vs. Sanjay Gandhi PGI of Medical Studies (supra), can be referred to in this context, where it was held by this court that, the services of a probationer can be terminated at any time before confirmation, provided that such termination is not stigmatic. This Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. VK Chourasiya 1999 SCC (L&S) 1155 also has held that in the event of a non-stigmatic termination of the services of a probationer, principles of audi alteram partem are not applicable. 46. We are also of the view that the award of the Labour Court is perverse as it had directed grant of backwages without giving any finding on the gainful employment of respondent No.1 and held that the discontinuance of the services of a probationer was illegal without giving any finding to the effect that the disengagement of respondent No.1 was in any manner stigmatic. The decision in the case of MP State Electricity Board vs. Jarina Bee (Smt) (supra), this court held that payment of full back wages was not the natural consequence of setting aside an order of reinstatement. In the instant case, though the termination was as far back as in 1983, the finding on unemployment. This Court in a recent case of State of Punjab vs. Bhagwan Singh (2002) 9 SCC 636 has held that even if the termination order of the probationer refers to the performance being 'not satisfactory', such an order cannot be said to be stigmatic and the termination would be valid”. Industrial Adjudicator has not given any Page 12 of 17 // 13 // 5.13. Hon’ble Court in the case of Karunakar Biswal in Para-6 & 9 has held as follows:- “6. For just and proper adjudication of the case, PMR 668- A is quoted below:- “Removal or reversion of officers appointed direct or promoted on probation: The following rules shall govern first appointments and on promotion of police and ministerial officers as detailed in Appendix -41. (a) All officers shall, in the first instance, be appointed or promoted on probation, where the period of probation is not otherwise provide for the rules, it shall be period of two years in the case of executive officers and one year in the case of ministerial officers. The authority empowered to make such appointment or promotion may, at any time during such probationary period and without the formalities laid down in Rule 828,remove an executive officer directly appointed or revert such an officer promoted who has not fulfilled the conditions of his appointment or who has shown himself unfit for such appointment or promotion. No appeal shall lie in such cases.’ from 10.09.2012 leave with effect There is no dispute that opposite party no.1 was granted 15 days paternity to 25.09.2012 as per prevailing circular. But instead of Page 7 of 12 joining, he overstayed till 22.03.2013 without any intimation. Subsequently, he joined on 23.03.2013, after a long gap of 179 days, on the plea of death of his grandmother, but did not produce any document to justify such plea. On being asked, opposite party no.1 also did not intimate about the death of his grandmother nor responded in the matter, which proves his gross indisciplined conduct. But fact remains, according to PMR 668-A, the period of unauthorized absence, after lapse of paternity leave, was treated as no pay retrospectively after his removal from service. The D.G. & I.G. of police has rightly considered the grievance of opposite party no.1 and passed a judicious order upholding the orders of the appointing authority in accordance with existing rules. Once the leave was allowed, but for some reason or other opposite party no.1 overstayed and subsequently the petitioners allowed opposite party no.1 to continue in service and no action was taken for his over- stay period at the relevant point of time. Subsequently, when he took leave on the plea of death of his grandmother, but Page 13 of 17 // 14 // actually such thing had Page 8 of 12 not happened, on such falsity of taking leave, he was removed from service vide order dated 07.06.2013. Such order was passed after more than four years of the leave already availed by opposite party no.1 and while passing such order, it appears that the authorities had not complied the principle of natural justice by giving opportunity of hearing to opposite party no.1. More so, such action of the authorities in removing opposite party no.1 from service is beyond the ambit and power vested on the appointing authority terms of PMR 668-A. in Consequentially, such exercise of power can be construed to be illegal one”. xxx xxx xxx 9. In the light of the law laid down by the apex Court, the tribunal considered the case of opposite party no.1 and passed order by holding that opposite party no.1, who was a constable, was not within the probation period, for which the