The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 (Arising out of the Judgment and Order of conviction dated 09th of October, 2009 passed by Shri S. R. Bohidar, Adhoc Addl. Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Jagatsinghpur in S.T. Case No. 59/06 / 153/06 of 2012, for the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860) Prasanta Mallick @ Bobby …. Appellant Mr. Satya Narayan Mishra, Advocate -versus- State of Odisha …. Respondent Mr. Aurobinda Mohanty, Addl. Standing Counsel CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH Date of Judgment: 28.11.2024 Chittaranjan Dash, J. 1. The Appellant, namely, Prasanta Mallik @ Bobby, in the present JCRLA, has challenged the Judgment and Order dated 09.10.2007 of the Adhoc Addl. Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Jagatsinghpur, wherein he having found guilty in the offence under section 302 Indian Penal Code (hereinafter, in short, called “IPC”) for commission of murder, sentenced to undergo imprisonment for JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 1 of 21 life and to pay a fine of ₹5,000/- (Rupees five thousand), and in default, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 1 (one) year. 2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 10.01.2006, at about 2 p.m., while Dija Mallick, the deceased, was resting at Balaji Matha, the Appellant came holding a spade and assaulted the deceased on his head with the spade. The Informant, who was tying his calf, witnessed the occurrence and shouted. At that moment, Naba Das, Bika Das, Iswar Mallick, and others arrived at the scene and administered water to the deceased, who was unconscious. When the deceased did not regain consciousness, they shifted him to the hospital, where he was declared brought dead. It was further alleged in the FIR that about one month prior to the incident, the Appellant had brought cash of Rs. 200/- from his house, and at the request of the Appellant’s father, the deceased took the Rs. 200/- from the Appellant and returned Rs. 100/- to his father. The Appellant demanded the return of the cash from the deceased twice, and taking advantage of the deceased being alone on the day of the incident, he murdered him. Based on these allegations, an FIR was registered at Balikuda Police Station vide P.S. Case No. 2/06, and the investigation commenced. 3. In the course of investigation, P.W.14, the I.O., examined the Informant and other witnesses, visited the scene, and seized a spade and a blood-stained shirt in the presence of witnesses. He then prepared the seizure list, which is marked as Ext. 3. On the same day, he also seized blood-stained earth and sample earth from the spot and prepared another seizure list, marked as Ext. 4. Additionally, he prepared the spot map, which is marked as Ext. 6. On 11.01.2006, the I.O. conducted inquest on the dead body at JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 2 of 21 UGPHC, Balikuda, arrested the Appellant, and sent him for a medical examination. The report of the medical examination is marked as Ext. 7/2. On 12.01.2006, the I.O. forwarded the Appellant to the Court under custody. On the same day, he seized one black check-shirt, one violet lungi, and one red napkin, following the post-mortem examination of the deceased. The seizure list for these items is marked as Ext. 8. The incriminating materials were sent for chemical examination through SDJM, Jagatsinghpur on 24.01.2006. The chemical examination report is marked as Ext. 10, and the post-mortem report is marked as Ext. 5. Having gathered sufficient evidence against the Appellant, the chargesheet was submitted to face trial. 4. The case of the defence is one of complete denial and false accusations. 5. To bring home the charge, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses in all. The defence has examined none on its behalf. 6.
Legal Reasoning
The learned trial Court having believed the evidence of the prosecution witnesses found the prosecution to have proved its case beyond all reasonable doubt and held the Appellant guilty and convicted him awarding sentence as described above. 7.
Legal Reasoning
Mr. Satya Narayan Mishra, the learned counsel for the Appellant, submits that the evidence on record does not conclusively establish the motive to commit murder. Mr. Mishra contends that firstly, there is no evidence of premeditation or any prior enmity between the appellant and the deceased. The alleged monetary dispute occurred two months prior to the incident and was minor in nature, insufficient to suggest a motive strong enough to JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 3 of 21 plan and execute a murder, and secondly, the eyewitness testimony of P.W.3, while corroborative in some respects, suffers from inconsistencies. P.W.3 claimed to have witnessed the appellant striking the deceased with a spade but admitted to becoming unconscious after observing a single blow. Mr. Mishra asserts that this raises questions about the