The High Court
Case Details
A.F.R. IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.26193 OF 2022 In the matter of writ petition under Article-226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. ---- Power Grid Corporation of India Ltd., Balangir -versus- The Collector-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Balangir & Another …. Petitioner …. Opposite Parties Appeared in this case by Hybrid Arrangement (Virtual/Physical Mode: =============================================== For Petitioner - Mr. Aditya Narayan Das, Advocate. For Opp. Parties - Mr.G.N. Rout, Addl. Standing Counsel, Mr. M.K. Mohapatra, Advocate (O.P. No.2). CORAM: MR. JUSTICE D.DASH MR. JUSTICE G.SATAPATHY DATE OF HEARING:21.11.2023 :DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04.12.2023 D.Dash,J. The Petitioner by filing this Petition has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Article-226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in impeaching an order dated 23.08.2022 passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Balangir (as then was) in the matter of an Interim Application arising out a reference under section-18 of the Land W.P.(C) NO.26193 OF 2022 Page 1 of 33 {{ 2 }} Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the L.A. Act) standing numbered as L.A. Case No.03 of 2012. The Petitioner has accordingly prayed for quashing the said reference made under section 18 of the L.A. Act’ by the Collector-cum-Land Acquisition Officer, Balangir, the Opposite Party No.1. 2. The Facts necessary for the purpose are stated as under:- (A) The Petitioner is a Public Sector Undertaking of the Government of India, incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, having its registered office at B-9, Qutab Institutional Area, Katwaria Sarai, New Delhi-110016 and its Corporate Office at “Saudamini”, Plot No.02, Sector-29, Gurgaon-122001. Its Regional Headquarter for the Odisha Projects is at Plot No.4 Unit- 41, Niladri Vihar, Chandrasekharpur, Bhubaneswar-751021. The Petitioner indulges in the activities which are in Public Interest and sub serve the National Interest being engaged in Power Transmission business. (B) Land in mouza / village Madhiapali under Khata No.167/131, Plot No.400 of kisam Atamamuli, measuring an area of Ac.0.50 decimals belonging to the Opposite Party No.2 with other lands owned and possessed by others were acquired by the State by notification under section 6 of the L.A. Act dated Page 2 of 33 W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 {{ 3 }} 16.07.2010 published in the Gazette of the State on 19.07.2010 for construction of Power Grid Sub-Station by the present Petitioner. The Land Acquisition Officer (Opposite Party No.1) made the award under section 11 of the L.A. Act on 12.10.2010. The Opposite Party No.2, thereafter, was served with notice under sub-section (2) of section 12 of the L.A. Act on 23.10.2010. Upon receipt of the said notice, the Opposite Party No.2 received the payment of this awarded amount of Rs.25,773/- as compensation for the said acquisition of his land. Thereafter, the Opposite Party No.2 filed an application signed and verified on 25.01.2011 before the Land Acquisition Officer (Opposite Party No.1) advancing a prayer for referring the matter to the Civil Court for determination of proper compensation for the acquired land under Section 18 of the L.A. Act. The application under Annexure-4 came to be received on 29.01.2011 by the Opposite Party No.1 as it finds reflected on the top left corner from the initial put thereon acknowledging its receipt. The Opposite Party No.1 by letter dated 09.09.2011 made the reference as per section 18 of the L.A. Act for determination of proper compensation, keeping in view the provision contained in section 23 of the said Act after giving opportunities of hearing W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 3 of 33 {{ 4 }} to the Petitioner who had borne burden of payment of compensation and may be so required to shoulder the liability on that count as per the decision of the Referral Court as well as the Opposite Party No.2 (Claimant). (C) When the reference proceeding was in progress, the Petitioner filed a petition nomenclaturing the same as one under Order-7 Rule-11 (d) read with section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘the CPC’) stating therein that the Opposite Party No.1 has made reference when at the time, when he had no such power and authority as the right to have a reference resting with the Opposite Party No.2 (Claimant) by then stood extinguished due to efflux of time. We may state here that the nomenclature of the petition as one under Order-7 Rule-11(d) read with section-151 of the Code is not correct. Be that as it may,
Legal Reasoning
reading the petition in entirety, we find that the prayer advanced therein is essentially for discharge of the reference without being answered as sought for by the Opposite Party No.1. (D) The Opposite Party No.2 filed his objection in stating that the petition filed by the Petitioner is devoid of merit. W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 4 of 33 {{ 5 }} (E) The Referral Court upon hearing the parties before it and on going through the record found on facts that the Opposite Party No.2 had presented the application before the Opposite Party No.1 53 days beyond statutory period of six weeks from the date of receipt notice under sub-section 2 of section 12 of the L.A. Act. The Referral Court has held as under:- “The aforesaid provision enumerated u/s.18(2)(b) makes it clear that every application for reference shall be made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under Section 12, sub-section (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire. In the case in hand, the documents of reference submitted by the L.A.O., Balangir clearly indicates that award U/s.11 of the Act has been passed by the Collector on 12.10.2010, notice U/s.12(2) has been received on 23.10.2010 but the petitioners have moved the present application for reference on 25.01.2011 i.e. 53 days beyond the statutory period of six weeks from the date of receipt of notice u/s.12(2). The aforesaid facts have not been denied or disputed by the petitioners in any manner.” (F) Having said as above, the Referral Court proceeded to consider the question as to whether it can hear the reference filed beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under section 18 of the L.A. Act. Finally, the Referral Court has gone to condone the W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 5 of 33 {{ 6 }} delay of 53 days in filing the application by the Opposite Party No.2 for making the reference. The said order passed by the Referral Court on 23.08.2022 has been called in question in the present writ petition. 