In the matter of Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr v. State of Rajasthan and Ors., reported in
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLMC No.2837 of 2023 Chandan Kumar Das …. Petitioner Mr. D. K. Mohapatra, Advocate -versus- State of Odishaand and another …. Opp. Parties Mr. Ashok Kumar Apat, Addl. P. P. For O.P. No.1 Mr. B. K. Das, Advocate For O.P. No.2 CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH Order No. ORDER 19.09.2025 15. 1. Heard learned counsel for the Parties. 2. By means of this application, the Petitioner seeks to
Facts
quash the FIR dated 12.09.2019 vide Singla P.S. Case No.136 of 2019 vis-à-vis the Criminal Proceeding bearing Spl. Case No.249 of 2019 pending before the court of the learned Special Judge (POCSO)-cum-ADJ-I, Balasore. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 12.09.2019 at about 9:30 p.m., the IIC received a complaint petition from the Court of the Learned Special Judge (POCSO)- cum-ADJ-I, Balasore, in ICC No. 41/2019 filed by Ramesh Chandra Manna. It was alleged that on 19.05.2019 at about 6:00 p.m., the complainant’s daughter, Jharana Manna, was kidnapped by the Petitioner with the assistance of his associates. When the victim resisted and raised an alarm, the accused and his associates wrongfully restrained her, hurled obscene abuses, and threatened her with dire consequences. It was further alleged that from 19.05.2019 to 26.05.2019, the accused, Chandan Kumar Das, subjected the victim to repeated sexual assault against her will. On 27.05.2019, the accused allegedly married the victim at Raighat Temple and thereafter left her at her house in Village–Kainagari. Subsequently, when the victim along with her father went to the house of the accused, the accused and others abused them in obscene language and threatened them with dire consequences. Accordingly, the FIR was registered vide Singla P.S. Case No.136 of 2019 vis-à-vis the Criminal Proceeding bearing Spl. Case No.249 of 2019, for offences punishable under Sections 341/294/363/506/34 of the IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act. 3. During the pendency of the case, the informant, father of the victim, filed a joint affidavit along with O.P. No. 2, stating that his daughter had married the Petitioner on 27.05.2019 at Raighat Temple and has since been Page 2 of 15 leading a happy conjugal life, peacefully residing in the Petitioner’s house. It was further stated that there is no need for further proceedings in this case, as they have been living happily after marriage and have been blessed with a female child born on 24.07.2023. 4. The law has been well settled in matters regarding compounding of serious offences, in the following cases – In the matter of Ramji Lal Bairwa & Anr. Vs. State of Rajasthan and Ors., reported in 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 865, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under – “25. Thus, in unambiguous terms this Court held that before exercising the power under Section 482, Cr. PC the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime besides observing and holding that heinous and serious offences could not be quashed even though a victim or victim’s family and the offender had settled the dispute. This Court held that such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on the society. Having understood the position of law on the second question that it is the bounden duty of the court concerned to consider whether the compromise is just and fair besides being free from undue pressure we will proceed to consider the matter further. A bare perusal of the impugned order dated 04.02.2022 would reveal that the High Court has erred in not bestowing proper consideration the law laid down in Gian Singh’s case (supra) while rendering the same. The the allegations contained in the subject FIR was not at all even adverted to, before quashing the same. We have referred to the allegations which are of serious impugned order would reveal that Page 3 of 15 nature revealed from the FIR. The complaint in this case is annexed to the FIR produced in this proceeding as Annexure P-1. In the said complaint which led to the registration of the FIR reads thus:- “Hence my report may be lodged and action may be taken against the offender Vimal Kumar Gupta as he is making pressure on me not to lodge report.” (underline supplied) the third and into between 26. In this context, it is to be noted that the complaint which led to the registration of the FIR was filed on 08.01.2022 and the compromise was entered fourth respondents within a few weeks thereafter viz., on 31.01.2022. A perusal of the impugned order would reveal that without even referring to the alleged offence and thereby without looking into the nature and gravity of the offence, solely relying upon the compromise, the High Court observed thus:- “This Court is aptly guided by the principles propounded by Hon’ble the Supreme Court and feels that whether dispute is essentially inter se between the parties, either they are relatives, neighbours or having business