The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK RSA No.181 of 2023 (From the judgment dated 31.1.2023 and decree dated 9.2.2023 passed by learned Second Addl. District Judge, Puri in RFA No.3/59 of 2019-17 dismissing the appeal in the process confirming the judgment and decree dated 31.7.2017 and 11.8.2017 passed by learned Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Puri in C.S. No.123/330 of 2015/2013) Sushila Dash and others … Appellants -versus- Debendra Kumar Nanda and another … Respondents Advocates appeared in the case through hybrid mode: For Appellants : Mr. S.K. Mishra, Sr. Advocate -versus- For Respondents 1 & 2: Mr.K.M.Dhal, Adv. For Respondent No.3 : Mr. G.M.Rath, Advocate. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ CORAM: JUSTICE SASHIKANTA MISHRA JUDGMENT 05.12.2025. Sashikanta Mishra,J. This is an appeal by the plaintiffs against a confirming judgment. The judgment dated R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 1 of 26 31.1.2023 followed by decree passed by the learned Second Addl. District Judge, Puri in RFA No.3/59 of 2019-17 is impugned, whereby the said appeal preferred by the plaintiffs against the judgment dtd.31.7.2017 followed by decree passed by the learned Addl. Senior Civil Judge, Puri in C.S. No.123/330 of 2015-13 was dismissed. 2. For convenience, the parties are referred to as per their respective status before the trial Court to avoid confusion. 3. The suit property is described in two schedules of the plaint being Schedule-B and B-1. Schedule-B is as follows: Mouza - Hiranpada, Satyabadi, Dist Puri, Khata No. 143 (one hundred four three) Chhaka No. 206 (two hundred six), Chaka Plot No. 970 (nine hundred seventy), Area -Ac. 3.96 (three acres ninty six dec.) Chakka No. 105/320 (one hundred five by three hundred twenty), Chaka Plot No 817/1136 (Eight hundred seventeen by one thousand one hundred thirty six), area Ac. 0.06 (six dec.). Total Ac. 4.02 (four acres and two decs.) Mouza Damadorpur Sasan, Dist - Puri, P.S - Puri Sadar, Plot No. 302, Khata No. 431 area Ac. 0.20 decimal. Schedule-B-1 is as follows: R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 2 of 26 1. Mouza Jhadeswari Sahi, P.S Puri Town, Dist-Puri, Khata No.54 (Fifty four), Plot No-28 (Twenty eight), Gharabari area Ac. 0.006 (six decs.) and Plot No - 29 (Twenty nine), Area Ac. 0.058, Total Area Ac 0.064. 2. Mouza-Daitapada Sahi, P.S- Puri Town, Dist - Puri, Plot No. 1379 (One thousand three hundred seventy nine), Municipal Jamanbandi No. 52 (Fifty two), Area – Ac. 011 ‰ decs. (Eleven and half dec) & Municipal Jamanbandi No.62 (sixty two) Area –Ac. 002 ‰ decs. (two and half dec.) Total-Ac. 014 (fourteen dec.). 3. Mouza Daitapada Sahi, Khata No. 271 (two hundred seventy one), Plot No. 1400 (One thousand four hundred), area-Ac. 0.023 (twenty three dec.) 4. As per plaint Schedule-A, the following genealogy reflects the relationship between the parties: Late Krupasindhu Nanda Netramani Dibya (wife) defendant. 2(two) Sushila Pramila Uramila Nramila Kshetramani Debendra (P-1) (P-2) (P-3) (P-4) (P-5) (D-1) 5. The case of the plaintiffs, briefly stated, is as follows: One Radhanath Nanda being the common ancestor had two sons namely, Krupasindhu Nanda and R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 3 of 26
Facts
Madhusudan Nanda. The plaintiffs and defendants are the successors of Krupasindhu Nanda. The suit properties are partly ancestral and partly parental properties of the plaintiffs and defendant No.1. After the death of Krupasindhu Nanda, there was a partition of the ancestral properties on 01.6.1966 through a registered deed between Madhusudan Nanda on one hand and Defendant Nos.1 and 2 on the other, representing the branch of Krupasindhu Nanda. Lot Nos.1 and 3 of Schedule-B-1 properties were allotted to Defendant Nos.1 and 2. The plaintiffs being his daughters also have equal share in it. The agricultural lands in Mouza-Hiranpada (Schedule-B) were purchased out of sale proceeds received after disposal of 8 acres of land of Krupasindhu Nanda in Mouza-Singhakuda in the year 1970. Thus, said lands are also the joint family property of the plaintiffs and Defendant Nos.1 and 2. However, Defendant No.1, by projecting himself as the sole successor of Krupasindhu Nanda and by manipulation and practice of fraud, influenced the settlement authorities to get the lands recorded exclusively in his R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 4 of 26 name. Furthermore, taking advantage of the old age of Defendant No.2, he also got a fraudulent Will executed by her in his favour. He thereafter sold the entire properties of Hiranpada mouza (Schedule-B) to Defendant No.3 vide sale deed dtd.11.4.2012 without consent and knowledge of the plaintiffs and without legal necessity. He then constructed a house on the paternal land without the consent of the plaintiffs. When the plaintiffs, having come to know of the above, confronted Defendant No.1, he not only declared himself as the sole successor but also threatened to dispose of the entire property. Hence, the plaintiffs filed the suit for partition claiming 1/7th share over Schedule-B and B-1 properties and to declare the sale deed dated 11.4.2012 as void with ancillary relief. 6. Defendant Nos.1 and 2 jointly filed written statement challenging the suit on the ground of limitation, maintainability and non-joinder of necessary