3. From the facts narrated above, it stands undisputed that award had been passed by the Opposite Party No.1 under Section 11 of the L.A. Act on 12.10.2010. Notice as required under sub-section 2 of section 12 of the said Act was sent and received by the Opposite Party No.2 on 23.10.2010 and pursuant to the said notice, the Opposite Party No.2 thereafter filed an application dated 25.01.2011 which was received by the Opposite Party No.1 on 29.01.2011 as it reveals from the initial put on the top left of the application. On receiving the said application, the Opposite Party No.1 has made the reference under section 18 of the L.A. Act to the Civil Court for determining the proper compensation for the acquired land etc. vide its letter dated 12.09.2011. 4. In view of the point raised for consideration, for proper appreciation, at the outset, it is felt apposite to place the provision contained under Section 18 of the L.A. Act. The same reads as under:- “18. Reference to Court.-(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 6 of 33 {{ 7 }} determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the person interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award taken: Provided that every such application shall made- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award; (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire.” (3) Any order made by the Collector on an application under this section shall be subject to revision by the High Court, as if the Collector were a Court subordinate to the High Court, as if the meaning of Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908). : Orissa Act No.19 of 1948, Section 2. A close reading of the aforesaid provision, posits three situations for which the period of limitation had been provided for making an application for reference. Firstly, if the person making application was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, the application must be filed within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award. In the given case, it is not disputed that the W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 7 of 33 {{ 8 }} Opposite Party No.2 was not present when the award was made. Therefore, section 18(2)(a) has no applicability to the facts of this case. The second and third situations are envisaged by Section 18(2)(b) of the L.A. Act. The second situation envisaged is where a notice is received under section 12(2) of the L.A. Act. In such a case, the period of limitation prescribed is six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice or within six months from the date of award of the Collector whichever period shall first expire. In the case at hand, the Opposite Party No.2 was served within the notice under section 12(2) of the L.A Act on 23.10.2010. The Opposite Party No.1 received the compensation on 30.10.2010. The Opposite Party No.2 had made the application for reference to the Opposite Party No.1 on 29.01.2011 having signed and verifying the application on 25.01.2011. In any case, the period of six weeks from the date of receipt of the notice or even from the date of receipt of the compensation which was on 30.10.2010 even by the time, the Opposite Party No.2 signed on the application had already expired. The Referral Court having taken the date of service of notice under section 12(2) of the Act upon the Opposite Party No.2 and the date when the Opposite Party No.2 had put his signature on the application made before the W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 8 of 33 {{ 9 }} Opposite Party No.1 has found the delay of 53 days to have occurred in making such application. The Referral Court has therefore, proceeded to find out as to if that delay is condonable in ascertaining as to if the Opposite Party No.2 was prevented by sufficient reason for not presenting the application before the Opposite Party No.1 within the period of limitation as prescribed under section 18(2)(b) of the L.A. Act. It has finally ruled in favour of the Opposite Party No.2 in condoning the delay. The delay appears to have been condoned by pressing into service, the provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act and in that analogy. 5. We have heard Mr. Aditya Narayan Das, learned Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. G.N. Rout, learned Additional Standing Counsel at length. None appeared on behalf of the Opposite Party No.2 despite opportunity. Mr. Das, with vehemence argued that the Reference being bad in law as by the time, the application was filed by the Opposite Party No.2. The Opposite Party No.1 had no power to make the Reference as by then the time period for the Opposite Party No.2 to exercise said right had expired; the Referral Court had no valid Reference to proceed as per law. He further submitted that there being no provision under the W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 9 of 33 {{ 10 }} Scheme of section-18 of the L.A. Act for condonation of delay in applying for making the Reference by the Opposite Party No.1 beyond the time stipulated and that power when the Opposite Party No.1 was not having the Referral Court could not have assumed such power by reading that provision of condonation and power into that section. He cited several decisions in support of his submission which would be referred to in our discussion to follow. Mr. G.N. rout, learned Additional Standing Counsel however submitted that as per the provision under section 18 of the L.A. Act, neither the Opposite Party No.1 