The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK RVWPET Nos.146, 147, 148 and 149 of 2023 M/s. Piyali Chakravarty …. Petitioner -Versus- The Revenue Divisional Commissioner (Northern Division), Sambalpur and others …. Opposite Parties Advocates appeared in these cases: For Petitioner : Mr. Surya Prasad Misra, For Opposite Parties Senior Advocate assisted by Ms. S. Rout, Advocate : Mrs. Suman Pattanayak, Additional Government Advocate CORAM: HON’ BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN J U D G M E N T -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of Hearing and Judgment : 27th October, 2025 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- HARISH TANDON, CJ. 1. The instant applications for review are against the common order dated 20th March, 2023 passed in W.P.(C) Nos.13399 of 2017, 13580 of 2017, 13582 of 2017 and 13583 of 2017, whereby and RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 1 of 21 whereunder the aforementioned writ petitions were dismissed primarily on the ground of delay and laches having attributed to the conduct of the review petitioner. 2. The undisputed facts so unfold would indicate that the predecessor of the petitioner was settled with the nazrul land by executing a lease deed in his favour which expired by efflux of time. After the expiration of the period of the lease and the original lessee having expired in the meantime, an application for renewal thereof was taken out by the successor of the lessee. 2.1. Amidst the pendency thereof, a portion of the demised land was carved out and vested with the Government and ultimately the lease was granted to the surviving successor in respect of a remaining portion. Settlement of the land and the execution of the
Legal Reasoning
lease deed was challenged by opposite party Nos.4 and 5 (RVWPET No.146 of 2023) by approaching the Revenue Divisional Commissioner (Northern Division), Sambalpur (in short „the RDC‟) with an additional prayer for settlement of the portion of the demised land in their favour on the strength of being in settled possession thereof. The RDC rejected the said application/appeal/ RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 2 of 21 revision, which was challenged by the opposite party Nos.4 to 7 (RVWPET No.148 of 2023) in W.P.(C) No.10239 of 2012, which was heard along with the other batch of writ petitions. The said writ
Decision
petition was disposed of on 13th September, 2012 in the following: “Heard Mr. Mohapatra, learned counsel for the learned Additional Government petitioners and Advocate. 2. The claim of the petitioners to a portion of the case land is by virtue of an unregistered document executed in favour of the petitioners’predecessor-Ram Shrestha Tiwari and by so-called original lessees, Sova Chakravorty and Jyotsnanath Sen whose original Nazul lease had been renewed. The renewal lease in favour of Sova Chakravorty was disbelieved by the Revenue Divisional Commissioner who cancelled such lease and as such the sub-lease in favour of the petitioners’ predecessor. At the petitioners’ application for settlement of the land for residential purpose has been rejected by the Revenue Divisional commissioner. the same time, The relevant portion of the order dated 3. 23.05.2012 of the Revenue Divisional commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur is quoted hereunder: “23……As to the claims of the appellants, it is construed that they have said to have been in possession of the land long since. in Case No.5/2001 has The appellant produced an unregistered document, appears to have been signed by Sova Chakravarty, wherein she wanted to pass on an area of Ac.0.08, Ac.0.05 and Ac.0.05 in favour of Ramshresth Tiwari S/O late Kirtan Tiwari (husband of appellant in appeal No.5/01), Krushna Putel S/O late Raghunath Putel (Father of appellant in Appeal No.3/2001) RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 3 of 21 and Muna Putel S/O late B. Putel (Father of appellant in Appeal No.4/2001) if the land would be renewed in her favour. This document was not agitated at the time of filing the appeal. The manner of the writing of the document clearly indicates that it has been manufactured afterwards, with a view to strengthen their stand. However, since Sova Chakraarty had not accrued her right, title over the case land by the time of writing the above mentioned document in the year 1982, there is no legal ground to accept it. As such the claim of the appellant in the appeal case Nos.3, 4 and 5/2001 become infructuous.” With the aforesaid Commissioner, the Revenue Divisional Division, Sambalpur rejected the appeal of the petitioners and at the same time in para-24 rejected their petition for settlement under the provisions of O.G.L.S. Act. finding Northern Northern 4. In our considered opinion, the appeal of the petitioners has been rightly dismissed by the Revenue Commissioner, Divisional Division, Sambalpur. But we that he should have feel independently dealt with the claim of the petitioners for settlement under the OGLS Act and passed necessary orders. Accordingly, the order and observation in respect of rejection of the petitioners’ application for settlement under the OGLS Act is set aside. Let 5. the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur take a decision on the claim of the petitioners for settlement. The application of the petitioners pending before the Tahasildar, Sambalpur be transferred to the Revenue Divisional Commissioner, Northern Division, Sambalpur. The Revenue Divisional Commissioner shall consider the same within a period of three months from the date of communication of this order and pass necessary orders. RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 4 of 21 The writ application is dismissed. All interim orders stand vacated. Issue urgent certified copy.” 2.2. After the said order was passed and the matter was relegated to the RDC, the review petitioner filed the writ petitions challenging the order of the RDC which by the impugned order dated 20th March, 2023 was dismissed, primarily on the ground of delay and laches. The review applications are filed on a premise that the said order dated 20th March, 2023 contains an error apparent on the face of the record and, therefore, comes within the purview of the Order- XLVII, Rule-1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”). 