relationship and which does not affect the society at large, then in such cases, with a view to maintain harmonious relationships between for restitution of relationship and with a view to end- up the dispute in between them permanently, the High Court should exercise its inherent power to quash the FIR and all other subsequent proceedings initiated thereto. Here in this case, though the offences are not compoundable but the parties have settled the dispute amicably and that is essentially in between the parties which is not- affecting public peace and tranquillity therefore with a view to maintain the harmony and to resolve the dispute finally in between the parties, it is deemed appropriate to quash the FIR and all two sides & the Page 4 of 15 further proceedings undertaken in pursuance thereof.” (underline supplied) 27. It is also to be noted that after quashing the FIR and further proceedings, the SHO of the Police Station concerned was directed to file a closure report with the concerned Judicial Magistrate within a period of one month from the date of receipt of a copy of the order. 28. A bare perusal of the impugned order and in the light of the observations and binding conclusions in Gian Singh’s case (supra), bearing in mind the allegations in the subject FIR, it would reveal that the High Court has misread and misapplied the law laid down in Gian Singh’s case (supra) to quash the subject FIR and all further proceedings based in pursuance thereof. We are at a loss to understand how the High Court arrived at the conclusion that in the case on hand a dispute to be resolved exists between the parties and further that to maintain harmony the FIR and all further proceedings thereto should be quashed even without adverting to the allegations raised against the 3rd respondent in the subject FIR. It is also a fact that though in terms of the decision in Gian Singh’s case (supra) an irrecusable duty of the Court to consider whether the compromise could be acted upon or not in the interest of justice, the impugned order would reveal that the High Court has failed to bestow proper consideration in that regard as well. ××× ××× ××× In this regard, it is relevant to note that in the 30. case on hand the victim was then a student of Class 11th in the Higher Secondary aged 16 years. The statement annexed to the FIR of the complainant viz., the 4th respondent itself would reveal that on 08.01.2022 he complained about the pressure from the 3rd respondent to restrain him from lodging report. The compromise was entered immediately Page 5 of 15 thereafter on 31.01.2022. Despite the said position, the Court has not chosen to consider whether the compromise entered into between the parents and the accused could be acted upon or not, in the interest of justice, taking note of the serious allegations levelled against the 3rd accused and in view of the law laid down in Gian Singh’s case (supra). In that context, it is relevant to refer to a decision of a learned Single Judge of the Delhi High Court in Sunil Raikwar v. State and Another1. Paragraph 12 therein, to the extent it is relevant reads thus:- “12. The father of the victim cannot be permitted to settle the dispute with the accused. He is not the victim and the courts have to safeguard and protect the interest of children against onslaught by bad forces. We cannot lose sight of the fact that the accused is being prosecuted for an offence that shocks the value system of a society and this is not a matter that can be permitted to be settled as a compoundable minor offence. Deterrence to others committing similar offence is a must and they cannot get a signal that anything and everything can be compromised......” ××× ××× ××× 33. In view of the reasons as aforesaid and in the light of the decisions referred supra, the impugned order dated 04.02.2022 of the High Court in S.B.C.R.M.P. No.1348/2022, quashing the FIR further No.6/2022 dated 08.01.2022 and all proceedings pursuant thereto solely on the ground that the accused and the complainant had settled the matter, invites interference. We have no hesitation to hold that in cases of this nature, the fact that in view of compromise entered into between the parties, the chance of a conviction is remote and bleak also cannot be a ground to abruptly terminate the investigation, by quashing FIR and all further 1 2021 SCC OnLine Del 258 Page 6 of 15 In the proceedings pursuant thereto, by invoking the power under Section 482, Cr. P.C. said impugned order dated this circumstances, The appeal is allowed. 