The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLA NO.156 OF 2016 In The matter of an Appeal under section-374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and from the judgment and order of sentence dated 27th January, 2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gajapati-Parlakhemundi in Sessions Trial No.61 of 2014. Nagesu Sabar ---- …. -versus- Appellant State of Odisha …. Respondent Appeared in this case by Hybrid Arrangement (Virtual/Physical Mode: ================================================== For Appellants - Mr. Basudev Pujari, S.K. Dash, S.K. Tripathy, Advocates. For Respondent - Mr. P.K. Mohanty, Additional Standing Counsel. CORAM: MR. JUSTICE D.DASH MR. JUSTICE A.C. BEHERA DATE OF HEARING :05.09.2023 : DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14.09.2023 D.Dash,J. The Appellant by filing this Appeal has assailed the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27th January, 2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gajapati, Parlakhemundi in Sessions Trial Case No.61 of 2014 arising out of G.R. Case No.301 of 2014 corresponding to Kasinagar P.S. Case No.55 of 2014 of the file of learned Sub- Divisional Judicial Magistrate (S.D.J.M.), Parlakhemundi. CRLA NO.156 OF 2016 Page 1 of 22 {{ 2 }} The Appellant (accused) thereunder has been convicted for commission of offence under section-302/379 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short called as the IPC). Accordingly, the Appellant (accused) has been sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and pay fine of Rs.10,000/- in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of one year for the offence under section-302 of the IPC and undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence under section-379 of the IPC with the stipulation that the substantive sentences would run concurrently. 2. Prosecution case is that in the intervening night of 6/7.06.2014, the accused in a drunken state having gone to the house of his father-in- law namely, Aauti Sabar stabbed him and caused his death, when he sleeping. It is further stated that the accused having thus committed the murder of Aauti Sabar, left the house immediately. One Bisingi Sabar (P.W.1) having lodged a written report narrating the incident before the Inspector-In-Charge (IIC) of Kasinagar Police Station, the same was treated as F.I.R. and upon registration of the case, the IIC directed one Sub-Inspector (S.I.) of Police attached to that Police Station to take up investigation. 3. The Investigating Officer (I.O.-P.w.27) then examined the Informant (P.W.1). He visited the spot i.e. house of the deceased Aauti CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 2 of 22 {{ 3 }} Sabar and prepared the spot map, Ext.11. He held the inquest over the dead body of Aauti in presence of witnesses and prepared the report, (Ext.2). He also examined some other witnesses at the spot. The dead body of Aauti was sent for postmortem examination. The I.O. (P.w.27) seized some incriminating articles such as the blood stained earth and one Kati fitted with wooden handle under seizure list, Ext.3. The I.O. (P.W.27) thereafter arrested the accused who then is stated to have led the I.O. (P.W.27) and others to his house in giving recovery of a mobile phone set pursuant to the statement made by him before the I.O. (P.w.27), which was seized under seizure list, Ext.5. The incriminating articles were sent for chemical examination through Court. On completion of investigation, the Final Form was submitted placing the accused to face the trial for commission of offence under section-302/379 of the IPC. 4. Learned S.D.J.M., Parlakhemundi, having received the Final Form as above, took cognizance of the said offences and after observing formalities, committed the case to the Court of Sessions for Trial. That is how the Trial commenced by framing the charge for the said offences against the accused persons. 5. In the Trial, the prosecution has examined in total, twenty eight (28) witnesses. Out of whom, as already stated P.W.1, who had lodged CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 3 of 22 {{ 4 }} the F.I.R. (Ext.1) and is the Informant is younger brother of the deceased-Aauti Sabar; whereas P.W.2 is the brother of P.W.1 and P.W.3 is their father -Aauti. P.Ws. 4, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 18 are the independent witnesses. The two wives of the deceased are P.Ws. 6 and
Facts