nor the Referral Court has the power to condone the delay in filing the application by the Claimant after the award for making a reference under section 18 of the L.A. Act. 6. The short questions which arises for being answered by us for disposal of the present writ petition are as under:- “Whether the Referral Court which assumed the jurisdiction of a reference being made by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 18 of the L.A. Act for answering the reference in determining the proper compensation since the claimant is not satisfied to the compensation as has been awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer, can rule upon the validity of the reference made by the Land Acquisition Officer in saying that the reference being made on a application filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under section 18(2)(b) of W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 10 of 33 {{ 11 }} the L.A. Act, and as such being not in accordance with law, in saying that it has no jurisdiction to answer the reference and therefore discharge the reference? And; Whether Referral Court can assume the jurisdiction even finding the reference to have been made on the basis of an application filed by the person interested beyond the period of limitation prescribed under section 18 of the L.A. Act by condoning the delay in making the application for reference before the Land Acquisition Officer?” 7. It is to be remembered that the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984) was enacted prescribing the limitation to exercise the power under section 4, 6 and 11 and also excluded the time occupied due to stay so granted by the Court. Taking cognizance of the limitation prescribed in proviso to sub-section-(2) of section 18 of the L.A.Act, the provisions of the Limitation Act were not expressly extended. Though provision contained in section 29(2) of the Limitation Act is available and the limitation in the proviso to the sub- section (2) of section 18 of the L.A.Act may be treated to be a special law, in the absence of such an application by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act (68 of 1984), it is seen that the L.A.Act specifically maintains a distinction between the Collector and the Court and the Collector/ L.A.O. performs only the statutory duties under the Act, including one while making reference under section 18 of the L.A. Act. W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 11 of 33 {{ 12 }} It would be thus difficult to construe that the Collector/L.A.O. while making reference under section 18, as statutory authority still acts as a Court for the purpose of section 5 of the Limitation Act being pressed into service. In view of the specific limitation provided under proviso to section 18(2) of the L.A.Act, whether the provision contained in sub- section (2) of section 29 can be applied to the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 of the L.A. Act is before us for consideration. Therefore, section 5 of the Limitation Act if can be applied for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 of the L.A. Act is precisely the field of our examination. 8. In case of Mahadeo Bajirao Patil vrs. State of Maharashtra; (2005) 7 SCC 440, the Appeal was before the Apex Court at the behest of the State. The sole question before the Court was whether the application filed by the claimant was barred by limitation and therefore, there was no power with the Land Acquisition Officer or the Court to condone the delay in filing an application under section 18 of the L.A. Act. The answer has been returned in the affirmative and accordingly, the order of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay, in setting aside the award passed by the Referral Court as a time barred reference has been upheld. W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 12 of 33 {{ 13 }} 9. Before the Apex Court in State of Karnataka Vrs. Laxuman; (2005) 8 SCC 709, the challenge was to the order of the learned Single Judge of Karnataka High Court by which the revision of the State challenging the order of the Referral Court, purporting to the condone delay in filing an application under section 18(3)(b) of the L.A. Act as amended in Karnataka. The Referral Court had condoned the delay and the High Court had refused to interfere with the same. It has been held therein by the Apex Court that provision of section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be available in such matter since the consequence flowing from the claimant not seeking to enforce his right under section 18(3)(b) of the LA Act in a case where the reference was not made within the time mandated by the statute was got over by the theory that there was no provision for extinguishment of the right and that a party cannot be penalized for the failure of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference. The Apex Court said that under the scheme of the section 18 of the LA Act as in Karnataka, thus the claimant looses his right to move the Court for reference on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of his making an application to the Deputy Commissioner under section 18 (1) of the Act within the period fixed by section 18(2) of the Act. This position is now settled by the decision of this W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 13 of 33 {{ 14 }} Court in The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore vs. Thakoredas, Major and others; (1997) 11 SCC 412. This loss of right to move the court precludes him from seeking a remedy from the court in terms of section 18 of the Act. This loss of right in the claimant puts an end to the right of the claimant to seek an enhancement of compensation. To say that the Deputy Commissioner can make a reference even after the right in that behalf is lost to the claimant would be incongruous. Once the right of the claimant to enforce his claim itself is lost on the scheme of section 18 of the Act, there is no question of the Deputy Commissioner who had violated the mandate of sub-section 3(a) of section 18 of the Act, reviving the right of the claimant by making a reference at his sweet- will and pleasure, whatever be the inducement or occasion for doing so. On a harmonious understanding of the scheme of the Act in the light of the general principle that even though a right may not be extinguished, the remedy may become barred, it would be appropriate to hold that on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of an application for reference made within time under section 18(1) of the Act, the remedy of the claimant to have a reference gets extinguished and the right to have an enhancement becomes unenforceable. The Deputy Commissioner would not be entitled to W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 14 of 33 {{ 15 }} revive a claim which has thus become unenforceable due to lapse of time or non-diligence on the part of the claimant. 