The High Court · 2025
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLMC No. 1345 of 2025 (An application under Section 528 of BNSS, 2023) Surendra Kumar Sahu State of Odisha (Vig.) ….. -versus- ….. Petitioner Opposite Party For Petitioner : Mr. Devashis Panda,Advocate For Opposite Party : Mr. N. Maharana, Additional Standing Counsel, Vigilance -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- CORAM: HON’BLE MISS JUSTICE SAVITRI RATHO JUDGMENT 2nd September 2025 Savitri Ratho, J. This CRLMC has been filed for quashing the order dated 11.02.2025 passed in V.G.R. Case No. 04 of 2021 by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Sundargarh taking cognizance of offences punishable under Sections 7 and 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act (in short “the P.C. Act”) and issuing notice to the petitioner for commission of offence under Section 7 of the P.C. Act. BRIEF FACTS 2. Written report was submitted by Narayan Bagh, Headmaster of Sahaspur Primary School, Sundargarh on 03.03.2021 before the CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 1 of 25 S.P. Vigilance, Rourkela Division stating that the Petitioner who was posted as Block Education Officer, Hemgir Block and co-accused Biranchi Khilei who was posted as Jr. Asst. in that office were harassing him and demanding illegal gratification of Rs. 35,000/- for not having submitted „utilization certificate‟ relating to expenditure of funds from the Block Education Officer (in short “the BEO”)B.E.O‟s office under various government schemes at the end of each fiscal year when during 2005-2012. The informant who was posted as Headmaster of Kutabaga Primary School stated that the Petitioner had called him to his office in January and told him that utilization certificates for the year 2010 were pending with him and instructed him to submit it early. The informant verified all documents and submitted a utilization certificate for Rs. 2200/- (Rupees Two thousand & two hundred only) in February, 2021. After receiving it, the Petitioner accused the informant of negligence saying that as the certificate was pending since long, a departmental proceeding would be initiated against the informant. He demanded a bribe of Rs. 50,000/- for not taking any action against the informant. On 03.03.2021, the petitioner called him to the B.E.O office and threatened to suspend him, if he did not pay the amount. After many requests, he asked the informant to contact Clerk Biranchi Khilei, CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 2 of 25 who had been instructed and to make payment of at least Rs. 35,000/- to him to 04.03.2021. The informant contacted co accused Biranchi Khilei who told him that the petitioner had told him and that the informant should make the payment to him the next day near Garjanbahal Chhaka, when he would be coming to the Hemgiri BEO Office. The informant thereafter approached the Superintendent of Police Vigilance on the same day, i.e 03.03.2021 with his complaint and the SP Vigilance directed the OIC Vigilance Police Station, Rourkela Vigilance Division to register a case. The DSP Vigilance
Facts
was directed to investigate into the case. FIR was registered on 03.03.2021 and Rourkela Vigilance P.S. Case No 4 of 2021 against the petitioner and co accused Biranchi Khilei under Section 7 and 12 of the P.C. Act. 3. A trap was laid by the Trap laying Officer (in short “the T.L.O.”) where informant produced seventy currency notes of Rs. 500/- denomination each, in presence of trap witnesses which were treated with phenolphthalein powder and handed over to the informant with advice to give a signal by brushing his head with both his hands after the transaction was over. Preparation was over at 7.15 am, on 04.03.2021. At 07:15 am, the trap party left for Garjanbahal Chhaka and took up their positions. At about 09:20 am, co-accused CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 3 of 25 Biranchi Khilei reached the spot on a motorcycle. After a discussion with the informant he left. He was followed by the trap party and at Durubaga Chhak, co-accused stopped and signaled to the informant to stop. The informant Narayan Bagh went to him. On receiving the pre-arranged signal from the informant, the trap party surrounded the co-accused who confessed about the entire arrangement as agreed between him, the informant and Petitioner. The accompanying witnesses also confirmed demand and acceptance of bribe. The co accused admitted that the petitioner had asked him to receive cash of Rs 35,000/- from the informant. On testing his fingers, they turned to pink colour. The bribe amount was recovered from his back pack which he brought out. The Petitioner was apprehended at B.S. High School, Sundargrah, where he had gone for a meeting. After completion of investigation Petitioner and co-accused chargesheet was filed under Section – 7 and 12 of the P.C. Act against the petitioner and the co accused . EARLIER ORDER OF COGNIZANCE 4. On 23.02.2023, cognizance order had been passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Sundargarh. Challenging the said
Legal Reasoning
