The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Debidutta Mohanty …. Petitioner State of Odisha and others …. Opposite Parties -Versus- Advocates appeared in this case: For Petitioner : Mr. Gautam Misra, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. J.R. Deo, Advocate For Opposite Parties : Mr. Bimbisar Dash, Additional Government Advocate for State CORAM: HON’ BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN J U D G M E N T -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of Hearing and Judgment : 11th August, 2025 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HARISH TANDON, CJ. 1. The instant case has a checkered history as the parties are litigating over their rights in this Court and even on one occasion have approached the apex Court. W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 1 of 26 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, pursuant to the auction notice for grant of lease published on 8th January 2018, the petitioner along with other intending bidders offered his bid by quoting a price, which does not match with the other intending bidders and the petitioner was shown as a third highest bidder. The first highest bidder was offered a lease for Subhadrapur sand sairat, but she did not adhere to the statutory requirement, which rendered her ineligible as defaulter in compliance of the terms and conditions embodied therein. The second
Legal Reasoning
highest bidder was then offered to match the price quoted by the first highest bidder and in the event he accord his consent and accept the said price, the lease may be executed in his favour. Undeniably, the second highest bidder consented to the price quoted by the first highest bidder and in terms of the provisions contained in Odisha Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2016 (OMMC Rules, 2016), the lease was executed by the Tahasildar in his favour. The first highest bidder filed a writ petition being W.P.(C) No.9023 of 2019 before this Court assailing the order of cancelling her bid and selecting the second highest bidder as successful tenderer. Amidst the pendency of the said writ petition, an interim order in the form of a status quo was granted by the High Court, which was subsequently vacated. The W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 2 of 26 moment the interim order stood vacated, the second highest bidder filed a writ petition being W.P.(C) No.22660 of 2019 before this Court seeking a direction upon the competent authority i.e. the Tahasildar, Sadar for execution of the lease deed in his favour, which came to be executed on 1st January, 2020. Immediately, after the execution of the lease deed, the first highest bidder filed another writ petition being W.P.(C) No.951 of 2020 challenging the action of the Tahasildar in executing the lease in favour of the second highest bidder wherein an interim order was passed restraining the authorities to execute the lease deed in favour of the second highest bidder, which was later on vacated with the rider that the operation of the lease shall be subject to the result of the pending writ petition. 3. The present writ petitioner thereafter filed a writ petition before this Court being W.P.(C) No.3326 of 2021 raising an issue on the solvency certificate issued in favour of the second highest bidder, which came to be disposed of on 4th February, 2021 with the direction upon the Collector, Cuttack to consider his representation wherein such issue was raised. During the currency of the said representation pending before the Collector, the present writ petitioner filed another writ petition being W.P.(C) No.14241 of W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 3 of 26 2021, which came to be disposed of on 19th April, 2021 upon recording the fact that the Tahasildar, Narasingpur has cancelled the solvency certificate of the second highest bidder, which is challenged before the appellate authority. Consequently, the second highest bidder, who was permitted to operate the sairat was prevented from such operation as the solvency certificate, which is one of the essential conditions in granting the lease, was cancelled by the Tahasildar. 4. The facts discern from the said litigation revealed that the issuance of the solvency certificate in favour of the second highest bidder was questioned solely on the ground that the properties disclosed before the competent authority was owned and possessed by the trust of which the second highest bidder was a chairman and, therefore, despite an order passed by the competent authority to issue the solvency certificate in favour of the trust, it was issued in favour of the second highest bidder in his individual capacity. The second highest bidder perceived such discrepancies, which would hinder the eligibility to have the lease deed executed in his favour, applied for issuance of a fresh solvency certificate in his name and the same to be W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 4 of 26 substituted and/or exchanged with the earlier certificate issued by the competent authority, which was subsequently cancelled. 