10. At paragraph 26 of the Judgment, the Apex Court’s view is as follows:- “Then the question is, whether in the context of Section 18 of the Karnataka amendment, the decision of this Court in Thakoredas (supra) and our discussion as above, Section 5 of the Limitation Act could be invoked or would apply to an application under section 18(3)(b) of the Act. This Court has held that section 5 of the Limitation Act has no application to proceedings before the Collector or Deputy Commissioner here, while entertaining an application for reference. We see no reason not to accept that position. Then arises the question whether section 5 could be invoked before the Land Acquisition Court while making an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act. We have held in agreement with the earlier Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, that the right to have a reference enforced through court or through the Deputy Commissioner becomes extinguished on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of the application for reference made in time. Consistent with this position it has necessarily to be held that section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be available since the consequence of not enforcing the right to have a reference made on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as obtaining in Karnataka, is to put an end to the right to have a reference at all. Since in that sense it is an extinguishment of the right, the right cannot be revived by resorting to section 5 of the Limitation Act. We may incidentally Page 15 of 33 W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 {{ 16 }} notice that in Thakoredas (supra) this Court rejected the application under section 18(3)(b) of the Act which was beyond time, though, of course, there was no specific discussion on this aspect.” 11. In case of Steel Authority of India Limited Vrs. SUTNI Sangam and Others; 2009 (16) SCC 1, it has been held as under:- “45. When the statute provides for a law of limitation, compliance thereof is mandatory. For the purpose of applying the statute of limitation, the courts should, however, be liberal in their approach. section 18(2)(b) of the Act provides for the maximum period of six months from the date of the Collector’s award. It was, therefore, impermissible to direct references to be made after a long period particularly when the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be said to have any application. 46. In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) & Anr. v. Shah Manilal Chandulal & ors., (1979) 2 SCC 572 the Hon’ble Court has held:-: "8. The right to make application in writing is provided under section 18(1). The proviso to sub- section (2) prescribes the limitation within which the said right would be exercised by the claimant or dissatisfied owner. In Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra, this Court was called upon to decide in a reference under section 18 made by the Collector to the court beyond the period of limitation, whether the court can go behind the reference and determine the compensation, though the application for W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 16 of 33 {{ 17 }} reference under Section 18 was barred by limitation? This Court had held that the Collector is required under section 18 to make a reference on the fulfillment of certain conditions, namely, (i) written application by interested person who has not accepted the award; (ii) nature of the objections taken for not accepting the award; and (iii) time within which the application shall be made. In paragraph 22 after elaborating those conditions as conditions precedent to be fulfilled, it held that the power to make a reference under section 18 is circumscribed by the conditions laid down therein and one such condition is a condition regarding limitation to be found in the proviso. The Collector acts as a statutory authority. If the application is not made within time, the Collector will not have the power to make reference. In order to determine the limitation on his own power, the Collector will have to decide whether the application presented by the claimant is or is not within time and specify the conditions laid down under section 18. Even if the reference is wrongly made by the Collector, the court will have to determine the validity of the reference because the very jurisdiction of the court to hear a reference depends upon a proper reference being made under section 18. If the reference is not proper there is no jurisdiction in the court to hear the reference. It was, therefore, held that it is the duty of the court to see that the statutory conditions laid down in section 18 including the one relating to limitation, have been complied with and the application is not time-barred. It is not debarred from Page 17 of 33 W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 {{ 18 }} satisfying itself that the reference which it is called upon to hear is a valid reference. It has to proceed to determine compensation and if it is time-barred, it is not called upon to hear the same. It is only a valid reference which gives jurisdiction to the court. Therefore, the court has to ask itself the question whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the reference. If the reference is beyond the prescribed period by the proviso to sub-section (2) of section 18 of the Act and if it finds that it was not so made, the court would decline to answer the reference. Accordingly, it was held that since the reference was made beyond the limitation, the court was justified in refusing to answer the reference. 