Orissa High Court
Case Details
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK RVWPET No.169 of 2021 Along with RVWPET No.167 of 2021 with CONTC Nos.4724 and 4725 of 2021 (From the common order dated 19.02.2021 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) Nos.1112 and 1114 of 2016) …. Petitioner(s) …. Opposite Party (s) The Collector and District Magistrate, Jagatsinghpur & Anr. (In RVWPET Nos.169 and 167 of 2021) Abhaya Kumar Samal and others (In CONTC No.4724 of 2021) Harekrushna Samal & Others (In CONTC No.4725 of 2021) -versus- Harekrushna Samal & Others (In RVWPET No.169 of 2021) Abhaya Kumar Samal and others In RVWPET No.167 of 2021) Sangram Kishori Mohapatra, Collector & District Magistrate, Jagatsinglipur and another (In CONTC Nos.4724 & 4725 of 2021) Advocates appeared in this case through Hybrid Arrangement Mode: For Petitioner(s) For Opposite Party(s) : : Mr. Pitambar Acharya, Sr. Adv. Advocate General with Mr. Ajodhya Ranjan Dash, AGA Mr. Surya Prasad Misra, Sr. Adv. along with associates Mr. BudhadebaRoutray, Sr. Adv. along with associates Mr. Prafulla Kumar Rath, Sr. Adv. along with associates Page 1 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 CORAM: DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI MR. JUSTICE G. SATAPATHY DATE OF HEARING:-08.05.2025 DATE OF JUDGMENT: -08.08.2025 Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J. 1. Since the aforesaid RVWPETs and CONTCs arise out of the same judgment, the same were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. 2. RVWPET Nos.169 and 167 of 2021 have been filed under Order 47 Rule 1 read with Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908(hereinafter referred to as “the C.P.C.” for brevity) at the instance of the State with a prayer to review the common order dated 19.02.2021 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.1112 and W.P.(C) No.1114 of 2016 directing the land Acquisition Officer (Civil), Jagatsinghpur to assess the compensation in terms of the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and extend such benefits to the Petitioners therein accordingly. 3. CONTC Nos.4724 and 4725 of 2021 have been filed by the Petitioners for non-compliance of the common order dated 19.02.2021 passed by the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.(C) No.1112 and W.P.(C) No.1114 of 2016 by the Opposite Parties/ State. 4. It is apparent that the review Petitioners were the Opposite Parties in W.P.(C) No.1112 and W.P.(C) No.1114 of 2016. Page 2 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 I. 5. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE: The then Petitioners are now Opposite Parties in W.P.(C) No. 1112 of 2016 and W.P.(C) No. 1114 of 2016 were land owners of village Fatepur and Patrapur whose lands measuring Ac. 86.64 dec were acquired by the State Government upon following the due process of law for establishing an industrial township by IDCO. 6. Notifications u/s 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act, 1894 have been issued respectively on 8.7.2008 and 31.8.2009. The first award was passed on 18.3.2011 and notices u/s 12(2) of the Act, 1894 for receiving the award amounts were issued at the same time to all other such landowners. Physical possession of the entire land has been handed over to IDCO. 7. In an earlier land acquisition proceeding of other villages situated nearby in 2006, the land owners had agitated against the alleged low estimate and decided not to receive compensation money. Accordingly, a tripartite meeting was held between the land owners, the State Government and the private company for whom the land was being acquired where the rate of compensation was enhanced. 8. The present Opposite Parties also similarly did not accept the compensation amount and demanded revision of the same. Therefore, the compensation amount awarded initially was revised by the 1st District Level Compensation Advisory Committee. 9. However, the present Opposite Parties preferred W.P.(C) No. 1112 of 2016 and W.P.(C) No. 1114 of 2016 seeking higher compensation in terms of the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Page 3 of 33 Signature Not Verified
Legal Reasoning
Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”). Vide impugned order dated 19.2.2021, further corrected on 21.4.2021, this Court was observed that the present Opposite Parties were entitled to compensation in terms of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 and direct assessment of compensation in terms of the Act, 2013 within three months. 10. Aggrieved, the State has preferred the present Review Petitions. 11. Now that the broad facts leading up to the instant Petition have been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to fully summarise the contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been urged seeking the exercise of this Court’s plenary powers of review. II. 12. PETITIONER’S SUBMISSIONS: It is submitted by Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner that the Impugned Order is amenable to review in view of the power of this Court under Article 215 of the Constitution of India and the same cannot be circumscribed by Order XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. As the Petitioner’s submissions are alleged to have escaped consideration, and led to an error apparent on the face of record, a review petition would be the appropriate remedy instead of cogitating the issues in an appeal. 13. On merits, it is submitted that this Court did not properly apply the settled position of law to the facts at hand, much less even went into the facts at hand. It is urged that the Petitioners, then Opposite Parties Page 4 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 were not given sufficient opportunity to file a counter affidavit which led to this Court proceeding on an erroneous view of facts. 14. It is strongly submitted that the proceedings under Act, 1894 would not ‘lapse’ in terms of the Act, 2013 as the majority of the awarded amount has been paid to the land losers and possession has also been taken by the State. III. OPPOSITE PARTIES’ SUBMISSIONS: 15. Per contra, it is submitted by Ld. Counsel for the Opposite Parties that they are entitled to compensation as per the Act, 2013 in light of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. 16.