order, the petitioner had approached this Court in CRLMC No. 3489 of 2024, which had been disposed of on 28.11.2024, setting aside CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 4 of 25 order dated 23.02.2023, observing that the trial Court has not applied its mind while taking cognizance and relegating the matter to the learned trial court “to pass appropriate order on cognizance by taking into consideration the materials form part of the charge sheet placed before it.” IMPUGNED ORDER 5. The learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Sundargarh, has observed in the impugned order that he has “gone through the materials i.e. the charge sheet No.5 dated 24.5.2022 and other documents such as FIR, case diaries, statement of witnesses U/s 161, Cr.P.C. & 164, Cr.P.C. preparation report, detection report, seizure lists, zimanama, spot map, C.E. Report, sanction order and other connected papers on record. I am satisfied that prima facie materials for the offence U/s 7/12 P.C. (Amendment) Act, 2018 are well established against the accused persons namely, Surendra Kumar Sahu, Ex.BEO, Hemgir Block, District - Sundargarh and Biranchi Khilei, Ex. Junior Clerk, office of the BEO, Hemgir, District - Sundargarh. Hence, cognizance of the offences U/s 7/12 (Amendment) Act, 2018 is taken against the above named accused persons. Issue notice to the accused Surendra Kumar Sahu for the offence U/s 7 of the P.C. (Amendment) Act, 2018 and to the accused Biranchi Khilei for the offence U/s 7 / 12 of the P.C.(Amendment) Act, 2018.‖ CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 5 of 25 SUBMISSIONS 6. I have heard Mr. Devashis Panda learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Niranjan Maharana learned Additional Standing Counsel, Vigilance. I have gone through the notes of submission filed by the counsel, the FIR, copy of the chargesheet dated 24.05.2022, statement of the informant recorded under Section- 161 Cr.P.C; his statement and statement of Biswajit Bhoi recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C as well as Annexure 4 and Annexure 5 to the CRLMC. 7. Mr. Panda, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner has been falsely implicated in this case. He further submitted that the Petitioner is not connected with the case and has neither demanded any gratification nor accepted any gratification from the informant. There has not been any recovery of the tainted notes from him. He had no knowledge about the alleged demand of bribe which has allegedly been paid to the co- accused at his behest. He was not present in his office when the alleged occurrence took place. He had gone to attend a meeting in B.S. Govt. High School, Sundargarh and was arrested from there. The basis of his implication is the statement of co-accused which is not admissible in evidence. The informant in his statement recorded under Section 164 of the CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 6 of 25 Cr.P.C., on 18.03.2021, has not stated about any demand by the Petitioner. The informant having been transferred to another school, the alleged demand from him is improbable. The impugned order, so far as it relates to him is therefore liable for interference. He has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal : AIR 1992 SC 604 :1992 SCC (SUPP) 1 335, in support of his submission that a prima facie case under Section 7 of the PC Act is not made out against the petitioner for which the process issued against him and the proceedings as far as the petitioner is concerned should be quashed . 8. Mr. N. Maharana, learned Additional Standing Counsel vehemently opposed the submissions of the learned counsel for the Petitioner stating that in order to escape detection, the Petitioner had asked the informant to pay the bribe to the co-accused and this had been confirmed by the co-accused. The informant has clearly stated about the demand for bribe by the petitioner in his FIR and his statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and this is supported by the statements of the other witnesses, for which cognizance of the offence under Section 7 and 12 of the PC Act has rightly been taken by the learned trial Court and notice has been issued against the petitioner for the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The tainted CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 7 of 25 notes had been paid and recovered from the co-accused who has stated that the Petitioner had asked him to accept the amount and it was to be paid to the Petitioner. The effect of the statement of the co- accused will be considered by the learned trial court. He has further submitted that in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C, this Court should not conduct a mini trial by examining the discrepancies in the statements of the witnesses. He has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of D. Velayutham vs State represented by Inspector of Police : (2015) 12 SCC 348: AIR 2015 SC 2506, in support of his submissions. He has mentioned in his written note that the decisions in the following cases, support the prosecution case : - (i) Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460; (ii) Supriya Jain v. State of Hariyana, (2023) 7 SCC 711; (iii) Gulam Mustafa v. State of Karnatak, 2023 SCC Online SC 603 (iv) State of Orissa v. Pratima Mohanty, (2021) SCC Online 1222; (v) CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) SCCOnline SC 379 CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 8 of 25 (vi) Dharam Beer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharsuguda, 2024 SCC Online SC 1894; (vii) Ranjeet Mittal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2024 SCC Online SC 2926; (viii) Rajeev Kourav v. Baisahab & Ors., (2020) 3 SCC 317 STATUTORY PROVISIONS 9. Section 7 of the P.C. Act and Section 30 of the Indian Evidence Act , which are relevant for deciding this case are extracted below: - “Section 7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed. Any public servant who,- (a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or (b)obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or (c)performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. in anticipation of or CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 9 of 25 Explanation 1.