The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLREV NO.112 of 2025 (An application U/S. 442 read with Sec. 438 of BNSS, 2023). Falcon Consultancy Pvt. Ltd., Bhubaneswar …. Petitioner -versus- …. Opposite Party Mr. R.Roy, Advocate None Rupanjali Sahu For Petitioner For Opposite Party CORAM: : : JUSTICE G. SATAPATHY F DATE OF HEARING & JUDGMENT:07.05.2025 (ORAL) G. Satapathy, J. 1. Challenge in the revision is to the impugned order dated 08.01.2025 passed by the learned Appellate Court directing the revision- petitioner to pay 20% of the compensation amount which was ordered to be paid to the OP by the learned trial Court while sentencing the revision-petitioner after holding him guilty for commission of offence CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 1 of 17 punishable U/S. 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881(in short, the “NI Act”). 2.
Legal Reasoning
The Court, of course, has to find out prima facie case against the accused before ordering compensation to be paid. Similarly, the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases and precisely that is why the legislature while introducing Section 397(2) of the CrPC has applied wisdom to check the delay in trial. The purport and object of both CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 5 of 17 the provisions of Sections 148 of NI Act and 438(2) of the BNSS is to check the undue delay and on the basis of such objectives, the term “interlocutory order” has to be considered so as to bar a revision against such order. True it is that interim/interlocutory order has not been defined either in the BNSS or in NI Act, but judicial precedent has defined interlocutory order. However, on an ordinary parlance, interlocutory order means an order which is not final. 6. In explaining as to what constitute the interlocutory order, the Apex Court in Amar Nath and others Vrs. State of Haryana and another; (1977) 4 SCC 137 has observed the following in paragraph-6 as under:- “6. Xxx xxx xxx. The term "interlocutory order" is a term of well-known legal significance and does not present any serious difficulty. It has been used in various statutes including the Code of Civil Procedure, Letters Patent of the High Courts and other like statutes. In Webster’s New World Dictionary "interlocutory" has been defined as an order other than final decision. Decided cases have laid down that interlocutory orders to be appealable must be those which decide the rights and liabilities of the parties concerning a particular aspect. It seems to us that the term "interlocutory order" in Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 6 of 17 restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused, or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in Section 397 of the 1973 Code. Thus, for instance, orders summoning witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under Section 397(2) of the 1973 Code. But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside revisional the purview of jurisdiction of the High Court.” the 7. In Madhu Limaye Vrs. The State of Maharashtra; (1977) 4 SCC 551, the Apex Court in paragraph-10 has held as under:- “10. As pointed out in Amar Nath’s case (supra) the purpose of putting a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding, is to bring about expeditious disposal of the cases finally. More often than not, the revisional power of the High Court was resorted to in relation to interlocutory orders delaying the final disposal of the proceedings. The Legislature in its wisdom decided to check this delay by introducing sub-section (2) in CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 7 of 17 Section 397. On the one hand, a bar has been put in the way of the High Court (as also of the Sessions Judge) for exercise of the revisional power in relation to any interlocutory order, on the other, the power has been conferred in almost the same terms as it was in the 1898 Code. On a plain reading of Section 482, however, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court". But, if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers. In such a situation, what is the harmonious way out? In our opinion, a happy solution of this problem would be to say that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court, meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. Then in accordance with one of the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redress of the grievance of the aggrieved party. But then, if the order assailed is purely of an interlocutory character which could be corrected in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court under the 1898 Code, the High Court will refuse to exercise its inherent power. But in case the impugned order clearly brings about a situation which is an abuse of the process of the Court or for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the High Court. But such cases would be few and far between. The High Court must exercise the inherent power very sparingly. One such case would be the desirability of the quashing of a criminal proceeding initiated illegally, vexatiously CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 8 of 17 or as being without jurisdiction. Take for example a case where a prosecution is launched under the Prevention of Corruption Act without a sanction, then the trial of the accused will be without jurisdiction and even after his acquittal a second trial, after proper sanction will not be barred on the doctrine of autrefois acquit. Even assuming, although we shall presently show that it is not so, that in such a case an order of the Court taking cognizance or issuing processes is an interlocutory order, does it stand to reason to say that inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceeding as early as possible, instead of harassing the accused upto the end? The answer is obvious that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and/or to secure the ends of justice. The label of the petition filed by an aggrieved party is immaterial. The High Court can examine the matter in an appropriate case under its inherent powers. The present case undoubtedly falls for exercise of the power of the High Court in accordance with Section 482 of the 1973 Code, even assuming, although not