3. Mr. Surya Prasad Misra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the review petitioner(s) submits that the observation of the Division Bench in dismissing the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches is contrary to the settled proposition of law that the Court should not take such plea after the matter has matured for hearing and placed reliance upon a Constitution Bench decision of the Apex Court in case on P.B. Roy v. Union of India reported in (1972) 3 SCC 432. RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 5 of 21 3.1. Learned Senior Counsel would further submit that once the explanation is offered in the writ petition constituting the sufficient cause in not approaching the Court promptly, the Court ought not to have dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches as the technicalities cannot overweigh substantial justice and placed reliance upon an unreported judgment of the apex Court rendered in case of State of Jharkhand and others v. Azadul Haque and Another (Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No.3916 of 2025 decided on 12th September, 2025. 3.2. He further submits that this Bench in case of Manjulata Bag v. State of Odisha and others (W.A. No.539 of 2025 decided on 1st May, 2025) held that it is not obligatory to explain the delay if the writ petition has been filed within the normal period of limitation and, therefore, the impugned order passed on 20th March, 2023 is liable to be reviewed. He thus submits that the Division Bench has misinterpreted the expression “disposed of” to be akin to “dismissed” and, therefore, such misinterpretation leads to a patent error inviting invocation of the review jurisdiction by the Court. RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 6 of 21 3.3. Though feebly, yet, it is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that once the order of the RDC was set aside by the Court, it would not have restricted the hearing of the revisional application filed before the RDC to the extent of claim of the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 but should have permitted the said application to be decided de novo by providing the right of hearing to the review petitioner to support the decision of the Collector passed in its favour. 3.4. It is lastly submitted that there is an apparent error on the face of the record and, therefore, the Court should not hesitate to exercise the power of review vested upon it. 4. Per contra, learned counsel for the contesting opposite parties submits that the review applications are intended to reopen the issue which has already been decided in the order dated 20th March, 2023. It is further submitted that there cannot be any error apparent on the face of the record as the Court clearly and explicitly indicated in the said order that there is delay and laches on the part of the review petitioner. It is, thus, submitted that there is no fetter on the part of the writ Court to dismiss the writ petition, if the party RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 7 of 21 has approached the writ Court belatedly and once such decision is taken, it is not amenable to be reviewed on the pretext of non- consideration of the sufficiency of the cause. 5. On the conspectus of the aforesaid facts, the first and foremost point emerged in the instant review applications is whether the order dated 20th March, 2023 suffers from any infirmities, which can be termed as an error apparent on the face of the record for invocation of the powers of review conferred upon the Court. 6. Before we proceed to decide the case on the factual matrix involved in the instant applications for review, it would be apposite to recapitulate the nuances of the review jurisdiction exercised by the Court. It is no longer res integra that the writ Court inheres the power of review as a plenary jurisdiction and once it exercises such power it has to pass the muster of the grounds conferred under Order-XLVII, Rule 1 of the CPC. The order which contains an error apparent on the face of the record is capable of being reviewed and, therefore, it is an ardent duty of the Court to find out whether the order sought to be reviewed contained such patent error. The error which is to be deciphered from the logical inferences to be drawn RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 8 of 21 from the observation made in the impugned judgment/order or requires a roving inquiry into voluminous papers cannot come within the periphery of the error apparent on the face of the record. 6.1. A distinction is to be drawn between an erroneous order and order containing an error apparent on the face of the record. In former case, it is open to the litigant to approach the higher forum to have such order set aside but in latter case, there is no quarrel to the proposition of law that the Court which passed the order is capable of reviewing the same on a perceived error apparent on the face of the record. The distinction is real and apparent and, therefore, the Court has to draw a line in between an erroneous order and an order containing an error apparent on the face of the record. The review jurisdiction is never intended to revisit or re-write the order. It has to be exercised within the strict parameters set forth in this regard and does not give a second chance to the litigant to reargue the matter inviting the attention of the Court that the Court passing an order which is a subject matter of challenge in the review jurisdiction ought to have been decided in such way or a particular way. RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 9 of 21 7. Having taken into consideration the broad principles touching upon the exercise of review jurisdiction, let us embark our journey on the factual terrain in order to ascertain whether the order dated 20th March, 2023 suffers from such patent infirmity or an error amenable to be reviewed by the Court. 