Legal Reasoning
It is strongly urged that there is no manifest error or mistake apparent on the face of the record. A review is not an appeal in disguise. The judgment may be incorrect in the petitioner’s view, but unless it contains a patent error that is self-evident and not dependent on elaborate reasoning, review is impermissible. 17. Moreover, it is also submitted that the Court’s review jurisdiction is narrow and exceptional, not equivalent to an appellate process. The petitioner’s attempt to invoke it as a second appeal or revision is legally impermissible. IV. ISSUES FOR CONSIDERATION: 18. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record, this court has identified the following issues that have to be determined which have emerged contentiously during the course of the hearing and is germane to finally decide the lis at hand; Page 5 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 A. WHETHER THE REVIEW PETITION AT THE INSTANCE OF THE PRESENT PETITIONERS IS ENTERTAINABLE WITHIN THE PARAMETERS OF LAW LAID DOWN FOR ENTERTAINING A REVIEW APPLICATION, PARTICULARLY KEEPING IN VIEW THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CASE? 19. An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine of “actus curiae niminem gravabit”. There is no doubt that the review is a creature of the statute. Therefore, the same has to be based on the principle as enumerated in Order-47 Rule-1 of the CPC although the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 does not apply to the writ proceedings in view of the specific provision contained in the explanation to Section-141 of CPC However, as a standard practice, the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as this Court have on many occasions held that the principle laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable to the writ proceedings although the substantive provision may not be applicable to the writ proceeding. 20. Keeping in view the aforesaid position of law, this Court would proceed to analyze the provisions contained in Order-47 Rule-1 of the CPC Order-47 Rule-1 of the CPC provides that any person considering himself aggrieved (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred; (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed; or (c) by a decision on a reference from a court to small causes and who from the Page 6 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 discovery of new and important matter or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of same mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order. The aforesaid sub-rule(1) is clarified by the provisions contained in sub-rule(2). Sub-rule(2) provides that a party, who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of the judgment notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the appellate court the case on which he appeals for the review. Moreover, the explanation attached to Order-47 Rule-1 of CPC reveals that the fact that the question of law involved in the judgment of the court, which has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior court in another case, shall not be a ground for review of such judgment. 21. Before proceeding to examine the contentions raised by the Petitioner in support of his plea that the judgment needs to be reviewed, it would be pertinent to delineate the scope and ambit of interference by a Court at the time of deciding the review petition and for this, this Court may first refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Page 7 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 Nagaraj v. State of Karnataka1, where it has been held that the review literally and even judicially means re-consideration/re- examination and primarily the philosophy inherent in a review is the universal acceptance of human fallibility, yet in the realm of law, Courts have leaned strongly in favour of finality of decisions which are legally and properly delivered. Supreme Court also noted that exceptions, both statutorily and judicially, have been carved out to correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India2, the Supreme Court while affirming that power of review can be exercised for correction of mistakes, penned a word of caution that it cannot be used as a tool to substitute a view and review proceedings cannot be decided as an appeal in disguise. The Apex Court also ruled that mere possibility of two views on the subject is not a ground for review and analysed the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, which provides that any person aggrieved by a judgment/order/decree from which no appeal is allowed or where appeal is allowed but has not been preferred, can be filed by any person aggrieved and who from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when judgment/decree/order was passed or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree or order 11993 Supp (4) SCC 595 2(2000) 6 SCC 224 Page 8 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 made against him, may apply for a review of the judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. The expression ‘any other sufficient reason’ was interpreted to mean a reason sufficient on grounds mentioned or at least analogous to those specified under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, as held in Chhajju Ram v. Neki3. 22. 