accepting, that invoking the revisional power of the High Court is impermissible.” Further, in Madhu Limaye (supra), the Apex Court has further held that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression "interlocutory order" as invariably being converse of the words "final order". There may be an order passed during the course of a proceeding which may not be final, but yet it may not be an interlocutory order-pure or simple. By a rule of harmonious CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 9 of 17 construction of sub-section (1) & (2) of section 397, it must be held that the bar in sub-section (2) is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. It is neither advisable nor possible to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be interlocutory order and which would be final and then prepare, an exhaustive list of those types of orders which would fall in between the two. 8. In relying upon the decision of the Karnataka High Court in Sanjay P.S. Vrs. Abhishek M.; MANU/KA/1977/2023, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the order passed by the learned appellate Court directing the revision- petitioner to deposit 20% of the compensation amount in this case is an intermediate order and, thereby, the bar as provided U/S.438(2) of the BNSS is not applicable for maintaining a revision. It is no doubt true that in the aforesaid decision, Karnataka High Court has in fact held the order passed in an application U/S.143-A to be intermediate order and, thereby, revision is maintainable against such order, CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 10 of 17 but fact remains that in Bapuji Murugesan Vrs. Mythili Rajagopalan; 2022 0 Supreme(Mad) 2018, the Madras High Court has held that revision against the order U/S.148 of NI Act is not maintainable because such order is an interlocutory order. However, the Gujarat High Court in Lap Lifestyle LLP and others Vrs. State of Gujarat and another; 2024 0 Supreme(Guj) 1611 has held that orders passed U/S.148 of NI Act are revisable orders. These two High Courts had in fact considered the order passed U/S.148 of NI Act to be either interlocutory or intermediate order so as to find out the maintainability of the revision against such order. 9. In the aforesaid situation, this Court considers it apposite to find out as to whether the order passed U/S.148 of NI Act is an interlocutory order or an intermediate order. True it is that interlocutory orders are defined in Amar Nath (supra) that, the orders which do not decide or touch the important rights or liabilities of the parties are interlocutory order, but the order which substantially affects the right of the CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 11 of 17 accused or decide certain rights of the parties cannot said to be interlocutory order so as to bar a revision against such order. In the given facts of the case, the order passed by the learned appellate Court in exercise of power U/S.148 of NI Act does not decide the appeal finally, but it cannot be said to have decided the substantial right of the accused so as to be called as an intermediate order inasmuch as the Court while passing such order is directing deposit of compensation amount which shall not be less than 20%, which is the mandate of Sec. 148 of the Act, but it never decides the appeal then on merit, rather the proviso appended to Section 148 of NI Act itself provides that if the appellant is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay the appellant the amount so released with interest at the bank rate prevalent at the beginning of relevant financial year within 60 days, which contingency applies, if the amount is released in favour of the complainant, but the appellate Court has discretion either to release the said amount to the complainant or to keep the deposit CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 12 of 17 with the Court. On the contrary, if the revision against such order is allowed, the proceeding will unnecessarily protract, which is not the intention of the legislature because the bar provided U/S.438(2) of the BNSS is purely meant to avoid undue delay so also the provision for compensation as contemplated in NI Act. 10. Moreover, the exercise of revisional jurisdiction is an extraordinary discretion to be exercised in aid of justice as held by a Constitutional Bench of our Apex Court in Pranab Kumar Mitra vrs. State of W.B.; AIR 1959 SC 144 and, therefore, what is significant is that a litigant does not have a right to have a revisable order set aside. Discretion to exercise revisional jurisdiction may, therefore, be exercised within the contours of the powers provided in Sec. 438(2) of the BNSS, but there is a prohibition to exercise revisional jurisdiction against any interlocutory order so that inquiry or trial may proceed without any delay. Besides, the exercise of revisional jurisdiction depends on facts of individual case. CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 13 of 17 Indisputably, the bar as provided either in Sec. 397(2) of the CrPC or 438(2) of the BNSS is not applicable in the case of intermediate order which is in fact not final, but yet not a interlocutory order. However, the interlocutory orders are those orders which does not decide the lis finally, but the test to know whether an order is interlocutory one or not would be decided by the answer to this question “had the impugned order been passed in favour of the party applying for revision would decide the lis finally, then revision is maintainable”, otherwise such order would be termed as interlocutory order. 