Orissa High Court
Case Details
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK RVWPET No.119 of 2025 In the matter of an Application under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC and Order XLVII of CPC read with Chapter XII, Rule 34 of High Court of Orissa Rules, 1948 *** Surya Prasad Panda Aged about 28 years Son of Surendra Kumar Panda Resident of Charigharia P.O: Madhabnagar P.S./District: Bhadrak Odisha. … -VERSUS- Petitioner (respondent in the Writ Appeal). State Selection Board Represented through Secretary, Department of Higher Education Government of Odisha, Bhubhaneshwar District: Khurda, Odisha … Opposite party (Apepllant in the Writ Appeal). Counsel appeared for the parties: RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 1 of 14 For the Petitioner : M/s. Somyakanta Mohapatra, Niranjan Sahu, Advocates For the Opposite party : None P R E S E N T: HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. HARISH TANDON AND HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN Date of Hearing : 10.07.2025 :: Date of Order : 10.07.2025
Decision
ORDER I.A. No. 192 of 2025 in RVWPET No.119 of 2025 1. Seeking review of judgment dated 30.08.2024 of this Court, the Respondent in W.A. No.510 of 2024 has filed this petition titled “An application under Section 114 read with Order XLVII of CPC and read with Order XLVII of CPC and read with Chapter XII, Rule 34 of Orissa High Court Rules” on ground that erroneous recording of fact entails scope of review of Judgment; thereby it is fervently prayed by the petitioner to revisit the judgment. 2. A petition under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in filing the review petition has been filed along with review petition on 04.04.2025. RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 2 of 14 3. The Registry of this Court has pointed out the delay as follows: Date Awards of Judgment 2024-08-30 Date Presentation of Valid 2025-0404 Total period occupied 217 day Limitation 30 day Certified copy period X day Delay in filing 187 days 3.1. The petition for condondation of delay as filed by the petitioner runs as follows: “1. That the present review petition is being filed by the the order dated petitioner seeking review of 30.08.2024 passed by the Hon‟ble Division Bench of this Hon‟ble Court in W.A. No.510/2024, whereby, the Hon‟ble Divisional Bench has pleased to set aside the order of the Hon‟ble Single Judge passed in W.P.(C) No.10537/2022 and allowed the writ appeal filed by the opposite party. The petitioner herein was the respondent in the writ appeal while the opposite party herein was the appellant before the Hon‟ble Division Bench in the writ appeal. Copy of the order dated 30.08.2024 passed by the Hon‟ble Division bench in W.A. No.510 of 2024. RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 3 of 14 2. That the averments made in the review petition may kindly be read as part of this IA petition for clarity and brevity. 3. 4. the That impugned order was passed on 30.08.2024. The petitioner after receipt of the certified copy sought for legal opinion for preferring the present review petition and in the process there in has been preferring the appeal. inadvertent delay ….. of days That it is most humbly submitted that there are no willful latches or negligence on the part of the present petition in not preferring the review petition in question within the stipulated time. It is further humbly submitted that the inadvertent delay in preferring the present review petition is for reasons beyond the control of the petitioner and are bona fide due to unavoidable procedural formalities. It may not be out of place to mention here that the petitioner has strong prima facie case and the balance of convenience is in its favour and would suffer irreparable loss if the Hon‟ble Court does not condone the delay of about days in preferring the present RVWPET.” 4. Though the writ appeal was argued by the petitioner himself, Mr. Soumyakanta Mohapatra, learned counsel petitioner conceding the fact that he is ignorant about what transpired at the time of hearing of writ appeal, contended that the Judgment in writ appeal reversing the order dated 22.02.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.10537 of 2022 committed error in returning facts, which warrants review of the judgment Page 4 of 14 RVWPET No.119 of 2025 in writ appeal. Therefore, he submitted that though elaborate reason is demonstrated for the delay, this Court may using discretion condone the delay in filing the review petition and take up the matter for hearing on merit. 5. This Court, on perusal of contents of application for condonation of delay, which are extracted hitherto, perceives that even though inordinate delay occurred in filing the review petition, there is no mention about the days of delay by the petitioner. On a query from the Bench, the learned counsel pleaded inadvertence. 5.1. This Court observes that besides the pleadings are so carelessly and casually drafted, inordinate delay in filing review petition, as pointed out by the Stamp Reporter, has not been explained. Reading the whole of the contents of the petition does not reveal reason, much less plausible reason, to consider the petition for condonation. However, the counsel for the petitioner without stressing upon citing sufficient reason explaining the unusual delay, went on arguing that review petition is liable to be allowed in view of factual perversity contained in the impugned Judgment of this Court in writ appeal. He vehemently contended that notwithstanding dismissal of special leave petition, being SLP(C) No.26868 of 2024, has been dismissed vide Order RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 5 of 14 18.11.20241 of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the review petition is entertainable to deal with the factual matrix to correct the error crept in the Judgment. 