3. In T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa4, the Supreme Court has held that ‘an error apparent on the face of the proceedings’ is an error which is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law i.e. an error which is a patent error and not a mere wrong decision. This position was further reiterated and reaffirmed in Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque5, where the Supreme Court held that to seek review there should be something more than a mere error, it must be one which is manifest on the face of the record and no error could be an error apparent on the face of the record, if it is not self-evident and requires examination or argument to establish it. 23. It would also be relevant to allude to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi6, where the Supreme Court considered the powers of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC and the relevant passage is as follows:— 3AIR 1922 PC 112 4 (1955) 1 SCR 250 5(1955) 1 SCR 1104 6(1980) 2 SCC 167 Page 9 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 review the Court will “8. It is well-settled that a party is not entitled to seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh decision of the case. The normal principle is that a judgment pronounced by the Court is final, and departure from that principle is justified only when circumstances of a substantial and compelling character make it necessary to do so: Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1965 SC 845 : (1965) 1 SCR 933, 948 : (1965) 1 SCJ 377]. For instance, if the attention of the Court is not drawn to a material statutory provision during the original hearing, its judgment: G.L. Gupta v. D.N. Mehta [(1971) 3 SCC 189 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 279 : (1971) 3 SCR 748, 750]. The Court may also reopen its judgment if a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary to pass an order to do full and Judge, justice: O.N. Mohindroo v. Distt. effective Delhi [(1971) 3 SCC 5 : (1971) 2 SCR 11, 27]. Power to review its judgments has been conferred on the Hon’ble Supreme Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that power is subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145. In a civil proceeding, an application for review is entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a criminal proceeding on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1, Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a review proceeding cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case, and the finality of the judgment delivered by the Court will not be reconsidered except “where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility”: Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib [(1975) 1 SCC 674 : 1975 SCC (Tax) 200 : (1975) 3 SCR 933].” 24. On the aspect of scope of review, it would also be relevant to refer to a recent judgment of the Supreme Court in S. Madhusudhan Reddy v. V. Page 10 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 Narayana Reddy7, where after referring to another judgment of the Supreme Court in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati8 , where the Supreme Court has succinctly culled out the principles for exercise of review jurisdiction, while discussing the confines and scope of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC and I quote:— “24. After discussing a series of decisions on review jurisdiction in Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, this Court observed that review proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised in the review application has already been dealt with and answered, parties are not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because an alternative view is possible. The principles for exercising review jurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below:
Decision
“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 20.1. When the review will be maintainable: (i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him; (ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; (iii) Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted in Chajju Ram v. Neki, and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. 72022 SCC OnLine SC 1034 8 2013 SCC OnLine SC 714 Page 11 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 Mar Poulose Athanasius to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principles have been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. 20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: (i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications. (ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import. (iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case. (iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. (v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error. (vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched. (viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition. (ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived. xxx xxx xxx 26. In State of West Bengal v. Kamal Sengupta, this Court emphasized the requirement of the review petitioner who approaches a Court on the ground of discovery of a new Page 12 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 matter or evidence, to demonstrate that the same was not within his knowledge and held thus: “21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such a character that if the same had been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seeking review has also to show that such additional matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of due diligence, the same could not be produced before the court earlier.”” 25. From a conspectus of the aforesaid judgments and the principles culled out by the Supreme Court which guide the Courts in deciding a review petition, it is luminously clear that a review petition is not an appeal in disguise and the Court in a review petition cannot be called upon to re-hear the matter and pass a fresh decision on merits. If two views on the issues under consideration are possible and the Court has taken one view, it cannot be urged in a review petition that another view was possible. While it is true that if there is an error apparent on the face of record or there are mistakes which require correction, Courts should not hesitate in correcting the same in the interest of justice, however, what is impermissible is a re-hearing on merits since judicial precedents have always leaned towards attaching finality to judgments delivered by Courts. It needs no reiteration that Page 13 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 a review Court is neither an Appellate Court nor a Court hearing the matter as an original proceeding. 