reliability of his account regarding the full sequence of events. He further argues that P.W.3 did not attempt to disarm the appellant or provide any explanation as to why he did not inform his family immediately, which weakens the credibility of his testimony. Coming to his third contention, Mr. Mishra submits that the medical evidence provided by P.W.7 indicates that the injuries were caused by a hard and blunt object consistent with the blunt side of the spade. The use of the blunt side rather than the sharp edge suggests a lack of intent to inflict fatal injuries. The prosecution has not provided any evidence to show that the appellant aimed specifically to cause the death of the deceased, as opposed to grievous bodily harm. Additionally, there is no evidence of repeated or excessive blows, which could indicate intent to kill. The learned counsel also submits that the seizure of the spade and other items, while relevant, does not independently establish guilt, and the alleged confession made before villagers shortly after the incident, lacks the legal sanctity of a proper extra- judicial confession. He argues that the incident occurred spontaneously and without premeditation and concludes his submission that the prosecution has not established a clear and direct link between the appellant’s actions and the motive to cause death. In light of these factors, Mr. Mishra requests this Court to JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 4 of 21 consider these submissions and extend the benefit of doubt to the Appellant. 8. Mr. Aurobinda Mohanty, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State, argues that the prosecution has successfully established the guilt of the Appellant under Section 302 IPC beyond all reasonable doubt. The testimony of the eyewitness, P.W.3, unequivocally places the Appellant at the scene of the crime holding the blood-stained spade, which was identified as the weapon of offense. He further asserts that the Appellant's own admission before the villagers immediately after the incident further corroborates the prosecution's case, demonstrating his consciousness of guilt and his direct involvement in the fatal assault on the deceased. While the confession is not entirely treated as substantive evidence on its own, it serves as strong corroborative evidence when viewed alongside the direct testimonies and material evidence. Mr. Mohanty submits that the medical evidence provided by P.W.7 confirms that the injuries sustained by the deceased were consistent with the use of the seized weapon in M.O.I, a spade, and the description of the injuries i.e. severe head trauma and exposed brain matter demonstrates the force and brutality of the attack, which was clearly aimed at vital parts of the body only for the deceased to do away with his life. Such injuries indicate a clear intention to cause death or, at the very least, knowledge that such an act would likely result in death. The Appellant’s deliberate choice to strike the deceased on the head, a vulnerable and vital area, further establishes his intention to inflict fatal harm. Mr. Mohanty further argues that the circumstances including the seizure of the blood-stained spade from the Appellant adds to the overwhelming JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 5 of 21 proof of his culpability. The blood on the spade and the Appellant’s clothing matched the blood group of the deceased, further linking the Appellant to the crime. This unbroken chain of evidence leaves no room for doubt as to the Appellant's role in causing the death of the deceased. The learned counsel finally concludes that the prosecution has meticulously addressed all aspects of the case, and the evidence collectively demonstrates the Appellant's premeditation and intention to commit the heinous act. The severity of the injuries inflicted, the conscious targeting of a vital part of the body, and the absence of any plausible defense or extenuating circumstances all point to the Appellant's culpability, hence, the State prays for upholding the conviction and sentence, as imposed by the learned trial Court. 9. In order to appreciate the aforesaid submissions, the relevant provisions with respect to the charges are required to be referred to – Indian Penal Code, 1860 300. Murder. —Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— 2ndly. —If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— 3rdly. —If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or— 4thly. —If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 6 of 21 likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 302. Punishment for murder.—Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or [imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to fine. 304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder.—Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder, shall be punished with [imprisonment for life]*, or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. 10. Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the respective parties, it is incumbent to deal with the testimonies of the relevant witnesses for better appreciation of the case. P.W.3 is the Informant who was present near the place of occurrence at the time of the incident. He stated that while tying his cow in front of Balaji Matha, he heard a cry and rushed to the spot. He saw the accused, Prasant Mallik, assaulting the deceased, Dija, with a spade, inflicting a bleeding injury on the deceased’s head above the ear. P.W.3 tried to intervene but was threatened by the accused, who raised the spade at him. When local people arrived, the accused fled and concealed himself inside his house. The deceased was then shifted to Balikuda Hospital, where he was JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 7 of 21 declared dead. P.W.3 lodged the FIR (Ext.1). In cross-examination, P.W.3 admitted that he saw only one blow inflicted by the accused before losing consciousness. He also mentioned that he did not inform his family about the incident and could not recall certain details, such as whether he went to his house after regaining consciousness or the names of the doctor or family members of the deceased. P.W.4 was at his house during the time of the incident. He heard that the accused had inflicted a cut blow to Dija. Upon reaching the spot, he found the deceased lying near Balaji Matha with a bleeding head injury and exposed brain matter. The accused had concealed himself nearby, holding a spade. P.W.4 testified that the accused confessed his guilt in front of him and others, stating that he had assaulted the deceased. The deceased was then shifted to Balikuda Hospital. In cross-examination, P.W.4 corroborated his chief statement and confirmed the presence of blood-stained materials at the spot. P.W.5, like P.W.4, was at home at the time of the incident and heard that the accused had attacked Dija with a cut blow. On reaching the spot, P.W.5 found the deceased lying near the Matha premises with severe head injuries and exposed brain matter. He also testified that the accused had concealed himself nearby with the spade. According to P.W.5, the accused confessed his guilt in front of him and others. P.W.5 also observed that the accused’s spade, shirt, lungi, and the earth near the scene were stained with blood. The deceased was shifted to Balikuda Hospital. JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 8 of 21 P.W.6 was the bagchasi (cultivator) of the land owned by Balaji Matha, where the incident occurred. He testified that the deceased, Dija, was the marfatdar (caretaker) of the Matha and managed its land. On the day of the incident, P.W.6 was at his house after harvesting paddy on the deity’s land. At around 1 p.m., he heard that the accused had murdered Dija near the Matha premises. P.W.11 testified that upon hearing about the incident, he went to the spot and found the accused detained by villagers, holding a blood-stained spade. He observed that the deceased was lying inside the Matha with a severe bleeding head injury. The accused confessed in front of P.W.11 and others that he had killed Dija. P.W.11 witnessed the police seizing the blood-stained spade and the accused’s blood-stained shirt and lungi, and the preparation of the seizure list. In cross-examination, P.W.11 reiterated that the accused’s wearing apparels were stained with blood. P.W.12 testified that he heard a commotion and went to the spot, where he found the accused standing near the crime scene with a blood-stained spade. He observed that the deceased was lying with a severe head injury and exposed brain matter. P.W.12 was present during the inquest conducted by the police and confirmed seeing the injuries on the deceased’s head. He accompanied the deceased’s body to Balikuda Hospital. In cross- examination, P.W.12 mentioned the deceased’s blood-stained clothing and identified the deceased as having a wife and two sons. He also noted the accused’s confession before the villagers, though he could not recall specific names of those who witnessed it. JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 9 of 21 P.W.13 testified that the incident occurred near Korchhanda Matha during the daytime, approximately two years prior. He stated that he heard a commotion and went to the spot, where he found the deceased lying with a bleeding head injury. According to P.W.13, the accused confessed to the crime in front of him and others. In cross-examination, P.W.13 admitted that he learned details of the incident from the villagers but could not name them. 11. Before analysing the culpability of the Appellant vis-á-vis the murder of his wife in her matrimonial house, it is incumbent to examine if the prosecution could successfully establish the death of the Appellant’s wife to be homicidal in nature. External Injuries: 1. Lacerated wound (1/2” × 1/4” × skin deep) in front of the right ear, soiled with dry blood. 2. Lacerated wound (1” × 1/2” × skin deep) on the middle of the scalp, longitudinal direction. 