4.1. The authority substituted the solvency certificate and proceeded with the execution of the lease deed, which led the litigation to be ensued. The record would reveal that the subsequent certificate, which was replaced with the earlier certificate, was found to be infirm and not in commensurate with the various provisions and was subsequently cancelled, as a consequence whereof the lease granted in favour of the second highest bidder was also cancelled by the Collector. 5. The challenge was made to the said order before this Court and this Court set aside the order of the Collector primarily on the ground that the first certificate issued in favour of respondent No.1 instead of issuing in favour of the trust was a mistake and/or bona fide error, which cannot be said to be intentional and/or deliberate. 6. The present writ petitioner challenged the said order before the apex Court by filing the Special Leave Petition wherein the leave was granted and the proceeding culminated into registration of a Civil Appeal No.4939 of 2022. The apex Court set aside the judgment of W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 5 of 26 the High Court on March 3, 2023 and restored the order of the Collector by which the said lease deed was cancelled in the following: in “10. In view of the above and for the reason stated above, we are of the opinion that the High Court has committed a very serious error in quashing and setting aside the order dated 24.03.2021 passed by the Collector, Cuttack cancelling the lease deed which was respondent no.1. favour of Consequently, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court deserves to be quashed and set aside and is accordingly quashed and set aside. The order passed by the Collector, Cuttack dated 24.03.2021 cancelling the lease deed which was in favour of respondent no.1 is hereby restored. On the impugned judgment and order being set aside the fresh lease deed in favour of respondent no.1 also deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside.” 7. Taking a clue from the judgment of the apex Court where the lease deed executed in favour of the second highest bidder was cancelled, the petitioner approached the competent authority for grant of lease in his favour as the third highest bidder, who concurs and consents to match the price quoted by the first highest bidder in terms of the provisions contained under the said Rules. 8. In the meantime, the OMMC Rules, 2016 underwent a sea change in the definition of „Authorized Officer‟ means the Director of Mines and Geology in respect of Specified Minor Minerals and W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 6 of 26 Director of Minor Minerals in respect of Minor Minerals Other than Specified Minor Minerals or any officer duly Authorized by the Government in writing for the purpose was substituted. Such amendment so introduced takes away the power of the Tahasildar and vested upon the other authority i.e. the Mining Officer. 9. Since the petitioner made an application to the Tahasildar for grant of the lease after the judgment is delivered by the apex Court, the same was transmitted and/or transferred to the Mining Officer as such amendment in the Rules has come into force and by the impugned order, the Mining Officer rejected the said application of
Decision
the writ petitioner taking a plea that because of the amendments have been brought in the said statutory Rules, the settlement of the sairat mines shall only be done through an e-auction. 10. The said order of the Mining Officer is a subject matter of challenge in the instant writ petition primarily on two counts—firstly, the amended provision, which came into effect on 24th April, 2023 does not have retrospective operation. Secondly, the rights of the parties, more particularly the writ petitioner to have the lease deed executed in the event the bid of the other highest bidder stood W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 7 of 26 cancelled is a vested right, which cannot be taken away by applying the amended provision. 11. Both the counsels are at variance on the above issues and relied upon the judgments of the apex Court as well as this Court, which would be dealt in seriatim. 12. According to Mr. Gautam Misra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the writ petitioner, the sequel of events would evince that the right to have the lease executed became crystalized much prior to the amendment having brought in the Rules and, therefore, the authorities cannot take shelter under the amended provision. Mr. Misra would further submit that Sub-Section 2 of Section 1 of the Odisha Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2023 (OMMC (Amendment) Rules, 2023) clearly postulates that it would apply prospectively and not retrospectively. He further submitted that once the bid of the highest bidder is cancelled either on account of default in compliance of the statutory provisions or for some other discrepancies, it is imperative on the authority to invite the next highest bidder to match the price quoted by the highest bidder and upon concurrence, the lease is required to be executed in his favour. W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 8 of 26 According to him, the moment the right is crystalized, the authorities cannot take shelter under the amended provision but should have proceeded to decide the cause on the basis of the un-amended provisions of the said Rules. 