The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.12548 of 2022 In the matter of an application under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. ……………… A. Arun Kumar & Ors. …. Petitioners State of Odisha & Ors. …. Opposite Parties -versus- For Petitioners along with Mr. A. Mishra, Advocate Mr. K.P. Mishra, Sr. Advocate : For Opp. Parties : Mr. S.P. Das Addl. Standing Counsel Mr. D. Nayak, Advocate (Opp. Party Nos. 3 to 5) PRESENT: THE HON’BLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of Hearing: 28.11.2025 and Date of Judgment: 28.11.2025 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J. 1. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Mode. 2. Heard Mr. K.P. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioners, Mr. S.P. Das, learned Addl. Standing Counsel
Legal Reasoning
appearing for the State-Opp. Parties and Mr. D. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for Opp. Party Nos. 3 to 5. // 2 // 3. The present writ petition has bene filed inter alia challenging order dtd.24.12.2021 so passed by Opp. Party No. 3, wherein claim of the Petitioners to get the benefit of regularization taking into account their long continuance was rejected. 4. It is the case of the Petitioners that they were all engaged in the year 1992 in the then Cuttack Municipality. While so continuing when Petitioners were illegally disengaged in the year 1995, Petitioners challenging such action of the Municipality approached this Court in OJC No. 9113 of 1995. This Court when vide order dtd.19.12.1995, passed an interim order of status quo to be maintained, Petitioners were suo moto reengaged in their work on 23.12.1995 vide office order of the same date under Annexure-2. 4.1. Learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioners contended that after being so reengaged vide office order dtd.23.12.1995, Petitioners were allowed to continue as before. Taking into such long continuance of the Petitioners w.e.f. 1992 and even after the reengagement vide order dtd.23.12.1995 under Annexure-2, Petitioners when were not absorbed in the regular establishment, they approached this Court with a prayer to take their services to be counted w.e.f. the initial date of engagement in 1992 and for Page 2 of 16 // 3 // correction of the gradation list so issued by the Cuttack Municipal Corporation. 4.2. When the same was not considered, Petitioners once again approached this Court in W.P.(C) No. 13232 of 2010. This Court vide order dtd03.03.2015 under Annexure-3 directed Opp. Party No. 3 to consider the grievance of the Petitioners by giving due opportunity of hearing. But such claim of the Petitioners was rejected vide order dtd.04.09.2015 under Annexure-4 and in the said order it was held that position of the Petitioners in the gradation list by showing their engagement of the year 1995 is justified. 4.3. It is contended that thereafter, Petitioners when were not regularized in their services, even if their engagement was taken of the year 1995, they approached this Court once again by filing W.P.(C) No. 27758 of 2021. This Court vide order dtd.23.09.2021 under Annexure-6, when directed the Cuttack Municipal Corporation to consider their claim, the same has been rejected vide the impugned order dt.24.12.2021 under Annexure-7, inter alia on the ground that W.P.(C) No. 9113 of 1995 so filed by them Page 3 of 16 // 4 // challenging their disengagement, was dismissed by this Court vide order dtd.22.11.2021. 4.4. Learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioners contended that W.P.(C) No. 9113 of 1995 was filed challenging the order of disengagement issued by the then Municipality. However, this Court when passed an interim order on 19.10.1995, Petitioners were suo moto reengaged by the Municipality vide order dt.23.12.1995 under Annexure-2 and were allowed to continue. Accordingly, prayer made in the said writ petition became infructuous after their reengagement suo moto by the Municipality. It is accordingly contended that the ground taken in the impugned order that W.P.(C) No. 9113 of 1995 since was dismissed by this Court vide order dtd.22.11.2021. Petitioners’ order of disengagement stands revived and Petitioners accordingly are not eligible to get the benefit of regularization is completely misconceived. 4.5. It is also contended that in view of the recent decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaggo vs. Union of India & Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3826 and Shripal & Anr. vs. Nagar Nigam, Ghaziabad, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 221 as well as Dharam Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Anr. (Civil Appeal No(s).8558 of Page 4 of 16 // 5 // 2018, Petitioners because of their long continuance even w.e.f.23.12.1995, are eligible and entitled to get the benefit of regularization and the ground on which their claim has been rejected vide the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law. 4.6. View expressed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaggo as cited supra in Para-22 to 25 and 27 reads as follows:- “22. The pervasive misuse of temporary employment contracts, as exemplified in this case, reflects a broader systemic issue that adversely affects workers’ rights and job security. In the private sector, the rise of the gig economy has led to an increase in precarious employment arrangements, often characterized by lack of benefits, job security, and fair treatment. Such practices have been criticized for exploiting workers and undermining labour standards. Government institutions, entrusted with upholding the principles of fairness and justice, bear an even greater responsibility to avoid such exploitative employment practices. When public sector entities engage in misuse of temporary contracts, it not only mirrors the detrimental trends observed in the gig economy but also sets a concerning precedent that can erode public trust in governmental operations. 