3. Lacerated wound (2” × 1/8” × skin deep) on the scalp, 4 inches above the right ear. 4. Abrasion (brown, 3” × 1/8”) on the right side of the face, 2 inches in front of the right ear, vertical direction. 5. Abrasions (brown, three in number, 2” × 1/8” each) on the posterior aspect of the right shoulder. 6. Lacerated wound (1/2” × 1/8” × skin deep) on the Pina of the right ear. Internal Injuries: JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 10 of 21 1. Subcutaneous haematoma (2” × 3” × 2”) on the parietal area underneath injury no. 3. 2. 3. Fracture of the parietal bone on the right side (2” long). Extradural haematoma (4” × 3”) on the parietal region of the brain membrane. 4. Laceration of brain matter under the fractured parietal bone. P.W.7, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem, provided critical evidence to establish the nature of the injuries, the cause of death, and the circumstances surrounding it. The external injuries, particularly the lacerated wounds on the scalp and right ear, are described as ante-mortem, meaning they occurred before death. This is significant in proving that the injuries were inflicted intentionally. Injury no. 3, which resulted in a subcutaneous haematoma, a fractured parietal bone, and a laceration of the brain matter, was identified as sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This links the cause of death directly to the injuries inflicted, rather than any natural cause or accident. The cause of death was stated as “shock and coma resulting from bleeding injuries on the head and brain matter.” This aligns with the nature of the injuries observed during the post-mortem, particularly the trauma to the brain. The injuries were consistent with being caused by a hard and rough weapon, which aligns with the prosecution’s claim that the spade was used as the weapon of offense. Although the spade was not examined by the doctor, the description of the injuries supports the use of such a weapon. The presence of multiple lacerated injuries (four in total) suggests repeated blows, pointing to an act of aggression rather than an JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 11 of 21 accidental fall or natural cause like a brain stroke. The estimated time since death (within 24 hours of the examination at 11:30 a.m. on 11.01.2006) is consistent with the time of the incident on the afternoon of 10.01.2006. This supports the prosecution’s timeline. The contents of the stomach, which included semi-digested food particles and brown fluid, further corroborate the recent nature of death and the time of the attack. In cross-examination, the defence raised the possibility of a brain stroke or natural causes like high blood pressure leading to coma; however, the doctor’s finding of multiple external and internal injuries directly points to traumatic causes. The doctor acknowledged that all lacerations could not result from a single blow, which reinforces the prosecution’s narrative of repeated blows by the Appellant. The post-mortem findings and P.W.7’s deposition strongly establish that the death was homicidal in nature. The injuries, particularly the trauma to the scalp and brain, were inflicted with a hard and rough weapon, consistent with the spade alleged to have been used. The presence of multiple injuries, their ante-mortem nature, and the timeline of death corroborate the prosecution’s case that the Appellant intentionally caused the fatal injuries, affirming that the death was indeed homicidal in nature. 12. Coming to the culpability of the Appellant, it is essential to assess the prosecution’s evidence in detail, evaluating the witnesses’ testimony and the circumstances leading to determine whether the allegations against the Appellant are substantiated beyond reasonable doubt. JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 12 of 21 13. The Apex Court in the matter of Sunil Kumar vs State Govt. of NCT of Delhi reported in AIR 2004 SC 552, while explaining the nature of witnesses, has cleared the following – 9. Vadivelu Thevar’s case (supra) was referred to with approval in the case of Jagdish Prasad and others vs. State of M.P. 1994 AIR(SC) 1251). This Court held that as a general rule to Court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of Section 134 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short the ‘Evidence Act’). But, if there are doubts about the testimony the Courts will insist for corroboration. It is for the Court to act upon the testimony of witnesses. It is not the number, the quantity, but the quality that is material. The time honoured principle is that evidence has to be weighed and not counted. On this principle stands the edifice of Section 134 of the Evidence Act. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, or otherwise. 