13. On the other hand, Mr. Bimbisar Dash, learned Additional Government Advocate arduously submitted that mere acceptance of a bid does not create a vested right into a bidder to have the lease executed in his favour and, therefore, there is no incongruity or infirmity in the decision of the Mining Officer in rejecting the application filed by the writ petitioner. Mr. Dash further submitted that there is no infirmity in applying the amended provision, which came into force at the time of considering an application as the law which stood as on the day of consideration has to be applied. According to Mr. Dash, the modality of settlement of the sairat mines under the amended provision is by way of an e-auction and, therefore, there is no illegality in the decision of the Mining Officer in rejecting the application of the petitioner by applying such amended Rules. He thus submitted that the writ petition deserves dismissal. W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 9 of 26 14. In order to put the record straight, it is recorded that the Mining Officer rejected the application filed by the petitioner solely on the ground that the amended provision, which came into effect from 24th April 2023, ordained the settlement of the sairat mines through e- auction. Thus, the question, which involves in the instant writ petition “whether the Mining Officer was justified in invoking the amended provision at the time of considering an application filed by the writ petitioner in relation to the tender floated prior in time in perceiving the amended provision to have retrospective operation?” 15. Ordinarily the statutory Acts or the statutory Rules being piece of legislation are presumed to have prospective operation unless intended to operate retrospectively either expressly or impliedly. The notion that every legislation must operate prospectively is founded upon the sound legal principle that the things which exists in praesenti should be dealt with and/or governed by the law prevalent at such time. The act or things done in past cannot be rendered invalid by stretching backward the applicability of the law enacted subsequently. The prospective operation of the law is laid upon the bedrock that every act of a person and the things done are on the existing law which should not normally be disturbed and/or upset by W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 10 of 26 extending the operation of the subsequent law retrospectively. Such notion firmly stand on the legal maxim “lex prospicit non respicit”, meaning thereby “the law looks forward, not backward”. Any legislation, which impacts the accrued or vested right or attached any disability has to be treated in prospective manner unless the legislative intent is reasonably gathered from the object, the purpose, the words or expressions or any specific provisions incorporated in the new legislation to operate retrospectively. 16. Before the court embarks its journey on the peripheral of its operation either prospectively or retrospectively, the doctrine of fairness may be an important factor explicitly discerned from the nature of the legislation and conferment of some beneficial rights or the curtailment thereof. The aforesaid proposition can be fortified from the constitution bench decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-I, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Limited, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 1 in the following: In such cases, retrospectively is attached to “31. benefit the the persons provision imposing some burden or liability where the presumption attaches towards prospectivity. In the instant case, the proviso added to Section 113 of the in contradistinction to W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 11 of 26 Act is not beneficial to the assessee. On the contrary, it is a provision which is onerous to the assessee. Therefore, in a case like this, we have to proceed with the normal rule of presumption against retrospective operation. Thus, the rule against retrospective operation is a fundamental rule of law that no statute shall be construed to have a retrospective operation unless such a construction appears very clearly in the terms of the Act, or arises by necessary and distinct implication. Dogmatically framed, the rule is no more than a presumption, and thus could be displaced by out weighing factors. 35. We would also like to reproduce hereunder the following observations made by this Court in the case of Govinddas v. Income-tax Officer, while holding Section 171 (6) of the Income- Tax Act to be prospective and inapplicable for any assessment year prior to 1-4-1962, the date on which the Income Tax Act came into force: “11. Now it is a well settled rule of interpretation hallowed by time and sanctified by judicial decisions that, unless the terms of a statute expressly so provide or necessarily require it, retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to take away or impair an existing right or create a new obligation or impose a new liability otherwise than as regards matters of procedure. The general rule as stated by Halsbury in Vol. 36 of the Laws of England (3rd Edn.) and reiterated in several decisions of this Court as well as English courts is that all statutes other than those which are merely declaratory or which relate only to matters of procedure or facie