The High Court · 2025
Case Details
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 (In the matter of an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India) Mukul Kumar …. Petitioner -versus- Laxmidhar Samantaray & Anr. …. Opposite Parties Advocate(s) appeared in this case:- For Petitioner : Mr. P.K.Rath, Sr.Advocate For Opposite Parties : Mr. S.R.Mahapatra, Advocate CORAM: JUSTICE B.P. ROUTRAY JUDGMENT 28th October 2025 B.P. Routray, J. 1. Heard Mr. P.K.Rath, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. S.R.Mahapatra, learned counsel for Opposite Parties. 2. Present CMP is directed challenging impugned judgment dated 13th February 2025 passed in F.A.O. No.99 of 224 of the C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 1 of 11
Facts
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 learned 2nd Additional District Judge, Bhubaneswar (Annexure-1) and the order of learned Trial Court dated 26th June 2024 (Annexure- 8) passed in I.A. No.01 of 2024 (arising out of C.S. No.455 of 2024), wherein the prayer for temporary injunction of the Plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC has been refused. 3. Present Petitioner is the Plaintiff who filed the aforesaid suit praying for permanent injunction against Defendant No.2 not to evict him without due process of law and not to interact the business of the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff’s case is based on a house rent agreement dated 20th August 2022 executed between Defendant No.1 and himself to be effective for a period of four years then to run a commercial shop (IMFL OFF SHOP). The suit property is a shop house situating over Plot No.298/2087. The suit plot was earlier owned by Defendant No.1 and others as a joint family property which was subsequently sold to Defendant No.2 on 16th February 2024 and the disputes started thereafter. 4. Admittedly, the Plaintiff was running an IMFL OFF Shop in the suit house situating over the suit plot having license obtained from the Competent Authority dated 1st April 2023 for a period of C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 2 of 11 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 one year which was then extended up-to 31st October 2023 and finally up-to 11th September 2024. This license of IMFL OFF Shop granted by the department of Excise, Government of Odisha mentions about the house rent agreement dated 20th August 2022 executed between Defendant No.1 and the Plaintiff. It is of course true that the license for running the IMFL OFF shop in the suit house was not extended after 11th September 2024 for the dispute pending between the parties in respect of the suit house. 5. According to the Plaintiff, after Defendant No.2 managed to purchase the suit land from Defendant No.1 and other family members, he wanted to close down the business of the Plaintiff for the reason he having another IMFL ON shop adjacent to the suit house. In such premises the Plaintiff contends that when his admission into the suit shop house is lawful, Defendant No.2 should be prohibited from creating any disturbance to his possession unless and until the Plaintiff is lawfully evicted therefrom. 6. Defendant No.2 after his appearance in the suit has filed his written statement disputing possession of the Plaintiff over the suit house by raising his counter claim for eviction of the Plaintiff from C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 3 of 11 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 the suit shop house. As per Defendant No.2, the Plaintiff’s induction in the shop house as a tenant under Defendant No.1 is disputed since there was a lease deed executed on 21st April 2022 by Defendant No.1 with one Ashok Kumar Swain. Thus it is contended by the Defendants that the Plaintiff was never in lawful possession of the suit house and he managed the Government authorities to get the IMFL OFF Shop license in his favour by producing the forged house rent agreement dated 20th August 2022. 7. In such background of the facts in controversy, both the Trial Court and First Appellate Court have refused to grant temporary injunction in favour of the Plaintiff with regard to his possession over the suit shop house mainly on the ground of disputing the house rent agreement dated 20th August 2022. As per the Trial Court, the Plaintiff did not produce any valid house rent agreement in support of his possession over the suit shop house and according to the findings of the First Appellate Court the house rent agreement dated 20th August 2022 being an unregistered one cannot confer any right in favour of the Plaintiff to retain his lawful possession over the suit shop house. C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 4 of 11 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 8. It is well-settled in law that a person in lawful possession of the property can maintain the injunction against the owner unless and until he is evicted in due process of law. In this regard, it is observed in Premji Ratansey Shah v. Union of India, (1994) 5 SCC 547, as follows; “The question, therefore, is whether an injunction can be issued against the true owner. Issuance of an order of injunction is absolutely a discretionary and equitable relief. In a given set of facts, injunction may be given to protect the possession of the owner or person in lawful possession. It is not mandatory that for mere asking such relief should be given. Injunction is a personal right under Section 41(j) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; the plaintiff must have personal interest in the matter. The interest of right not shown to be in existence, cannot be protected by injunction.” In Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594, it has been stated that; “In a suit for permanent injunction to restrain the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession, the plaintiff will have to establish that as on the date of the suit he was in lawful possession of the suit property and the defendant tried to interfere or disturb such lawful possession. Where the property is a building or building with appurtenant land, there may C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 5 of 11 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 not be much difficulty in establishing possession. The plaintiff may prove physical or lawful possession, either of himself or by him through his family members or agents or lessees/licensees. Even in respect of a land without structures, as for example an agricultural land, possession may be established with reference to the actual use and cultivation. The question of title is not in issue in such a suit, though it may arise incidentally or collaterally.” 