The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLREV No. 367 of 2025 Subash Chandra Nayak …. Petitioner Mr. Nira Sundar Panda, Advocate -versus- State of Odisha (Vig) …. Opp. Party Mr. Sangram Das, Standing Counsel (Vigilance) Order No. ORDER 18.08.2025 03. 1. The legality, propriety and correctness of the order dated 14.05.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Balasore
Facts
in T.R. No.10 of 2015 arising out of V.G.R. No.41 of 2012 is under challenge in the present revision petition filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the present Petitioner, Subash Chandra Nayak, then serving as an official responsible for allotment under the Indira Awas Yojana Scheme, is alleged to have extended benefits to inelligible persons by submitting an incorrect report. During inquiry, it was revealed that two individuals namely, Babuli Behera and Brundaban Panigrahi, who were not entitled to such benefits, were wrongly recommended, resulting in a loss of Rs.1,60,840/- to the Government. It is further alleged that the Petitioner, in connivance with other co-accused persons, CRLREV No.367 of 2025 Page 1 of 8 misappropriated the said amount and shared a common intention in committing the offence. Upon completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the Petitioner and others, and cognizance of the offences under Sections 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(c)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Sections 409/120B of the I.P.C. was taken by the learned court below.
Legal Reasoning
appreciation of evidence but only to see whether a prima facie case is made out. Accordingly, it was submitted that the revision petition is devoid of merit and liable to be dismissed. 5. This Court has perused the case record and heard the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner as well as the learned Standing Counsel for Vigilance at length. The rival contentions and the materials placed before this Court have been duly considered. 6. At this stage, it is apposite to notice the settled position of law. In State by Deputy Superintendent of Police Vs. R. Soundirarasu Etc., reported in (2023) 6 SCC 768, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has clarified the already established position of law, and held as follows – “55. The nature of evaluation to be made by the court at the stage of framing of charge came up for consideration of this Court in Onkar Nath Mishra and others v. State (NCT of Delhi) and another, (2008) 2 SCC 561, and referring to its earlier decisions in the State of Maharashtra v. Som Nath CRLREV No.367 of 2025 Page 3 of 8 Thapa, (1996) 4 SCC 659, and the State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, (2000) 6 SCC 338, it was held that at that stage, the Court has to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged and it is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. The relevant observations made in the judgment are as follows:- “11. It is trite that at the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence.” in the case of Som Nath 56. Then again Thapa (supra), a three- Judge Bench of this Court, after noting the three pairs of Sections i.e. (i) Sections 227 and 228 resply in so far as the sessions trial is concerned; (ii) Sections 239 and 240 resply relatable to the trial of warrant cases; and (iii) Sections 245(1) and (2) qua the trial of summons cases, which dealt with the question of framing of charge or discharge, stated thus: (SCC p. 671, para 32). “32...if on the basis of materials on record, a court could come to the conclusion that commission of the offence is a probable consequence, a case for framing of charge exists. To put it differently, if the court were to think that the accused might have committed the offence it can frame the charge, though for conviction the conclusion is required to CRLREV No.367 of 2025 Page 4 of 8 be that the accused has committed the offence. It is apparent that at the stage of framing of a charge, probative value of the materials on record cannot be gone into; the materials brought on record by the prosecution has to be accepted as true at that stage.” 57. In a later decision in Mohanlal Soni (supra), this Court, referring to several of its previous decisions, held that: (SCC p. 342, para 7) “7. The crystallised judicial view is that at the stage of framing charge, the court has to prima facie consider whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. The court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 58. Reiterating a similar view in Sheoraj Singh Ahlawat and others v. State of Uttar Pradesh and another, (2013) 11 SCC 476, it was observed by this Court that while framing charges the court is required to evaluate the materials and documents on record to decide whether the facts emerging therefrom taken at their face value would disclose existence of ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At this stage, the court is not required to go deep into the probative value of the materials on record. It needs to evaluate whether there is a ground for presuming that the accused had committed the offence and it is not required to evaluate sufficiency of evidence to convict the accused. It was held that the Court at this stage cannot speculate into the truthfulness or falsity contradictions & of inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses cannot be looked into at the stage of discharge. allegations and the 75. In Munna Devi v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., (2001) 9 SCC 631, this Court held as under:- the Code of “3.....The revision power under in a Criminal Procedure cannot be exercised routine and casual manner. While exercising such powers the High Court has no authority to appreciate the evidence in the manner as the trial and the appellate courts are required to do. Revisional powers could be exercised only when it CRLREV No.367 of 2025 Page 5 of 8 is shown that there is a legal bar against the continuance of the criminal proceedings or the framing of charge or the facts as stated in the first information report even if they are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged.” 76. Thus, the revisional power cannot be exercised in a casual or mechanical manner. It can only be exercised to correct manifest error of law or procedure which would occasion injustice, if it is not corrected. The revisional power cannot be equated with appellate power. A revisional court cannot undertake meticulous examination of the material on record as it is undertaken by the trial court or the appellate court. This power can only be exercised if there is any legal bar to the continuance of the proceedings or if the facts as stated in the charge-sheet are taken to be true on their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence for which the accused has been charged. It is conferred to check grave error of law or procedure.” 