prospectively and retrospective operation should not be given to a statute so as to affect, alter or destroy an existing right or create a new liability or obligation unless evidence prima are of W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 12 of 26 that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment. If the enactment is expressed in language either which interpretation, it ought to be construed as prospective only.” capable of fairly is 17. The aforesaid principles of law is restated and reiterated in a subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court in Assistant Excise Commissioner, Kottayam and others v. Esthappan Cherian and another, reported in (2021) 10 SCC 210 in the following: There is profusion of judicial authority on the 16. proposition that a rule or law cannot be construed as retrospective unless it expresses a clear or manifest intention, to the contrary. In Commissioner of Income Tax v Vatika Township (P) Ltd., this court, speaking through a Constitution Bench, observed as follows: “28. Of the various rules guiding how a legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, a legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation. The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities. Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past. If we do something today, we do it keeping in view the law of today and in force and not tomorrow‟s backward adjustment of it. Our belief in the nature of the law is founded on the bedrock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset. This principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit: law looks forward not backward. As was observed in Phillips vs. Eyre, a retrospective legislation is contrary to the general principle that legislation W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 13 of 26 by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated when introduced for the first time to deal with future acts ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law. 29. The obvious basis of the principle against retrospectivity is the principle of 'fairness‟, which must be the basis of every legal rule as was observed in the decision reported in L‟Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon legislations which Steamship Co.Ltd. Thus, modified accrued rights or which impose obligations or impose new duties or attach a new disability have to be treated as prospective unless the legislative intent is clearly to give the the enactment a retrospective effect; unless legislation is for purpose of supplying an obvious omission in a former legislation or to explain a the former cornucopia of case law available on the subject because aforesaid legal position clearly emerges from the various decisions and this legal position was conceded by the counsel for the parties. In any case, we shall refer to few judgments containing this dicta, a little later.” legislation. We need not note 17. Another equally important principle applies: in the absence of express statutory authorization, form of rules or delegated regulations, cannot operate retrospectively. In CIT v. M.C. Ponnoose, this rule was spelt out in the following terms: legislation the in “5……….The courts will not, therefore, ascribe retrospectivity to new laws affecting rights unless by express words or necessary implication it appears that such was the intention of the legislature. Parliament can delegate its legislative power within the recognised limits. Where any rule or regulation is made by any person or to whom such powers have been authority W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 14 of 26 to make the same so as delegated by the legislature it may or may not be possible to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provision which may in express terms or by necessary implication empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But where no such language is to be found it has been held by the courts that the person or legislative authority functions cannot make a rule, regulation or bye- law which can operate with retrospective effect.” subordinate exercising 18. On the conspectus of law enunciated in the above report, Sub- Section 2 of Section 1 of the Odisha Minor Mineral Concession (Amendment) Rules, 2023 can be gainfully applied, which postulates that such amendment shall come into force on the day of its publication in the Odisha Gazette. 19. The identical question arose before a coordinate bench of this Court in the case of Harendra Kumar Pattnaik v State of Odisha and others, reported in 2023 SCC OnLine Ori 5643 where the applicability of the subsequent legislation superseding the earlier legislation, whether prospectively or retrospectively, was considered and authoritatively held to have its prospective operation in the following: “25. Thus, the OMMC (Amendment) Rules, 2018 being prospective in nature, the RML Application W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 15 of 26 which was pending consideration much prior to introduction of Rule-8A, the Government should have decided the merit of the RML Application on the basis of the OMMC Rules, 2004.” 