8. Indubitably, the land was settled in favour of the petitioner on the strength of the order of the Collector and a lease deed was also executed in her favour. The said settlement as well as the lease deed was assailed by the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 along with others before the RDC with an additional prayer for settlement of the portion of the land in their favour. The order of the RDC can be dissected into two parts; firstly, the claim of the opposite party Nos. 4 and 5 along with others to settle the portion of the demised land in their favour, was rejected by the RDC and secondly, the order of the Collector in settling the land in favour of the review petitioner was set aside. A person can approach the Court provided he is an aggrieved person. The opposite party Nos.4 and 5 along with others challenged the order of the RDC and, therefore, it is the paramount duty of the Court to ascertain as to whether the order of the RDC was challenged in its entirety or was restricted to the portion, which RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 10 of 21 affects the right of the person, who filed the writ petition. Even if, the pleadings do not indicate with clarity and the precision but one can reasonably gather the intention that is manifested from the portion of the order passed by the Court in disposing the said writ petition. The order dated 13.09.2012 as quoted hereinabove is indicative of the fact that the portion of the order by which the claim of the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 along with others was rejected and set aside was assailed in the writ petition. Any other interpretation would frustrate the intent and the purport evident from the expression “accordingly, the order and observation in respect of rejection of the petitioner‟s application for settlement under the OGLS Act is set aside”. One can safely proceed on a bare reading of the said expression and/or observation that the order of the RDC, which contains two parts was interfered with, so far as the claim of the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 and the others are concerned, the remaining portion of the order of the RDC remained untouched. The law does not put any fetter on the Court to set aside the portion of the impugned order keeping the other portion intact and the observations made by the Court should be construed to be restricted to the portion which is interfered with and not on the remaining RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 11 of 21 portion. The person, who emerged successful in achieving the relief in part cannot be said to be aggrieved person so far as such part is concerned and, therefore, the Court while disposing of the writ petition on 13.09.2012 was conscious of such facts and interfered with the order of the RDC to the extent by which the claim of the opposite party Nos.4 and 5 and others were rejected. 8.1. Law does not put any fetter on the person, who suffered the other portion of the same order to challenge the same by taking out an independent proceeding. In fact, the same is done by the review petitioner by taking out any independent writ petition but the Court refused to entertain the same on the ground of delay and laches. The Constitution Bench in P.B. Roy (supra) held that there is no hard and fast rule that the Court should reject the writ petition on the ground of delay and the moment the explanation is offered, the Court must decide the matter on merit in the following: “8. The learned Judge who had initially heard the petition had pointed out that the representation of the Appellant was first rejected on July 29, 1960, and that it did not matter that the petitioner had continued making subsequent representations. The learned Judge had noticed the explanation that the petitioner could not approach the court as he was admitted to a Tuberculosis Clinic in June 1961. The learned Judge, having found RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 12 of 21 that this was not sufficient to explain the delay between July 29, 1960 and June 1961 was disposed to reject the petition on the ground of laches. But, in view of the decision of the majority of the Full Bench of the Punjab High Court in S. Gurmej Singh v. Election Tribunal, Gurdaspur [1964 PLR 589] the delay in filing the petition was overlooked on the ground that, after the admission of a writ petition and hearing of arguments, the Rule that delay may defeat the rights of a party is relaxed and need not be applied if his case is “positively good”.” 8.2. It admits no ambiguity that if a party approaching the Court belatedly has offered an explanation, which satisfies the conscience of the Court, it would not be proper on the part of the Court to reject the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. The Court should not adopt the pedantic approach in dismissing the writ petition after the parties were invited to exchange affidavits and the matter matured at the stage of hearing as every litigation should be decided on its merit which furthered the fundamental policy of the country that a person should be heard before any adjudication is made affecting the rights of the citizenry. The Constitution Bench in the above report does not rule out the power of the writ Court to dismiss the petition on the ground of delay and laches and, therefore, has to be applied in a fact scenario, which is compatible to the facts of the above report. Admittedly, the writ petition, being W.P.