5.2. Scrutiny of the contents of said petition does not disclose “sufficient reason” or “good reason”, much less a reason to take a pragmatic view to show indulgence. The petition lacks material particulars to construe that there was inadvertence and the petition suffers non-disclosure of factual foundation to appreciate reason for such a delay. Thus, this Court finds laches on the part of the petitioner in filing the petition for condonation of delay. 5.3. Unless a petition for condonation of delay discloses “sufficient cause” or “good cause” as required to be demonstrated in terms of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, this Court would not be in a position to exercise discretion to condone the delay in filing the review petition. Sufficient cause is a question of fact and this Court is required to exercise its discretion in appreciating circumstances in a given case. 5.4. It is well settled that discretion cannot be arbitrary, whimsical and fanciful. There is no cavil that merit of the review petition cannot be taken into consideration 1 Order dated 18.11.2024 passed in SLP is reproduced hereunder: “1. 2. Heard learned senior counsel for the petitioner. We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.” 3. 4. RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 6 of 14 while analysing “sufficient cause” which prevented the petitioner from filing such review petition within the specified period. In the case at hand the petition for condonation of delay neither explains the delay caused during the specified period during which the review petition ought to have been filed nor is it emanated from contents of such petition reasons for the delay beyond specified period till its filing. 5.5. It is well settled that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigours when prescribed by statute. 5.6. In Pathupati Subba Reddy Vrs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA), (2024) 4 SCR 241 = 2024 INSC 286, having taken review of relevant earlier decisions, the principles for consideration of condonation of delay have been expounded in the following terms: “6. The moot question before us is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the delay in filing the proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by limitation. *** 9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 7 of 14 even though limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act. *** 12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the word „shall‟ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings. In other words, it casts an obligation upon the Court to dismiss an appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the Courts to admit an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the Courts are conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant is able to establish „sufficient cause‟ for not filing it within time. The said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred after is in nature and may not be discretionary exercised even if sufficient cause is shown the expiry of time RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 8 of 14 based upon host of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc. 13. It is very elementary and well understood that injustice-oriented Courts should not adopt an the applications for approach condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a pragmatic line to advance substantial justice. in dealing with *** ‘sufficient cause’ 17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights. *** 26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 9 of 14 come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; limitation contained law of (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been that exercise of power explained, but is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the Court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 10 of 14 imposed, statutory provision.” tantamounts to disregarding the 5.7. It may be of benefit to have reference to Esha Bhattacharjee Vrs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 9 SCR 782, wherein the following principles are culled out: “15. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice- oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. (ii) The terms „sufficient cause‟ should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 11 of 14 (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. the (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily face such a litigation. to (xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 12 of 14 by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 5.8. With such clear enunciation of legal perspective bearing in mind, on a careful appreciation of the contents of the petition for condonation of delay it is discernible to be bereft of sufficient cause being shown and there is absence of plausible and acceptable explanation proffered in said petition. 6. With the aforesaid conspectus of the legal position and non-disclosure or lack of material particulars constituting “sufficient cause” in the petition, there is no manner of doubt that this Court would not be justified on the facts and in the circumstances of the case to exercise discretion to condone the delay in filing review petition, particularly when it is brought to notice of this Court that the Special Leave to Appeal, being SLP (C) No.26868 of 2024, has been dismissed vide Order dated 18.11.2024 without any interference by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 13 of 14 7. Accordingly, application with a prayer to condone the delay in filing the review petition is dismissed. As a sequel thereto, the review petition is also dismissed. However, in the circumstances there shall be no order as to costs. (HARISH TANDON) CHIEF JUSTICE (MURAHARI SRI RAMAN) JUDGE Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: ASWINI KUMAR SETHY Designation: Personal Assistant (Secretary-in-Charge) Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 11-Jul-2025 18:22:14 High Court of Orissa, Cuttack The 10th July, 2025//Aswini RVWPET No.119 of 2025 Page 14 of 14