9. It would thus be clear that one of the conditions precedent to make a valid reference to the court is that the application under section 18(1) shall be in writing and made within six weeks from the date of the award when the applicant was present either in person or through counsel, at the time of making of the award by the Collector under clause (a) of proviso to sub-section (2). The Collector, when he makes the reference, acts as a statutory authority. 50. We will, however, proceed on the assumption that most of the awardees were poor and illiterate and they were not aware of their rights. It is one thing to say that an Association, like the first respondent, takes up its cause but it would be another thing to say that only due to the said reason the mandatory provisions of the statutes would not be necessary to be complied with. W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 18 of 33 {{ 19 }} 12. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Bhagaban Das & Others Vrs. State of Utter Pradesh & Others and Nayantara Gupta and others –vrs- State of Uttar Pradesh and others (2010) 3 SCC 545, considered the following questions:- (a) Whether an appeal would lie under Section 54 of the Act against the order of the Collector refusing to make a reference? (b) Whether the Collector can condone the delay in filing an application seeking reference, if sufficient cause is shown? (c) Whether the period of six months under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 18 of the Act should be reckoned from the date of knowledge of the award of the Collector or from the date of award itself? (d) Whether the appellants were entitled to relief? 13. Question Nos.(b) and (c) with which we are concerned in so far as the case before us, have been answered as under:- “14. The proviso to section 18 requires that an application by a person interested, to the Collector, seeking reference of his claim for higher compensation for determination by the Court, shall be made within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award, if such person was present or represented before the Collector, at the time when the award was made. If not, the application for reference shall have to be made within six weeks of the receipt of the notice of the Collector under section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award, whichever period shall first expire. W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 19 of 33 {{ 20 }} 15. In Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) & Anr. v. Shah Manilal Chandulal & Ors.;1996 (9) SCC 414, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that in view of the special limitation provided under the proviso to section 18 of the Act, section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, cannot be applied to the proviso to section 18 of the Act; and therefore, the benefit of sections 4 to 24 of Limitation Act 1963, will not be available in regard to applications under section 18(1) of the Act. It was also held that as the Collector is not a court when he discharges his functions as a statutory authority under section 18(1) of the Act, section 5 of the Limitation Act 1963 cannot be invoked for extension of the period of limitation prescribed under the proviso to section 18(2) of the Act. 16. As the Collector is not a civil court and as the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 have not been made applicable to proceedings before the Collector under the Act, and as there is no provision in the Act enabling the Land Acquisition Collector to extend the time for making an application for reference, the Collector cannot entertain any application for extension, nor extend the time for seeking reference, even if there are genuine and bonafide grounds for condoning delay. This view was reiterated in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. S.U.T.N.I. Sangam and others; 2009 (16) SCC 1. Therefore, the observation of the High Court that an application for condonation of delay could have been made by the person interested, is incorrect. The question No.c has been answered as follows:- W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 20 of 33 {{ 21 }} 18. Clause (b) of the proviso to section 18 requires a person interested who has not accepted the award, to make an application to the Collector requiring him to refer the matter for determination of the court, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12(2) or within six months from the date of the Collector’s award whichever period first expires, if he or his representative was not present before the Collector at the time of making of the award. 19. The reason for providing six months from the date of the award for making an application seeking reference, where the applicant did not receive a notice under section 12(2) of the Act, while providing only six weeks from the date of receipt of notice under section 12(2) of the Act for making an application for reference where the applicant has received a notice under section 12(2) of the Act is obvious. When a notice under section 12(2) of the Act is received, the land owner or person interested is made aware of all relevant particulars of the award which enables him to decide whether he should seek reference or not. On the other hand, if he only comes to know that an award has been made, he would require further time to make enquiries or secure copies so that he can ascertain the relevant particulars of the award. 