9. In the case at hand, the admitted fact remains that Defendant No.2 purchased the suit land on 16th February 2024 from Defendant No.1 and others. The rent agreement dated 20th August 2022 as relied on by the Plaintiff has been admittedly acknowledged by the authorities of Government in Excise Department to grant licence for IMFL OFF Shop in favour of the Plaintiff over the suit shop house. The contention of Defendants that prior to execution of such alleged house rent agreement dated 20th August 2022 a lease deed was earlier executed by Defendant No.1 with one Ashok Kumar Swain dated 21st April 2022 is not substantiated by any material to show prima facie possession of Ashok Kumar Swain over the suit shop house. It appears that a lease agreement dated 21st April 2022 as contended by the Defendants is though came into existence prior to the house rent agreement dated 20th August 2022 still the running of C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 6 of 11 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 IMFL OFF shop over the suit house by the Plaintiff is never disputed by the Defendants which dispels the contention of Defendants with regard to possession of the Plaintiff over the suit shop house. 10. It is true that when a new purchaser purchases a property wherein there was a tenant previously existing, the option lies between either to continue with the tenancy by execution of fresh tenancy agreement or to evict the tenant by due process of law, at the choice of the new owner. So once it is found that the Plaintiff was running an IMFL OFF Shop from 1st April 2023 over the suit shop house the prima facie possession of the Plaintiff over the suit shop house is substantiated by the fact of grant of license by Competent Authority of Government. This is further fortified in absence of any material in respect of possession of alleged Ashok Kumar Swain over the suit shop house. Thus, it can be safely opined that the Plaintiff has a prima facie case in his favour to proceed in the suit against the Defendants. 11. It is explained in State of Kerala v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 183, that three golden principles Viz. of prima facie case, C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 7 of 11 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 balance of convenience, and irreparable loss has to be in favour of the party seeking temporary injunction and it is explained as follows; “12. The globally acknowledged golden principles, collectively known as “the triple-test”, are followed by the courts across the jurisdictions as the prerequisites before a party can be mandatorily injuncted to do or to refrain from doing a particular thing. These three cardinal factors, that are deeply embedded in the Indian jurisprudence as well, are:
Legal Reasoning
12.1. A “prima facie case”, which necessitates that as per the material placed on record, the plaintiff is likely to succeed in the final determination of the case; 12.2. “Balance of convenience”, such that the prejudice likely to be caused to the plaintiff due to rejection of the interim relief will be higher than the inconvenience that the defendant may face if the relief is so granted; and 12.3. “Irreparable injury”, which means that if the relief is not granted, the plaintiff will face an irreversible injury that cannot be compensated in monetary terms. XX .. xx .. xx .. 16. Coming to the first factor i.e. the prima facie case, the plaintiff State has raised various substantive questions of constitutional interpretation. Generally speaking, the phrase “prima facie case” is not a term of art and it simply signifies that at first sight the plaintiff has a strong case. According to Webster's International Dictionary, “prima facie case” means a case established by “prima facie evidence”, which in turn means the evidence that is sufficient in law to raise a presumption of fact unless rebutted.” C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 8 of 11 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 12. In Best Sellers Retail (India) (P) Ltd. v. Aditya Birla Nuvo Ltd., (2012) 6 SCC 792, it has held that; “26. It has been held by this Court in Kishoresinh Ratansinh Jadeja v. Maruti Corpn. [(2009) 11 SCC 229 : (2009) 4 SCC (Civ) 506] that it is well established that while passing an interim order of injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 CPC, the Court is required to consider: (i) whether there is a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff; (ii) whether the balance of convenience is in favour of passing the order of injunction; and (iii) whether the plaintiff will suffer irreparable injury if an order of injunction would not be passed as prayed for. Hence, we only have to consider whether these well-settled principles relating to grant of temporary injunction have been kept in mind by the trial court and the High Court. Xx .. xx .. xx .. 29. Yet, the settled principle of law is that even where prima facie case is in favour of the plaintiff, the Court will refuse temporary injunction if the injury suffered by the plaintiff on account of refusal of temporary injunction was not irreparable. 30. In Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh [(1992) 1 SCC 719] this Court held: (SCC p. 721, para 5) “5. … Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in ‘irreparable injury’ to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he needs protection from the C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 9 of 11 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. Irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely, one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages.” Xx .. xx .. xx .. 36. To quote the words of Alderson, B. in Attorney General v. Hallett [(1857) 16 M & W 569 : 153 ER 1316] : (ER p. 1321) “… I take the meaning of irreparable injury to be that which, if not prevented by injunction, cannot be
Decision
afterwards compensated by any decree which the court can pronounce in the result of the cause.” 13. The document produced on record when shows that the Plaintiff was running an IMFL OFF Shop over the suit house being duly permitted by the Competent Authority, and such documents of license granted by the Competent Authority remain undisputed, the balance of convenience leans in favour of the Plaintiff for an order of temporary injunction in his favour since the loss likely to be caused on his part deprived from running his business would be more and such loss sustained by the Plaintiff in his business cannot be compensated subsequently or otherwise. 14. It needs to be mentioned here that Defendant No.2 being the subsequent purchaser of the suit property must be aware of C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 10 of 11 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGRAM DAS Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 06-Nov-2025 17:38:47 possession of the Plaintiff over the suit house and when prima facie the Plaintiff has established his possession over the suit house being inducted as a tenant by the previous owner, the same can be well termed as lawful possession to presume in favour of the Plaintiff. 15. In view of the discussions made above, the CMP is allowed directing both parties to maintain status-quo over the suit shop house in respect of possession of the Plaintiff over the same till final decision in the suit. It is made clear that any such observation made in this order or by the First Appellate Court or by the Trial Court while dealing with the prayer of the Plaintiff under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 of the CPC, shall not influence the final decision. (B.P. Routray) Judge S.Das/Sr.Steno C.M.P. No.297 of 2025 Page 11 of 11