14. It is no doubt that the conviction of an accused can be based solely on the testimony of a solitary witness. However, in such a case the Court must be satisfied that implicit reliance can be placed on the testimony of such a witness and that his testimony is so free of blemish that it can be acted upon without insisting upon corroboration. In the instant case, P.W.3, the Informant, is the sole eyewitness and has directly witnessed the Appellant assaulting the deceased with a spade. He testified that while tying his cow near the Balaji Matha, he heard a cry, rushed to the spot, and saw the Appellant striking the deceased on the head with the said spade, causing a bleeding injury. He also stated that when he attempted to JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 13 of 21 intervene, the Appellant threatened him with the spade, forcing him to step back. This detailed account places P.W.3 as an immediate and direct observer of the crime. His prompt lodging of the FIR further strengthens his credibility, as it reflects a consistent narrative with no undue delay. With this, and the fact that the Informant is in no way an interested witness, his testimony inspires confidence and hardly leaves any doubt in the mind of the Court about the truthfulness of the witness. 15. Consequently, it is incumbent upon this Court to appreciate all the evidence presented by the prosecution to fully establish that the evidence of P.W.3 is probable and consistent, and the Appellant is the true author of the concerned crime. 16. It is noted that the Appellant’s confession made immediately after the incident, in front of the villagers, may hold evidentiary value but does not fulfill the strict principles governing extra-judicial confessions. For a confession to be treated as substantive evidence, it must meet certain conditions under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. It should be made voluntarily, without coercion or inducement, and preferably to a person in whom the accused reposes trust or confidence. In the present case, the Appellant, soon after the assault, admitted to P.Ws. 4, 5, 11 and 12, that he had assaulted the deceased, who were not in any close or trusted relationship with the Appellant. The incident occurred in a public place, and the Appellant was cornered by the villagers, with emotions likely running high. His statement can therefore be interpreted as an impulsive outburst rather than a carefully considered admission of guilt. Furthermore, there is no indication that the villagers were persons in whom the Appellant had natural JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 14 of 21 confidence, as required for extra-judicial confessions to be admissible as substantive evidence. However, while the confession does not stand alone as direct evidence of guilt of the Appellant, it plays a significant role, being consistent in the sworn testimony of the witnesses, as corroborative evidence to the testimony of P.W.3, the eyewitness. P.W.3’s account of witnessing the Appellant striking the deceased with a spade is supported by this spontaneous admission, lending credibility to the overall prosecution case. Thus, while the confession in isolation does not satisfy the strict requirements for an extra-judicial confession under the Indian Evidence Act, it acts as a corroborative link to the culpability of the accused. 17. Furthermore, the seizure of the weapon from the Appellant’s possession is significant under Sections 3 and 8 of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 3 defines “relevant facts,” and Section 8 deals with the conduct of an accused before, during, or after the crime. The recovery of the spade, stained with blood, is a critical fact that corroborates the prosecution’s narrative and the eyewitness testimony. The Appellant’s possession of the weapon immediately after the commission of the crime strongly supports his involvement. The probative value of this seizure lies in its corroborative role. The blood-stained spade aligns with the eyewitness account of P.W.3, who saw the Appellant assault the deceased with a spade. 18. Moreover, the chemical examination report confirming that the blood on the spade matches the deceased’s blood group directly links the weapon to the crime. JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 15 of 21 Section 100(4) CrPC requires that seizures be made in the presence of independent witnesses, which was adhered to in this case. Witnesses such as P.W.4 and P.W.11 attested to the seizure, lending credibility to the prosecution’s case. Additionally, Section 102 CrPC allows the police to seize any property suspected to be connected with the commission of an offence, which was properly invoked during the seizure of spade from the possession of the Appellant. Thus, the surrounding circumstances such as the Appellant being caught shortly after the incident, the spade being stained with the deceased’s blood, and the C.E. Report confirming this fact solidifies the evidentiary value of the seizure as corroborative evidence. 