20. The term ’date of the Collector’s award’ occurring in clause (b) of the proviso, has been interpreted by this Court in several cases. We may refer to a few of them. 21) In Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. Dy. Land Acquisition Officer; AIR 1961 SC 1500, the Hon’ble Apex Court held: W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 21 of 33 {{ 22 }} "5…….Therefore, if the award made by the Collector is in law no more than an offer made on behalf of the Government to the owner of the property then the making of the award as properly understood must involve the communication of the offer to the party concerned. That is the normal requirement under the contract law and its applicability to cases of award made under the Act cannot be reasonably excluded. Thus considered the date of the award cannot be determined solely by reference to the time when the award is signed by the Collector or delivered by him in his office; it must involve the consideration of the question as to when it was known to the party concerned either actually or constructively. If that be the true position then the literal and mechanical construction of the words ’the date of the award’ occurring in the relevant section would not be appropriate. There is yet another point which leads to the same conclusion. If the award is treated as an administrative decision taken by the Collector in the matter of the valuation of the property sought to be acquired it is clear that the said decision ultimately affects the rights of the owner of the property and in that sense, like all decisions which affect persons, it is essentially fair and just that the said decision should be communicated to the said party. The knowledge of the party affected by such a decision, either actual or constructive, is an essential element which must be satisfied before the decision can be brought into force. Thus considered the making of the award cannot consist merely in the physical act of writing the award or signing it or even filing it in the office of the Collector; it must involve the communication of the said award to the party concerned either actually or W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 22 of 33 {{ 23 }} constructively. If the award is pronounced in the presence of the party whose rights are affected by it, it can be said to be made when pronounced. If the date for the pronouncement of the award is communicated to the party and it is accordingly pronounced on the date previously announced the award is said to be communicated to the said party even if the said party is not actually present on the date of its pronouncement. Similarly if without notice of the date of its pronouncement an award is pronounced and a party is not present, the award can be said to be made when it is communicated to the party later. The knowledge of the party affected by the award, either actual or constructive, being an essential requirement of fair play and natural justice the expression ’the date of the award’ used in the proviso must mean the date when the award is either communicated to the party or is known by him either actually or constructively. In our opinion, therefore, it would be unreasonable to construe the words ’from the date of the Collector’s award’ used in the proviso to Section 18 in a literal or mechanical way." 21. In State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaisar Jehan Begum & Anr.; AIR 1963 SC 1604, this Court reiterated the principles stated in Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh (supra) and further held as follows:- "5……..It seems clear to us that the ratio of the decision in Harish Chandra’s case (supra) is that the party affected by the award must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of six months will run from the date of that knowledge. Now, knowledge of the award does not mean a mere knowledge of the fact that an award has been made. The knowledge must relate to the essential contents of the award. These contents Page 23 of 33 W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 {{ 24 }} may be known either actually or constructively. If the award is communicated to a party under S. 12(2) of the Act, the party must be obviously fixed with knowledge of the contents of the award whether he reads it or not. Similarly when a party is present in court either personally or through his representative when the award is made by the Collector, it must be presumed that he knows the contents of the award. Having regard to the scheme of the Act we think that knowledge of the award must mean knowledge of the essential contents of the award." 23. In Parsottambhai Maganbhai Patel & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat through Dy. Collector Modasa & Anr.; 2005(7) SCC 431 and in Steel Authority of India Ltd. vs. S.U.T.N.I Sangam; 2009(16) SCC 1, the aforesaid principles were followed and reiterated by this Court. 24. When a land is acquired and an award is made under section 11 of the Act, the Collector becomes entitled to take possession of the acquired land. The award being only an offer on behalf of the Government, there is always a tendency on the part of the Collector to be conservative in making the award, which results in less than the market value being offered. 25. Invariably the land loser is required to make an application under section 18 of the Act to get the market value as compensation. The land loser does not get a right to seek reference to the civil court unless the award is made. This means that he can make an application seeking reference only when he knows that an award has been made. 26. If the words six months from the ‘date of the Collector’s award’ should be literally interpreted as referring to the date of the award and not the date of knowledge of the award, it will Page 24 of 33 W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 {{ 25 }} lead to unjust and absurd results. For example, the Collector may choose to make an award but not to issue any notice under section 12(2) of the Act, either due to negligence or oversight or due to any ulterior reasons. Or he may send a notice but may not bother to ensure that it is served on the land owner as required under section 45 of the Act. If the words ‘date of the Collector’s award’ are literally interpreted, the effect would be that on the expiry of six months from the date of award, even though the claimant had no notice of the award, he would lose the right to seek a reference. That will lead to arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination between those who are notified of the award and those who are not notified of the award. 