26. As the Petitioner has alleged that there is an error apparent on the face of record, this Court is of the opinion that the Review Petition is entertainable, whether it succeeds or not, shall be examined in the following issue. B. WHETHER THE GROUNDS TAKEN IN THE REVIEW PETITION ARE SUFFICIENTLY GOOD GROUNDS TO COME TO A CONCLUSION THAT THERE EXISTS AN ERROR APPARENT ON THE FACE OF THE RECORD AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE SAME CALLS FOR INTERFERENCE IN FINAL ORDERS DATED 19.2.2021 BY THIS COURT IN EXERCISE OF ITS REVIEW JURISDICTION? 27. A review is not a routine procedure. This Court therefore had resolved to hear the Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner at length to remove any feeling that the party has been hurt without being heard. However, as discussed above, this Court cannot review its earlier order unless satisfied that a material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice. As held by the Apex Court in Sow Chandra Kante v. Sheikh Habib9: “A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial 9(1975) 1 SCC 674 Page 14 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 fallibility …. The present stage is not a virgin ground but review of an earlier order which has the normal feature of finality” 28. The Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Indore Development Authority case [Indore Development Authority (Lapse-5 J.) v. Manoharlal10] has opined that satisfaction of either of the conditions, namely, either taking possession of the acquired land or payment of compensation to the landowners would be sufficient to save the acquisition from being lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Various questions posed before the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court were also answered. Relevant paras 365 and 366 are extracted below: “365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 : (2014) 2 SCC (Civ) 274] has been followed, are also overruled. … 366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under: 366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the the date of award commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act. 366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue is not made as on 1-1-2014, 10(2020) 8 SCC 129 Page 15 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed. 366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse. 366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non- deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. 366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners Page 16 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. 366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b). 366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2). 366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a in case lapse of proceedings are applicable deemed authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1- 2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. 366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.” 29. Further, with reference to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, the position is summed up in para 208 of Indore Development Authority case, which is extracted below: Page 17 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 fulfilled by “208. … In our opinion, when amount has been tendered, the obligation has been the Collector. Landowners cannot be forced to receive it. In case a person has not accepted the amount wants to take the advantage of non-payment, though the amount has remained (sic unpaid) due to his own act. It is not open to him to contend that the amount has not been paid to him, as such, there should be lapse of the proceedings. Even in a case when offer for payment has been made but not deposited, liability to pay amount along with interest subsist and if not deposited for majority of holding, for that adequate provisions have been given in the proviso also to Section 24(2). The scheme of the 2013 Act in Sections 77 and 80 is also the same as that provided in Sections 31 and 34 of the 1894 Act.” 30. The issue as to what is meant by “possession of the land by the State after its acquisition” has also been considered in Indore Development Authority case. It is opined therein that after the acquisition of land and passing of award, the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances. The vesting of land with the State is with possession. Any person retaining the possession, thereafter, has treated to be a trespasser. When large chunk of land is acquired, the State is not supposed to put some person or police force to retain the possession and start cultivating on the land till it is utilised. The Government is also not supposed to start residing or physically occupying the same once process of the acquisition is complete. If after the process of acquisition is complete and land vests in the State free from all encumbrances with possession, any person retaining the land or any Page 18 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 re-entry made by any person is nothing else but an act of trespassing on the State land. 31. This Court has carefully examined the contentions raised in Review Petitions RVWPET No. 169 of 2021 and RVWPET No. 167 of 2021, which challenge the common orders dated 19.2.2021 (as