20. The law enunciated hereinabove leaves no ambiguity that the amended provision which impairs the existing right cannot operate retrospectively unless the legislatures either by express words or by necessary implication intended to operate the same retrospectively. We do not find any dissent to the views expressed by the coordinate bench having founded upon the sound legal principle expressed on variety cornucopia of the judgments rendered by the Supreme Court and the High Courts that the amended Rules of 2023 shall operate prospectively and not retrospectively. 21. However, the arguments are advanced at the bar that mere declaration in the bid process that the intending bidder has secured a position, does not create a vested right to have the contract executed in its favour. Several judgments have been relied upon in this regard by the respective parties, which we feel it prudent to deal with in seriatim. 22. In Haryana Urban Development Authority and Others v. Orchid Infrastructure Developers Private Limited, reported in W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 16 of 26 (2017) 4 SCC 243, it has been held unequivocally that the highest bidder does not acquire any vested right to have the auction concluded in his favour as it is within the domain of the Government or its authority either to accept or reject the said bid subject to strong reasons having assigned. It is further highlighted that unless there is a concluded contract by issuance of allotment letter, it does not create any right into the highest bidder to claim the bid to be accepted in the following: “13. It is a settled law that the highest bidder has no vested right to have the auction concluded in his favour. The Government or its authority could validly retain power to accept or reject the highest bid in the interest of public revenue. We are of the considered opinion that there was no right acquired and no vested right accrued in favour of the plaintiff merely because his bid amount was highest and had deposited 10% of the bid amount. As per Regulation 6(2) of the 1978 Regulations, allotment letter has to be issued on acceptance of the bid by the Chief Administrator and within 30 days the successful bidder has to deposit another 15% of the bid amount. In the instant case allotment letter has never been issued to the petitioner as per Regulation 6(2) in view of non-acceptance of the bid. Thus there was no concluded contract. Regulation 6 of the Regulations of 1978 is extracted hereunder : thereof, “6. Sale of lease of land or building by auction.- (1) In the case of sale or lease by auction, the price/premium to be charged shall be such reserve price/premium as may be determined taking into consideration the various factors as W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 17 of 26 indicated in sub-regulation (1) of Regulation 4 or any higher amount determined as a result of bidding in open auction. (2) 10 per cent of the highest bid shall be paid on the spot by the highest bidder in cash or by means of a demand draft in the manner specified in sub-regulation (2) of Regulation 5. The successful bidder shall be issued allotment letter in Form „CC‟ or „C-II‟ by registered post and another 15 per cent of the bid accepted shall be payable by the successful bidder, in the manner indicated, within thirty days of the date of allotment letter conveying acceptance of the bid by the Chief Administrator; failing which the 10 per cent amount already deposited shall stand forfeited to the Authority and the successful bidder shall have no claim to the land or building auctioned. (3) The payment of balance of the price/premium, rate of interest chargeable and the recovery of interest shall be in the same manner as provided in sub-regulations (6) and (7) of Regulation 5. (4) The general terms and conditions of the auction shall be such as may be framed by the time and from Chief Administrator announced to the public before auction on the spot.” time to 14. We are fortified in our view by a decision of this Court in Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Om Prakash Sharma, the questions arose for its consideration that : whether there is any vested right upon the plaintiff/bidder until the bid is accepted by the competent authority in relation to the property in question? Merely because the plaintiff is the highest bidder by depositing 20% of the bid amount without there being approval of the same by W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 18 of 26 it amounts to a the competent authority and concluded contract in relation to the plot in question; and whether the plaintiff could have maintained the suit in the absence of a concluded contract ? Considering the aforesaid questions, this Court has discussed the matter thus : “30. In support of the said proposition, the learned Senior Counsel for the defendant, Mr reliance Rakesh Dwivedi has also placed upon another decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh. The learned Senior Counsel has rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Rajasthan Housing Board case (2007) 1 SCC 477 which reads as under: (SCC p. 483, para 9) for consideration “9. This being the settled legal position, the respondent acquired no right to claim that the auction be concluded in its favour and the High Court clearly erred in entertaining the writ petition and in not only issuing a the direction representation but also issuing a further direction to the appellant to issue a demand note of the balance amount. The direction relating to issuance of the demand note for balance amount virtually amounted to confirmation of the auction in favour of the respondent which was not the function of the High Court.” of In State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal case, relevant paragraph of which reads as under: (SCC pp. 44-45, para 13) “13. ……. There is no concluded contract till the bid is accepted. Before there was a concluded contract, it was open to the bidders to withdraw their bids (see Union of India v. Bhim Sen Walaiti Ram (1969) 3 SCC W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 19 of 26 146). By merely giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights. ...” (emphasis supplied) x x x x x 31. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the learned Senior Counsel Mr Rakesh Dwivedi has rightly placed reliance upon the same in support of the case of the first defendant, which would clearly go to show that the plaintiff had not acquired any right and no vested right has been accrued in his favour in respect of the plot in question merely because his bid amount is highest and he had deposited 20% of the highest bid amount along with the earnest money with the Board. In the absence of acceptance of bid offered by the plaintiff to the competent authority of the first defendant, there is no concluded contract in respect of the plot in question, which is evident from letters dated 26-5-1977 and 8-7-1977 wherein the third defendant had rejected the bid amount deposited by the plaintiff and the same was refunded to him by way of demand draft, which is an undisputed fact and it is also not his case then Assistant Housing Commissioner who has conducted the public auction had accepted the bid of the plaintiff.” that the (emphasis supplied). 15. This Court in Om Prakash Sharma case has held that in the absence of a concluded contract which takes place by issuance of allotment letter, suit could not be said to be maintainable as there is no vested right in the plaintiff without approval of the bid by the competent authority. Thus, in the wake of aforesaid decision, in the absence of a concluded contract, the suit could not have been decreed for mandatory injunction. It amounted to enforcing of contract in the absence thereof.” W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 20 of 26 23. In a recent judgment rendered in case of Indore Vikas Praadhikaran (IDA) and Another v Shri Humud Jain Samaj Trust and Another, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3511, the apex Court upon taking into consideration the plethora of judgments rendered earlier held: 14. We are fortified in our view by a decision of this Court in U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Om Prakash Sharma [U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Om Prakash Sharma, (2013) 5 SCC 182 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 737] , wherein the questions arose for its consideration that : whether there is any vested right upon the plaintiff bidder until the bid is accepted by the competent authority in relation to the property in question? Merely because the plaintiff is the highest bidder by depositing 20% of the bid amount without there being approval of the same by the competent authority and it amounts to a concluded contract in relation to the plot in question; and whether the plaintiff could have maintained the suit in the absence of a concluded contract? Considering the aforesaid questions, this Court has discussed the matter thus : (SCC pp. 195- 97, paras 30-31) “30. In support of the said proposition, the learned Senior Counsel for the defendant, Mr Rakesh Dwivedi has also placed reliance upon another decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh [State of U.P. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh, (1982) 2 SCC 365]. The learned Senior Counsel has rightly placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in Rajasthan Housing Board case v. G.S. Investments, (2007) 1 SCC 477] which reads as under : (SCC p. 483, para 9) [Rajasthan Housing Board „9. This being the settled legal position, the respondent acquired no right to claim that W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 21 of 26 the auction be concluded in its favour and the High Court clearly erred in entertaining the writ petition and in not only issuing a direction for consideration of the representation but also issuing a further direction to the appellant to issue a demand note of the balance amount. The direction relating to issuance of the demand note for balance amount virtually amounted to confirmation of the auction in favour of the respondent which was not the function of the High Court.‟ In State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal [State of Orissa v. Harinarayan Jaiswal, (1972) 2 SCC 36] case, relevant paragraph of which reads as under : (SCC pp. 44- 45, para 13) „ is accepted. Before 13. … There is no concluded contract till the bid there was a concluded contract, it was open to the bidders to withdraw their bids (see Union of India v. Bhim Sen Walaiti Ram [Union of India v. Bhim Sen Walaiti Ram, (1969) 3 SCC 146] ). [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised Vikas Parishad case, (2013) 5 SCC 182.] By merely giving bids, the bidders had not acquired any vested rights [Ed.: The matter between two asterisks has been emphasised in Avam Evam Vikas Parishad case, (2013) 5 SCC 182.]