8. P.W.6 is the second wife of the deceased whereas P.W.8 is the first wife. The wife of the accused has come to the witness box as P.W.7. The two witnesses to the recovery of the mobile phone said to have been made at the instance of the accused pursuant to his statement given before the I.O. (P.W.27) and its seizure are P.Ws. 14 and 15. P.Ws.16 and 17 are the witnesses to the seizures of incriminating articles in course of investigation. The Doctor, who had conducted postmortem examination over the dead body of the deceased, is P.W.23; whereas P.W.24 is the other Doctor, who had collected the nail clippings and blood of the accused. The I.O. has come to the witness box at the end as P.W.27. 6. The prosecution besides leading evidence by examining the above witnesses has also proved several documents which have been admitted in evidence and marked Exts.1 to 12. Important of those are; the F.I.R. (Ext.1), inquest report (Ext. 2), postmortem report (Ext.8), chemical examiner’s report (Ext.12), the spot map (Ext.11). The statement of the accused pursuant to which the mobile phone set was CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 4 of 22 {{ 5 }} said to have been seized which was recorded under section 27 of the Evidence Act has been admitted in evidence and marked as Ext.4. 7. The accused having taken the plea of complete denial and false implication has however not led any evidence in support of the same. 8. The Trial Court on examination of the evidence let in by the prosecution and upon their evaluation has finally found that the charges against the accused for commission of offences under section -302/379 of the IPC have been established beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, the accused having been convicted for commission of those offences has been sentenced as aforestated.
Legal Reasoning
17. Adverting to the evidence let in by the prosecution, we find that during Trial, the second wife of the deceased P.W.6 has been projected as an eye witness. The evidence of P.W.6 has been disbelieved by the Trial Court in branding her as not a truthful witness which as already stated suffers from the vice of non-assignment of any reason/s. Be that as it may, having gone through the evidence of P.W.6, we find that she has stated that in the occurrence night, the accused returned to the house in a drunken state and by going upstairs, stabbed her husband, while he (husband) was sleeping with her. Thereafter, she says that accused fled away. So, she claims that when the stab was given by the accused, she was sleeping by the side of her husband. But it is found that, this important part as to the role of the accused in that CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 10 of 22 {{ 11 }} night terming him to be the perpetrator of the crime or in other words, the author of the fatal injuries caused upon the deceased as is stated by her to have been seen, was not in her statement given during investigation as has been pointed out by the defence by drawing the attention of the witnesses during her cross-examination which she has however denied. It is however heartening to note that the defence has failed in its duty during examination of the I.O.(P.W.27) to prove said omission which according to us is a material contradiction. In such situation, in order to prevent failure of justice for the fault of the defence Counsel and simultaneously, that of the Trial Court; in order to cross-check when we perused the statement of the witness (P.W.6) recorded by the I.O. (P.W.27) under section-161 of the Cr.P.C., we find that this P.W.-6 had not stated so at that time. Therefore, her introduction in the Trial in respect of such an important happening directly implicating the accused in stabbing would be highly unsafe to be relied upon. At this juncture, we must state that when the learned Counsel defending the accused has utterly failed in his duty being not careful, equally, the Trial Court has acted as mute spectator, although it had the duty in that regard to be vigilant and watchful. CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 11 of 22 {{ 12 }} That apart, the evidence of P.W.6 in directly implicating the accused to have stabbed his father-in-law (deceased) is not safe to be relied upon for the reason that when we find that P.W.1 has said to have lodged F.I.R (Ext.1) and it had been so written thereof hearing about the murder of his brother, he with some of the villagers had been to his house where P.W.6 was very much present. It has however been stated in the F.I.R.(Ext.1) that some unknown culprit has committed the murder of Aauti in further mentioning that they were suspecting that accused since he was frequently quarreling with Aauti. That shows that it was not disclosed by P.W.6 before P.W.1 or others that this accused stabbed his father-in-law to her seeing when she was sleeping by the side. Although the Trial Court has assigned no such reason/s to discard the evidence of P.W.6 from consideration, for the above reasons supplied by us, we have no disagreement with the conclusion of the Trial Court that P.W.6 is not a truthful witness and her evidence to that effect thus would be hazardous to be accepted to fasten the liability of murder upon the accused. 