The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C)(OA) No.35 of 2018 Jatindra Kumar Das …. Petitioner Mr. S.K. Pattanaik, Sr. Advocate along with Mr. P.K. Pattanaik, Advocate -versus- State of Odisha & Ors. …. Opposite Parties
Legal Reasoning
Mr. H.M. Dhal, AGA CORAM: JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY
Decision
ORDER 04.03.2024 Order No 03. 1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Arrangement (Virtual/Physical) Mode. 2. Date chart along with notes of submission filed in Court be kept in record. 3. Heard Mr. S.K. Pattanaik, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioner along with Mr. P.K. Pattanaik and Mr. H.M. Dhal, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate appearing for the Opp. Parties. 4. Petitioner has filed the present writ petition inter alia challenging the order of punishment passed in a disciplinary proceeding initiated against him by Opp. Party No. 2 vide order dtd.22.06.2016 under Annexure-21 and so confirmed by the appellate authority- Opp. Party No. 1 vide order dtd.24.07.2017 under Annexure-23. 5. Learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioner contended that against the order of punishment passed under Annexure-21 Petitioner though preferred an appeal inter alia taking various grounds, but appellate authority-Opp. Party No. 1 without considering the same in its proper perspective, rejected the same // 2 // without assigning any reason whatsoever. It is contended that since no reason has been assigned by the appellate authority while rejecting the appeal, the said order is not sustainable in the eye of law. In support of his aforesaid submission, learned Sr. Counsel relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India (1990) 4 SCC 594. 5.1. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee in Para 37 to 40 has held as follows:- “37. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The Committee expressed the opinion that “there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair; and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise” and that “where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity”. (p. 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that “natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man’s sense of justice”. (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th edn. p. 548.) In Siemens Engineering Co. case [(1976) 2 SCC 981 : 1976 Supp SCR 489] this Court has taken the same view when it observed that “the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process”. This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a judge in his own cause, and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : (1970) 1 SCR 457] wherein it has been held : (SCR pp. 468-69 : SCC p. 272, para 20) “The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it Page 2 of 4 // 3 // included just two rules namely : (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria causa), and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi- judicial enquiries must he held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice.” 38. A similar trend is discernible in the decisions of English courts wherein it has been held that natural justice demands that the decision should be based on some evidence of probative value. (See : R. v. Deputy Industrial Injuries Commissioner ex p. Moore [(1965) 1 QB 456 : (1965) 1 All ER 81] ; Mahon v. Air New Zealand Ltd. [1984 AC 648 : (1984) 3 All ER 201] ) 39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice “is to prevent miscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action”. As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underly-ing such a provision would outweigh the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case. the salutary purpose served by 40. For the reasons aforesaid, it must be concluded that except in cases where the requirement has been dispensed with expressly or by necessary implication, an administrative Page 3 of 4 // 4 // authority exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions is required to record the reasons for its decision.” 6. Mr. H.M. Dhal, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate also fairly contended that appellate authority-Opp. Party No. 1 while rejecting the appeal, has not assigned any reason. It is contended that the matter may be remitted to Opp. Party No. 1 to take a fresh decision on the appeal so filed by the Petitioner under Annexure-22 in accordance with law. 7. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties and after going through the materials available on record, this Court finds that against the order of punishment passed by Opp. Party No. 2 on 22.06.2010 under Annexure-21, Petitioner filed an appeal before Opp. Party No. 1 under Annexure-22 by taking various grounds. As found from the impugned order at Annexure-23, Opp. Party No. 1 while rejecting the appeal has not assigned any reason whatsoever. 7.1. Since reason is the soul of any order, placing reliance on the decision as cited supra, this Court is inclined to quash the order dtd.24.08.2017 so passed by Opp. Party No. 1 under Annexure-23 for the present. While quashing the same, this Court remits the matter to Opp. Party No. 1 to take a fresh decision on the appeal so filed by the Petitioner under Annexure-22 in accordance with law within a period of four (4) months from the date of receipt of this order. Petitioner be given an opportunity of hearing by Opp. Party No. 1 prior to taking a final decision on the appeal. 8. The writ petition is disposed of accordingly. (Biraja Prasanna Satapathy) Judge Sneha Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SNEHANJALI PARIDA Designation: Sr. Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 05-Mar-2024 19:08:24 Page 4 of 4