The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK WP(C) No.7565 of 2019 Sarat Chandra Patra -versus- Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jeypore and others …. …. Petitioner Opposite Parties Advocates appeared in this case : For Petitioner :
Legal Reasoning
Mr. G.C. Swain, Advocate For Opposite Party No.3 : Mr. P.C. Chhinchani, Advocate CORAM: JUSTICE ARINDAM SINHA JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR MISHRA --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Dates of hearing: 28.02.2023 and 11.04.2023 Date of Judgment: 20.04.2023 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ARINDAM SINHA, J. 1. Mr. Swain, learned advocate appears on behalf of petitioner (workman). He submits, impugned is order dated 27th June, 2016 rejecting his clients claim on entitlement, made under section 33C(2) Page 1 of 6 of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, for encashing earned leave of 64 days. Finding by the labour Court that his client was not entitled to receive any dues from the management, is perverse. 2. He submits, his client was entitled to have his leave commuted, to be applied against his absence on medical grounds, notwithstanding the period having been extended. Instead, the management wrongfully sanctioned earned leave and thereby disputed his client’s claim before the labour Court. His client’s leave of half pay was to be commuted, without drawing from his earned leave. In the circumstances, it was a claim on entitlement for encashment of 64 days of earned leave. Impugned order be interfered with and relief be given to his client. 3. Mr. Chhinchani, learned advocate appears on behalf of the management and submits, the workman’s application for commuting his leave could not be allowed as there was insufficient leave of half pay to his credit. In the circumstances, there was sanction of earned leave. It would appear from record in impugned order that the workman was paid more than what was due to him, on earned leave remaining to his credit. At the material time the workman was aware WP(C) no.7565 of 2019 Page 2 of 6 of the situation and did not challenge sanction of earned leave, on his prayer for commuting leave, to be applied against his absence. 4. He relies on judgment of the Supreme Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ganesh Razak, reported in 1994 AIR SCW 5000, paragraph-12. The paragraph is reproduced below. “12. The High Court has referred to some of these decisions but missed the true import thereof. The ratio of these decisions clearly indicates that where the very basis of the claim or the entitlement of the workmen to a certain benefit is disputed, there being no earlier adjudication or recognition thereof by the employer, the dispute relating to entitlement is not incidental to the benefit claimed and is, therefore, clearly outside the scope of a proceeding under Section 33- C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court has no jurisdiction to first decide the workmen's entitlement and then proceed to compute the benefit so adjudicated on that basis in exercise of its power under Section 33-C(2) of the Act. It is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognised by the employer and thereafter for the purpose of implementation or enforcement thereof some ambiguity requires interpretation that the interpretation is treated as incidental to the Labour Court's power under Section 33- WP(C) no.7565 of 2019 Page 3 of 6 C(2) like that of the Executing Court's power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution.” (emphasis supplied) 5. We find from Ganesh Razak (supra) the Bench in the Supreme Court had referred to earlier Constitution Bench judgment of said Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. Rajagopalan, reported in AIR 1964 SC 743. Thus, interpretation given in paragraph-12 of Ganesh Razak (supra) includes interpretation of declaration of law made in Rajagopalan (supra). 6. In Rajagopalan (supra) the Constitution Bench considered scope of section 33C(2), to liken the proceeding to execution as that the Court cannot go behind the decree, nor can it add to or subtract from the provision of the decree. It was said that the limitations apply also to the labour Court, but like the executing Court, the labour Court would also be competent to interpret the award or settlement, on which a workman bases his claim under section 33-C(2). The judgment goes on to say that it is possible claims not based on settlement, awards or made under the provisions of Chapter-VA, may also be competent under section 33C(2) and that may illustrate its WP(C) no.7565 of 2019 Page 4 of 6 wider scope. The Bench, however, indicated some of the claims, which could not fall under section 33C(2). Example given was if an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demotion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under section 33C(2) [see paragraphs 18 and 19 in the report]. 7. Applying above test, we are convinced that when the application for commuting the leave was dealt with by sanctioning earned leave, the workman could have sought to raise a dispute or could have invoked the constitutional writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Interpretation of Rajagopalan (supra) by Ganesh Razak (supra) was the Supreme Court saying, it is only when the entitlement has been earlier adjudicated or recognized by the employer and for purpose of implementation or enforcement some ambiguity required interpretation, it can be treated as incidental to the labour Court’s power under section 33C(2), like that of the executing Court’s power to interpret the decree for the purpose of its execution. Here in this case, petitioner’s application for commuting leave stood dealt with by the management and not thereafter challenged by him. Allowing for WP(C) no.7565 of 2019 Page 5 of 6 widest interpretation to scope of the provision, we cannot accept that petitioner’s claim of the management not having commuted his leave would amount to entitlement for computation. More so, impugned order clearly records finding that petitioner in the material time had accepted the sanction of earned leave. 8. 9. For foregoing reasons, we are unable to interfere.
Decision
The writ petition is dismissed. ( Arindam Sinha ) Judge ( S. K. Mishra ) Judge P. Pradhan WP(C) no.7565 of 2019 Page 6 of 6