corrected on 12.4.2021) in WP (C) No. 1112 of 2016 and WP (C) No. 1114 of 2016. The primary grievance of the Review Petitioners, who represent the State, is that the adjudication proceeded without the benefit of their counter affidavit, resulting in the omission of critical documentary evidence and factual context that was essential to a just and comprehensive decision. It is evident from the pleadings that certain pivotal facts relating to the timelines of acquisition and the statutory framework applicable were not adequately presented or considered. In such circumstances, it is incumbent upon the Court to assess whether the absence of such information, especially when not attributable to any deliberate default but rather to the structure of the original proceedings, amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record. The Court finds it necessary to revisit the matter, given the weight of evidence now brought forth and its bearing on the legal determinations previously made. 32. The impugned order had directed the assessment of compensation under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter "Act, 2013"), but failed to undertake the requisite statutory inquiry as Page 19 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 to whether the land acquisition proceedings, originally commenced under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter "Act, 1894"), had lapsed or were preserved under the saving clause of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, 2013. The Review Petitioners assert that the acquisition processes concerning the villages of Fatehpur and Patrapur had matured with awards being passed in the year 2011, which is much prior to the cut-off date of 1.1.2014 when the 2013 Act came into force. This fact, if considered within the correct legal framework, squarely places the acquisition within the protective ambit of Section 24(1)(b), whereby the repealed Act continues to apply to proceedings and where award was already passed before the new law came into effect. The statutory presumption is clear: such proceedings do not lapse, and there exists no legal basis for importing the provisions of the 2013 Act. The Court is, thus, required to re-evaluate the legal effect of these timelines in the light of the legislative scheme laid down under both statutes. 33. It is not in dispute that during the hearing of the original Writ Petitions, the Review Petitioners were unable to place their counter affidavit on record as the Court passed the order without affording an opportunity to file the counter affidavit. This procedural anomaly had the effect of precluding the Court from examining crucial documents that established the chronological progression of the acquisition process and the corresponding discharge of statutory obligations under the Act, 1894. The absence of such documents significantly Page 20 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 impaired the factual matrix on which the legal conclusions were based. In legal proceedings concerning land acquisition, the sequence and timing of statutory milestones—such as issuance of notification under Section 4, declaration under Section 6, passing of awards under Section 11, and disbursement of compensation—are not merely clerical details but are central to determining the applicable legal regime. Therefore, any adjudication that proceeds without full cognizance of these details runs the risk of misconstruing the statutory context. The review jurisdiction of this Court is appropriately invoked in such cases to correct material oversight where the factual foundation of the judgment is demonstrably incomplete or inaccurate. The Review Petitioners have now placed sufficient material to justify such a corrective course of action. 34. Reliance has been rightly placed by the Review Petitioners on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Pratibha Industries Ltd.,11 which authoritatively holds that the High Court, while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226, retains the power to review its orders if it is shown that a material suppression of facts or oversight has led to a decision that does not reflect the true factual or legal position. The principle laid down in that case resonates with the present circumstances, where non- disclosure of the acquisition records—not due to any mala fide conduct on the part of the Review Petitioners, but for a lapse in 11(2019) 3 SCC 203 Page 21 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 procedural sequencing—led to an incomplete presentation of facts. The Court’s responsibility in such matters extends beyond a mechanical reading of pleadings; it must ensure that orders, particularly those affecting statutory rights and liabilities of numerous stakeholders, are passed upon a full and fair appraisal of all relevant circumstances. Suppression of material facts, even if unintentional, has the legal consequence of undermining the integrity of judicial findings. The record now reveals that significant parts of the acquisition process had been completed in conformity with the Act, 1894, a fact not previously adjudicated upon. 35. A meticulous review of the documents submitted by the Review Petitioners now establishes that the land acquisition proceedings for Fatehpur village commenced in the year 2008, culminating in awards being passed on 18.3.2011. In respect of Patrapur village, a declaration under Section 6 of the Act, 1894 was issued on 20.8.2009, and the majority of awards were similarly finalized in 2011. These facts, supported by the original acquisition records, firmly place the proceedings within the pre-2014 legal framework. The statutory import of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, 2013 is that if an award under Section 11 of the 1894 Act has been passed prior to 1.1.2014, the acquisition proceedings shall not lapse and will be governed as if the 1894 Act has not been repealed. This statutory continuity is not contingent upon subjective judicial discretion but arises by operation of law. Thus, any adjudication that overlooks this temporal Page 22 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 classification risks applying an inapplicable legal standard, which not only disrupts administrative finality but also creates legal uncertainty in land acquisition matters. The petitions now present sufficient cause to conclude that such oversight requires judicial correction to uphold statutory consistency and procedural equity. 