—For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper. Illustration.—A public servant, ‗S‘ asks a person, ‗P‘ to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time. 'S' is guilty of an offence under this section. Explanation 2.—For the purpose of this section,— (i) the expressions ―obtains‖ or ―accepts‖ or ―attempts to obtain‖ shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or ―accepts‖ or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means; (ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party.‖ ― Section 30. Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it and others jointly under trial for same offence. When more persons than one are being tried jointly for the same offence, and a confession made by one of such persons affecting himself and some other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration such confession as against such other person as well as against the person who makes such confession. Explanation.––―Offence,‖ as used in this section, includes the abetment of, or attempt to commit, the offence. Illustrations (a) A and B are jointly tried for the murder of C. It is proved that A said––―B and I murdered C‖. The Court may consider the effect of this confession as against B. (b) A is on his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to show that C was murdered by A and B, and that B said –– CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 10 of 25 ―A and I murdered C‖. This statement may not be taken into consideration by the Court against A, as B is not being jointly tried.‖ JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS 10. Some of the decisions relied on by the learned Additional Standing Counsel are not relevant for deciding this CRLMC. The decisions which I thought were relevant for deciding this CRLMC are extracted below :- In the case Ch. Bhajan Lal ( supra ) , the Supreme Court has given the categories of the cases by way of illustration , where power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice , which are as under : ―(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report of the complaint even if they are taken at their face value and accepted their entirety do not prima facie cnostitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 11 of 25 under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the Fit or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned under which a criminal proceeding is instituted to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and /or where there is a specific provision in the Code of the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 12 of 25 (7) Where a criminal proceeding in manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for arresting vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. In the case of D. Velayutham vs. State: (2015) 12 SCC 348: AIR 2015 SC 2506, the Supreme Court has held as follows : - ―14. Though this Court has stressed the need and significance of phenolphthalein as a trap device in corruption cases, so as to allay doubts about the actual receiving of bribes by accused persons, there may be cases where there are multiple demanders in a common or conjoint bribe demand, and for whatsoever reason, only one receives the sum on their behalf, and is entrapped in consequence. Depending on strength of the remainder of evidence, in these cases, constructive receipt by co-accused persons is open to establishment by the prosecution, in order that those who intermediately obtain bribes be latched with equal culpability as their co- accused and entrapped receivers. This will, of course, discount those cases where the trap is successful only against one and not the other official, the latter having refused to accept the bribe tendered. In this case, the trap would have clearly failed against such an official, and there could be no question of the application of constructive receipt. If the receipt and handling of bribe money by Accused 2 so convincingly and CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 13 of 25 inexorably points towards his custodianship of part of the same bribe amount on behalf of his superior officer, namely Accused 1, then Accused 1 cannot rely on mere non- handling/ non-receipt of the bribe money, as his path to exculpation. This Court's construal of anti-corruption cases is sensitive even to these byzantine methods of bribe-taking, and where an evader escapes a trap, constructive receipt has to be an alternate means of fastening criminal culpability.‖ ―17………Contrarily, in the case before us, Accused 1's absence from the office at the time of the trap strengthens, rather than weakens, the claim that his junior officer, Accused 2, was receiving part of the bribe amount as a custodian on his behalf.