18. The evidence of sole eye witness being pushed out of the arena of consideration, we are unable to find out from the evidence on record as to how the circumstances which have been pointed out by the Trial Court are enough to come to an irresistible conclusion with regard to CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 12 of 22 {{ 13 }} the guilt of the accused overruling all the hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused. The first circumstance pointed out by the Trial Court is the confessional statement of the accused before the I.O. (P.W.27) and others. It pains us to say that the same being wholly in admissible in evidence for being taken as the confession of the accused; the Trial Court repeatedly has so noted and relied upon as the confession. 19. We find that the Trial Court being totally oblivious of the provision of section-27 of the Evidence Act has gone to say so, as has been written by the I.O.(P.W.27) on that Ext.4 and deposed. 20. The evidence of the I.O.(P.W.27) is as under:- “I arrested the accused, recorded his statement U/s.27 of the Evidence Act vide Ext.4 (marked) and Ext.4/3 is my signature and the accused confessed his guilt of committing the murder of the deceased during police custody and the accused led the police party to give discovery of the mobile phone and gave recovery of the same from his house which I seized in presence of the witnesses as per seizure list vide Ext.5 (marked) and Ext.5/3 is my signature.” The recording of the evidence itself appears to be highly faulty. The Trial Court was to record the version as to what he did and what response he got. CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 13 of 22 {{ 14 }} 21. The two witnesses to the above development after the arrest of the accused are P.W.14 and 15. P.W.14 has stated:- “After receiving the report from the informant, police arrived at the house of the deceased and in presence of the villagers and me the accused confessed his guilt by telling the villagers that he committed the murder of his father-in-law and took away the mobile phone of the deceased. The confessional statement of the accused recorded U/s.27 of the Evidence Act by the police vide Ext.4 and Ext.4/1 is my signature. Thereafter the accused let the police party and the witnesses to the place of recovery and gave recovery of one mobile phone of the deceased, his wearing apparels which were seized by the I.O. as per the seizure list vide Ext.5 and Ext.5/1 is my signature.” P.W.15 has stated:- “After receiving the report from the informant, police arrived at the house of the deceased and in presence of the villagers and me the accused confessed his guilt by telling the villagers that he committed the murder of his father-in-law and took away the mobile phone of the deceased. The confessional statement of the accused recorded U/s. 27 of the Evidence Act by the police vide Ext.4 (marked) and Ext.4/2 is my signature. Thereafter the accused led the police party and the witnesses to the place of recovery and gave recovery of one mobile phone of the deceased, his wearing apparels which were seized by the I.O. as CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 14 of 22 {{ 15 }} per the seizure list vide Ext.5 (marked) and Ext.5/2 is my signature.” All these above recording of evidence are not only faulty but also contrary to the legal provision. 22. The very heading of section 27 of the Evidence Act is “How much information received from accused may be proved”, which carves out an exception to the provision contained in section-25 of the Evidence Act. The section reads as under:- “Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of all the aforesaid prosecution witnesses is that none of them have deposed the exact statement said to have been made by the accused herein which ultimately led to the discovery of a fact relevant under section 27 of the Evidence Act. 23. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to and rely upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Murli and Another v. State of Rajasthan; (2009) 9 SCC 417, held as under:- CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 15 of 22 {{ 16 }} “34. The contents of the panchnama are not the substantive evidence. The law is settled on that issue. What is substantive evidence is what has been stated by the panchas or the person concerned in the witness box………….” 