State of Odisha and others v. Sudhansu Sekhar Rout and another)
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.A. No.663 of 2024 State of Odisha and others Minati Kumari Nayak …. Appellants Mr. Bimbisar Dash, AGA -versus- Respondent Mr. Laxmikanta Mohanty, Advocate …. CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MISS JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO Order No.
Decision
ORDER 27.11.2024 04. This matter is taken up through Hybrid mode. 2. Mr. Laxmikanta Mohanty, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submits that since there is some urgency in the matter, filing of certified copy of the impugned order as undertaken vide order dated 20.11.2024 passed in I.A. No.1655 of 2024 may be ignored. 3. In view of such submission made, filing of certified copy of the impugned order is ignored. 4. In the present intra-Court appeal filed on behalf of the State of Odisha and its officials, an order dated 19.10.2022 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.C. (OAC) No.236 of 2018 has been challenged. By the said order, learned Single Judge has disposed of the writ petition in following terms: “4. It is submitted that the claim as made in the writ Petition is squarely covered by a decision of the Page 1 of 6 learned Tribunal passed on 14.08.2013 in O.A. No. 3124(C) of 2008 under Anncxurc-7. It is also submitted that the said order was challenged before this Court in W.P.(C) No.25622 of 2014 and this Court vide its order dtd.07.04.2017 while dismissing the writ Petition filed by the State confirmed the order passed by the learned Tribunal on 14.08.2013. It is also submitted that the Petitioner in O.A. No. 3124(C) of 2008 in the meantime has been extended with the benefit after dismissal of the writ Petition filed by the State vide order dtd.14.09.2017. 5. In that view of the matter the Petitioner is also entitled to get the benefit as prayed for in the writ Petition. O.P. Nos.2 & 3 are directed to extend the benefit as has been extended in favour of the Petitioner in O.A. No. 2134(C) of 2008. The entire exercise shall be completed within a period of three (3) months from the date of receipt of this order.” 5. Learned Additional Government Advocate assailing the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge has submitted that the respondent was a fence-sitter, who had approached the Orissa Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, Cuttack (the ‘Tribunal’ for short) after the order of this Court was passed on 07.04.2017 in W.P.(C) No.25622 of 2014. He has, however, not been able to distinguish the case of the respondent with that of the respondent (opposite party) in W.P.(C) No.25622 of 2014 (State of Odisha and others v. Sudhansu Sekhar Rout and another). 6. The respondent in her original application before the Tribunal had claimed that she had a qualification of M.A. in Sanskrit with B.Ed, and upon due selection, she was appointed as Classical Teacher on 01.07.1987 by the Secretary of the Managing Page 2 of 6 Committee of the concerned School and was subsequently promoted to Junior SES cadre with effect from 29.06.2006. It was her further claim that the State Government in the School & Mass Education Department had issued a Notification dated 18.02.2008 to grant T.G. scale of pay to Hindi Teacher from the date of their appointment. The said benefit was extended to Classical Teachers vide Government Notification dated 05.09.2011 and 04.06.2012. The actual payment was required to be made in terms of the said Notification with effect from 01.01.2006. Relying on a decision of Division Bench of this Court in case of Sudhansu Sekhar Rout (supra), the respondent had made a representation. As no action was taken on her representation, she had to approach the Tribunal by filing an application giving rise to O.A. No.236 (C) of 2018. After abolition of the Odisha Administrative Tribunal, the case stood transfer to this Court and came to be registered as W.P.C (OAC) No.236 of 2018, wherein the impugned order has been passed by the learned Single Judge, relying on the said Division Bench decision in case of Sudhansu Sekhar Rout (supra). 7. We have heard Mr. Bimbisar Dash, learned Additional Government Advocate represents the State of Odisha-appellants and Mr. Laxmikanta Mohanty, learned counsel for the respondent. 8. From the order passed by the Division Bench of this Court in case of Sudhansu Sekhar Rout (supra), it can be easily noticed that the effect of the same Notification dated 05.09.2011 whereby benefit of grant of T.G. scale of pay to Classical Teachers was extended, was under consideration. This Court in case of Sudhansu Page 3 of 6 Sekhar Rout (supra) declined to interfere with the order passed by the Tribunal. The said Notification dated 05.09.2011 having been already interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court, learned Single Judge has rightly followed the said decision and disposed of the writ petition by the impugned order. The only submission, which has been made on behalf of the appellants, is that the respondent being a fence-sitter cannot be allowed the same benefit which was granted to a person who was vigilant and who pursued his claim with due diligence. 9. In our considered view, the decision in case of Sudhansu Sekhar Rout (supra) is a judgment in rem on the point of applicability of the Notification dated 05.09.2011 in a particular manner for a class of employees. In case of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347, the Supreme Court has laid down the law in this regard in following terms: 22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under. 22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that Page 4 of 6 merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2. However, this principle is subject to well- recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long their delay only because of counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. the reason that similarly situated persons, whether 22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to they all approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject-matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India [K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 226] ). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not and like the Page 5 of 6 from suffer acquiescence.” either laches and delays or (Emphasis supplied) 10. In our opinion, the present case falls under the exception carved out in paragraph-22.3 in the case of Arvind Kumar Srivastava (supra). 11. In such view of the matter, the impugned order does not require any interference. This appeal is accordingly dismissed. Chief Justice (Chakradhari Sharan Singh) Judge (Savitri Ratho) M. Panda, Sec. & S. K. Behera, Jr. Stenographer Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: MRUTYUNJAYA PANDA Designation: Secretary Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 03-Dec-2024 19:10:38 Page 6 of 6