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Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.5994 OF 2021 In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India ……………… Bishnubrata Mishra Petitioner …. -versus- Punjab National Bank, Zonal Audit Office & Others …. Opposite Parties For Petitioner : Mr. S.N. Biswal, Advocate For Opp. Parties : Mr. A.C. Swain, Advocate (for O.P. Nos.1 to 3) PRESENT: THE HONBLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of Hearing:15.09.2025 and Date of Judgment: 28.10.2025---- ------------------------------------------------------------------------ ---- Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J. 1. 2. This matter is taken up through Hybrid Mode. The present Writ Petition has been filed inter alia with the following prayer: therefore prays The Petitioner that your Lordships would be graciously pleased to admit this writ application, call for the records and after hearing the parties allow the same with cost and issue a writ/writs in the nature of certiorari/mandamus by quashing the disciplinary proceeding under Annexure-1 // 2 // series as the same is barred under Regulation 48(2) of 1995 Regulation under Annexure-5 and without jurisdiction in view of the settled principles of laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India; law And pass any other order or orders as this Hon’ble court deems fit and proper; And for this act of kindness, the Petitioner as in duty bound shall ever pray. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner contended that Petitioner while continuing as Chief Concurrent Auditor under the Opp. Party-Bank, he retired from his services on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.10.2015. However, much after his retirement, the Bank initiated the impugned proceeding vide Memorandum dt.29.02.2020 under Annexure-1, in terms provision contained under Punjab National Bank Officer Employees’ (Disciplinary and Appeal) Regulations, 1977. 3.1. Such proceeding initiated vide the impugned Memorandum dtd.29.02.2020 was forwarded to the Petitioner vide letter dt.05.03.2020 under Annexure-2. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner contended that on being served with the charges in the impugned proceeding dt.29.02.2020, Petitioner made his reply on Page 2 of 17 // 3 // 05.05.2020 under Annexure-3 inter alia taking a specific ground that in view of the provisions contained under Regulation 48(2) of the Punjab National Bank (Employees) Pension Regulation, 1995 (in short, “Regulation 1995) under Annexure-5, the proceeding initiated against the Petitioner vide Charge Memo dt.29.02.2020 under Annexure-1 is not maintainable. Regulation 48(2) of the 1995 Regulation reads as follows: “No departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the employee was in service, shall be instituted in respect of an event which took place more than four years before such institution. Provided that the disciplinary proceedings so in accordance with the instituted shall be procedure applicable to disciplinary proceedings in relation to the employee during the period of his service.” 3.2. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner contended that Petitioner since retired from his services on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.10.2015 and the proceeding was initiated on 29.02.2020 in respect of the incidents for the period from 17.05.2012 to 30.06.2015, in view of the provision contained under Regulation 48(2) of the 1995 Regulation, the Proceeding Page 3 of 17 // 4 // is not maintainable. It is also contended that since the allegation in the Charge memo relates to the period 17.05.2012 to 30.06.2015 and during the continuance of the Petitioner in the Mumbai branch from 28.10.2011 to 31.10.2015, the proceeding so initiated under Annexure-1 vide Memorandum dt.29.02.2020 is not maintainable and required to be quashed. It is also contended that this Court while issuing notice of the matter vide order dt.08.03.2021, restrained the Opp. Party-Bank from passing the final order without the leave of this Court. 3.3. While relying on the provisions contained under
Legal Reasoning
Regulation 48(2) of the 1995 Regulation, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner also relied on the following decisions: 1. Uco Bank & Others Vs. Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade, (2018) 14 SCC 98 2. Rajeshwar Prasad Singh Vs. The State of Bihar & Others, passed in WP(C ) No.5937 of 2017 dt.12.10.2017. 3.4. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Prabhakar Sadashiv Karvade, in paragraph-9 held as follows: Page 4 of 17 // 5 // the 1979 Regulations, 9. A reading of the plain language of Regulation 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations and Regulation 20(3)(iii) of the 1979 Regulations makes it clear that any of the penalties, whether major or minor can be imposed only on a serving officer employee of the Bank. This necessarily implies that none of the penalties specified in Regulation 4 of the Discipline and Appeal Regulations can be imposed on an officer employee after his retirement from service, though in terms of Regulation 20(3)(iii) the disciplinary of proceedings initiated against an officer employee before his retirement can be continued and final order is passed and further that such officer