19. From the discussions above, it is well established that the Appellant caused the death of the deceased, Dija. However, at this point, the question arises as to whether, in the surrounding circumstances in which the crime was committed, the act amounts to murder under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC. According to the evidence of P.W.7, the injuries on the deceased were consistent with being caused by a hard and rough weapon, and the nature of the injuries aligns with the use of the seized spade (M.O.I) as the weapon of offense. Crucially, the evidence suggests that the blunt side of the spade, rather than its sharp edge, was used to inflict the fatal injuries. This fact indicates a potential lack of intent to kill outright. Had the Appellant harboured a clear intention to cause death, the sharp side of the spade i.e. a far more lethal option could have been used, making the injuries far more severe. To appropriately assess whether this act constitutes murder or culpable JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 16 of 21 homicide not amounting to murder, the decisions of this Court in the matter of Makaru Naik vs. State of Odisha reported in (2024) 96 OCR 368; passed in JCRLA No. 08 of 2010, referring to the decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court provide valuable guidance as follows – In the case of Ram Asrey vs. State of U.P. reported in 1993 Supp (4) Supreme Court Cases 218, where also the Appellant used the backside of the bankas in assaulting the deceased, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it can be reasonably inferred that such assailant had no intention to cause the death of the victim, otherwise there was no reason to use the back side of the bankas, instead of sharp side which in normal course could have caused the death of the victim. Accordingly, the conviction under section 302 of the I.P.C. was set aside and instead the accused was convicted under section 304 Part-I of the I.P.C. In the case of State vs. Raja Parida and others in 1972 Criminal Law Journal 193 reported (MANU/OR/0129/1971), a Division Bench of this Court held as follows – “14. The case against Appellant Raja, however, stands on a different footing. Both P.Ws. 2 and 3 say that Raja came to the spot saying that the Guard should be finished and struck a blow with the blunt side of the axe on the right side of the head of the Forest Guard and that minutes thereafter the Guard died. If really Raja intended to cause the death of the Guard, there is no reason why he did not use the sharp edge of the Tangia in giving the blow to the deceased. Merely because he said that the Guard should be finished, it does not necessarily mean that he intended that he should be killed. We are, therefore, not prepared to hold that the prosecution has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that Raja intended to kill the Guard. In this connection it is worth recapitulating the distinction between murder and culpable homicide not amounting to murder by referring to Sections 299 JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 17 of 21 is likely and 300. I.P.C. Section 299 is divided into three parts. The first part refers to the act by which the death is caused by being done with the intention of causing death. That part corresponds to the first part of Section 300 I.P.C. The second part of Section 299, I.P.C. speaks of the intention to cause such bodily injury as to cause death. This has corresponding provisions in clauses “secondly” and “thirdly” of Section 300, I.P.C. Section 304, Part I I.P.C. covers cases which by reason of the Exceptions under Section 300 I.P.C. are taken out of the purview of Clauses (1), (2) and (3) of Section 300, I.P.C. but otherwise would fall within it, and also cases which fall within the second part of Section 299 but not within Section 300 Clauses (2) and (3). The third part of Section 299 corresponds to “Fourthly” of Section 300. Section 304, Part II, I. P. C. covers those cases which fall within the third part of Section 299 but do not fall within the fourth clause of Section 300. As already stated, the case against Raja does not come under the first part of Section 300, I.P.C. Clause (2) of Section 300 is attracted only when the act is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused. It includes cases of constitution, constitutional defects or the ailments of the deceased. There is no evidence of the existence of such circumstances in this case. We do not have even evidence of the exact nature of the injury that is caused from which it is possible to infer that Raja had the knowledge that the injury which he intended to; inflict was likely to cause death. Clause (2) of Section 300, I.P.C. has therefore no application. knowledge special the of 15. The next question is whether the injury is one which was intended to be caused and if so whether it was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. If the injury caused is not in the ordinary course of nature sufficient to cause death, it is out of the purview of clause ‘Thirdly’ of Section 