Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 2023 · Orissa High Court
Case Details
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLREV No.159 of 2024 along with CRLREV No.153 of 2024 (From the judgment dated 16.03.2024 passed by the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar, in Criminal Appeal No.26 of 2023upholding the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Learned J.M.F.C, Bhubaneshwar, in 1CC Case No. 2386 of 2015). Susanta Kumar Sahoo …. Petitioner(s) -versus- Pratap Kumar Sahoo …. Opposite Party (s) Advocates appeared in the case throughHybrid Mode: For Petitioner(s) For Opposite Party (s) : : Mr.Sidheswar Rath, Adv.. Mr. S. Kashyub, Adv. CORAM: DR. JUSTICE S.K. PANIGRAHI DATE OF HEARING:-08.10.2024 DATE OF JUDGMENT: -17.12.2024 Dr. S.K. Panigrahi, J. 1. The Petitioner, through the present CRLREVs, challenges the judgment dated 16.03.2024 rendered by the 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar, in Criminal Appeal No.26 of 2023. By the said judgment, the Appellate Court upheld the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 23.02.2024 passed by the Learned J.M.F.C, Bhubaneswar, in 1CC Case No. 2386 of 2015 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Page 1 of 16
Legal Reasoning
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 Instruments Act, 1881 (“NI Act”) sentencing him to undergo Simple Imprisonment for four months and directing him to pay compensation of Rs. 18,00,000/- (Rupees Twenty Lakhs) to the Petitioner/Complainant as compensation under Section 357(3) Cr.P.C., which is to be realized in the manner of a criminal fine. In case of default in the payment of the compensation, the convict shall further undergo simple imprisonment for 30 days. I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE: 2. The brief facts necessary for disposal of this CRLREV are as follows:- (i) The Opposite Party, being the complainant, had filed 1C.C. No.2386 of 2015, alleging the commission of an offense under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (“N.I.Act”) against the Petitioner-Accused. (ii) The Opp. Party, a paddy businessman, had a business relationship with the Petitioner, who owns a rice mill. The Opp. Party supplied paddy to the Petitioner for milling, beginning in 2012. In December 2014, the Opp. Party supplied paddy worth ₹38,40,280/- (Rupees Thirty-Eight Lakhs Forty Thousand Two Hundred Eighty). The Petitioner made a partial payment of ₹8,40,280/- (Rupees Eight Lakhs Forty Thousand Two Hundred Eighty) in cash and requested one month to pay the remaining ₹30,00,000/- (Rupees Thirty Lakhs). (iii) After one month, despite repeated requests by the Opp. Party, the Petitioner issued six post-dated account payee cheques. These cheques, numbered 931925 to 931930, were dated between 07.04.2015 and 20.04.2015, each amounting to ₹5,00,000/- (Rupees Five Lakhs) and Page 2 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 collectively totaling ₹30,00,000/-. These cheques were issued for the discharge of the Petitioner’s legally enforceable liability. (iv) Out of the six cheques, the appellant requested the respondent to deposit two on 14.07.2015 in State Bank of India, Jagatsinghpur, ADB Branch. These were Cheque No. 931929 dated 16.04.2015 for Rs. 5,00,000/- and Cheque No. 931930 dated 20.04.2015 for Rs. 5,00,000/-, both of which were returned unpaid with the remark “Funds Insufficient” on 15.07.2015. Additionally, two other cheques, Cheque No. 931927 dated 12.04.2015 and Cheque No. 931928 dated 14.04.2015, were deposited on 10.07.2015 and returned unpaid with the same remark on 11.07.2015. (v) Subsequently, the Opp. Party issued a legal notice to the Petitioner on 30.07.2015 under the provisions of the NI Act through registered post with acknowledgment due (A/D). Although the postal A/D was not returned, the notice was sent to the Petitioner’s correct address, and as per legal presumption, the notice is deemed to have been served. Despite the notice, the Petitioner failed to pay the cheque amount. Consequently, the Opp. Party filed a case under Section 138 of the N.I. Act in the Court of the learned SDJM, Bhubaneswar, which was later transferred to the Court of J.M.F.C., Bhubaneswar, for adjudication. (vi) The Petitioner’s defense was one of complete denial, asserting that the cheques in question were not issued for any legal debt or liability but were held by the Opp. Party as security for paddy supplies. During the trial, the Opp. Party provided oral and documentary evidence. Page 3 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 (vii) However, the learned Trial Court convicted the Petitioner on 23.02.2023, sentencing them to four months of simple imprisonment and ordering compensation of ₹18,00,000/- (Rupees Eighteen Lakhs), with a further 30 days of simple imprisonment in default of payment. (viii) Aggrieved by the conviction, the Petitioner filed Criminal Appeal No.26 of 2023 in the Court of the learned District & Sessions Judge, Khurda at Bhubaneswar. The appeal, citing various grounds including misassessment of evidence and failure to meet the mandatory requirements under Section 138 of the NI Act, was transferred to the learned 3rd Additional Sessions Judge, Bhubaneswar, for disposal. (ix) The Petitioner argued that the cheques were held as security and not issued to discharge any legal liability. However, the Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence or recognize this fact. The Appellate Court, while adjudicating the appeal, did not judiciously evaluate the evidence or properly consider the exhibited documents, legal provisions, or judgments cited by the Petitioner. (x) As a result, the Appellate Court upheld the Trial Court’s judgment on 16.03.2024, reaffirming the conviction and sentence. II. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER: 3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner/ complainant earnestly made the following submissions in support of his contentions. (i) The learned First Appellate Court should have recognized that the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act relies primarily on documentary evidence. The Opposite Party-Complainant’s failure to Page 4 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 exhibit essential documents, such as those related to the supply of paddy, procurement of loans, stock registers, books of account, and truck waybills, casts doubt on the allegations made in the complaint. The absence of these vital documents and the lack of proof establishing legal liability or debt undermine the validity of the transaction, rendering the impugned Judgments liable to be set aside. (ii) In the absence of a legal liability, the presentation of cheques by the Opposite Party is legally untenable. A clear legal obligation must be established to justify the cheques’ issuance. The trial Court erred in delivering the impugned Judgment based on presumptions, which is unsustainable in law. Since the Opposite Party failed to prove the existence of a legal liability or debt beyond a reasonable doubt, both the trial and appellate Courts’ decisions are flawed. (iii) The core issue was whether there was a legal liability or debt. The trial Court failed to appreciate this fundamental point in its Judgment. The burden rested on the Opposite Party to establish the case beyond a reasonable doubt, yet these critical aspects were overlooked, making the impugned Judgments unsustainable in law and subject to being set aside. (iv) To determine the existence of legal liability, the prosecution must establish a legally enforceable debt or obligation. The trial Court failed to adequately consider this, convicting the Petitioner without sufficient evidence. Consequently, the impugned Judgments must be set aside. (v) The trial Court neglected to examine exhibited documents and evidence properly, which were insufficient to establish liability concerning the Page 5 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 impugned cheques. The Opposite Party could have opted for a civil suit, but the Courts below erred by applying a rigid formula to convict the Petitioner. This approach is legally untenable, and the impugned Judgments must be set aside. (vi) The offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act is documentary-based. The failure of the Complainant-Opposite Party to provide essential documents supporting the alleged legal debt or liability necessitated the acquittal of the Petitioner. In the absence of adequate evidence, the trial Court’s Judgment is unsustainable and must be set aside. (vii) The trial Court overlooked the fact that the complaint alleged the supply of paddy to the Petitioner’s Rice Mill, which was not impleaded as an accused. (viii) The core point of determination was whether the Opposite Party supplied paddy to the Accused or his Rice Mill. The trial Court failed to frame and address this critical issue, resulting in a Judgment that lacks reasoning and is therefore liable to be set aside. (ix) During cross-examination, the Opposite Party admitted that the paddy supplied to the Petitioner was procured from different farmers on credit. However, none of these farmers were presented as witnesses to support the claim. (x) The trial Court should have framed a point of determination regarding the financial capacity of the Opposite Party to supply paddy on credit. This critical issue was overlooked, leading to flawed conclusions in both the trial and appellate Judgments. Page 6 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 (xi) The Opposite Party/Complainant failed to establish legal liability on the dates of execution of both the cheques, creating doubt regarding the evidence presented. (xii) The trial Court did not consider the Memorandum of Argument filed under Section 314 Cr.P.C. by the Petitioner or the cited case law. The appellate Court also failed to address these aspects in its Judgment rendering both Judgments unreasoned and liable to be set aside. (xiii) The cheques in question were post-dated. The Opposite Party/Complainant was required to provide evidence supporting the underlying liability. (xiv) The Demand Notice was not received by the Petitioner. The Opposite Party/Complainant failed to provide sufficient evidence to counter this claim. (xv) The complaint case filed under Rule-20 of the GRCO (Criminal) Vol.