JUSTICE v. NARASINGH Date of hearing & Judgment
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK MACA No.324 of 2016 In the matter of an application under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. …. Appellant The New India Assurance Company Limited, Represented Through its Branch Manager, Balangir -versus- …. Respondents 1. Bihari Parabhue 2. Umakanta Parabhue 3. Kishore Kumar Parabhue 4. Lalita Parabhue 5. Mukesh Kumar Agrawala For Appellant : Mr. G.P Dutta, Advocate CORAM: JUSTICE V. NARASINGH Date of hearing & Judgment : 31.01.2025 I.A No.150 of 2025 V. Narasingh, J. Heard learned counsel for the Appellant. Page 1 of 7 1. This is an appeal Under Section 173(1) of the MV Act, 1988 (in short “the Act”) by the appellant- Assurance Company challenging the impugned judgment dated 16.10.2015 passed by the learned Addl. District Judge-cum-MACT, Balangir in M.A.C Case No.65/88 of 2009-12. 2. The MACA was filed on 14.03.2016. Admittedly, it was not accompanied by any petition for condonation of delay, though a petition seeking an extension of time to pay the Court fees was submitted. 3. While taking of the MACA for adjudication, by order dated 08.01.2025 in the present I.A (I.A No.150 of 2025), the direction was given to calculate
Legal Reasoning
the delay in filing the appeal in the background that the I.A seeking condonation of delay was filed in Court on the said date (08.01.2025). On further stamp reporting, Registry was pointed out the delay of 3,270 days in filing the appeal, as noted above. 4.
Legal Reasoning
Learned counsel for the Appellant submits that the Petition for delay can be filed at any stage of the proceeding and to fortify his submission, he relies on the judgment in the case of Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar Vrs. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi and Others; AIR 1978 SC 537 and in the case of State of Patna Vrs. Ray Chandi Nath Sahay and others; AIR Page 2 of 7 1983 Patna 189, Dijabar and another Etc. Versus Sulabha and others, AIR 1986 Ori 38, Rajkumar Jindal Versus Orissa Forest Corporation and another, AIR 1996 Ori 10 and Bikal Sethy Versus Gouranga Chandra Sethy and others, 1987 (II) OLR-312. 5. On a bare perusal of the aforementioned judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the Appellant- Insurance Company, it can be seen that the underlying principles, as decided, is that no straight jacket formula can be led for condonation of delay and each case has to be examined in the peculiar factual matrix thereof to decide what would constitute sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In fact in the case of Mrs. Sandhya Rani Sarkar Vrs. Smt. Sudha Rani Debi (Supra), relied upon by the learned counsel for the Appellant, the Apex Court has restated that the words “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should be liberally construed only when “negligence or any inaction or want of bona fides is imputable party” resulting in delay in filing the appeal. 6. The Apex Court further stated that “what would be such necessary steps will depend upon the circumstances of a particular case”. Page 3 of 7 7. The grounds taken in the I.A for condonation of delay have to be tested on anvil of the aforementioned dictum of the Apex Court and the other judgments cited on behalf of the Learned counsel for the Insurance Company. 8. As noted the appeal was filed assailing the award of Rs.3,00,000/- along with interests from the date of application i.e. 01.08.2009 till the actual payment is made and while preferring the appeal, though an application seeking extension of time to pay the Court fees under Section 149 of CPC was submitted for reasons based on known petition for condonation of delay was not filed and as already noted the same was filed on 08.01.2025 and in such petition for condonation of delay curiously enough the appellant has treated with delay in presenting the appeal as 50 days. The relevant paragraph-8 of the I.A is extracted hereunder: xxx xxx xxx “8. That in the process, there has been a delay of about fifty days in filing appeal.” xxx xxx xxx 9 . The MACA in question is filed in terms of the Section 173(1) of Motor Vehicle Act,1998. For Page 4 of 7 convenience of ready reference the said Section 173(1) is extracted hereunder: xxx xxx xxx “173. Appeals.-(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an award of a Claims Tribunal may, within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal to the High Court: Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay any amount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the High Court, unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupees or fifty per cent. of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, in the manner directed by the High Court: Provided further that the High Court may entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. xxx xxx xxx 10. On a bare perusal of second proviso to Section 173(1), it can be seen that the appeal has to be Page 5 of 7 presented within 90 days, failing which the same can be entertained by the High Court on the Appellant satisfying the Court that it was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. 11. On a conjoint reading of Section 173(1) and the second proviso, it is manifestly clear that once the appeal is not presented on time, the limitation begins to run and it gets arrested only on filing of the petition for condonation of delay. 12. In this context, this Court relies on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Balwant Singh(dead) Vrs. Jagdish Singh and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 685 and so far as the Law Governing limitation is concerned, this Court respectfully reiterates the dictum of the Apex Court in the case of Mool Chandra Vrs. Union of India & Anr., 2024 INSC 577. The relevant part of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: “xxx xxx xxx No litigant stands to benefit in approaching the courts belatedly. It is not the length of delay that would be required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay which has been propounded will have to be examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of “sufficient cause”, irrespective of the length of delay same deserves to be condoned. However, if the cause Page 6 of 7 shown is insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay, same would not be condoned. xxx xxx xxx” 13. The judgments cited bereft of their factual matrix have no bearing on the points at issue. 14. On a conspectus of materials on record, this Court is not persuaded to hold, keeping in view that the Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation, that the grounds as set forth in the petition for condonation of delay constitute “sufficient cause” for condoning the delay of 3,270 days so as to engulf the sisters and brothers of the deceased of an accident which took place in 28.12.2008 in litigation. 15. The I.A is accordingly dismissed and consequently MACA stands rejected. Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 31st January, 2025/ Soumya (V. NARASINGH) Judge Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SOUMYA RANJAN SAMAL Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa Date: 07-Mar-2025 20:46:15 Page 7 of 7