27. Unless the procedure under the Act is fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory, it will run the risk of being branded as being violative of Article 14 as also Article 300A of the Constitution of India. To avoid such consequences, the words ‘date of the Collector’s award’ occurring in proviso (b) to section 18 requires to be read as referring to the date of knowledge of the essential contents of the award, and not the actual date of the Collector’s award. 14. In summing up at paragraph 28, the following positions have emerged from the interpretation of the proviso to section 18 of the L.A. Act as made by the Hon’ble Apex Court: “28. xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx (i) If the award is made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 25 of 33 {{ 26 }} make the application within six weeks from the date of the Collector’s award itself. (ii) If the award is not made in the presence of the person interested (or his authorised representative), he has to make the application seeking reference within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12(2). (iii) If the person interested (or his representative) was not present when the award is made, and if he does not receive the notice under Section 12(2) from the Collector, he has to make the application within six months of the date on which he actually or constructively came to know about the contents of the award. (iv) If a person interested receives a notice under section 12(2) of the Act, after the expiry of six weeks from the date of receipt of such notice, he cannot claim the benefit of the provision for six months for making the application on the ground that the date of receipt of notice under section 12(2) of the Act was the date of knowledge of the contents of the award. 29. A person who fails to make an application for reference within the time prescribed is not without remedy. It is open to him to make an application under section 28A of the Act, on the basis of an award of the court in respect of the other lands covered by the same acquisition notification, if there is an increase. Be that as it may.” 15. In case of Popat Bahiru Govardhane Vrs. Land Acquistiion Officer; (2013) SCC 765; although the Apex Court was considering the W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 26 of 33 {{ 27 }} question of limitation in filing the application under section 28(A) of the LA Act, the observations made at para-16, according to us has bearing on the present case and that run as under:- “It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” (See: The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta; AIR 1966 SC 529; and Rohitas Kumar & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 30)” 16. In case of Mohd. Hasnuddin v. State of Maharashtra; 1979 (2) SCC 572, the Apex Court was called upon to decide in a reference under section 18 made by the Collector to the court beyond the period of limitation, whether the court can go behind the reference and determine the compensation, though the application for reference under section 18 was barred by limitation? The Court held that the Collector is required under section 18 to make a reference on the fulfillment of certain conditions, namely, (i) Page 27 of 33 W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 {{ 28 }} written application by interested person who has not accepted the award; (ii) nature of the objections taken for not accepting the award; and (iii) time within which the application shall be made. In paragraph 22 after elaborating those conditions as conditions precedent to be fulfilled, it held that the power to make a reference under section 18 is circumscribed by the conditions laid down therein and one such condition is a condition regarding limitation to be found in the proviso. The Collector acts as a statutory authority. If the application is not made within time, the Collector will not have the power to make reference. In order to determine the limitation on his own power, the Collector will have to decide whether the application presented by the claimant is or is not within time and specify the conditions laid down under section 18. Even if the reference is wrongly made by the Collector, the court will have to determine the validity of the reference because the very jurisdiction of the court to hear a reference depends upon a proper reference being made under section 18. If the reference is not proper there is no jurisdiction in the court to hear the reference. It was, therefore, held that it is the duty of the court to see that the statutory conditions laid down in section 18 including the one relating to limitation, have been complied with and the application is not time- barred. It is not debarred from satisfying itself that the reference which it W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 28 of 33 {{ 29 }} is called upon to hear is a valid reference. It has to proceed to determine compensation and if it is time-barred, it is not called upon to hear the same. It is only a valid reference which gives jurisdiction to the court. Therefore, the court had to ask itself the question whether it has jurisdiction to entertain the reference. If the reference is beyond the prescribed period by the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 18 of the Act and if it finds that it was not so made, the court would decline to answer the reference. Accordingly, it was held that since the reference was made beyond the limitation, the Court was justified in refusing to answer the reference. It would thus be clear that one of the conditions precedent to make a valid reference to the court is that the application under section 18(1) shall be in writing and made within six weeks from the date of the award when the applicant was present either in person or through counsel, at the time of making of the award by the Collector under clause (a) of proviso to sub-section (2). The Collector, when he makes the reference, acts as a statutory authority. 