Legal Reasoning
obviously be ruled out. This power being unfettered, we cannot put any fetter; any such action of ours would render some really hard-pressed people without a remedy. May we repeat that we are not at the question as to when power under section 37 would be, or should be exercised. As already pointed out, this power shall be available only under compelling compelling circumstances existing) we cannot shut out the invocation of the power. May we also observe that though section 37 has conferred an unfettered power, it is settled law that every power, be it administrative or judicial, has to be exercised in a reasonable manner, and the reasonable exercise of power inheres in its exercise within a reasonable time as stated at pp. 1245-6 of Manasaram v. S.P. Pathak : (1984) 1 SCC 125 : A.I.R. 1983 S.C. 1239. This apart, no power is really unfettered; every power has to be exercised according to rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion; according to law, and not according to humour. The exercise of discretionary power cannot be arbitrary, vague and fanciful; it has to be legal and regular.” It is not the plaintiffs’ case that their claim falls under any of the aforementioned exceptions so as to enable the Civil Court to reopen the issue. 19. It is contended that since the Hiranpada land (Schedule-B) was purchased from out of the sale proceeds of the ancestral lands at Mouza Bhimpur, the same acquires the status of ancestral properties. This Court however finds that as per the plaint averments, said land was purchased from sale proceeds of R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 22 of 26 agricultural land in Singhakuda in 1970. No evidence is available in this regard. On the contrary, the sale deed dtd.16.11.1971 (Ext-6) specifically refers to non- payment of consideration of purchase of Hiranpada land by Defendant No.1 from one Krushna Chandra Sahoo on 02.11.1970 as reason for sale of such land to Defendant No. 3. Nothing has been placed before this Court to demonstrate as to how the same helps the plaintiffs’ case. The findings of the Courts below cannot therefore be faulted with. 20. In so far as the disputed sale deed is concerned, the same relates to Schedule B property. As already stated, there is ample evidence on record to show that initially the settlement authorities in the year 1977 and the consolidation authorities in the year 1982 have acknowledged the exclusive right of the Defendant No.1 over the said land. As such, the sale of said land by him in favour of Defendant No.3 as per the disputed sale deed cannot be challenged at this distance of time particularly R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 23 of 26 when this Court has negatived the plea of the plaintiffs of ignorance regarding existence of the ROR earlier. 21. In so far as Lot No.1 of Schedule B-1 is concerned, the same vested with the Government on 24.4.1963, but subsequently settled in favour of Defendant No.1 in 1965 and ROR was issued. This was also never challenged. As regards Lot No.3 of Schedule-B-1, the land vested to the Government but was subsequently settled in favour of Defendant No.1 as per Section-8 was OEA Act. This was also never challenged at any point of time. Such being the factual position, the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to question the correctness of the orders passed by the concerned authorities so far back in time. As regards the land under Lot No.2 of Schedule-B-1, the same pertains to a leasehold land granted by the Puri Municipality in favour of Defendant No.2. It goes without saying that the nature of land being leasehold, the same cannot be the subject matter of partition. Moreover, the Courts below have found that a fresh lease was granted by the lessor in favour of Defendant No.1 and not a renewal of the R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 24 of 26 existing lease granted to the original lease. Therefore, the judgment of the Supreme Court in Annapurna Das (Supra) would not be applicable in the facts of the present case. 22. Thus, from a conspectus of the facts, law and analysis made, this Court finds that the plaintiffs have shown no ground to reopen the long-finalised settlement, consolidation or OEA proceedings. Their plea of ignorance of the RORs stands disproved, and none of the exceptions in Gulzar Khan (Supra) permitting post- consolidation interference by the Civil Court is attracted. The Schedule-B and B-1 properties having been duly recorded and validly settled long ago in favour of Defendant No.1, no subsisting right remains with the plaintiffs to claim partition. The sale of Schedule-B land by Defendant No.1 to Defendant No.3, being based on his exclusive title, cannot therefore be interfered with. The substantial questions of law stand answered accordingly. R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 25 of 26
Arguments