04.02.2022 of the High Court in S.B.C.R.M.P. No.1348/2022 is hereby quashed and the FIR No.6/2022, set aside. Consequently, investigation and criminal proceedings pursuant thereto subject to the nature of the report to be filed under Section 173(2), Cr. P.C., be proceeded with against the accused, in accordance with law. In the matter of Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “51. In the very nature of its constitution, it is the judicial obligation of the High Court to undo a wrong in course of administration of justice or to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process. This is founded on the legal maxim quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, concedituret id sine qua res ipsa esse non potest. The full import of which is wheneveranything is authorised, and especially if, as a matter of duty, required to be done by law, it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, may also be done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. Ex debito justitiae is inbuilt in such exercise; the whole idea is to do real, complete and substantial justice for which it exists. The power possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code is of wide amplitude but requires exercise with great caution and circumspection. ××× 53. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of Page 7 of 15 offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. ××× 57. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or the Page 8 of 15 the involving cases criminal proceedings criminal offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis for such quashing offences. But having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like the C offences arising out of transactions or matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” In Shimbhu & Anr vs. State Of Haryana, reported in AIR 2014 SC 739 – “22) Further, a compromise entered into between the parties cannot be construed as a leading factor based on which lesser punishment can be awarded. Rape is a non-compoundable offence and it is an offence against the society and is not a matter to be left for the parties to compromise and settle. Since the Court cannot Page 9 of 15 always be assured that the consent given by the victim in compromising the case is a genuine consent, there is every chance that she might have been pressurized by the convicts or the trauma undergone by her all the years might have compelled her to opt for a compromise. In fact, accepting this proposition will put an additional burden on the victim. The accused may use all his to pressurize her for a compromise. So, in the interest of justice and to avoid unnecessary pressure/harassment to the victim, it would not be safe in considering the compromise arrived at between the parties in rape cases to be a ground for the Court to exercise the discretionary power under the proviso of Section 376(2) of IPC.” influence Further, the Punjab and Haryana High Court, has observed in Nardeep Singh Cheema @ Navdeep Singh Cheema vs. State of Punjab and others, reported in 2022 LiveLaw (PH) 257 – the accused with to sexual assault by “Facts reveal that prosecutrix was admittedly a minor when she was enticed and has been recovered from the custody of the accused-petitioner. Material placed on the record by the State shows that she has been subjected the petitioner. the Subsequent marriage of prosecutrix would not dilute the offence under POCSO Act or under Section 376, IPC. POCSO Act has been incorporated with the objective of protecting children from offences of sexual assault, sexual harassment, pornography. If an accused is absolved of committing sexual excesses with a minor on the basis of settlement with victim on her attaining majority, this would encourage an unhealthy trend and defeat the objective and spirit behind the legislation of POCSO Act. Consequently, offence under POCSO Act, which is a special statue, cannot be quashed on the basis of any compromise or matrimony between the accused and the prosecutrix. Finding no merit in the prayer made, Page 10 of 15 petition is dismissed. It is clarified that nothing said hereinabove shall be construed to be an expression of opinion on the merits of the case and the Trial Court shall conclude trial uninfluenced by any observation made hereinabove.” In Daxaben vs. State of Gujarat and others, the reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC 936, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “34. In Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1, this Court observed:—
Legal Reasoning
“46. The court must ensure that criminal prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise the accused. On analysis of the aforementioned cases, we are of the opinion that it is neither possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when it is justified by the tests specifically laid down in the statute itself and in the aforementioned cases. In view of the settled legal position, judgment cannot be sustained.” impugned the 38. However, before exercising its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash an FIR, criminal complaint the High Court, as and/or criminal proceedings, observed above, has to be circumspect and have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous or serious crimes, which are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society cannot be quashed on the basis of a compromise between the offender and the complainant and/or the victim. Crimes like murder, rape, burglary, dacoity and even abetment to commit suicide are neither private nor civil in nature. Such crimes are against the society. In no circumstances can prosecution be quashed on compromise, when the offence is serious Page 11 of 15 and grave and falls within the ambit of crime against society.” 