23. The International Labour Organization (ILO), of which India is a founding member, has consistently advocated for employment stability and the fair treatment ILO’s Multinational Enterprises of workers. The Declaration6 encourages companies to provide stable employment and to observe obligations concerning employment stability and social security. It emphasizes in that enterprises should assume a promoting employment security, particularly in contexts where job discontinuation could exacerbate long-term unemployment. leading role 24. The landmark judgement of the United State in the case of Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corporation7 serves as a Page 5 of 16 // 6 // pertinent example from the private sector, illustrating the consequences of misclassifying employees to circumvent providing benefits. In this case, Microsoft classified certain workers as independent contractors, thereby denying them employee benefits. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined that these workers were, in fact, common-law employees and were entitled to the same benefits as regular employees. The Court noted that large Corporations have increasingly adopted the practice of hiring temporary employees or independent contractors as a means of avoiding payment of employee benefits, judgment thereby underscores the principle that the nature of the work performed, rather than the label assigned to the worker, should the employment corresponding rights and benefits. It highlights the judiciary’s role in rectifying such misclassifications and ensuring that workers receive fair treatment. their profits. This increasing determine status and in government institutions, often 25. It is a disconcerting reality that temporary employees, particularly face multifaceted forms of exploitation. While the foundational purpose of temporary contracts may have been to address short-term or seasonal needs, they have increasingly become a mechanism to evade long-term obligations owed to employees. These practices manifest in several ways: • Misuse of "Temporary" Labels: Employees engaged for work that is essential, recurring, and integral to the functioning of an institution are often labeled as "temporary" or "contractual," even when their roles mirror those of regular employees. Such misclassification deprives workers of the dignity, security, and benefits that regular employees are entitled to, despite performing identical tasks. • Arbitrary Termination: Temporary employees are frequently dismissed without cause or notice, as seen in the present case. This practice undermines the principles of natural justice and subjects workers to a state of constant insecurity, regardless of the quality or duration of their service. • Lack of Career Progression: Temporary from themselves for skill development, promotions, or employees often opportunities excluded find Page 6 of 16 // 7 // incremental pay raises. They remain stagnant in their roles, creating a systemic disparity between them and their regular counterparts, despite their contributions being equally significant. • Using Outsourcing as a Shield: increasingly resort Institutions to outsourcing roles performed by temporary employees, effectively replacing one set of exploited workers with another. This practice not only perpetuates exploitation but also demonstrates a deliberate effort to bypass the obligation to offer regular employment. • Denial of Basic Rights and Benefits: Temporary employees are often denied fundamental benefits such as pension, provident fund, health insurance, and paid leave, even when their tenure spans decades. This lack of social security subjects them and their families to undue hardship, especially in cases of illness, retirement, or unforeseen circumstances. xxxx xxxx xxxx to not only functioning, in providing 27. In light of these considerations, in our opinion, it is imperative lead by for government departments example fair and stable employment. Engaging workers on a temporary basis for extended periods, especially when their roles are integral to the organization’s contravenes international labour standards but also exposes the organization to legal challenges and undermines employee morale. By ensuring fair employment practices, government institutions can reduce the burden of unnecessary litigation, promote job security, and uphold the principles of justice and fairness that they are meant to embody. This approach aligns with international standards and sets a positive precedent for the private sector to follow, thereby contributing to the overall betterment of labour practices in the country.” 