36. The Review Petitioners have correctly drawn attention to the oversight in the impugned order regarding the scope and applicability of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013. This provision applies only when two cumulative conditions are met: that neither compensation has been paid nor possession taken. The Review Petitioners have demonstrated, through documentary evidence, that awards were made in 2011—within the five years preceding the enforcement of the Act, 2013—and compensation was in fact tendered. As such, the requisite statutory bar for the proceedings to be considered lapsed under Section 24(2) does not arise. Furthermore, under Section 24(1)(b), if an award has been made under the 1894 Act and the compensation has been tendered, the proceedings continue as if the 2013 Act had not come into force. The impugned order, however, assumed that the mere passage of time since initiation was sufficient for lapse, without engaging with the critical legislative language of Section 24(1)(b), which preserves concluded proceedings. The petitioners’ detailed submissions have now clarified that there was no legal basis to treat the acquisitions as lapsed. The absence of any finding as to whether both conditions under Section 24(2) were Page 23 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 satisfied is a significant legal omission, and the error justifies revisiting the matter. 37. Another pivotal concern raised by the Review Petitioners is that the Division Bench proceeded to decide the writ petitions without seeking clarification from the State on the applicability of the Act, 2013 to the acquisitions in question. When the proceedings themselves are governed by a statutory framework that underwent substantial changes, it is imperative for the Court to determine the applicable legal regime before pronouncing a decision on compensation or lapsing. The issue is not of mere procedural irregularity but of substantive misapplication of law. A foundational inquiry into whether the proceedings were governed by the repealed Act or the 2013 Act was not conducted. This legal question was central to the outcome. The Court’s earlier assumption that the newer Act applied across the board was not grounded in a full appreciation of the relevant dates of acquisition activity and statutory compliance. The Review Petitioners, now presenting a complete and structured set of records, including timelines of Section 6 declarations and awards, have enabled the Court to conclusively determine that the legal foundation of the impugned order was incomplete. It is not a matter of changing positions but of restoring fidelity to statutory interpretation, which requires setting aside the order and enabling a fresh adjudication on the correct legal premises. Page 24 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 38. The Review Petitioners have appropriately invoked the precedent set in S. Bagirathi Ammal v. Palani Roman Catholic Mission12, where the Supreme Court clarified that a review may be entertained when an error is so self-evident that it does not require elaborate argument to establish. In the present case, the omission to examine the impact of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, 2013 and to correctly apply the statutory principles governing ongoing acquisitions constitutes precisely such an error. The Court is not being asked to reconsider the matter on fresh facts or reweigh evidence rather to recognize that a pivotal statutory provision was not judicially analyzed, leading to an outcome inconsistent with legislative intent. The clarity and finality offered in the Indore Development Authority case further reinforces the position that acquisitions where awards have been passed prior to 1.1.2014 must continue under the 1894 Act. The threshold for review is amply satisfied when a material provision such as Section 24(1)(b) is not even addressed in the impugned order. This is not merely an interpretive oversight—it is a fundamental lapse that warrants judicial correction in accordance with established legal standards. 39. The Court has now had the benefit of reviewing the comprehensive acquisition records and timelines provided by the Review Petitioners. These demonstrate that awards were indeed passed in 2011 for a substantial number of landowners in both Fatehpur and Patrapur villages. Compensation under the Act, 1894 was not only determined 12(2009) 10 SCC 464 Page 25 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 but also tendered to many of the beneficiaries. The initial claim by the Opposite Parties—that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed due to non-payment—was premised on a misinterpretation of the statutory scheme, particularly Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. The new materials on record clearly indicate that the State discharged its statutory obligations in a timely manner. Tendering compensation constitutes compliance under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, and the absence of actual receipt by some landowners does not amount to default on the part of the acquiring authority. As clarified by the Supreme Court, the acquiring body is not required to secure acceptance but merely to tender compensation to fulfill its obligations. Accordingly, the premise on which the original order directed compensation under the 2013 Act was flawed. The present facts establish statutory compliance, and no legal grounds exist to invoke Section 24(2), thereby necessitating a review. 