‖ In its recent decision in the case of Devinder Kumar Bansal vs The State of Punjab : 2025 INSC 320, the Supreme Court has observed that:- ―11. Thus, in an offence under Section 7 of the Act, 1988, the points requiring proof are: (i) that, the accused at the time of the offence was, or expected to be, a public servant; (ii) that, he accepted or retained or agreed to accept, or attempted to obtain from some person a gratification; (iii) that, such gratification was not remuneration due to him; a legal CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 14 of 25 (iv) that, he accepted such gratification as a motive or reward, proof of which is essential for (a) doing or forbearing to do an official act, or (b) showing or forbearing to show favour or disfavour to someone in exercise of his official functions, or (c) rendering or attempting to render any service, or someone, with the legislative or disservice to executive government, or with any public servant. 12. Further it is seen that, Section 7 speaks of the "attempt" to obtain a bribe as being in itself an offence. Mere demand or solicitation, therefore, by a public servant amounts to commission of an offence under Section 7 of the P.C. Act. The word "attempt" is to imply no more than a mere solicitation, which, again may be made as effectually in implicit or in explicit terms. 13. Actual exchange of bribe is an essential requirement to be prosecuted under this law. Further, those public servants, who do not take a bribe directly, but, through middlemen or touts, and those who take valuable things from a person with whom they have or are likely to have official dealings, are also punishable as per Sections 10 and 11 of the Act 1988 respectively.‖ The Privy Council in the case of Emperor vs. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty has held that confession of a co-accused can only be used to “lend assurance to other evidence against a co-accused ”. CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 15 of 25 In the case of In Re Periyaswami Moopan & Anr. vs. Unknown : AIR 1931 Mad. 177, the Privy Council it has been observed as follows : - ―the provision goes no further than this--where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient, if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession described in section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an additional reason for believing that evidence.‖ In Suresh Budharmal Kalani vs. State of Maharashtra : (1998) 7 SCC 337, it has been held by the Supreme Court that under Section 30 of the Evidence Act, a confession of an accused is relevant and admissible against a co-accused if both are being tried together in one trial for the same offence. But confessional statements of an accused cannot be used against a co-accused in terms of Section 30 of Evidence Act, for the purpose of framing charges in the absence of any other evidence to do so. In Dipak Bhai Jagdishchandra Patel vs. State of Gujarat & Another : (2019) 16 SCC 547, the Supreme Court has held that before a confession of a co accused can be used , it has to be proved against the maker and it has to be clearly established that such confession is neither vitiated either by Section 24 of the Evidence CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 16 of 25 Act nor barred by Section 25 and this can only be established by leading cogent evidence in the course of trial. In its recent decision P. Krishna Mohan Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh : 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1157: 2025 INSC 725, the Supreme Court referring to many of its earlier decisions, has concluded as follows: - ―53. From the above exposition of law, the following emerges: - (i) A person who is accused of an offence or named in the first information report, can be examined by the police and his statement may be recorded under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C., as held in Nandini Satpathy (supra). (ii) A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C, would ordinarily be of two kinds, it may be inculpatory in nature or may be exculpatory in nature. (iii) An inculpatory statement again may be in the form of an admission or a confession. If such statement admits either a gravely incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, respectively, as held in Pakala Narayana Swami (supra), then it amounts to confession. (iv) Where such police statement of an accused is confessional statement, the rigour of Section(s) 25 and 26 respectively will apply with all its vigour. A confessional statement of an accused will only be admissible if it is not hit by Section(s) 24 or 25 respectively and is in tune with the provisions of Section(s) 26, 28 and 29 of the Evidence Act CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 17 of 25 respectively. In other words, a police statement of an accused which is in the form of a confession is per se inadmissible and no reliance whatsoever can be placed on such statements either at the stage of bail or during trial. Since such confessional statements are rendered inadmissible by virtue of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, the provision of Section 30 would be of no avail, and no reliance can be placed on such confessional statement of an accused to implicate another co-accused. (v) A confessional statement of one accused implicating another co accused may be taken into consideration by the court against such co accused in terms