‟. in Avam Evam 31. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decisions, the learned Senior Counsel Mr Rakesh Dwivedi has rightly placed reliance upon the same in support of the case of the first defendant, which would clearly go to show that the plaintiff had not acquired any right and no vested right has been accrued in his favour in respect of the plot in question merely because his bid amount is highest and he had deposited 20% of the highest bid amount along with the earnest money with the Board. In the absence of acceptance of bid offered W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 22 of 26 by the plaintiff to the competent authority of the first defendant, there is no concluded contract in respect of the plot in question, which is evident from letters dated 26-5-1977 and 8-7-1977 wherein the third defendant had rejected the bid amount deposited by the plaintiff and the same was refunded to him by way of demand draft, which is an undisputed fact and it is also not his case that the then Assistant Housing Commissioner who has conducted the public auction had accepted the bid of the plaintiff.” This Court in Om Prakash Sharma case [U.P. 15. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Om Prakash Sharma, (2013) 5 SCC 182 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 737] has held that in the absence of a concluded contract which takes place by issuance of allotment letter, suit could not be said to be maintainable as there is no vested right in the plaintiff without approval of the bid by the competent authority. Thus, in the wake of the aforesaid decision, in the absence of a concluded contract, the suit could not have been decreed for mandatory injunction. It amounted to enforcing of contract in the absence thereof.” 24. The law enunciated in the above report is exposit that mere declaration that intending bidder has secured a position to have the contract awarded in his favour is not a vested right nor an inchoate right unless further steps are taken by the authority, which would bring the same within the ambit of a concluded contract. Equally where the statutory Rules provide the authorities to act or do a thing in a particular manner, any departure and/or infraction or avoidance of such statutory provision is unacceptable. The authorities cannot W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 23 of 26 transgress the outer shell of the statutory provision nor be permitted to act in contradiction thereto. The action of the authorities must be strictly within the four corners of the statutory provisions and should not be permitted to depart therefrom. 25. We would not have ventured to go into the aspect whether a vested or legal right has accrued to the petitioner as the authority while rejecting the claim of the petitioner did not take into such abstract as rejection was solely founded upon the applicability of the amended Rules and its operation to a past event. In this regard reference can be gainfully applied to a judgment of the Apex Court rendered in Mohinder Singh Gill & Another v. The Chief Election Commissioner & Others, reported in AIR 1978 SC 851, wherein it is held that the point which has not been taken by an administrative authority cannot be permitted to be raised at the bar as the Court exercising the power of judicial review decides the process by which such decision has been taken in the following: “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 24 of 26 additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose, J. in Gordhandas Bhanji [Commr. of Police, Bombay v. Gordhandas Bhanji, 1951 SCC 1088 : AIR 1952 SC 16] : “Public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the actings and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself.” Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older.” 26. Since the impugned order was simply founded upon the applicability of amended Rules, 2023 to have its applicability to the past incident, we do not think that such questions would be of a seminal importance at this stage. 27. Since the authorities have not taken any plea whether the claim of the petitioner is sustainable in view of the law enunciated in this regard, we do not feel it apposite to make any observation and leave it to the wisdom of the authority to decide the same. 28. Since the amended Rules 2023 cannot operate retrospectively as held hereinabove, the order impugned cannot be sustained. The W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 25 of 26 same is hereby quashed and set aside. The competent authority is directed to reconsider the issue in the light of the observations made hereinabove on the basis of an un-amended provision, which we expect shall be taken within one month from the date of communication of this order. 29. The writ petition is thus disposed of. No order as to costs. (M.S. Raman) Judge (Harish Tandon) Chief Justice M. Panda/Arun Mishra Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MRUTYUNJAYA PANDA Designation: Secretary, Orissa High Court Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 29-Sep-2025 15:42:56 W.P.(C) No.18244 of 2024 Page 26 of 26