employee is not entitled to retiral benefits till the conclusion of disciplinary proceedings and passing of final order. The only exception to this is that the officer is entitled to receive his own contribution to CPF. However, there is nothing in the language of these regulations from which it can be inferred that the disciplinary authority has the power to impose a substantive punishment on retired officer employee. This becomes more explicit from a conjoint reading of Regulation 48 of the Pension the competent Regulations which empowers authority to withhold or withdraw a pension or a part thereof and order recovery from pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the bank if in a departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence or criminal breach of trust or forgery or acts done fraudulently during the period of his service. Second proviso to Regulation 48 contains a fiction and lays down that if the departmental proceedings are instituted while the employee was in service, the same shall be deemed to be proceedings under the regulations and continued and concluded as if the employee had continued in service. The third proviso imposes a bar on the initiation of departmental or judicial proceedings against an employee after his retirement in respect of an event which took place more than 4 years before such institution. The sum and substance of these though a departmental inquiry instituted against an officer employee before his retirement can continue even after his retirement, none of the substantive penalties specified in Regulation 4 of 1979 Regulations, which include dismissal from service, that even regulations is Page 5 of 17 // 6 // can be imposed on an officer employee after his retirement on attaining the age of superannuation. Therefore, we have no hesitation to hold that order dated 12-10-2004 passed by the disciplinary authority dismissing the respondent from service, who had superannuated on 31-12-1993 was ex facie illegal and without jurisdiction and the High Court did not commit any error by setting aside the same. 3.5. Hon’ble High Court of Patna in the case of Rajeshwar Prasad Singh, in paragraphs-4 &11 held as follows: 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, further, submits that the petitioner filed his show cause hat the petitioner retired on 31.05.2007 and the proceeding against the petitioner under Rule 43(b) of the Rules was initiated on 19.07.2011, after more than four years from the date of retirement of the petitioner. Therefore, initiation of the departmental proceeding is void abinitio and the punishment on such enquiry report is not legal and sustainable. It is, further, submitted that the Lok Ayukta, Bihar, did not find the petitioner guilty nor made any recommendation for taking action against the petitioner. The petitioner also submitted his show cause to the enquiry officer that the departmental proceeding was initiated on 19.07.2011 under Rule 43(b) of the Rules was with regard to the event of the year 2007 and the proceeding was initiated, admittedly, after four years of the retirement of the petitioner on 31.05.2007. The petitioner promotion and Assured Career granted Progression Scheme in to accordance Patna High Court CWJC No.5937 of 2014 dt. 12-10-2017 with law much prior to the date of his retirement, ie., 31.05.2007, but, the disciplinary authority did not consider the show cause. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2010(3) P.LJ.R., 8.45 (Urmila Sharma @ Urmila Singh & Anr. Vrs. The State of Bihar & Ors.). the employees Page 6 of 17 // 7 // 11. In view of these facts, the submission of the learned counsel for the State is of no substance that limitation shall be counted from the date of knowledge about the event or misconduct or negligence of the employed causing pecuniary loss to the employer. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner retired on 31.05.2007 and before his retirement he granted promotion to fourth grade employees and also granted Assured Career Progression Scheme to the work the departmental charge employees, but, proceeding under Rule 43(b) of the Rules was initiated only on 19.07.2011, i.e after four years from the date of event, i. e, while the petitioner the was to the employees. of initiation departmental proceeding, itself, High Court CWJC No.5937 of 2014 dt. 12-10-2017 is barred by limitation and consequent punishment after such departmental inquiry withholding 20% pension of the petitioner is also bad and not sustainable in service granted /benefits Therefore, 4. Mr. A.C. Swain, learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-Bank on the other hand made his submission basing on the stand taken in the counter affidavit so filed by Opp. Party No.2. While not disputing the fact that Petitioner retired from service on 31.10.2015, but it is contended that as provided under Regulation 48 of the 1995 Regulation, the Bank is permitted to recover pecuniary loss caused to the Bank. Since during his continuance, Petitioner has caused pecuniary loss to the Bank, the Bank has rightly initiated the proceeding under Annexure-1 and the bar contained under Regulation 48(2) of the 1995 Regulation cannot be taken Page 7 of 17 // 8 // as an embargo to proceed in the proceeding . In support of his submission, reliance was placed on the provisions contained under Regulation 48(1) of the Regulation 1995 which reads as follows: 48. Recovery of Pecuniary loss caused to the Bank.