The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK CRLLP No.77 of 2018 An Application U/s.378 of Cr.P.C. --------------------- State of Orissa …..… Petitioner Bipin @ Bipin Bihari Das …..… Opposite party -Versus- For Petitioner : Mr. Tapas Kumar Praharaj, Standing Counsel For Opp.Party : ------------------ P R E S E N T: THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE M.S. SAHOO ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date of Hearing & Judgment:23.11.2023 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ M.S.SAHOO, J. I.A. No.62 of 2019 that has been tagged to the present case arises out of CRLLP No.77 of 2019, whereas the present petition is CRLLP No.77 of 2018. Registry shall de-tag the I.A. No.62 of 2019 and tag it to the correct petition after verification. 2. As per the S.R., there is no delay in filing the present CRLLP. Accordingly, the petition is taken up on merits. 3. The petition has been filed U/s.378(1) and (3) of Cr.P.C., 1973 seeking leave to appeal against the order of acquittal dated 27.02.2018 passed by the learned Special Judge-cum- Sessions Judge, Kendrapara in S.T. Case No.13 of 2016 arising Page 1 of 14 // 2 // out of Marsaghai P.S. Case No.60 dated 14.03.2013 corresponding to G.R. Case No.319 of 2013 acquitting the opposite party from the charges U/s.341/323/294 of the IPC read with Section 3(i)(x) SC/ST (PA) Act. 4. Learned Standing Counsel strenuously argued that in view of the grounds stated in the petition it is a fit case where leave should be granted to appeal. However, it is also fairly stated that apart from the evidence adduced before the learned trial court and the materials presented by the prosecution no further material can be considered while considering the prayer for grant of leave to appeal. 5. This Court has the occasion to go through the judgment passed by the learned court of the 1st instance. It is evident that the learned court has dealt with the evidence led by the prosecution. P.W.1 in his depositions has not disclosed about the opposite party restraining P.W.1 from the proceeding in a direction to which he has right to proceed nor it discloses that the opposite party caused annoyance to anybody by uttering any abusive words. The I.O. in his deposition before the Court was confronted with the statement of P.W.1 and the defence brought out the fact in the statement of the I.O. (P.W.4) that he has not recorded any statement of P.W.1 regarding use of offensive language. The I.O. further deposed that he did not investigate/report regarding enmity between the accused and the informant i.e. he did not investigate regarding the mens rea on behalf of the opposite party to offend P.W.1. The I.O. (P.W.4) also has stated in his deposition that he did not ascertain the cause of delay in lodging the F.I.R. by the informant-P.W.1. Page 2 of 14 // 3 // 6. In Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., (2020) 10 SCC 166 : 2020 SCC OnLine SC 776 (at page 179 of SCC), the law on the appeal against acquittal and the scope and ambit of Section
Legal Reasoning
378 CrPC and the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal against acquittal was considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it has been held:- 14.1. In Babu [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] , this Court had reiterated the principles to be followed in an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. In paras 12 to 19, it is observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 196-99) “12. This Court time and again has laid down the guidelines for the High Court to interfere with the judgment and order of acquittal passed by the trial court. The appellate court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be the more probable one. While dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court has to consider the entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether the views of the trial court were perverse or otherwise unsustainable. The appellate court to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, the trial court had failed to take into consideration admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration the evidence brought on record contrary to law. Similarly, wrong placing of burden of proof may also be a subject-matter of scrutiny by the appellate court. (Vide Balak Ram v. State of U.P. [Balak Ram v. State of U.P., (1975) 3 SCC 219 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 837] , Shambhoo Missir v. State Bihar [Shambhoo Missir v. State of Bihar, (1990) 4 SCC 17 : , Shailendra 1990 Pratap v. State of U.P. [Shailendra is entitled 518] SCC (Cri) of (Underlined to Supply Emphasis) Page 3 of 14 // 4 // (Cri) 432] Pratap v. State of U.P., (2003) 1 SCC 761 : , Narendra 2003 SCC Singh v. State M.P. [Narendra of Singh v. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1893] , Budh Singh v. State of U.P. [Budh Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 9 SCC 731 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 377] , State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh [State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 102 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 363] , S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy [S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy, (2008) 5 SCC 535 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 645] , Arulveluv. State [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] , Perla Somasekhara Reddy v. State of A.P. [Perla Somasekhara of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 176] and Ram Singh v. State of H.P. [Ram Singh v. State of H.P., (2010) 2 SCC 445 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1496] ) Reddy v. State 13. In Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor [Sheo Swarup v. King Emperor, 1934 SCC OnLine PC 42 : (1933-34) 61 IA 398 : AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] , the Privy Council observed as under: (SCC Online PC: IA p. 404) ‘… the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses; (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial; (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt; and (4) in the slowness of an appellate court disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses.’ 14. The aforesaid principle of law has consistently been (See Tulsiram Kanu v. State [Tulsiram Kanu v. State, 1951 SCC followed by this Court. (Underlined to Supply Emphasis) Page 4 of 14 // 5 // Agarwal v. State 92 : AIR 1954 SC 1] , Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab [Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1957 SC 216 : 1957 Cri LJ 481] , M.G. Agarwal v. State of Maharashtra [M.G. of Maharashtra, AIR 1963 SC 200 : (1963) 1 Cri LJ 235] , Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar [Khedu Mohton v. State of Bihar, (1970) 2 SCC 450 : 1970 of SCC Kerala [Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P. [Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P., (2002) 4 SCC 85 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 736] and State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran [State of Goa v. Sanjay Thakran, (2007) 3 SCC 755 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 162] .) , Sambasivan v. State 479] (Cri) 15. In Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] , this Court reiterated the legal position as under: (SCC p. 432, para 42) ‘(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. such Various expressions, (3) as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good “very strong and sufficient grounds”, circumstances”, conclusions”, “distorted “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere (Underlined to Supply Emphasis) Page 5 of 14 // 6 // with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’ In Ghurey Lal v. State of U.P. [Ghurey 16. Lal v. State of U.P., (2008) 10 SCC 450 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 60], this Court reiterated the said view, observing that the appellate court in dealing with the cases in which the trial courts have acquitted the accused, should bear in mind that presumption that he is innocent. The appellate court must give due weight and consideration to the decision of the trial court as the trial court had the distinct advantage of watching the demeanour of the witnesses, and was in a better position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. trial court's acquittal bolsters the the 17. In State of Rajasthan v. Naresh [State of Rajasthan v. Naresh, (2009) 9 SCC 368 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1069], the Court again examined the earlier judgments of this Court and laid down that: (SCC p. 374, para 20) ‘20. … An order of acquittal should not be lightly interfered with even if the court (Underlined to Supply Emphasis) Page 6 of 14 // 7 // believes that there is some evidence pointing out the finger towards the accused.’ In State of U.P. v. Banne [State of 18. U.P. v. Banne, (2009) 4 SCC 271 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 260] , this Court gave certain illustrative circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court. The circumstances include:(SCC p. 286, para 28) ‘(i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; (iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) This Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; (vi) This Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal.’ A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Dhanapal v. State [Dhanapal v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 401 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 336] . 19. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional are cases where compelling there circumstances, and judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. the (Underlined to Supply Emphasis) Page 7 of 14 // 8 // The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.” 14.2. When can the findings of fact recorded by a court be held to be perverse has been dealt with and considered in paragraph 20 of the aforesaid (Babu decision, which case [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1179] , SCC p. 199) under: reads as it if by taking (Vide Rajinder Admn. [Rajinder “20. The findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding or relevant material into irrelevant/inadmissible consideration material. The finding may also be said to be perverse is “against the weight of evidence”, or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of Kumar irrationality. Kindra v. Delhi Kumar Kindra v. Delhi Admn., (1984) 4 SCC 635 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 131] , Excise & Taxation Officer-cum-Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons [Excise & Taxation Officer-cum- Assessing Authority v. Gopi Nath & Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312] , Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [Triveni & Plastics v. CCE, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 665] , Gaya Prasad [Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad, (2001) 1 SCC 501] , Aruvelu [Arulvelu v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 288] and Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P. [Gamini Bala Koteswara Rao v. State of A.P., (2009) 10 SCC 636 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 372] )” (emphasis supplied) Din v. Hanuman Rubber Page 8 of 14 // 9 // in Kuldeep