authorities could not have taken recourse to the provisions contained in PMR 668-A to remove him from the post of Sepoy. The said order was passed upon instruction of SAP Hdqrs., Odisha, Cuttack, communicated, vide letter dated 30.05.2013 read with PMR 668-A without issuing any show cause to opposite party no.1. Since opposite party No.1 had completed more than four years of service by the time the impugned order was passed, it was not open to the petitioners to take any action on opposite party no.1, other than through a departmental proceeding and the procedure prescribed in Appendix 49 of PMR. Therefore, non-adherence to the procedure as envisaged under law by conducting a Page 11 of 12 Page 12 of 12 departmental proceeding or by adhering to Appendix 49 of PMR, the order of removal cannot be sustained. 6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties and considering the submissions made, this Court finds that Petitioner while continuing as a contractual S.P.O, he was appointed as a regular Constable vide order of appointment issued on 21.01.2013 under Annexure-2. Petitioner thereafter was deputed to undergo training in Police Training School, S.W, Range, Koraput, where he joined to undergo the said training. But while so undergoing the training, Petitioner made an application to take leave for the period from 26.02.2013 to 02.03.2013 vide Page 14 of 17 // 15 // Annexure-B/3. But as found from Annexure-B/3, Petitioner was allowed leave till 28.02.2013 by the Asst. Commandant, 4th S.S.Bn.-cum-Training-In Charge, RTPS, Koraput. 6.1 Even though Petitioner was allowed leave up to 28.02.2013, but he never joined after availing such leave on 01.03.2013 and joined only on 12.03.2013 after overstaying the leave without giving any intimation and application. After such joining of the Petitioner on 12.03.2013, when he again remained on unauthorized leave w.e.f. 14.03.2013, a show cause was issued to him by the Principal of the Training Center on 14.03.2013, which was duly received by the Petitioner on 16.03.2013, as found from Annexure-C/3- Series. 6.2. Even though Petitioner received the show cause on 16.03.2013, but on the face of such a show cause, he never joined nor filed his reply and remained on unauthorized leave till 22.07.2013. Petitioner though has taken a stand that Petitioner remained on medical leave during the period from 14.03.2013 to 22.07.2013, but no document are in record showing that the Petitioner was on medical leave for the aforesaid period. No application is also enclosed to the writ petition, showing that Petitioner while submitting the reply to the show cause dtd. 14.03.2013, has taken a stand that he was on medical leave for the period in question. In absence of any such document and /or application, this Court is unable to accept the contentions raised by the Page 15 of 17 // 16 // learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner that Petitioner was on medical leave for the period in question. 6.3. Since the Petitioner after his joining in the Training School remained on unauthorized absence for the period from 01.03.2013 to 12.03.2013 and thereafter from 14.03.2013 to 22.07.2013 without making any application to that effect, this Court placing reliance on the decision in the case of C.G. Sharma and Other decisions relied on by the learned State Counsel is of the view that Petitioner has been rightly discharged from his services vide the impugned order dtd.08.11.2013 of Opposite Party No.3 under Annexure-3 in view of the provisions contained under PMR- 668-A, so confirmed by the appellate authority-Opposite Party No.2 vide order dtd.20.04.2016 under Annexure-5. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the Petitioner has got no applicability to the facts of the present case as the stand taken by the Petitioner that he was on medical leave, is not supported by any document or application. Not only that since the misconduct has occurred during the period Petitioner was under training and probation, the decisions so relied on are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 6.4. In view of the aforesaid analysis and placing reliance on decisions cited by the learned Addl. Government Advocate, this Court finds no illegality or irregularity with the impugned order of discharge dtd.08.11.2013 so passed by Opposite Party No.3 under Annexure-3 and further Page 16 of 17 // 17 // confirmed by Opposite Party No.2 vide order dtd.20.04.2016 under Annexure-5. 7. The Writ Petition accordingly stands dismissed. (Biraja Prasanna Satapathy) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 26th July, 2024/Subrat Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SUBRAT KUMAR BARIK Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Date: 06-Aug-2024 13:41:09 Page 17 of 17