40. The Review Petitioners have firmly established that the legal consequences flowing from Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, 2013 were not factored into the impugned order. This provision, which stipulates that acquisition proceedings shall not lapse if an award has been made under Section 11 of the Act, 1894 before 1.1.2014, forms the legislative safeguard for acquisitions already crystallized prior to the new Act. By failing to engage with this provision, the impugned order inadvertently directed a shift to a legal regime that does not govern the facts at hand. It is not open to courts to ignore such express Page 26 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 statutory saving clauses, particularly where the legislative intent is to protect the validity of concluded administrative acts. The Review Petitioners’ submissions confirm that the acquisition, having matured through all statutorily mandated stages, must remain governed by the Act, 1894. Any direction to assess compensation under the Act, 2013, therefore, lacks legal foundation and cannot be sustained without a complete re-examination of the case based on all relevant material and statutory principles. 41. Another critical issue misapprehended in the impugned order pertains to the alleged lapse due to non-payment of compensation. The Review Petitioners have placed concrete data, backed by acquisition records, showing that compensation was tendered in most cases. Tendering, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, constitutes fulfillment of the State’s obligation under Section 31(1) of the Act, 1894. The claim by the Opposite Parties that compensation was not accepted by them is legally insufficient to trigger a lapse under Section 24(2), as mere non-acceptance does not imply non-payment when the acquiring authority has duly offered compensation. The Court must distinguish between procedural imperfection and legal default. In this case, the procedural actions of the acquiring authority—issuing awards, tendering compensation, and effecting possession—are evident, and the statutory chain under the 1894 Act was fulfilled, negating the basis for treating the acquisition as lapsed. Page 27 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 42. The Review Petitioners have also clarified that ex-gratia payments made under the Orissa Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy, 2006 were misconstrued in the impugned order as being equivalent to compensation under the Act, 1894. This misunderstanding distorted the assessment of the compensation status under the applicable legal framework. Ex-gratia payments are policy-driven measures provided in addition to, and not in substitution of, statutory compensation. They have no bearing on the validity or completion of acquisition proceedings under either the 1894 Act or the 2013 Act. Misinterpreting such administrative payments as determinative of the status of acquisition proceedings introduces serious inconsistencies into the legal framework governing eminent domain. The Review Petitioners have rightly distinguished these voluntary benefits from the statutory obligations discharged under the acquisition laws. It is important that courts maintain a strict boundary between policy-led ex-gratia relief and statutory compensation to preserve the legal sanctity of land acquisition processes. The erroneous conflation of these two distinct categories of payments in the impugned order reinforces the need for a comprehensive review to prevent distortion of well-settled legal principles. 43. Another point of contention arises from the assumption in the impugned order that adjacent villages received compensation under the Act, 2013, thereby creating a presumption of parity. The Review Petitioners have now provided a complete rebuttal of this assumption, Page 28 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 demonstrating through acquisition records that no such application of the 2013 Act occurred in nearby areas. This factual error influenced the impugned order’s reasoning, leading to an incorrect comparison and resulting in an unjustified direction for compensation reassessment. Courts must refrain from drawing inferences unsupported by the record, especially in matters involving large-scale public acquisitions where a small factual mistake can have widespread administrative implications. Equally, parity cannot be presumed between different land parcels without verifying the applicable acquisition dates, legal processes, and award timelines. The application of the law must remain fact-specific and rooted in statutory compliance, not broad analogies. The erroneous assumption regarding neighboring villages materially affected the conclusions of the impugned order and justifies its recall. 44. The Review Petitioners have further shown that the majority of landowners in Fatehpur and Patrapur were either offered or paid compensation prior to the enforcement of the Act, 2013. This evidence refutes the claim that the majority did not receive compensation, which would be a precondition for triggering a lapse under the proviso to Section 24(2). The legal threshold for lapse is stringent and must be applied carefully, with due regard to both tendering and possession. The data now placed before the Court, including the Additional Affidavits, provides a clear picture of how the acquisition progressed through its legally required stages. When the evidentiary Page 29 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 burden is met with this degree of specificity, the judicial response must be to restore the legal framework that governs the facts. It would be contrary to legislative intent to treat valid proceedings as void merely because of procedural oversights in the writ stage. The new information not only substantiates the legality of the acquisition but also reinstates administrative finality, which is essential for ongoing public infrastructure projects. The petitions present a compelling case for review and reset of the adjudication. 