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Case Details

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.11565 of 2024 In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. ……………… Tapan Kumar Pradhan @ Tapan Pradhan …. -versus- Petitioner State of Odisha and Others …. Opposite Parties For Petitioner :Mr. D.R. Bhokta, Advocate For Opp. Parties : Mr. M.R. Mohanty, AGA PRESENT: THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of Hearing:11.09.2025 and Date of Judgment:11.09.2025 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J. 1. On the oral prayer made by learned counsel for the petitioner, he is permitted to correct the description of O.P. No.3 in Court.

Legal Reasoning

2. Heard Mr. D.R. Bhokta, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. M.R. Mohanty, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate for the State. // 2 // 3. Petitioner has filed the present Writ Petition inter alia with the following prayer:- “The petitioner, therefore, prays that this Hon’ble Court be graciously pleased to issue a Rule Nisi calling upon the opposite parties to show cause as to why a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or writs shall not be issued; i ) quashing the order dtd. 19.3.2024 passed by the Opp. Party no.2 under annexure-7 and directing the Opp. parties to give the petitioner re-appointment to the post of Home Guard in Sambalpur district. ii) if the opposite parties fail to show-cause or show insufficient cause to make the said rule absolute; and iii ) to pass such other order/orders and to issue such other writ/writs as would afford complete relief to the petitioners;” 4. It is contended that while continuing as a Home Guard because of his implication in a criminal case, petitioner was discharged from his work vide order dated 09.08.2017 under Annexure-3 by the Commandant of Home Guards-O.P. No.3. It is contended that in the Criminal Proceeding basing on which petitioner was so discharged, petitioner was acquitted vide judgment dated 07.11.2017 under Annexure-4. However, after his acquittal in the Criminal Case, even though petitioner immediately moved O.P. No.3 and thereafter O.P. No.2, seeking his re-instatement, but the same was initially Page 2 of 10 // 3 // rejected by O.P. No.2 vide order dated 20.04.2018 under Annexure-5. 4.1. It is contended that challenging such order passed on 20.04.2018, petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.15879 of 2019. This Court vide order dated 30.04.2024, while setting aside the