(C) RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 13 of 21 No.13399 of 2017, was disposed of at the stage of admission though a notice was issued to the opposite parties therein. Mere issuance of the notice does not ipso facto makes the writ petition admitted as at times such notices are issued calling upon the opposite parties as to why such writ petition should not be admitted. We do not find there was any direction passed by the Court to exchange the affidavits and the writ petition was disposed of at the admission stage. 8.3. While applying the ratio decidendi of a judgment, the first and foremost duty is to find out in the context in which the same is used. The observations made in the judgment should not be applied treating the same as ratio thereof in isolation of the context in which it is so used. The disparity in facts or an additional fact may invite a different proposition of law and, therefore, the Court must be conscious in applying the ratio in an adjunct manner but should find the parity of facts or some similarity of facts. The Constitution Bench was considering a case where the parties were directed to exchange affidavits and several orders were passed in this regard but the High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. In the backdrop of the said facts, it was held that it is not proper on the part of the Court to dismiss the writ petition on the RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 14 of 21 ground of delay and laches once the affidavits were exchanged. It was further held that once the explanation, which constitutes the expression “sufficient cause” is pleaded in the writ petition, it would not be proper for the Court to dismiss petition/application on the ground of delay and laches. 8.4. In the instant case, though the explanation appears to have been offered but the moment the Court proceeded to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches, it necessarily implies that the explanation so offered does not appear to be sufficient enough for the purpose of condoning the conduct of the parties in approaching the Court belatedly. The sufficiency of the cause is to be judged in a subjective manner and once the Count finds that the explanation is not convincing or put any fetter into the litigants to approach the Court in a time bound manner, we do not find any absolute proposition of law that the writ Court is denuded of its power in not rejecting the writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. 8.5. It is the satisfaction of the concerned Judge in treating the explanation as a plausible one and it is also open to the Judge to take RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 15 of 21 a view that such explanation is not sufficient to discard the delay attributed to the conduct of the litigant. There may be a possibility of two views to be taken on the basis of such explanation and if one is taken, even if the other appears to be more reasonable or plausible does not invite the Court to exercise its review jurisdiction. Even if the findings appears to be somewhat erroneous, it is open to the litigant to move the higher forum to have the same adjudicated upon but cannot come within the bracket of “error apparent on the face of the record”. 8.6. The subsequent unreported judgment of the apex Court in Azadul Haque (supra), the Court was considering an application for condonation of delay at the behest of the State and held that the immobility in the Government department is not unknown as “bureaucratic lethargy” which is ingrained and inhered in the system and, therefore, the substantial justice, which is a crest on the head of a serpent, should prevail in the following: “6. Keeping the aforestated principles in mind when the facts on hand are examined, we observe that the cause shown for the delay has been explained as the officials being involved in Special Summary Revision 2024 and also in the programme of "Sarkar Aapke Dwaar". for Though the cause shown the application in RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 16 of 21 condonation of delay is casual, this Court cannot lose sight of the fact that the State being an impersonal machinery moves at a snail’s pace, there will be no personal interest of the officials in withholding the file. Even when the substantial justice cannot be sacrificed at the cost of public good. Under similar circumstances, this Court in the Case of State of Nagaland vs Lipok Ao & Ors., 2005 (3) SCC 752 has held: is bureaucratic lethargy, there “12. In O.P. Kathpalia v. Lakhmir Singh [(1984) 4 SCC 66] a Bench of three Judges had held that if the refusal to condone the delay results in grave miscarriage of justice, it would be a ground to condone the delay. Delay was accordingly condoned. In Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji [(1987) 2 SCC 107] a Bench of two Judges considered the question of limitation in an appeal filed by the State and held that Section 5 was enacted in order to enable the court to do substantial justice to the parties by disposing of matters on merits. The expression “sufficient cause” is adequately elastic to enable the court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — that being the life purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been in matters making a instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. This Court reiterated that the expression “every