parties. It was contended that the ancestral land having been partitioned through a registered partition deed in R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 5 of 26 the year, 1966, the plaintiffs are no longer co-parceners by virtue of Section 6(c) of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. As regards, the Schedule-B land, it was stated that the same was purchased by Defendant No.2 in the name of Defendant No.1 out of her stridhan and with assistance received from her brothers. When Defendant No.1 attained majority, the land was mutated in his name and ROR was issued in his favour by the revenue as well as consolidation authorities. Thus, the plaintiffs have no manner of right over the property. In order to construct a new house in place of the dilapidated house, he sold the entire property to Defendant No.3 through the registered sale deed in question, which is valid and binding. In respect of Item No.1 of Schedule B-1, it was contended that the same along with the old dwelling house standing thereon was allotted to the share of Defendant No.1 in the partition of the year 1966. It had vested to the Government on 24.4.1963 but was again settled in favour of Defendant No.1 in the year 1965 through a claim proceeding under Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act. ROR was also issued in R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 6 of 26 his favour. Therefore, the order of the OEA authority is not open to challenge as per Section 39 of the Act. As regards Item No.2, it was contended that the same was the leasehold land of late Krupasindhu Nanda granted by Puri Municipality for 10 years. After expiry of the tenure, Defendant No.2 being his widow applied for renewal. The municipal authorities issued notice to the plaintiffs, who relinquished their right in favour of Defendant No.2. As such, they are estopped from taking a contrary stand. As regards Item No.3, it was stated that the same came to the share of Defendant No.1 in partition in the year, 1966. The land vested to the Government, but was subsequently settled in favour of Defendant No.1 as per Section-8 of the O.E.A. Act. 7. Defendant No.3 filed a separate written statement supporting the stand taken by the other defendants. It is her case that she purchased the property validly by a registered sale deed dtd.11.4.2012 by paying the consideration money. As such, the title of the property R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 7 of 26 has been validly conveyed to her and the properties are not liable to partition. 8. Basing on the rival pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues for determination: (i) Whether the suit is maintainable? (ii) Whether the plaintiffs have got cause of action to file this suit? (iii) Whether the suit is barred by limitation? (iv) Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder and mis- joinder of necessary parties? (v) Whether the registered sale deed bearing No. 114812025215 dtd. 11.04.2012 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant No.3 is valid and not binding on the plaintiffs? (vi) Whether all the properties given in the. plaint are liable for partition, if so, what is the share of the parties ? (vii) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get a decree of permanent injunction?; (viii) To what other reliefs the parties are entitled to? 9. Taking up Issue Nos. III, V, VI and VII for consideration at the outset, the trial Court, after detailed scanning of the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, found that at the time of purchase of Hiranpada property in the name of Defendant No.1 some of the plaintiffs had already attained majority. However, being daughters of Defendant No.2 they would have been aware of the transaction. Neither the major daughters R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 8 of 26 nor those who attained majority subsequently raised any objection against such transaction, though it was against their interest, but remained silent. Defendant No.1, on attaining majority raised claim before the consolidation authority as well as the settlement authority which was accepted and ROR was prepared in his name. At that time also, the plaintiffs did not take any steps. The RORs having been published in 1977 and 1982, the plaintiffs cannot be allowed to challenge the same so belatedly, more so when they had neither pleaded nor adduced any evidence as to when exactly they came to know about the wrong recording of the property in the name of Defendant No.1. Finding thus that the transactions relating to the property had remained unchallenged for all these years, the trial Court raised presumption that the documents were rightly prepared. The claim for partition of Item No.1 of B-1 schedule property was thus held to be barred by Article 110 of the Limitation Act. As regards Lot No.3, the trial Court was of the view that in order to validly claim their share, the plaintiffs ought to have impleaded Madhusudan Nanda or his successors- R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 9 of 26 in-interest as parties. Not having done so and not having given proper boundary description, the