- (1) The Competent Authority may withhold or withdraw a pension or a part thereof, whether permanently or for a specific period, and order recovery from pension of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the bank if in any departmental the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence or criminal breach of trust or forgery or for acts done fraudulently during the period of his service: judicial proceedings or Provided that the Board shall be consulted before any final orders are passed: Provided further that where a part of pension is withheld or withdrawn the amount of pension drawn by a pensioner shall not be less than the minimum these Regulations. payable pension under Provided also that the departmental proceedings, if instituted while the employee was in service, shall, after the retirement of the employee, be deemed these Regulations and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service. to be proceedings under 4.1. It is also contended that even though the ground of initiation of the Proceeding is with regard to the incidents starting from the period from 17.05.2012 to 31.10.2015, but Petitioner while in service, was issued Page 8 of 17 // 9 // with a show-cause on 24.05.2019 and taking into account such show-cause issued on dt.24.05.2019, the Proceeding in question was initiated on 29.02.2020 and accordingly it is within the period specified under Regulation 48(2) of the 1995 Regulation. 4.2. It is also contended that challenge made to the proceeding at the threshold is not at all entertainable and Petitioner be directed to participate in the proceeding as the charges are very grievous and serious. In support of his submission, reliance was placed to the following decisions: 1. Union of India (UOI) and Ors.Vs. Kunisetty Satyanarayana, (2006) 12 SCC 28 2. Secretary, Ministry of Defence V. Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565. 3. Chairman, LIC of India V. M. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530. 4. B.C. Chaturvedi V. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749. 5. Pravin Kumar Vs. Union of India, (2020) 9 SCC 471. 4.3. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Kunisetty Satyanarayana, in paragraphs-14,15 & 16 held as follows: Page 9 of 17 // 10 // 14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show- cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a imposing some punishment or final order otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. 15.Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet. 16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not. interfere in such a matter. 4.4. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Prabhash Chandra Mirdha, in paragraph-10 held as follows: 10. Ordinarily a writ application does not lie against a chargesheet or show cause notice for the reason that it does not give rise to any cause of action. It does not amount to an adverse order which affects the right of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction/competence to do so. A writ lies when some right of a party is infringed. In fact, chargesheet does not infringe the right of a party. It is only when a final order imposing the Page 10 of 17 // 11 // punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, it may have a grievance and cause of action. Thus, a chargesheet or show cause notice in disciplinary proceedings should not ordinarily be quashed by the Court. (Vide, State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma AIR 1987 SC 943 Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramesh Kumar Singh and Ors. MANU/SC/0180/1996: (1996) 1 SCC 327; Ulagappa and Ors. v. Div. Commr., Mysore and Ors. AIR 2000 SC 3603 (2), Special Director and Anr. v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and Anr. MANU/SC/0025/2004 AIR 2004 SC 1467; v. andUnion MANU/SC/0711/1987Kunisetty Satyanarayana MANU/SC/5137/2006: AIR 2007 SC 906). India Anr. and of 4.5. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of A. Masilamani, in paragraphs-17 & 18 held as follows: 17. The second question involved herein, is also no longer res integra. Whether or not the disciplinary authority should be given an opportunity, to complete the enquiry afresh from the point that it stood vitiated, depends upon the gravity of delinquency involved. Thus, the court must examine, the magnitude of misconduct alleged against the delinquent employee. It is in view of this, that courts/tribunals, are not competent to quash the charge-sheet disciplinary proceedings, before the same are concluded, on the aforementioned grounds. related and 18. The court/tribunal should not generally set aside the departmental enquiry, and quash the charges on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings, as such a power is de hors the limitation of judicial review. In the event that, the court/tribunal exercises such power, it exceeds its power of judicial review at the very threshold. Therefore, a charge-sheet or show cause notice, issued in the course of disciplinary proceedings, cannot ordinarily be quashed by court. The same principle in relation to there being a delay in conclusion of is applicable, Page 11 of 17 // 12 // and Datt