45. It is also important to clarify that the legal finality attached to awards passed under Section 12 of the Act, 1894 cannot be undermined by invoking writ jurisdiction to question their validity years later. The Opposite Parties’ attempt to sidestep the statutory remedy available under Section 18—where they could have sought a reference on quantum of compensation—shows that their grievance lies not with procedural irregularity but with the amount awarded. Writ courts are not an alternative forum for litigants who fail to utilize the remedies specifically provided by the legislature. The challenge raised in the writ petitions, which culminated in the impugned order, was in essence an indirect appeal against final awards, an approach that is neither permissible nor sustainable. The proper remedy, had the Opposite Parties been aggrieved by the awards, was to seek a reference under Section 18 within the time prescribed. Their failure to do so cannot now be cloaked under the broader challenge of lapsing or inadequate application of the correct law. The Review Petitioners’ Page 30 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 argument on this issue aligns with well-established principles of statutory finality and judicial restraint in writ matters. 46. The assertion that proceedings lapsed due to non-possession is similarly contradicted by the record now before the Court. In acquisition jurisprudence, possession can be established either through actual transfer or constructive measures such as panchnamas or administrative control. The Review Petitioners have placed credible documentation showing that possession was in fact taken in most cases prior to 1.1.2014. It is well settled that the concept of "lapse" under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 is a limited and exceptional remedy meant for cases of clear governmental inaction. Where possession has been taken and compensation tendered, the law does not contemplate automatic lapse. This is especially so when the acquiring body has fulfilled its part of the statutory process, and delays in acceptance or litigation ensue due to private party conduct. The constitutional bench in Indore Development Authority (supra) reaffirmed this position by holding that both non-possession and non-payment are mandatory to establish a lapse. The present case does not meet that test, and continued reliance on that argument only underscores the necessity for a judicial correction of the record. 47. Moreover, the Review Petitioners’ inability to file a counter affidavit during the original proceedings is not a mere procedural lapse—it had a determinative impact on the outcome. In matters of land acquisition, where extensive documentation is required to trace the validity of Page 31 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 actions under multiple statutes, the counter affidavit is not just a formal response—it forms the evidentiary backbone of the State’s position. The petitioners’ additional note of submission filed on 8.5.2023, supported by certified records, has now addressed this gap comprehensively. It is clear that in Patrapur 82.09% of the awarded amounts have been paid and 74% ex-gratia have been paid. So far as Fatepur is concerned, 82.3% of the awarded amounts have been paid and 63.72% ex-gratia have been paid. The Court acknowledges that the absence of this material precluded a thorough legal analysis of which Act applied and whether the proceedings had lapsed. Review, in such circumstances, is not about second-guessing prior decisions but about affording a complete and just hearing based on all relevant material. Judicial discipline demands that errors caused by procedural incompleteness be corrected when new, conclusive evidence is produced, especially where large public interest and landowners’ rights intersect. The current record supports a review not as a concession to the State but as a necessary exercise of judicial rectitude. V. CONCLUSION: 48. In conclusion, the Review Petitioners have demonstrated, through both statutory interpretation and evidentiary substantiation, that the impugned order cannot be sustained. The cumulative effect of their submissions—clarifying timelines of awards, establishing possession and compensation, rebutting misapplied legal provisions, and supplying omitted records—justifies setting aside the order dated Page 32 of 33 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Aug-2025 19:06:13 19.2.2021. The acquisition proceedings for Fatehpur and Patrapur, having substantially concluded under the Act, 1894, are saved by the express terms of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act, 2013. There is no legal or factual ground for invoking Section 24(2). 49. In the interest of justice and adherence to statutory mandate, both the Review Petitions are allowed. The directions of this Court vide impugned order dated 19.2.2021 are set aside. 50. Consequently, the afore-mentioned CONTCs are disposed of being dropped. 51. No order as to costs. Ordered accordingly. (Dr.S.K. Panigrahi) Judge (G. Satapathy) Judge G. Satapathy, J.I agree. Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 8th August, 2025/ Page 33 of 33