trial Court was of the view that the property being ancestral in nature cannot be partitioned. As regards the deed of partition effected in the year 1966, the trial Court noted that the same is a registered document and had never been challenged on the ground of fraud or any other ground. The plaintiffs had never raised any objection before the OEA Collector. As regards Lot No.2 of Schedule B-1, it was found that a fresh lease was granted in favour of Defendant No.2. Therefore, during the lifetime of Defendant No.2, the plaintiffs cannot claim any right over the said property. In view of the fact that the partition had been effected prior to 20.12.2004, the same cannot be reopened on the basis of Section-6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act. It was thus held that the suit properties are not partible and the registered sale deed in question is valid. It was also held that the suit is bad for non-joinder of the successors of Radhanath Nanda as parties. Basically, on the above findings, the suit was dismissed. R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 10 of 26 10. The plaintiffs carried appeal to the District Court. Considering the rival contentions, the First Appellate Court framed the following points for consideration: (i) Whether the suit properties are joint properties of the plaintiffs and defendant no.1 and 2 and liable for partition? the sale (ii) Whether bearing No.114812025215 dated 11.04.2012 executed by defendant no.1 in favour of defendant no.3 in respect of lands situated in village Hiranpada, is valid and binding on the plaintiffs ? deed 11. Both points were taken up together for consideration. After independently analyzing the evidence on record in light of the settled position of law, the First Appellate Court concurred with the finding of the trial Court that the consolidation record is final and its validity cannot be questioned in the Civil Court and therefore, Hiranapada (Schedule-B) land is to be treated as the exclusive property of Defendant No.1. Consequently, the sale deed dtd.11.4.2012 executed by him is also to be treated as valid and binding. The First Appellate Court also agreed with the finding of the trial Court that in the absence of the legal heirs of late R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 11 of 26 Madhusudan Nanda, the plaintiffs having claimed 1/7th share over the ancestral property, the suit is bad for non- joinder. It was further held that the leasehold property could be resumed by the lessor (Puri Municipality) at any time for which it cannot be subjected to partition. As regards the remaining properties, the First Appellate Court referred to the admission made by P.W.1 that they were aware of the factum of partition and had not raised any objection. Since they had never challenged the partition deed of 1966, they cannot claim any share. It was also held that the plaintiffs have not been able to establish as to how the OEA authorities had committed any illegality or procedural error so as to empower the Civil Court to interfere. Basically on such findings, the appeal was dismissed and the judgment and decree of the trial Court was confirmed. 12. Being further aggrieved, the plaintiff-appellants have preferred this Second Appeal, which was admitted on the following substantial question of law: “(i) Whether the right of plaintiffs survived over the suit properties to claim for partition and R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 12 of 26 whether the explanation under Section 6 of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 would permit reopening of partition, if any”? (ii) Whether the findings of both the courts below that the suit was barred by limitation is correct without considering the time when the cause of action arose? (iii) Whether the findings of the courts below that the suit is bad for non-joinder of the heirs of Radhanath Nanda is correct when the plaintiffs have no claim over the properties belonging to the said branch? (iv) Whether the courts below were correct in not considering the claim of the plaintiffs that the cause of action had arisen after the closure of consolidation and OEA proceedings?” 13. Heard Mr. S.K.Mishra, learned Senior counsel with Ms.P.Mohanty for the plaintiffs-appellants, Mr. K.M.Dhal, learned counsel for the Defendants- Respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Mr. G.M.Rath, learned counsel for the Defendant-Respondent No.3. 