24. The conditions necessary for the applicability of section 27 of the Act are broadly as under:- (1) Discovery of fact in consequence of an information received from accused; (2) Discovery of such fact to be deposed to; (3) The accused must be in police custody when he gave information; and (4) So much of information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible – Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State of Maharashtra: AIR (1976) SC 483. Two conditions for application: – (1) information must be such as has caused discovery of the fact; and (2) information must relate distinctly to the fact discovered Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka: AIR (1983) SC 446. 25. The scope and ambit of section 27 of the Evidence Act were illuminatingly stated in Pulukuri Kottaya and Others v. Emperor; AIR 1947 PC 67, which have become locus classicus, in the following words: CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 16 of 22 {{ 17 }} "10. ….It is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered” within the section as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the information given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to past user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to its discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives were discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be added “with which I stabbed A" these words are inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant." 26. Keeping in view the above and as per our discussion of evidence in the forgoing paragraph, the answer stands that the evidence on record do not at all successfully pass through the tests under the provision of section 27 of the Evidence Act for their admissible or acceptability. 27. In the case of Sampath Kumar v. Inspector of Police, Krishnagiri; (2012) 4 SCC 124, decided on 02.03.2012, this Court held as under: CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 17 of 22 {{ 18 }} “29. In N.J. Suraj v. State; [(2004) 11 SCC 346: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 85] the prosecution case was based entirely upon circumstantial evidence and a motive. Having discussed the circumstances relied upon by the prosecution, this Court rejected the motive which was the only remaining circumstance relied upon by the prosecution stating that the presence of a motive was not enough for supporting a conviction, for it is well settled that the chain of circumstances should be such as to lead to an irresistible conclusion, that is incompatible with the innocence of the accused. 30. To the same effect is the decision of the top Court in Santosh Kumar Singh v. State; [(2010) 9 SCC 747: (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1469] and Rukia Begum v. State of Karnataka; [(2011) 4 SCC 779 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 488 : AIR 2011 SC 1585] where this Court held that motive alone in the absence of any other circumstantial evidence would not be sufficient to convict the appellant. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Sunil Rai v. UT, Chandigarh; [(2011) 12 SCC 258 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 2011 SC 2545] . The Hon’ble Apex Court explained the legal position as follows: (Sunil Rai case [(2011) 12 SCC 258 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 543 : AIR 2011 SC 2545] , SCC p. 266, paras 3132) “31. … In any event, motive alone can hardly be a ground for conviction. 32. On the materials on record, there may be some suspicion against the accused, but as is often said, suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot take the place of proof.” CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 18 of 22 {{ 19 }} 31. Suffice it to say although, according to the appellants the question of the appellant Velu having the motive to harm the deceased Senthil for falling in love with his sister, Usha did not survive once the family had decided to offer Usha in matrimony to the deceased Senthil. Yet even assuming that the appellant Velu had not reconciled to the idea of Usha getting married to the deceased Senthil, all that can be said was that the appellant Velu had a motive for physically harming the deceased. That may be an important circumstance in a case based on circumstantial evidence but cannot take the place of conclusive proof that the person concerned was the author of the crime. One could even say that the presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of the case creates a strong suspicion against the appellant but suspicion, howsoever strong, also cannot be a substitute for proof of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.” 28.