Legal Reasoning
Singh v. Commr. It is further observed, after following the decision of this Court of Police [Kuldeep Singh v. Commr. of Police, (1999) 2 SCC 10 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 429] , that if a decision is arrived at on the basis of no evidence or thoroughly unreliable evidence and no reasonable person would act upon it, the order would be perverse. But if there is some evidence on record which is acceptable and which could be relied upon, the conclusions would not be treated as perverse and the findings would not be interfered with. Mohan Singh v. State recent decision of Vijay Mohan 14.3. In the of Singh [Vijay Karnataka, (2019) 5 SCC 436 : (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 586] , this Court again had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 378 CrPC and the [State of interference by Karnataka v. Vijay Mohan Singh, 2013 SCC OnLine Kar 10732] in an appeal against acquittal. This Court considered a catena of decisions of this Court right from 1952 onwards. In para 31, it is observed and held as under: (SCC pp. 447-49) the High Court the identical question came “31. An to be considered before this Court in Umedbhai Jadavbhai [Umedbhai Jadavbhai v. State of Gujarat, (1978) 1 SCC 228 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 108] . In the case before this Court, the High Court interfered with the order of acquittal passed by trial court on learned reappreciation of the entire evidence on record. However, the High Court, while reversing the acquittal, did not consider the reasons given by the learned trial court while acquitting the accused. Confirming the judgment of the High Court, this Court observed and held in para 10 as under: (SCC p. 233) the appeal was rightly ‘10. Once entertained against of acquittal, the High Court was entitled to evidence the reappreciate independently and come to its own entire
Decision
order the (Underlined to Supply Emphasis) Page 9 of 14 // 10 // to importance conclusion. Ordinarily, the High Court would give due the opinion of the Sessions Judge if the same were arrived at after proper appreciation of the evidence. This rule will the present case where the made Sessions an absolutely wrong assumption of a very material and clinching aspect in the peculiar circumstances of the case.’ in applicable Judge has not be In Sambasivan [Sambasivan v. State of 31.1. Kerala, (1998) 5 SCC 412 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1320] , the High Court reversed the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court and held the accused guilty on reappreciation of the entire evidence on record, however, the High Court did not record its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable. Confirming the order passed by the High Court convicting the accused on reversal of the acquittal passed by the learned trial court, after being satisfied that the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial court was perverse and suffered from infirmities, this Court declined to interfere with the order of conviction passed by confirming the order of conviction passed by the High Court, this Court observed in para 8 as under: (SCC p. 416) the High Court. While to ‘8. We have perused the judgment under appeal to ascertain whether the High Court has conformed the aforementioned principles. We find that the High Court has not strictly proceeded in the manner laid down by this Court in Doshi case [Ramesh Babulal Doshi v. State of Gujarat, (1996) 9 SCC 225 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 972] viz. first recording its conclusion on the question whether the approach of the trial court in (Underlined to Supply Emphasis) Page 10 of 14 // 11 // the dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions arrived at by it were wholly untenable, which alone will justify interference in an order of acquittal though the High Court has rendered a well-considered judgment duly meeting all the contentions raised before it. But then will this non-compliance per se justify setting aside the judgment under appeal? We think, not. In our view, in such a case, the approach of the court which is validity of the considering judgment of an appellate court which has reversed the order of acquittal passed by the trial court, should be to satisfy itself if the approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal or conclusions arrived at demonstrably unsustainable and whether he judgment of the appellate court is free from those infirmities; if so to hold that the warranted trial interference. In such a case, there is obviously no reason why the appellate court's judgment should be disturbed. But if on the other hand the court