4.7. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Shripal as cited (supra) in Para-14, 15, 17 & 18(IV) has held as follows:- “14. ...... More importantly, Uma Devi cannot serve as a shield to justify exploitative engagements persisting Page 7 of 16 // 8 // for years without the Employer undertaking legitimate recruitment. 15. ……. Indian labour law strongly disfavors perpetual daily-wage in contractual circumstances where the work is permanent in nature. engagements or xxx xxx xxx 17. Indeed, bureaucratic limitations cannot trump the legitimate rights of workmen who have served continuously in de facto regular roles for an extended period. In assessing regularization, 18.(IV) The Respondent Employer is directed to initiate a fair and transparent process for regularizing the Appellant Workmen within six months from the date of reinstatement, duly considering the fact that they have performed perennial municipal duties akin to permanent posts. the Employer shall not impose educational or procedural criteria retroactively if such requirements were never applied to the Appellant Workmen or to similarly situated regular employees in the past. To the extent that sanctioned vacancies for such duties exist or are required, the Respondent Employer shall expedite all necessary administrative processes to ensure these longtime employees are not indefinitely retained on daily wages contrary to statutory and equitable norms.” 4.8. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dharam Singh as cited supra in Paragraph-13,14,15 & 17,18,19 & 20 has held as follows: “13. As we have observed in both Jaggo (Supra) and Shripal (Supra), outsourcing cannot become a convenient shield to perpetuate precariousness and to sidestep fair engagement practices where the work is inherently perennial. The Commission’s further contention that the appellants are not “full-time” employees but continue only by virtue of interim orders also does not advance their case. That interim protection was granted precisely because of the long history of engagement and the pendency of the challenge to the State’s refusals. It neither creates rights that did not exist nor that may arise upon a proper erases entitlements adjudication of the legality of those refusals. Page 8 of 16 // 9 // 14. The learned Single Judge of the High Court also declined relief on the footing that the petitioners had not specifically assailed the subsequent decision dated 25.11.2003. However, that view overlooks that the writ petition squarely challenged the 11.11.1999 refusal as the High Court itself directed a fresh decision during pendency, and the later rejection was placed on record by the respondents. In such circumstances, we believe that the High Court was obliged to examine the legality of the State’s stance in refusing sanction, whether in 1999 or upon reconsideration in 2003, rather than dispose of the matter on a mere technicality. The Division Bench of the High Court compounded the error by affirming the dismissal without engaging with the principal challenge or the intervening material. The approach of both the Courts, in reducing the dispute to a mechanical enquiry about “rules” the core question of ignoring and “vacancy” while arbitrariness in the State’s refusal to sanction posts despite perennial need and long service, cannot be sustained. 15. Therefore, in view of the foregoing observations, the impugned order of the High Court cannot be sustained. The State’s refusals dated 11.11.1999 and 25.11.2003,in so far as they for sanction/creation of Class-III/Class-IV posts to address perennial ministerial/attendant work, are held unsustainable and stand quashed. Commission’s proposals concern the xxx xxx xxx 17. Before concluding, we think it necessary to recall that the State (here referring to both the Union and the State governments) is not a mere market participant but a constitutional employer. It cannot balance budgets on the backs of those who perform the most basic and recurring public functions. Where work recurs day after day and year after year, the establishment must reflect that reality in its sanctioned strength and engagement practices. The long-term extraction of regular labour under temporary labels corrodes confidence in public administration and offends the promise of equal protection. Financial stringency certainly has a place in public policy, but it is not a talisman that overrides fairness, reason and the duty to organise work on lawful lines. 18. Moreover, it must necessarily be noted that “ad-hocism” thrives where administration is opaque. The State Departments must keep and produce accurate establishment registers, muster rolls and outsourcing arrangements, and they must explain, with evidence, why they prefer precarious Page 9 of 16 // 10 // engagement over sanctioned posts where the work is perennial. If “constraint” is invoked, the record should show what alternatives were considered, why similarly placed workers were treated differently, and how the chosen course aligns with Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India. Sensitivity to the human consequences of prolonged insecurity is not sentimentality. It is an institutional discipline that should inform every decision affecting those who keep public offices running. 