-I lacked the requisite supporting documents. Since offences under Section 138 of the N.I. Act depend heavily on documentary evidence, the failure to produce such evidence renders the case untenable. (xvi) The Opposite Party-Complainant failed to prove his claim that he was a paddy businessman or that the alleged transaction occurred as described. Without documentary evidence substantiating the alleged liability or payment claims, the trial Court erred in convicting the Petitioner, necessitating the setting aside of the impugned Judgments. III. SUBMISSION OF THE OPPOSITE PARTIES: 4. Conversely, the learned counsel for the Opposite Party supported the impugned judgments passed by the lower Appellate Court, submitting Page 7 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 that the trial court considered all relevant aspects while imposing the sentence. 5. Similarly, the lower Appellate Court, having properly re-evaluated the evidence on record, passed the impugned judgment affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction. There exists no substantial reason to interfere with the same. Therefore, he prayed for the dismissal of this Criminal Revision. IV. COURT’S REASONING AND ANALYSIS: 6. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the evidence on record. In the aforesaid factual background, I do not think that the Trial Court erred in holding that the onus was not on the respondent to show existence of debt or legal liability. Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act, read as follows: “118. Presumptions as to negotiable instruments. — Until the contrary is proved, the following presumptions shall be made:- (a) of consideration — that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that every such instrument, when it has been accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred, was accepted, indorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration; (b) as to date —that every negotiable instrument bearing a date was made or drawn on such date; (c) as to time of acceptance —that every accepted bill of exchange was accepted within a reasonable time after its date and before its maturity; (d) as to time of transfer —that every transfer of a negotiable instrument was made before its maturity; Page 8 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 (e) as to order of endorsements —that the endorsements appearing upon a negotiable instrument were made in the order in which they appear thereon; (f) as to stamps —that a lost promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque was duly stamped; (g) that holder is a holder in due course — that the holder of a negotiable instrument is a holder in due course: Provided that, where the instrument has been obtained from its lawful owner, or from any person in lawful custody thereof, by means of an offence or fraud, or has been obtained from the maker or acceptor thereof by means of an offence or fraud, or for unlawful consideration, the burden of proving that the holder is a holder in due course lies upon him.” 139. Presumption in favour of holder.— It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.” 8. The Supreme Court inKalamani Tex and Another v. P. Balasubramanian,1 examined the scope and ambit of the presumption under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act and held that when an accused’s signature on a cheque is admitted or established, Sections 118 and 139 presume it was issued for consideration and represents a legally enforceable debt, shifting the burden to the accused to rebut this presumption by proving otherwise on a preponderance of probabilities. The relevant excerpt is produced hereinbelow: 1[2021] 1 S.C.R. 668 Page 9 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 “14. Adverting to the case in hand, we find on a plain reading of its judgment that the trial Court completely overlooked the provisions andfailed to appreciate the statutory presumption drawn under Section118 and Section 139 of NIA.The Statute mandates that once thesignature(s) of an accused on the cheque/negotiable these ‘reverse onus’ clauses become operative. Insuch a situation, the obligation shifts upon the accused to dischargethe presumption imposed upon him. This point of law has beencrystalized by this Court in RohitbhaiJivanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat in the following words: instrument areestablished, then “In the case at hand, even after purportedly drawing the presumptionunder Section 139 of the NI Act, the trial court proceeded to questionthe want of evidence on the part of the complainant as regardsthe source of funds for advancing loan to the accused and want ofexamination of relevant witnesses who allegedly extended him moneyfor advancing it to the accused. This approach of the trial court hadbeen at variance with the principles of presumption in law. After such presumption, the onus shifted to the accused and unless theaccused had discharged the onus by bringing on record such factsand circumstances as to show the preponderance of probabilitiestilting in his favour, any doubt on the complainant’s case could nothave been raised for want of evidence regarding the source of loan to the fundsfor advancing appellant-accused…..” 