14. Mr. Mishra, learned Senior counsel would argue that both the Courts below have approached the dispute from an erroneous perspective, inasmuch as the claim of the plaintiffs has been held to be barred by limitation and bad for non-joinder of parties. As regards limitation, Mr. Mishra would argue that it is settled law that limitation runs from the date of knowledge. The plaintiffs R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 13 of 26 have specifically pleaded in the plaint that the cause of action arose on 17.5.2013 when Defendant No.1 threatened to sell the entire property to strangers. So, as per Article-59 of the Limitation Act, the suit to set aside the fraudulent sale deed can be filed within three years from the date of knowledge, which the plaintiffs did. As regards the issue of non-joinder, Mr. Mishra would argue that the property having been already partitioned long back, the plaintiffs have no claim against the members of Madhusudan Nanda branch and have confined their claim to the properties of Krupasindhu Nanda. Therefore, the former are not necessary parties. He further argues that the First Appellate Court ignored the admission made in Ext.6 about the sale of the land for the purpose of repayment of loan. On the plea of the defendants that the plaintiffs had relinquished their right over the lease property, Mr.Mishra would submit that the same is not tenable because the said property was not covered by consolidation operations. Further, the property under Schedule B was fraudulently sold to Defendant No.3 on 04.11.2012, which is after closure of R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 14 of 26 the consolidation proceedings. This gives rise to a fresh cause of action and hence, the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gulzar Khan v. Commissioner of Consolidation and Others, 1993 (II) OLR 194 is not applicable and section 51 of the OCH & PFL Act will not be a bar. Moreover, the issue of succession among co-parcenors has not been dealt with in the said case. In support of his contentions, Mr. Mishra relies on the following case laws: i. Income Tax v. Seth Govindram Sugar Mills Ltd. (1965) 57 ITR 510 ii. Shyam Narayan Prasad v. Krishna Prasad (2018) 7 SCC 646 iii. Gurdip Kaur v. Hamand Singh 1964 SCC Online Punj 180 iv. S.P Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath (1994) 1 SCC 1 v. Gita bai Maruti Raut (dead) through LR. & Ors. v. Pandurang Maruti Raut (dead) , Civil Appeal No.- 7702 of 2013 vi. Bhimavarapu Subba Reddy v. B. Nagireddy, AIR 1973 AP 184 vii. Balwant Singh & Anr. V. Daulat Singh (Dead) through LRs. & Ors., 1997 AIR SC 2719 viii. Deepak Kumar Anr. V. Board of Revenue & Ors., Writ B No.-356 of 2013 of Allahabad High Court ix. Annapurna Das v. State of Odisha & Ors., SLP (C) No.- 21039 of 2024 R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 15 of 26 15. Mr. K.M.Dhal, on the other hand, would argue that under the partition deed of 1966, specific shares were allotted to both branches. Said partition was never challenged at any point of time. During the settlement and consolidation operations also, the plaintiffs had never raised any objection nor challenged the ROR. In any case, the order of the consolidation authorities is not open to challenge in the absence of the situations referred to in the case of Gulzar Khan (Supra). No case for interference by the Civil Court has been made out at all by the plaintiffs. Thus, not only Section 51 is a bar but also the order of the consolidation authorities acts as res-judicata. Moreover, the partition of ancestral properties was effected way back in the year 1966 for which the plaintiffs cannot invoke the amended provisions of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. As regards the lease properties, all plaintiffs had specifically relinquished their shares in favour of their mother (Defendant No.2) for which they are estopped from questioning the same. Mr.Dhal further argues that if the plaintiffs contend that the properties are undivided R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 16 of 26 ancestral properties, the members of all branches are necessary parties. Moreover, it is admitted that they had knowledge of the partition deed as well as the publication of RORs by the settlement and consolidation authorities but never challenged the same and therefore, the suit was rightly held to be barred under Article-110 A of the Limitation Act. 16. Mr. G.M.Rath, learned counsel, while adopting the arguments made by Mr. Dhal as referred above, additionally submits that the Defendant No.3 had purchased the land (Schedule-B) through a registered sale deed on payment of consideration and was put into possession. It was a valid sale transaction and cannot be questioned by the plaintiffs. 17. As already stated, the dispute relates to different properties described under Schedule-B and B-1. The plaintiffs claim 1/7th share. Be it noted that the plaintiffs are the daughters of late Krupasindhu Nanda. It seems to be an admitted fact that one Radhanath Nanda was the common ancestor, whose two sons were R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 17 of 26 Madhusudan and Krupasindhu. After death of Radhanath, the properties were partitioned amongst his two sons. Madhusudan was allotted Ac.13.00 decs land whereas Defendant Nos.1 and 2 got only Ac.0.15 decs. Though appearing disproportionate on the face of it, yet fact remains that such allotment was made on the basis of a registered partition deed in the year 1996. The deed was never challenged. Learned Senior counsel Mr. Mishra would argue that the plaintiffs do not claim any share whatsoever from the share allotted to Madhusudan branch and have confined their claim to the share allotted to their father Krupasindhu Nanda. As such, they were not required to implead the legal heirs of Madhusudan Nanda as parties to the suit. This appears to be a valid argument. The ancestral properties having been partitioned, the same cannot operate as estoppel for members of one branch to claim partition inter-se in respect of the share falling to their branch. The plaintiffs have claimed 1/7th share, which is commensurate with the number of members of their family. To amplify, the plaintiffs are 5 daughters, Defendant No.1 is their only R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 18 of 26 brother and Defendant No.2 is their mother. It has not been demonstrated that any of the suit schedule properties relates in any manner to the Ac.13.00 decs. allotted to the share of Madhusudan. The suit cannot therefore, be held to be bad for non-joinder of necessary parties. 