Arguments
9. Mr. B. Pujari, learned Senior Counsel for the Appellant (accused) without disputing the nature of death of Aauti Sabar to be homicidal contended that the finding of conviction of the accused returned by the Trial Court is based on no evidence. He submitted that the Trial Court when has disbelieved the evidence of solitary eye witness, the second wife of the deceased (P.W.6) by holding her to be not a truthful witness; in the absence of any such incriminating circumstances emerging from evidence in making the chain of events so complete in ruling out all the hypothesis other than the guilt of this accused, simply accepting the seizure of mobile phone set pursuant to the statement of the accused while in police custody which could not CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 5 of 22 {{ 6 }} have been taken as the base has fallen in grave error in holding the accused to be the perpetrator of crime. He further submitted that the evidence of the prosecution coming from the lips of P.W.27 and other two witnesses P.Ws. 14 and 15, do not satisfy the tests laid down for their admissibility and acceptability. It was also submitted that the accused being the son-in-law of the deceased even if for a moment, it is said that the mobile phone set of the deceased was with the accused in his house, in the absence of any other evidence to connect said mobile phone set in any way with the commission of offence, the said recovery even accepting to be at the instance of the accused is not at all incriminating. Placing the discussion of the evidence made by the Trial Court as well as the circumstances which according to the Trial Court are incriminating, he contended that the impugned judgment of conviction on a bare reading without even looking at the depositions of the prosecution witnesses and accepting what have been noted by the Trial Court, does not stand to minimum legal scrutiny. 10. Mr. P.K. Mohanty, learned Additional Standing Counsel submitted that the evidence of P.W.6 who is the second wife of the deceased, when taken together with the other circumstances emanating from the evidence let in by the prosecution, the finding of guilt against CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 6 of 22 {{ 7 }} the accused as has been returned by the Trial Court is not liable to be interfered with. 11. Keeping in view the submissions made; we have carefully read the judgment passed by the Trial Court and have extensively travelled through the evidence adduced by the prosecution witnesses i.e. P.Ws. 1 to 28. The documents admitted in evidence and marked Exts.1 to 12 from the side of the prosecution have been perused. 12. The nature of death of Aauti Sabar (deceased) to be homicidal is seen to have not been challenged during Trial and that has also been the situation before us. Be that as it may, we find the evidence of the Doctor (P.W.23) that during postmortem examination, he had noticed a penetrated wound of the size of 7cm x 3cm on chest besides left side of sternum in the third space and it was cutting adjacent ribs. These injuries are said to be antemortem in nature and might have been caused by sharp cutting weapon. His evidence is that very categorically that the death was due to such injuries to the vital organ of the body causing severe haemorrhage. Whatever has been stated by P.W.23, those findings appear in his report Ext.8 to which there is no challenge to those findings. Above being the evidence of the Doctor (P.W.23), we too find the evidence of P.W.27, the I.O. who during inquest has noticed such CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 7 of 22 {{ 8 }} injuries on the chest of the deceased and reflected in his report, Ext.2. That has also been the statement of other witnesses who have seen the deceased lying dead with such injuries on his chest. In view of the above, unchallenged evidence on record, we are left with no option but to hold with the prosecution through acceptable evidence has established that Aauti met a homicidal death. 13. Having said as above, in order to address the rival submission and ascertain the sustainability of the finding of guilt against the accused as has been returned by the Trial Court, we at the outset feel inclined to take note of some of the discussions made by the Trial Court in its judgment. 14. The Trial Court having re-produced the evidence of almost all the witnesses examined from the side of the prosecution at paragraph-6, 7, 8 and 9, has of course at paragraph-10 noted as to what is the point for determination. But then at one stage, the conclusion of the Trial Court is worth reading which we are tempted to reproduce herein below:- “The entire case of the prosecution rests upon the circumstantial evidence like confessional statement given by the accused during police custody U/s.27 of the Evidence Act and recovery of the mobile set of the deceased as per seizure list Exts. 4 and 5.” CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 8 of 22 {{ 9 }} This shows that the two circumstances which in its language; (i) the confessional statement of accused recorded under section-27 of the Evidence Act; and (ii) the recovery of the mobile set as per the seizure list which it culled out from the evidence for answering whether those are duly proved and of so whether those are incriminating in holding that the chain of events is complete is ruling out all the hypothesis other than the guilt of the accused are ruled out to say that in all human probability the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. It be stated here that the statement of the accused which becomes admissible in evidence to the extent as permitted under section 27 of the Evidence Act, thereby creating an excepted sub-category only is never said or taken as the confessional statement of the accused. The confessional statement before the Police is wholly admissible. This appears that the Trial Court has carried on wholly erroneous idea in mind as regards the provision contained in section-25, and 27 of the Evidence Act. 15. The Trial Court has next proceeded to say:- “Now let us scrutinize the other evidence on record i.e. the evidence of P.Ws.-6, Smt. Laxmi Sabar but she is not truthful witness as at the first instance she has stated that, she has been the accused stabbing her husband but during her cross- examination, she could not withstand cross-examination and CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 9 of 22 {{ 10 }} from her evidence, it is forthcoming that she has not seen the actual assault made by the accused on her husband.” The Trial Court here appears to have assigned no such specific reason to say so which though was the absolute requirement. 16. Having said above, in the next sentence the Trial Court has stated as follows:- “I have already discussed earlier that this case clearly falls under the circumstantial evidence and there was no eye witness/ (to the) occurrence as the occurrence was /(had) taken place in the mid night on the roof of the house of the deceased at village.”