19. Having regard to the long, undisputed service of the appellants, the admitted perennial nature of their duties, and comparator the material regularisations, we issue the following directions: vacancies and indicating shall stand regularized with effect i. Regularization and creation of Supernumerary posts: All from appellants 24.04.2002, the date on which the High Court directed a fresh recommendation by the Commission and a fresh decision by the State on sanctioning posts for the appellants. For this purpose, the State and the successor establishment (U.P. Education Services Selection Commission) shall create supernumerary posts in the corresponding cadres, Class-III (Driver or equivalent) and Class-IV (Peon/Attendant/Guard or equivalent) without any caveats or preconditions. On regularization, each appellant shall be placed at not less than the minimum of the regular pay-scale for the post, with protection of last-drawn wages if higher and the appellants shall be entitled to the subsequent increments in the pay scale as per the pay grade. For seniority and promotion, service shall count from the date of regularization as given above. ii. Financial consequences and arrears: Each appellant shall be paid as arrears the full difference between (a) the pay and admissible allowances at the minimum of the regular pay- level for the post from time to time, and (b) the amounts actually paid, for the period from 24.04.2002 until the date of regularization /retirement/death, as the case may be. Amounts already paid under previous interim directions shall be so adjusted. The net arrears shall be released within three months and if in default, the unpaid amount shall carry compound interest at 6% per annum from the date of default until payment. iii. Retired appellants: Any appellant who has already retired shall be granted regularization with effect from 24.04.2002 until the date of superannuation for pay fixation, arrears under clause (ii), and recalculation of pension, gratuity and Page 10 of 16 // 11 // other terminal dues. The revised pension and terminal dues shall be paid within three months of this Judgment. iv. Deceased appellants: In the case of Appellant No. 5 and any other appellant who has died during pendency, his/her legal representatives on record shall be paid the arrears under clause (ii) up to the date of death, together with all terminal/retiral dues recalculated consistently with clause (i), within three months of this Judgement. v. Compliance affidavit: The Principal Secretary, Higher Education Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, or the the U.P. Education Services Selection Secretary of Commission or the prevalent competent authority, shall file an affidavit of compliance before this Court within four months of this Judgement. 20. We have framed these directions comprehensively because, case after case, orders of this Court in such matters have been met with fresh technicalities, rolling “reconsiderations,” and administrative drift which further prolongs the insecurity for those who have already laboured for years on daily wages. Therefore, we have learned that Justice in such cases cannot rest on simpliciter directions, but it demands imposition of clear duties, fixed timelines, and verifiable compliance .As a constitutional employer, the State is held to a higher standard and therefore it must organise its perennial workers on a sanctioned footing, create a budget for lawful engagement, and implement judicial directions in letter and spirit. Delay to follow these obligations is not mere negligence but rather it is a conscious method of denial that erodes livelihoods and dignity for these workers. The operative scheme we have set here comprising of creation of supernumerary posts, full regularization, subsequent financial benefits, and a sworn affidavit of compliance, is therefore a pathway designed to convert rights into outcomes and to reaffirm in that administration are not matters of grace, but obligations under Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution of India.” in engagement and transparency fairness Page 11 of 16 // 12 // 5. Mr. D. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation on the other hand made his submission basing on the stand taken in the counter affidavit so filed by Opp. Party Nos. 3 to 5. Though it is not disputed that all the Petitioners were engaged in the year 1992, but it is contended that Petitioners were disengaged w.e.f.11.12.1995. The said order when was challenged in OJC No. 9113 of 1995, this Court passed an interim order on 19.12.1995 by directing therein for maintenance of status quo. 5.1. It is contended that in view of the interim order so passed on 19.12.1995, Petitioners continued after their reengagement on 23.12.1995 vide order under Annexure-2. It is contended that since Petitioners continued because of the interim order passed by this Court on 19.12.1995 till the writ petition was ultimately dismissed vide order dtd.22.11.2021, ratio decided in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC-1 is not made applicable to the claim of the Petitioners. 