11. Be that as it may, it is held by Apex Court in Amar Nath (supra) that orders summoning witness, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of pending proceeding may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie U/S. 397(2) of the Code, but the impugned order in this case is an order staying realization of CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 14 of 17 compensation amount from the appellant subject to condition of his depositing of 20% of such compensation as awarded by the learned trial Court while sentencing the appellant which is passed by the learned Appellate Court in exercise of power U/S. 148 of NI Act which starts with a non-obstante clause “notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974)----” and the same has to be considered in the context of BNSS. Further, the impugned order in this case no way substantially affect the right of the accused, rather it affects the right of the complainant to his entitlement to receive such compensation amount, if the Appellate Court decides it to release in his favour and the same is also refundable with interest if the accused-cum- revision petitioner become successful in appeal. Besides, the impugned order is not a pre-condition to admit the appeal to file and thereby, is not a final order deciding the appeal on merit. Moreover, as noted in Amar Nath (supra), the purpose of introducing Sec. 397(2) of the CrPC is to curb the CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 15 of 17 delays in decision of criminal cases and thereby to the benefit of the accused by giving him or her a fair and expeditious trial, but the effort of the revision- petitioner in this case would only contribute to delay if he is found successful and his endeavour is against the objective of the bar to the criminal revision. This brings us to a situation in which this Court on a respectful consideration of the decisions of the Gujarat & Madras High Court is unable to agree with the view of the Gujarat High Court in Lap Lifestyle LLP(supra), but quite in agreement with the view of Madras High Court in Bapuji Murugesan(supra). In any way, viewing in any angle, this Court considers the impugned order to be a interlocutory order, but not a intermediate order and thereby, the bar as provided U/S. 438(2) of the BNSS is applicable to the present case which makes the revision by the revision- petitioner to be not maintainable. In the result, the criminal revision being not maintainable stands dismissed. In view of the memo CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 16 of 17 filed by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the revision-petitioner is, however, at liberty to challenge the impugned order by way of appropriate proceeding, if the same is available to him under law. (G. Satapathy) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack, Dated the 7th May, 2025/Kishore Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: KISHORE KUMAR SAHOO Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa Date: 13-May-2025 10:24:29 CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 17 of 17
Arguments
Heard, Mr.Rajeet Roy, learned counsel for the revision-petitioner at the threshold before admission on the point of maintainability of the revision against the impugned order. 3. After having considered the rival submissions upon perusal of record, the only issue arises before this Court right now is whether a revision is maintainable against the impugned order passed by the learned Appellate Court in exercise of power U/S. 148 of NI Act on the ground of it being an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision U/S. 438(2) of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023(in shot, the “BNSS”). 4. For clarity, better understanding and to answer the question of maintainability of the revision against the impugned order, the relevant provisions which are Section 148 of the NI Act and Sec. 438(1) & (2) of the BNSS involved in this case, are quoted as under:- CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 2 of 17 pending appeal Notwithstanding “148. Power of Appellate Court to order payment against anything conviction.-(1) contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), in an appeal by the drawer the against conviction under section 138, Appellate Court may order the appellant to deposit such sum which shall be a minimum fine or of compensation awarded by the trial Court: twenty per cent of the Provided that the amount payable under this sub-section shall be in addition to any interim compensation paid by the appellant under section 143-A. (2) The amount referred to in sub- section (1) shall be deposited within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the appellant. (3) The Appellate Court may direct the release of the amount deposited by the appellant to the complainant at any time during the pendency of the appeal: Provided that if the appellant the Court shall direct is the acquitted, complainant to repay to the appellant the amount so released, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial year, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant.” “438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.- (1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 3 of 17 correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court, and may, when calling, for such record, direct that the execution of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in confinement that he be released on his own bond or bail bond pending the examination of the record. Explanation. - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of this sub-section and of section 439. (2) The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, trial or other proceeding.” inquiry, 5. Admittedly, the provision for compensation as existed today and referred in Sec. 143(1) and 148 of the NI Act were earlier not there in the statute, but this provision was brought and incorporated in the original Act by way of Amendment Act No. 20 of 2018 w.e.f. 01.09.2018 to address the issue of undue delay in final resolution of the dishonor of cheque cases. The new amendment to Sec. 148 of NI Act was inserted in the same amendment providing discretion to the Appellate Court to order the appellant CRLREV No.112 of 2025 Page 4 of 17 to deposit such a sum which shall be a minimum of 20% of the fine or compensation awarded by the trial Court. The primary objects behind the amendments to Sec. 143 and 148 of the NI Act was to expedite the resolution of cheque dishonor cases U/s. 138 of the NI Act and to prevent undue delays caused by the appeal. The overall objects of these amendments are to streamline the process for cheque dishonor cases and to prevent the accused from using appeals to delay the payment to the complainant. These amendments aim to provide quicker relief to the complainants by enabling the payment of interim compensation/ compensation before the final resolution of the case.