5. In view of the decisions referred to as above, this Court is conscious to observe that offences under the POCSO Act are matters of the utmost seriousness, striking at the very root of the protection afforded to children by the law. The legislative intent behind the enactment of the POCSO Act, 2012, as well as the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, is to shield minors from any form of sexual exploitation and to ensure that their consent, which the law deems legally irrelevant, is not misused to legitimise acts of abuse. 6. A compromise between the parties cannot be permitted to operate as a tool to dilute or negate the gravity of such offences. This Court cannot treat the solemn declarations of compromise or settlement as a game to be played with statutes enacted to safeguard the dignity, bodily integrity, and future of children. To permit such a course would not only undermine the very purpose of these laws but would also embolden perpetrators of such offences to misuse subsequent matrimonial ties or settlements as shields against criminal liability. It is urged that marriage and childbirth, howsoever presented, cannot be treated as solutions to sexual Page 12 of 15 offences, much less those involving children. The law does not recognise such subsequent developments as exonerating the accused from prosecution for acts which, at the relevant time, constituted statutory offences. To adopt a contrary view would, in effect, legitimise child marriage and statutory sexual assault under the cloak of compromise, a proposition alien to the protective spirit of POCSO. 7. It is also apposite to mention herein that the notion of consent in such cases is not an abstract concept capable of being stretched to justify conduct prohibited by statute. 8. It is pertinent to note that the FIR was lodged on 12.09.2019, at which point the victims had not attained the age of majority, and even during the alleged marriage, i.e., 27.05.2019, she was about 17 years of age and, therefore, a minor in the eye of law. The Petitioner, who is stated to be 25 years in 2023, was approximately 21 years old at the time of the alleged incident. In this context, it requires to be observed that under the provisions of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006, a marriage in which either of the contracting parties is a child is voidable at the option of the minor contracting party. Further, under the POCSO Act, 2012, any physical or sexual relationship with a girl Page 13 of 15 below the age of 18 years amounts to statutory sexual assault, irrespective of her consent. Therefore, even if the parties claim to have solemnised a marriage on 27.05.2019, the same cannot be recognised as a valid marriage in law, and any alleged consent of the victim would be immaterial for the purposes of the prosecution under the POCSO Act. 9. The age of the victim at the time of the incident determines the applicability of the law, and once it is established that the victim was a minor, any purported consent is rendered meaningless in the eyes of law. The statutory framework imposes strict liability to ensure that children are insulated from exploitation, even if cloaked under the garb of alleged consensual relationships. 10. It is further important to note that the offences alleged in the FIR i.e. Sections 341, 294, 363, 506, 34 IPC read with Section 6 of the POCSO Act are not trivial or simple in nature. They involve allegations of kidnapping, wrongful restraint, use of obscene language, criminal intimidation, and repeated aggravated penetrative sexual assault. These are grave charges which cannot be brushed aside on the ground of a subsequent compromise. Criminal intimidation, in particular, goes to the heart of the coercive Page 14 of 15 circumstances in which the victim was allegedly placed, making the matter all the more serious 11. Considering the aforesaid aspects relating to the alleged marriage between the parties and the subsequent birth of a child, this Court is of the considered view that such developments cannot, in law, be a basis to invoke the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the cognizance taken by the learned Court below for offences of such grave nature. To do so would be to undermine both the statutory mandate and the larger societal interest that these laws are designed to protect. 12. However, it is directed that the accused shall appear forthwith before the Court in seisin of the matter. Upon such appearance, the learned trial Court shall not pass any adverse order for non-appearance till date, but shall proceed with the trial and endeavour to conclude the same expeditiously and strictly in accordance with law.
Decision
13. Accordingly, the CRLMC stands disposed of. Judge (Chittaranjan Dash) AKPradhan Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN Designation: Sr. Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 26-Sep-2025 18:34:05 Page 15 of 15