7. In the above decision, it is reiterated that at the stage of framing of charge or consideration of discharge, the Court is only required to evaluate the material on record with a view to seeing whether, if taken at face value, the same disclose the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the probative value of the material cannot be gone into. Even a strong suspicion founded on material leading the Court to form a presumptive opinion about the commission of the offence is sufficient to frame charges. It is further emphasised that revisional powers cannot be equated with appellate jurisdiction and can be exercised only to correct a manifest illegality or jurisdictional error; not to re-appreciate evidence or weigh its sufficiency. CRLREV No.367 of 2025 Page 6 of 8 8. It is also held in the recent decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of State Vs. Eluri Srinivasa Chakravarthi and Others, reported in 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 633 – in list of documents, “27…The consideration of material, i.e., chargesheet and the background of allegations made against the accused is the available path for discharge by the special court and the High Court. But, a path unavailable to the special court and the High Court is the consideration of material invited at the instance of the defence for ordering discharge…” 9. In the instant case, the Petitioner’s grounds primarily rest on the assertion that his role was limited to affixing signatures after verification by other competent officers and that the principal responsibility lay with the B.D.O. and Gram Panchayat officials. It is also urged that the statements of certain witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. do not directly implicate him. This Court is of the view that all such pleas are essentially matters of defence. Whether the Petitioner’s act of endorsing sanction letters was perfunctory or formed part of a deliberate act in connivance with other accused persons is a matter that can only be tested in the course of trial. Similarly, the fact that multiple officers were involved in the process does not automatically exonerate the Petitioner; the precise role and culpability of each officer are questions of fact that cannot be determined at the stage of discharge. 10. Further, the absence of direct attribution in some witness statements does not erase the incriminating circumstances otherwise brought on record. The settled principle is that, at the stage of framing charge, it is enough if there exists prima facie material CRLREV No.367 of 2025 Page 7 of 8 raising strong suspicion of the Petitioner’s involvement. Whether such suspicion ripens into proof beyond reasonable doubt is a matter reserved for trial. 11. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order dated 14.05.2025 passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Balasore in T.R. No.10 of 2015 does not suffer from any infirmity warranting interference in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. The grounds raised by the Petitioner are in the nature of defences, which he is at liberty to place and establish during trial. 12. Accordingly, the CRLREV stands dismissed. It is, however, made clear that nothing observed herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case, which shall be decided independently by the learned trial court on the basis of evidence adduced. (Chittaranjan Dash) Judge A.K.Pradhan Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: ANANTA KUMAR PRADHAN Designation: Sr. Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 25-Aug-2025 19:48:01 CRLREV No.367 of 2025 Page 8 of 8
Arguments
3. Mr. Panda, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submitted that the impugned order dated 14.05.2025 rejecting the discharge petition under Sections 227 and 239 Cr.P.C. is unsustainable in law and fact. He argued that the Petitioner had no independent role in the sanction or disbursement of Indira Awas Yojana benefits, as the responsibility of identifying beneficiaries lay with the Block Development Officer, Gram Panchayat Secretary and other field officers. It was contended that the Petitioner merely signed the sanction letters after spot verification reports prepared by the competent authorities, and there is no material to show misappropriation or dishonest intention on his part. Learned counsel further argued that the trial court mechanically rejected the discharge petition without proper application of mind, despite the fact that the statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. do not attribute any specific act of misappropriation to the Petitioner. It was also submitted that the allegations, even if taken at face value, disclose at best an irregularity in official duty but not the ingredients of the offences alleged under the Prevention of Corruption Act or the I.P.C. Hence, it was prayed that the Petitioner ought to have been discharged. 4. Per contra, Mr. Das, learned Standing Counsel for State (Vigilance), drew attention to the revision memo to argue that the CRLREV No.367 of 2025 Page 2 of 8 very grounds raised by the Petitioner demonstrate his conscious role in the allotment process. It was pointed out that the Petitioner had verified and recommended the names of inelligible persons, which directly facilitated wrongful sanction and disbursement under the Indira Awas Yojana. Mr. Das argued that the investigation has unearthed specific materials showing the Petitioner’s connivance with co-accused in causing a wrongful loss to the State exchequer to the tune of Rs.1,60,840/-, and such acts clearly attract the ingredients of Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(c)(d) of the P.C. Act and Section 409 IPC. He contended that the order of the learned Special Judge is well- reasoned and based on materials in the charge-sheet, and at the stage of discharge, the Court is not expected to conduct a meticulous