of Section 30 of the Evidence Act, only at the stage of trial, where (1) the confession itself was relevant and admissible in terms of the Evidence Act; (2) was duly proved against the maker; (3) such confessional statement incriminates the maker along with the co accused and; (4) both the accused persons in question are in a joint trial for the same offence. (vi) Furthermore, because such confessional statements are not ―evidence‖ in terms of Section 3 of the Evidence Act as held in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), such a confession as held in Kashmira Singh (supra) can only be pressed into consideration by the court as a rule of prudence, to lend assurance to the other evidence against such co-accused, provided that aforesaid ingredients or conditions of Section 30 read with Section(s) 24 to 29 of the Evidence Act, are fulfilled. CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 18 of 25 (vii) Where the police statement of an accused is in the form of an admission, such inculpatory statement even if it implicates another co-accused cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused in terms of Section(s) 17 read with 21 of the Evidence Act, as doing so would militate against the general principle, that an admission may be given as evidence against the maker alone. The exceptions to the aforesaid general principle carved out under the Evidence Act, do not permit the usage of such admission against a co-accused in any scenario whatsoever. (viii) Where the police statement of the accused is an exculpatory statement i.e., it is neither a confession nor an admission, the statement being one under Section 161, would immediately attract the bar under Section 162 of the Cr.PC., and the same may be used only for the very limited purpose provided in the Proviso for the purpose of contradiction or reexamination of such accused person alone, as held in Mahabir Mandal (supra). Even if such exculpatory statement of one accused, implicates another co-accused, the same cannot be taken into consideration against such co-accused, as there can be no credibility attached to an exculpatory statement of an accused implicating another co-accused, more particularly because it is neither required to be given on oath, nor in the presence of the co-accused, the same cannot be tested by cross examination and the exculpatory nature of such statement militates against the foundational principle that CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 19 of 25 permits taking into consideration a statement of one accused person against another co-accused as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra), i.e., ‗when a person admits guilt to its fullest extent either to a certain incriminating fact or substantially all the facts which constitute the offence, and in doing so exposes himself and in the process other co- accused persons to the pain and penalties provided for the guilt, there exists a sincerity and semblance of sanction for the truthfulness of such statement‘. (ix) Although a handful of decisions of this Court such as Indresh Kumar (supra) and Salim Khan (supra) have held that statements under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. ought to be looked into by the courts at the stage of anticipatory or regular bail for the purpose of ascertaining whether a prima-facie case has been made out against the accused and the nature and gravity of the allegations, yet the aforesaid rule only applies insofar as such statements under Section 161 were made by witnesses and not accused persons. A statement of an accused under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C. stands on a completely different footing from a police statement of a witness. As already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, if the police statement of an accused is inculpatory in nature, its more in the form of a confession or admission rather than a statement, and the relevant provisions of Section(s) 17 to 30 of the Evidence Act, will apply with all its vigour. Where such statement of the accused is exculpatory in nature, the same can be looked into by the courts only for the limited purpose of either CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 20 of 25 culling out the stance of the accused person qua the allegations or for contradicting the accused, if the accused chooses to be examined as a witness in terms of Section 315 of the Cr.P.C.. However, such exculpatory statement in so far as it implicates another accused person cannot be looked into by the courts, as such statements by their nature cannot be tested by cross-examination if such accused person declines to be a witness in the trial in terms of Section 315 of the Cr.P.C., and because such exculpatory statement has no credibility as explained in Bhuboni Sahu (supra). (x) Before the court looks into the police statement of any person under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C for the purpose of anticipatory or regular bail, the court must first ascertain whether such person is actually a witness or an accused person, or likely to be an accused person in respect of the offence(s) alleged. This is because, there may be situations where a person while giving his statement under Section 161 of the Cr.P.C may not be an accused, but later arrayed as one. In such a scenario the courts must be mindful of the fact that because the investigation is still ongoing, it is more likely for a person who was originally a witness to happen to be later arrayed as an accused person. If the court was to blindly place reliance on statement of such a person merely because he is not named in the first information report, without first seeing whether such person is likely to be arrayed as an accused or not, it would lead to an absurd situation where the statement of such a person may be relied CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 21 of 25 upon up until such person is arrayed as an accused. We also caution the courts, where it emerges from the material on record, that such a person is likely to be arrayed as an accused, the courts should refrain from expressing any such opinion so that the investigation is not prejudiced in any manner.