comes to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court does not suffer from any infirmity, it cannot but be held that the interference by the appellate court in the order of acquittal was not justified; then in such a case the judgment of the appellate court has to be set aside as of the two reasonable views, the one in support of the acquittal alone has to stand. Having regard to the above discussion, we shall proceed to examine the judgment of the trial court in this case.’ judgment it are court by In K. Unnithan [K. Ramakrishnan 31.2. Ramakrishnan Unnithan v. State of Kerala, (1999) 3 SCC 309 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 410] , after observing that though there is some substance in the grievance of the learned counsel appearing on (Underlined to Supply Emphasis) Page 11 of 14 // 12 // in discarding behalf of the accused that the High Court has not adverted to all the reasons given by the trial Judge for according an order of acquittal, this Court refused to set aside the order of conviction passed by the High Court after having found that the approach of the Sessions Judge in recording the order of acquittal was not proper and the conclusion arrived at by the learned Sessions Judge on several aspects was unsustainable. This Court further observed that as the Sessions Judge was not justified relevant/material evidence while acquitting the accused, the High Court, therefore, was fully entitled to reappreciate the evidence and record its own conclusion. This Court scrutinised the evidence of the eyewitnesses and opined that reasons adduced by the trial court for discarding the testimony of the eyewitnesses were not at all sound. This Court also observed that as the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court was manifestly erroneous and therefore it was the duty of the High Court to interfere with an order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge. the 31.3. In Atley [Atley v. State of U.P., AIR 1955 SC 807 : 1955 Cri LJ 1653] , in para 5, this Court observed and held as under: (AIR pp. 809-10) ‘5. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the trial court being one of acquittal, the High Court should not have set it aside on mere appreciation of the evidence led on behalf of the prosecution unless it came to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial Judge was perverse. In our opinion, it is not correct to say that unless the appellate court in an appeal under Section 417 CrPC came to the conclusion that the judgment of acquittal under appeal was perverse it could not set aside that order. It has been laid down by this Court that it is open to the High Court on an appeal against an order of acquittal to review the entire evidence and to come to its own conclusion, of course, (Underlined to Supply Emphasis) Page 12 of 14 // 13 // keeping in view the well-established rule that the presumption of innocence of the accused is not weakened but strengthened by the judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court which had the advantage of observing the demeanour of witnesses whose evidence have been recorded in its presence. It is also well settled that the court of appeal has as wide powers of appreciation of evidence in an appeal against an order of acquittal as in the case of an appeal against an order of conviction, subject to the riders that the presumption of innocence with which the accused person starts in the trial court continues even up to the appellate stage and that the appellate court should attach due weight to the opinion of the trial court which recorded the order of acquittal. If the appellate court reviews the evidence, keeping those principles in mind, and comes to a contrary conclusion, the judgment cannot be said this connection the very cases cited at the Bar, namely, Surajpal Singh v. State [Surajpal Singh v. State, 1951 SCC 1207 : AIR 1952 SC 52] ; Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P. [Wilayat Khan v. State of U.P., 1951 SCC 898 : AIR 1953 SC 122] ) In our opinion, there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that justified in reviewing the entire evidence and coming to its own conclusions.’ to have been vitiated. Court High (See was the in not (Underlined to Supply Emphasis) In K. Gopal Reddy [K. Gopal 31.4. Reddy v. State of A.P., (1979) 1 SCC 355 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 305] , this Court has observed that where the trial court allows itself to be besetwith fanciful doubts, rejects creditworthy evidence for slender reasons and takes a view of the evidence which is but barely possible, it is the obvious duty of the High Court to interfere in the interest of justice, lest the administration of justice be brought to ridicule.” (emphasis supplied) Page 13 of 14 // 14 // 7. In view of above discussions and the well-reasoned findings given by the learned trial court applying the principles laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anwar Ali (Supra), in considered opinion of this Court, the present case is not fit for grant of leave to appeal and the same stands disposed of. …………………… M.S.Sahoo, J. Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 23rd November, 2023/RRJena Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: RADHARANI JENA Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: ohc Date: 02-Jan-2024 14:36:53 Page 14 of 14