300, I.P.C. and would then appropriately fall under the second JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 18 of 21 part of Section 299. I.P.C. Unfortunately in this case the nature of the injury caused on the deceased by the single blow given by Appellant Raja is not known and much less is there any evidence that such blow is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In the circumstances, the Appellant must have the benefit of doubt and the case must go out of the purview of clause “Secondly” and “Thirdly” of Section 300, I.P.C. Surely the death of the deceased was not caused by the blow given on his legs and knees by the Appellant Hrushi. It can therefore, safely be held that the deceased died as a result of the blow given on his head by Raja. That blow was given with, the blunt edge of the Tangia on a vital part of the deceased, namely his head. The blow so given is neither unintentional nor the circumstances of the case, the Appellant Raja must be held to have intended to give such a blow as is likely to cause death. We would, therefore, hold that the Appellant Raja is guilty under the first part of Section 304, I.P.C.” accidental. In 20. In the instant case, the Appellant used a spade, but only its blunt and hard side was employed to strike the deceased. The spade, being a dual-purpose tool, could have inflicted far more lethal injuries if its sharp edge had been used. The choice of the blunt side indicates that the Appellant likely did not intend to kill the deceased, but rather to cause grievous hurt by assaulting in the vital part of the body. Neither the eyewitness mentioned the use of the sharp edge of the spade, nor the same was supported by the medical officer, P.W.7, further supporting the lack of intent to cause death. While the head injury was fatal, the use of the blunt side suggests that the Appellant did not intend to cause death but was aware that such an act could result in serious harm, potentially leading to death. JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 19 of 21 21. Under Section 299 IPC, culpable homicide involves causing death with the intention of causing death, bodily injury likely to cause death, or knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. Here, the act falls under the second category i.e. intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, bringing it under the ambit of Section 304 Part-I IPC. Conversely, the case does not meet the criteria of Section 300 IPC (murder), which requires the act to fall under specific clauses such as “intention to kill” or “knowledge that injuries inflicted are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.” From the available materials, there appears to be no evidence of longstanding or significant animosity between the Appellant’s family and that of the deceased. While there is a reference to a monetary dispute that allegedly occurred two months before the incident, the time gap diminishes its direct relevance as a motive for premeditated murder. Instead, this dispute may explain the Appellant’s underlying frustration or agitation, which led to the violent act. However, the manner in which the weapon was used specifically the blunt side of the spade to inflict the injuries does not fully align with the criteria required to establish murder under Section 302 IPC. Rather, the appellant’s act is better classified as culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under Section 304 Part-I IPC, since the assault made by the Appellant was such as likely to cause death. It supports the conclusion that the Appellant acted with the intent to cause grievous harm, which, given the circumstances, is sufficient to bring the offense under Section 304 Part-I IPC. This classification acknowledges the JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 20 of 21 culpable nature of the act while distinguishing it from the heightened intentionality required for murder. 22. In view of the above, the conviction of the Appellant is altered from section 302 of the IPC to one under section 304 Part-I of the Indian Penal Code and the Appellant is sentenced to undergo R.I. for ten years for the said offence. 23. In the event the Appellant has already undergone the substantive sentence as above imposed by us, and, his detention is not required in any other case, he shall be set at liberty forthwith. 24. As a result, the JCRLA is allowed in part. Before parting with the case, we would like to put on record our appreciation to Mr. Satya Narayan Mishra, Advocate for the Appellant, for rendering his valuable help and assistance towards arriving at the decision above mentioned. This Court also appreciates the valuable help and assistance provided by Mr. Aurobinda Mohanty, learned Addl. Standing Counsel. (Chittaranjan Dash) Judge (S.K. Sahoo) Judge K.C.Bisoi Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BIJAY KETAN SAHOO Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 29-Nov-2024 16:40:49 JCRLA No. 62 of 2009 Page 21 of 21