day's delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. The doctrine must be applied in a rational, common-sense, pragmatic manner. When substantial technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to liberal approach justice and justifiably RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 17 of 21 delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. Judiciary is not respected on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Making a justice- oriented approach from this perspective, there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution of the appeal. The fact that it was the State which was seeking condonation and not a private party was altogether irrelevant. The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants, including the State as a litigant, are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There is no warrant for according a stepmotherly treatment when the State is the applicant. The delay was accordingly condoned.” 7. In these circumstances, we are of the considered view that certain amount of latitude requires to be extended when administrative delay is pleaded. In the present case the facts unfolded would indicate that the cause for the delay has been explained namely it is contended that concerned officials were deputed on other official assignments. Thus, delay seems to be not intentional. The writ applicant who had succeeded before the learned Single Judge can be suitably compensated for espousing his cause in the appellate Court and before this Court by award of realistic cost of Rs.1,00,000/- payable by the State. The payment of cost to the writ applicant will be condition precedent for the appeal being taken up on Board and disposed of its own merit. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits and subject to the observations made hereinabove, the appeal is allowed. The impugned order dated 28.10.2024 passed in I.A. No.9029/2024 in L.P.A. (Filing) No.6893/2024 is set aside and the application filed under Section 5 of Act in I.A. No.9029/2024 in L.P.A. (Filing) No.6893/2024 stands allowed and intra- Court appeal is returned to file of the High Court. The aforestated cost imposed shall be paid to the writ applicant within eight weeks from today and it is RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 18 of 21 needless to state that the State would be at liberty to recover the cost from the officers responsible for the delay, if they deem fit.” 8.7. Even our judgment rendered in Manjulata Bag (supra) as relied upon by the petitioner is a repository of the proposition of law concerning the condonation of delay, wherein it is held that there is no obligation on the part of the litigant to offer an explanation, if the proceeding is initiated within the normal period of limitation provided for institution of the suit. The aforementioned reports are pointer to an issue that the Court must take a pragmatic approach as opposed to a pedantic approach in dealing with the cause concerning the delay in approaching the Court within the period of limitation provided therefor. 8.8. We are conscious that the Limitation Act, 1963 does not contain any provision relating to the filing of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. However, it has been held in a catena of decisions that if for the self-same cause of action, the suit is to be filed within the period of limitation provided therefor, then once the approach is made to a writ Court within such period of limitation, the same cannot be defeated nor be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches nor any explanation is required to be RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 19 of 21 offered in this regard. Once the approach is made with delay after a considerable period, it is imperative on the litigant to offer an explanation which constrained him in approaching the Court promptly. The plea of infringement of fundamental right stands on a different pedestal than the invocation of the statutory right or the contractual right admissible to a litigant. 8.9. Ordinarily, the Court should not defeat the writ petition founded upon the facts concerning the violation of the fundamental rights enshrined under Part-III of the Constitution of India on the ground of delay and laches as the infringement and/or violation is a recurring cause of action and continues till the same is remedied. If a person sat over his other rights for a considerable period, he cannot approach the Court after a long hiatus and seek the blessings to decide the case on merit instead of dismissing on the ground of delay and laches. Law does not support the indolent. 8.10. The words „dismissal‟ and „disposal‟ are interchangeable at times being used to convey the same message or to achieve the same distinction. Mere using the expression “dismissal” instead of “disposal” does not invite a patent error the moment the latent RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 20 of 21 intention becomes patent from the observations preceding the same. The Court was conscious in this regard and had taken a decision that the conduct of the petitioner does not instill confidence that he was prevented by sufficient cause. Such satisfaction does not invite an error having committed on the face of the record and, therefore, we do not find that it is a fit case for exercising the powers and the jurisdiction concerning the review of its own order. These review applications, therefore, fail. No order as to 9. costs. (M.S. Raman) Judge (Harish Tandon) Chief Justice S.K. Jena/Secy. Sisira Ku Behera/Steno Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANJAY KUMAR JENA Designation: SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Date: 06-Nov-2025 14:11:14 RVWPET Nos. 146, 147, 148 & 149 of 2023 Page 21 of 21