5.2. It is also contended that after rejection of their claim vide the impugned order, Petitioners are also continuing because of the interim order passed in the present writ petition on 18.05.2022. It is accordingly contended that since Petitioners after their reengagement Page 12 of 16 // 13 // in the year 1995, are continuing by virtue of the interim order passed in OJC No. 9113 of 1995 and now in the present writ petition, Petitioners are not eligible and entitled to get the benefit of regularization and their claim is not covered as per the decision in the case of Uma Devi as cited supra and subsequent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jaggo, Shripal as well as Dharam Singh as cited supra. It is accordingly contended that no illegality or irregularity can be found with the impugned order, in rejecting the Petitioners’ claim. 5.3. Since Petitioners’ engagement was counted w.e.f.23.12.1995 and challenge made to the same in W.P.(C) No. 12232 of 2010 was not acceded to with passing of the order dt.04.09.2015 under Annexure-4, Petitioners’ engagement being after 12.04.1993, they are not eligible to get the benefit of regularization. It is contended that in view of the Finance Dept. Resolution dt.15.05.1997, the cut-off date for engagement of NMR/DLR being 12.04.1993 and Petitioners’ engagement having been taken as 23.12.1995, Petitioners are not eligible to get the benefit of regularization. 6. To the submission made by Mr. Nayak, learned counsel appearing for the Corporation, Mr. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the Petitioners made further submissions contending inter alia that since Page 13 of 16 // 14 // after passing of the impugned order on 19.12.1995, Petitioners were suo moto reengaged vide order dtd.23.12.1995 under Annexure-2, it cannot be held that Petitioners continued by virtue of the interim order passed on 19.12.1995. 6.1. Learned Sr. Counsel also contended that cut-off date 12.04.1993 is not applicable to the employees working in different Urban Local Bodies of the State in view of the notification of the Department issued on 15.12.2000, wherein the cut-off date for such employee has been fixed at 19.05.1997. It is accordingly contended that the ground on which Petitioners’ claim has been rejected vide the impugned order requires interference of this Court. 7. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties and considering the submissions made, it is found that all the Petitioners were engaged as DLRs in the establishment of the then Cuttack Municipality in the year 1992. While so continuing, when the Petitioners were disengaged w.e.f.11.12.1995, the matter was carried to this Court in OJC No. 9113 of 1995. This Court when passed an interim order on 19.12.1995 directing for maintenance of status quo, Petitioners were suo moto reengaged vide order dtd.23.12.1995 under Annexure-4. Page 14 of 16 // 15 // 7.1. In view of such action taken by the then Municipality, it is the view of this Court that Petitioners after 23.12.1995 never continued by virtue of the interim order passed by this Court on 19.12.1995 and it is also a suo moto action by the then Cuttack Municipality. Since it is not disputed that after their reengagement vide order dtd.23.12.1995,
Decision
Petitioners continued all through, dismissal of the writ petition in OJC No. 9113 of 1995 vide order dtd.22.11.2021, as per the considered view of this Court is not a bar to consider the eligibility and entitlement of the Petitioners to get the benefit of regularization. 7.2. Since Petitioners after their reengagement vide order dtd.23.12.1995 were allowed to continue all through, it is the view of this Court that Petitioners’ claim falls within the ratio decided by the Apex Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka Vs. Uma Devi, (2006) 4 SCC-1, so followed in the case of State of Karnatak Vs. M.L. Keshari (2010)9 SCC 247) and now the recent decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Jaggo, Shripal as well as Dharam Singh as cited supra. The cut-off date 12.04.1993 is also not applicable in view of the stipulation contained in notification dt.15.12.2000 of the Housing & U.D. Department. Page 15 of 16 // 16 // 7.3. In view of the aforesaid analysis, this Court is of the view that the ground on which Petitioners’ claim has been rejected is not sustainable in the eye of law. Therefore, this Court while quashing the said order, directs Opp. Party No. 3 to take a fresh decision with regard to the eligibility of the Petitioners to get the benefit of regularization taking into account the ratio decided in the case of Jaggo, Shripal as well as Dharam Singh as cited supra and the earlier decision in the case of Uma Devi. Such a fresh order be passed within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of this order with due communication to the Petitioner No. 1. 8. The writ petition accordingly stands disposed of. (BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY) JUDGE Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 28th of November, 2025/Sneha Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SNEHANJALI PARIDA Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 02-Dec-2025 18:45:57 Page 16 of 16