Decision
In view of the above, even if it is believed that the accused had the motive to commit the crime, the same may be a circumstance in a case based on circumstantial evidence but cannot take the place of conclusive proof that the person concerned was the author of the crime. One could even say that the presence of motive in the facts and circumstances of the case creates a strong suspicion against the accused but suspicion, howsoever strong, cannot be the substitute for proof of the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 19 of 22 {{ 20 }} 29. All these above, show as to how the Trial Court has faulted in accepting the evidence of P.W.27, 14 and 15 in saying that the accused had confessed his guilt before them and also what have been indicated in Exts. 4 and 5, the statement of the accused and the relevant seizure list. the statement of the accused even if believed to have been made before P.W.27 (I.O.) and others while in police custody in leading them to this house in giving recovery of the articles so seized; the same is only passable to service to say about the place from which the articles were produced and the knowledge of the accused as to that and the information given must relate to that. 30. The other circumstance is that the accused was threatening the deceased to take away his life as has been stated by the wife of the accused i.e. P.W.7 and another is the seizure of the mobile phone from the house of the accused which according to us make no sense in view of the admitted relationship between the accused and the deceased and also without any sort of other evidence to connect the said mobile set with the commission of offence of murder of Aauti. At this stage, we too mark the sorry state of affairs with the judgment of the Trial Court when we go through paragraph-11 of its judgment. Having noted the argument of the learned Public Prosecutor, the following conclusion has been arrived at:- CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 20 of 22 {{ 21 }} “Perused the said reported judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court and I found/(find) that the circumstances placed from the side of the prosecution as per Exts.4 & 5 clearly proves /(prove) against the accused and those circumstances are conclusive in nature. So the prosecution in the instant case completed the chain for which the circumstantial evidence adduced before this Court is to be accepted.” Ext. 4 is the said statement of the accused, which we have already discussed and Ext.5 is the relevant seizure list. We are really at a loss understand as to how basing on the same a conclusion has been reached by the Trial Court in holding the accused guilty of commission of offence under section-302 of the IPC for being visited with the sense of imprisonment for life. In view of the aforesaid, we are constrained to accept the statement of the learned Counsel for the Appellant (accused) that the finding of guilt against the accused as had been returned by the Trial Court is based on no evidence on record. Accordingly, we hold that the finding of the Trial Court holding the accused guilty for commission of the offence under section-302/379 of the IPC cannot be sustained. Therefore, we are of the view that the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence impugned in this Appeal are liable to be set aside. 31. In the wake of aforesaid, the Appeal stands allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 27th January, 2016 Page 21 of 22 CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 {{ 22 }} passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Gajapati, Parlakhemundi in Sessions Trial No.61 of 2014 are hereby set aside. Since the Appellant (accused) namely, Nagesu Sabar is on bail; his bail bonds shall stand discharged. Mr. A.C. Behera, J. I Agree. Narayan (D. Dash), Judge. (A.C. Behera), Judge. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: NARAYAN HO Designation: Peresonal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: OHC Date: 22-Sep-2023 13:24:33 CRLA NO. 156 OF 2016 Page 22 of 22