18. As regards the question of limitation, it has been argued that the plaintiffs came to know about recording of the schedule lands exclusively in the name of Defendant No.1 by the settlement and consolidation authorities when he threatened to sell the same to outsiders. This Court has perused the plaint averments carefully. The cause of action is discussed in the following manner. “That, the cause of action for the suit arose on (Seventeen May Two Thousand 17.05.2013 Thirteen) when (one) the defendant No. 1 threatened the entire property to the strangers in Mouza Jhadeswari Sahi and Daitapada Sahi within the local limits of this Hon’ble Court.” the plaintiffs to sell Nothing has been stated about the RORs issued by the aforementioned authorities, much less the date on which the plaintiffs came to know about the same. R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 19 of 26 Limitation runs from the date on which the cause of action accrues or from the point of time when the plaintiff acquires knowledge of the material facts constituting such cause of action. A bare and un- particularised allegation that the defendant "threatened to sell the property” is insufficient to establish the date of knowledge, particularly when the plaintiffs have neither pleaded nor proved the date on which they actually became aware of the RORs issued in favour of Defendant No.2, a fact that lies at the very root of the question as to when exactly the period of limitation commenced. In the absence of clear factual averments and a specific date indicating when the plaintiffs obtained knowledge of the RORs, the alleged threat to sell the schedule property cannot, ipso facto, be treated as the point of accrual of knowledge so as to constitute the cause of action. It is borne out from the evidence on record that the suit Schedule B property was purchased by Defendant No.2 in the name of Defendant No.1 while he was still a minor, but on attaining majority, the lands were mutated in his name and ROR was issued by the settlement authorities R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 20 of 26 and subsequently by the consolidation authorities. This ROR was never challenged. Moreover, in view of the specific bar in the OCH and PFL Act in the form of Section 59, the order of the consolidation authorities cannot be questioned before the civil Court. Certain exceptions have been laid down in the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Gulzar Khan (supra) as follows: in conformity with “42. We may conclude our views relating to Civil Court’s jurisdiction by stating that the same would be available after closure of consolidation operations only in any one of the following circumstances; (i) The cause of action accruing after the closure of the consolidation operations, a la Suba Singh. (ii) If the consolidation authorities had taken the decision without complying with the provisions of the Act or had not acted the fundamental principle of judicial procedure (which would take within its fold the case of violation of natural justice), vide principle No. (ii) of Magulu. (iii) Obtaining of order (s) of consolidation authorities by playing fraud on the party who seeks to approach the Civil Court, as per Karbalai Begum’s case. 43. The aforesaid being the position, it is apparent that a forum has to be available to a person who was to be aggrieved, after section 41 notification has been issued, with any order having been passed or anything having been done during the consolidation operations affecting his right, title and interest As stated in the opening sentence of this judgment, there cannot be a right without any remedy; and, according to us, the remedy can be made available principally by section 37 of the Act. As to when such a situation may arise need not be spelt out, indeed, it cannot be; the probability of such a situation arising cannot the hand from R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 21 of 26 on but circumstances,
Decision
23. In view of the above findings, the Second Appeal is held to be devoid of merit and is therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs. …………….……..………. Sashikanta Mishra, Judge Ashok Kumar Behera Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR BEHERA Reason: authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 08-Dec-2025 12:00:05 R.S.A. No. 181 of 2023 Page 26 of 26