‖ ANALYSIS AND REASONING 11. From a careful reading of the decisions referred to above it is apparent that where a confession is inculpatory (as it is in the present case), it cannot be used against a co accused unless it is proved in a joint trial. That stage has not arrived in this case as the order taking cognizance and issuing process to the petitioner has been challenged. 12. There can be no quarrel over the settled position of law that if the only incriminatory material against an accused is statement of the co accused, the proceedings can be quashed. A confessional statement of a co-accused cannot by itself be taken as a substantive piece of evidence against another co-accused and can at best be used as corroboration. In the absence of any substantive evidence it would not be proper to convict an accused solely on the basis of the confession or statement of the co accused. CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 22 of 25 13. In the present case, the confession of the co-accused is not the only incriminatory material against the petitioner. Nor is it the case of the prosecution that the co accused demanded the bribe on behalf of the petitioner. It is the other way around. The allegation of the informant is that the petitioner demanded the bribe of Rs 50,000/- which was subsequently reduced to Rs 35,000/- and the petitioner asked the informant to pay it through the co accused. The co-accused confirmed the demand of bribe by the petitioner and accepted the bribe. 14. To constitute an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act, the accused must be or expecting to be a public servant and had accepted, agreed to accept or attempted to obtain gratification from a person, which was not due to him as remuneration as a motive or reward for doing something. In the present case, the petitioner is alleged to have demanded gratification from the informant for not initiating proceedings against him for placing him under suspension. He had allegedly threatened the petitioner that if the gratification was not paid he would be suspended. 15. The materials collected by the prosecution are enough to form a prima facie opinion that the accused-petitioner made demand for illegal gratification and asked the informant to pay it to the co - CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 23 of 25 accused, threatening to initiate departmental proceedings against him in case of non-payment. The co accused confirmed that he had been instructed by the petitioner to accept the bribe amount of Rs.35,000/- from the informant on his behalf. This amount was thereafter received by the co accused and recovered from him and he stated before the witnesses that he had taken the money on the direction of the petitioner. A prima facie case under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption (Amendment) Act, 2018 is thus made out against the petitioner. Absence of the petitioner from the spot and his presence at a meeting at the time of acceptance of the gratification is not relevant as the amount was to be paid to the co accused as per the instructions of the petitioner. 16. I am not satisfied that the case comes within any of the categories of the cases indicated in the case of Ch. Bhajan Lal (supra). I also do not consider it proper to conduct a mini trial in exercise of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to assess the worth of the materials relied on by the prosecution. There are bound to some variations in the statement of the complaint recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. and his statement recorded under Section 164 Cr.P.C., due to lapse of time. The effect of any variation(s) can best be examined at the appropriate stage by the learned trial Court. CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Page 24 of 25 CONCLUSION
Decision
17. In view of the above discussion and the decisions referred to above, I am not satisfied that the impugned order taking cognizance of the offences under Section 7 and 12 of the P.C. Act and issuing summons to the petitioner under Section 7 of the P.C. Act calls for any interference in exercise of power under Section – 482 of the Cr.P.C. 18. 19. The CRLMC is accordingly dismissed. Copy of the order be sent to the learned Special Judge Vigilance, Sundargarh forthwith. ……………………… (Savitri Ratho) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack. The 2nd September, 2025/Subhalaxmi Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SUBHALAXMI PRIYADARSHANI SAHOO Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack CRLMC No.1345 of 2025 Date: 12-Sep-2025 20:09:53 Page 25 of 25