17. In State of Punjab & Anr.v. Satinder Bir Singh; 1995 (3)SCC 330, a Bench of two Judges, was called upon to consider whether the application for reference under section 18 was barred by limitation and the direction issued by the court for making reference was valid in law. W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 29 of 33 {{ 30 }} The Collector made the award on August 1, 1970. The notice under section 12(2) was received by the respondent on September 22, 1970 and he received the compensation under protest on September 29, 1970. The application for reference under section 18 was made on January 21, 1971. The Collector rejected the application as being barred by limitation. The High Court in revision under section 115, CPC, similar to Gujarat Amendment, allowed the revision holding that since the notice did not contain all the details of the award, notice under section 12(2) was not valid. Therefore, there was no limitation. The Court reversing the view had held in paragraph 7 that the form of notice was not material since the respondent appeared and received the notice on September 22, 1970 and received the compensation under protest on September 29, 1970. The limitation began to run from the date of the receipt of the notice and by operation of clause (b) of the proviso to sub- section (2) of section 18 since the application was not made within six weeks from the date of the receipt of the notice, the application was barred by limitation prescribed in section 18(2). It does not depend on the ministerial act of communication of notice in any particular form which the Act or Rules have not prescribed. The limitation began to operate from the moment the notice under section 12(2) was received as W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 30 of 33 {{ 31 }} is envisaged by section 18(2). Accordingly the order of the High Court was set aside. 18. Coming to the undisputed facts and circumstances as obtained in the given case on the anvil of the legal principle which have been noted in the foregoing paragraphs, we find that the Referral Court assumed the jurisdiction basing upon a reference made to it under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act by the (Opposite Party No.1) Land Acquisition Collector. So, the jurisdiction of the Referral Court whether is exercisable as per the provision contained in the L.A. Act depends upon a valid reference being made by the Opposite Party No.1 (Land Acquisition Officer) substantially following the provision of the LA Act. When it has been authoritatively said that if the reference is wrongly made by the Collector, the Court will have to determine the validity of the reference case, and thus the very jurisdiction of the Court to hear the reference depends upon the proper reference being made under section 18 of the LA Act and if the reference is not proper, there is no jurisdiction in the Court to hear the reference. In the wake of as aforesaid, we are of the considered view that in the present case, the Referral Court having found the Opposite Party No.1 to have made the reference upon an application being made beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under section 18 of the L.A. Act; it has gone to W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 31 of 33 {{ 32 }} accept that as such that it has no jurisdiction to proceed with the reference in finally answering the same as requested by the Opposite Party No.1 in determining the proper compensation. The Referral Court in the present case has then condoned the delay occasioned in filing the application before the Opposite Party No.1 by the Opposite Party No.2 and thus have assumed the jurisdiction in attaching the seal of validity, post-facto the reference which was invalid or not a valid one at its inception and receipt by the Referral Court. As provided in law, the course adopted by the Referral Court in the present case is wholly erroneous and improper for the simple reason that when the Opposite Party No.1 had no power to condone the delay and therefore, the reference made by him to the Referral Court is invalid, the Referral Court is equally powerless to condone the delay in thus converting an invalid reference as valid. Putting it with clarity, it be said that when after expiry of the period of limitation for making application for reference, the Opposite Party no.1 had no power at all to make a reference and that having been done in contravention of the provision of law in that regard; the Referral Court was having no jurisdiction to proceed with the reference. It has completely erred in law by assuming the jurisdiction to answer the reference in condoning the delay occasioned at the level of the Opposite Party No.1 in reading such a W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 32 of 33 {{ 33 }} power to be resting with it as if an inherent one and thereby, clothing the Opposite Party No.1 with the jurisdiction to so refer the matter to the Referral Court is not at all permissible under the scheme of section 18 of the LA Act. Such a course adopted by the Referral Court in our considered view is wholly not in consonance with law and therefore, the impugned order cannot be sustained and the reference made since has no base to stand upon and is bad in law, it cannot proceed for being answered for determination of proper compensation by the Referral Court. 19. For the aforesaid discussions and reasons, we are of the considered view that the impugned order cannot be sustained in the eye of law and accordingly, we quash the reference made by the Opposite Party No.1 in giving rise to the L.A. Case No.03 of 2012 in the Court of learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Balangir. Consequent upon the same, the proceeding vide L.A. No.03 of 2012 pending in the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge, Balangir is hereby quashed. There shall however be no order as to cost. G. Satapathy, J. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: NARAYAN HO Designation: PERSONAL ASSISTANT Reason: Authentication Location: OHC Date: 12-Dec-2023 15:08:35 Narayan I Agree. (D. Dash), Judge. (G.Satapathy), Judge. W.P.(C) NO. 26193 OF 2022 Page 33 of 33