Decision

order dated 20.04.2018, disposed of the Writ Petition by directing the O.P. No.2 to take a fresh decision taking into account the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Lal Vrs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.7935 of 2023). 4.2. It is contended that without proper appreciation of the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram Lal Vrs. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (Civil Appeal No.7935 of 2023) so followed in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and Others (Civil Appeal No.5497 of 2025), petitioner’s claim has again been rejected vide the impugned order dated 19.03.2024 under Annexure- Page 3 of 10 // 4 // 7. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-13, 25 and 30 of the decision in the case of Ramlal has held as follows:- “13. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. [See G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446, State Bank of Hyderabad vs. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 and S. Samuthiram (supra)] 25. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honorably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. 30. In view of the above, we declare that the order of termination dated 31.03.2004; the order of the Appellate Authority dated 08.10.2004; the orders dated 29.03.2008 and 25.06.2008 refusing to reconsider and review the penalty respectively, are all illegal and untenable.” 4.3. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-47 & 50 of the decision in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh has held as follows:- “47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well-established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such the disciplinary cases, upholding findings the in Page 4 of 10 // 5 // proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G. M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan31. 50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that the prosecution "miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt" as both the informant and PW- 2 refused to identify the appellant in court. This discussion confirms that the appellant’s acquittal was based not on mere technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this like "benefit of doubt" or Court held "honourably acquitted" should not be treated as formalities. The Court’s duty is to focus on the substance of the judgment, rather than the terminology used.” terms that 4.4. It is contended that since petitioner after 3 (three) months of his discharge, was acquitted in the criminal proceeding, there was no bar for his re- engagement on the face of the approach made by the petitioner. But without proper appreciation of the provisions contained under Odisha Home Guard Act and Rules and the decision governing the field, petitioner’s prayer for re-engagement was initially rejected vide order dated 20.04.2018 under Annexure-5. Even though the said order was set aside by this Court in W.P.(C) No.15879 of 2019 with a direction on the Opp. Party No.2 to take a fresh decision taking into account the decision in the case of Ram Lal as cited (supra), but without proper appreciation, said claim has again been rejected vide Page 5 of 10 // 6 // order 19.03.2024 under Annexure-7. It is also contended that in the meantime the ban with regard to engagement of Home Guard has already been lifted by the State and selection process has been initiated in all the districts of the State to fill up the post of Home Guard. 4.5. It is accordingly contended that the impugned order is not sustainable in the eye of law and petitioner is eligible to get the benefit of re- engagement as a Home Guard. 5. Even though notice of the Writ Petition has been issued since 13.05.2024 but no counter affidavit has been filed as yet. However, basing on the materials available on record, learned Addl. Govt. Advocate contended that since petitioner was discharged vide order dated 09.08.2017 and in the meantime 3 (three) years has already elapsed, in view of the provisions contained under Rule-8 of the Odisha Home Guard Rules, 1962 (in short Rules), petitioner is not eligible and entitled to get the Page 6 of 10 // 7 // benefit of re-engagement. Rule-8 of the Rules reads as follows:- “8. Term of office:- The term of office of a member of the Home Guards shall be three years: Provided that if any such member is found to be medically unfit to continue as a member of Home Guards his appointment may be terminated before the expiry of the aforesaid term of office. Provided further that a person appointed as a member of the Home Guards shall be eligible for re-appointment.” 5.1. It is accordingly contended that claim of the petitioner has been rightly rejected pursuant to the earlier order passed by this Court vide order dated 19.03.2024 under Annexure-7 and it requires no interference. 6. To the submission made by the learned Addl. Govt. Advocate basing on Rule-8, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that Rule-8 has no applicability to the petitioner’s case as petitioner just 3 (three) months of his discharge, when was acquitted in the criminal proceeding, he immediately moved both O.P. No.2 and 3, seeking his reinstatement. But such claim was rejected vide Page 7 of 10 // 8 // order dated 20.04.2018. It is accordingly contended that petitioner is eligible for his reinstatement. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the submissions made, this Court finds that petitioner while continuing as a Home Guard in the establishment of O.P. No.3, because of his implication in a criminal case, he was discharged vide order dated 09.08.2017 under Annexure-3. As found from the record, petitioner was acquitted in the Criminal Proceeding vide judgment dated 07.11.2017 in G.R. Case No.9 of 2017 under Annexure-4. As further found, immediately after his acquittal in the criminal proceeding, petitioner though moved O.P. No.2 seeking his re-engagement after the same was rejected by the Commandant vide order dated 29.01.2018, but O.P. No.2 rejected such claim vide order dated 20.04.2018 under Annexure- 5. 7.1. Challenging such order, when petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No.15879 of Page 8 of 10 // 9 // 2019 and this Court vide order dated 30.01.2024 directed for re-consideration with quashing of order dated 20.04.2018 placing reliance on the decision in the case of Ram Lal as cited (supra), claim of the petitioner has again been rejected vide the impugned order dated 19.03.2024 under Annexure-7. 7.2. Considering the fact that within a period of 3 (three) months of his discharge, petitioner was acquitted in the criminal proceeding, it is the view of this Court that Rule-8 of the Rules is not applicable to the facts of the petitioner’s case. It is also found that immediately after his acquittal when petitioner made a prayer to re-engage him, that was rejected by the Commandant-O.P. No.3 vide order dated 29.01.2018 and against the said order, when an appeal was preferred, O.P. No.2 being the Appellate Authority rejected the same vide order dated 20.04.2018 under Annexure-5. 7.3. Even though the said order was set aside by this Court in its judgment dated 30.01.2024 under Page 9 of 10 // 10 // Annexure-6, but once again claim of the petitioner was rejected without proper appreciation of the decision in the case of Ram Lal and the fact that petitioner was acquitted within a period of 3 (three) months of his discharge. 7.4. In view of the aforesaid analysis and considering the fact that the ban with regard to engagement of Home Guard has already been lifted and steps are now being taken to fill up the post of Home Guard in all the district of the State, this Court while quashing the impugned order dated 19.03.2024 under Annexure-2, directs O.P. No.3 to re-engage the petitioner as against the post of Home Guard with passing of an appropriate order within a period of 4 (four) weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 8. The Writ Petition stands disposed of accordingly. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BASUDEV SWAIN Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 19-Sep-2025 16:48:51 Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 11th September, 2025/Basudev (Biraja Prasanna Satapathy) Judge Page 10 of 10

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