15. Once the 2nd Appellant had admitted his signatures on the chequeand the Deed, the trial Court ought to have presumed that the chequewas issued as consideration for a legally enforceable debt. The trialCourt fell in error when it called the Complainant-Respondentto upon circumstances under which the appellants were liableto pay. Such approach of the trial Court was directly in the teeth ofthe explain the Page 10 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 established legal position as discussed above, and amounts toa patent error of law. xxxxxx 18. Even if we take the arguments raised by the appellants at face value that only a blank cheque and signed blank stamp papers were given to the respondent, yet the statutory presumption cannot be obliterated….” 9. Then in T. Vasanthakumar v. Vijaykumari,2the Supreme Court has held as following: “9. Therefore, in the present case since the cheque as well as the signature has been accepted by the accused-respondent, the presumption under Section 139 would operate. Thus the burden was on the accused to disprove the cheque or the existence of any legally recoverable debt or liability. To this effect, the accused has come up with a story that the cheque was given to the complainant long back in 1999 as a security to a loan; the loan was repaid but the complainant did not, return the security cheque. According to the accused, it was that very cheque used by the complainant to implicate the accused. However, it may be noted that the cheque was dishonoured because the payment was stopped and not for any other reason. This implies that the accused had knowledge of the cheque being presented to the bank, or else how would the accused have instructed her banker to stop the payment. Thus, the story brought out by the accused is unworthy of credit, apart from being unsupported by any evidence.” 10. Ergo, the burden of proof squarely rested on the revisionist to establish that no debt or financial liability existed to support the issuance of the cheques in question. This burden was not discharged at the trial stage. 2(2015) 8 SCC 378 Page 11 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 Accordingly, the findings of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, holding otherwise, are devoid of any legal infirmity. 11. Next, the counsel for the revisionist contended that the cheques in question were not issued for any legal debt or liability but were held by the Opp. Party as security for paddy supplies. It is thus argued that cheque covered by security purposes is not covered under NI Act. However, this contention cannot be accepted.
Legal Reasoning
12. In Sripati Singh (since deceased) Through His Son Gaurav Singh v. State of Jharkhand &Anr.,3the Supreme Court observed that even acheque issued as “security” remains enforceable, as it signifies a pledge to fulfill an obligation. If the loan it secures is not repaid by the due date or no agreement to defer payment exists, the cheque matures for presentation. The relevant paragraphs are cited as under: “16. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered as a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. “Security” in its true sense is the state of being safe and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the 32021 SCC OnLine SC 1002 Page 12 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 same. On such presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of N.I. Act would flow. ................... 22. These aspects would prima-facie indicate that there was a transaction between the parties towards which a legally recoverable debt was claimed by the appellant and the cheque issued by the respondent No.2 was presented. On such cheque being dishonoured, cause of action had arisen for issuing a notice and presenting the criminal complaint under Section 138 of N.I. Act on the payment not being made. The further defence as to whether the loan had been discharged as agreed by respondent No.2 and in that circumstance the cheque which had been issued as security had not remained live for payment subsequent thereto etc. at best can be a defence for the respondent No.2 to be put forth and to be established in the trial. In any event, it was not a case for the Court to either refuse to take cognizance or to discharge the respondent No.2 in the manner it has been done by the High Court. Therefore, though a criminal complaint under Section 420 IPC was not sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the complaint under section 138 of the N.I Act was maintainable and all contentions and the defence were to be considered during the course of the trial.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. In DashrathbhaiTrikambhai Patel v. Hitesh Mahendrabhai Patel &Anr.,4the Supreme Court listed the following legal principles: “......Based on the above analysis of precedent, the following principles emerge: 4(2023) 1 SCC 578 Page 13 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 (i) Where the borrower agrees to repay the loan within a specified timeline and issues a cheque for security but defaults in repaying the loan within the timeline, the cheque matures for presentation. When the cheque is sought to be encashed by the debtor and is dishonoured, Section 138 of the Act will be attracted; (ii) However, the cardinal rule when a cheque is issued for security is that between the date on which the cheque is drawn to the date on which the cheque matures, the loan could be repaid through any other mode. It is only where the loan is not repaid through any other mode within the due date that the cheque would mature for presentation; and (iii) If the loan has been discharged before the due date or if there is an “altered situation,” then the chequeshall not be presented for encashment.” 14. In light of the foregoing, the petitioner’s defense that the cheques were issued solely as security lacks merit. It is well-established in law that even when a cheque issued as security is dishonored, the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, are invoked, as correctly determined by the trial court. 15. This Court concurs with the view that the appellants’ defense fails to meet the threshold of a ‘preponderance of probability’ and lacks credibility. In the absence of cogent and relevant evidence, the trial court was justified in rejecting the appellants’ defense and in holding them accountable under the presumptions mandated by Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act. 16. The present revisionist has asserted that the Trial Court did not adequately examine the evidence. However, at this stage, it is evident that the High Court should refrain from interfering with the concurrent Page 14 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court unless there is a discernible error of fact or law in their determinations. 17. In State of Orissa v. NakulaSahu and Ors.,5 the Supreme Court held that the High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction, ought not to interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court in the absence of any discernible error of fact or law in their determinations. The relevant portion is reproduced hereinbelow: “So far as the first point is concerned, it is to be emphasized that although the revisional power of the High Court under section 439 read with section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 is as wide as the power of Court of Appeal under section 423 of the Code, it is now well settled that normally the jurisdiction of the High Court under section 439 is to be exercised only in exceptional cases when there is a glaring defect in the procedure or there is a mainfest error on a point of law which has consequently resulted in flagrant miscarriage of justice. Reference in this connection may be made to the decisions of this Court in Amar Chand Agarwalla v. Shanti Bose &Anr. etc.(1) and AkaluAhdr v. Ramdeo Ram(2), In the latter case viz. AkaluAhir v. Ramdeo Ram (supra) this Court follolwing its earlier decision in Amar Chand Agarwalla v. Shanti Bose &Anr etc. (supra) held that in spite of the wide language of section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 which empowered it to satisfy itself as to the correctness legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order recorded or passed by any inferior court situate within the limits of its jurisdiction and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior court and in spite of the fact that under section 439 of the Code it can exercise inter alia the power conferred on a court of appeal under section 423 of the Code, the High Court is not expected to act under section 435 or section 439 as if it is hearing on appeal. 5AIR 1979 SC 663 Page 15 of 16 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Designation: AR-CUM-SR. SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Dec-2024 18:01:54 The power being discretionary, it has to be exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily or lightly. Judicial discretion, as has often been said, means a discretion which is informed by tradition, methodised by analogy and disciplined by system.” 18. Likewise, in State of Kerala v. PuttamanaIllathJathavedanNamboodiri,6 the Supreme Court observed that revisional jurisdiction is supervisory in nature and intended to rectify instances of miscarriage of justice. It further clarified that this jurisdiction is neither equivalent to appellate jurisdiction nor akin to a second appellate forum. Consequently, it is inappropriate for the High Court to reappraise evidence or substitute its own conclusions unless a glaring irregularity amounting to gross miscarriage of justice is brought to its attention. V. CONCLUSION: 19. From the aforementioned, it is clear that both the Trial Court and the Revisional Court meticulously examined the evidence and arrived at a conclusion establishing the guilt of the accused. No patent error or irregularity in their findings or analysis of evidence is apparent. This does not warrants interference or correction by this Court. 20. In light of the foregoing, both the CRLREVs aredismissed and disposed of in terms of the aforesaid observations. Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the17th Dec., 2024 6(1999 (2) SCC 452 (Dr.S.K. Panigrahi) Judge Page 16 of 16