taking Sharma consideration disciplinary proceedings. The facts and circumstances of the case in question, have to be examined, the into gravity/magnitude of charges Involved therein. The essence of the matter is that the court must take into consideration, all relevant facts and to balance and weigh the same, so as to determine, if it is infact in the interest of clean and honest administration, that the judicial proceedings are allowed to be terminated, only on the ground of delay in their conclusion. (Vide: State of U.P. v. Brahm Anr. MANU/SC/0711/1987: AIR 1987 SC 943 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Anr. MANU/SC/0251/1990 AIR 1990 SC 1308;Union of India and Anr. v. Ashok Kacker: 1995 (1) SCC 180; Secretary to Excise Government, Department Srinivasan MANU/SC/1108/1996: (1996) 3 SCC 157; State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan MANU/SC/0278/1998: AIR 1998 SC 1833; M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and Ors. MANU/SC/1857/2006: AIR 2006 SC 3475, Union of India and Anr. v. Kunisetty Satyanarayana MANU/SC/5137/2006 AIR 2007 SC 906; and The Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Ors. v. Prabash Chandra Mirdha MANU/SC/0492/2012: AIR 2012 SC 2250). Prohibition & L. v. 4.6. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of B.C. Chaturvedi, in paragraph-12 held as follows: the authority reaches 12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the Individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion is necessarily which correct in the eye of the Court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the Page 12 of 17 // 13 // authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical rules of Evidence Act nor of proof fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to the authority disciplinary proceeding. When accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its power of judicial review does not act as appellate authority to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where that proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have never reached, the Court/Tribunal may interfere with the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. the authority held 4.7. Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Pravin Kumar, in paragraphs-25 & 26 held as follows: in the interference 25. Learned Counsel for the Appellant spent considerable time taking us through the various evidences-on-record with intention of highlighting lacunas and contradictions. We feel that such an exercise was in vain, as the the present threshold of proceedings is quite high. The power of judicial review discharged by Constitutional Courts Under Article 226 or 32, or when sitting in appeal Under Article 136, is distinct from the appellate power exercised by a departmental appellate authority. It would be gainsaid that judicial review is an evaluation of the decision- making process, and not the merits of the decision itself. Judicial Review seeks to ensure fairness of fairness in treatment and not Page 13 of 17 // 14 // conclusion. It ought to be used to correct manifest errors of law or procedure, which might result in significant injustice; or in case of bias or gross unreasonableness of outcome. 26. These principles are succinctly elucidated by in B.C. a three-judge Bench of this Court Chaturvedi India MANU/SC/0118/1996: (1995) 6 SCC 749 p. 12 in the following extract: Union of v. the authority reaches 12. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner In which the decision is made. Power of judicial review is meant to ensure that the individual receives fair treatment and not to ensure that the conclusion which is necessarily correct in the eye of the court. When an inquiry is conducted on charges of misconduct by a public servant, the Court/Tribunal is concerned to determine whether the inquiry was held by a competent officer or whether Rules of natural justice are complied with. Whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence, the authority entrusted with the power to hold inquiry has jurisdiction, power and authority to reach a finding of fact or conclusion. But that finding must be based on some evidence. Neither the technical Rules of Evidence Act nor of proof of fact or evidence as defined therein, apply to disciplinary proceeding. When the authority accepts that evidence and conclusion receives support therefrom, the disciplinary authority is entitled to hold that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge. The Court/Tribunal in its judicial review does not act as power of appellate authority to reappreciate the evidence and to arrive at its own independent findings on the evidence. The Court/Tribunal may interfere where the authority held the proceedings against the delinquent officer in a manner inconsistent with the Rules of natural justice or in violation of statutory Rules prescribing the mode of inquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached, the Court/Tribunal may the conclusion or the finding, and mould the relief so interfere with Page 14 of 17 // 15 // as to make it appropriate to the facts of each case. 5. To the submission made by the learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-Bank, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner contended that the alleged show-cause notice dt.24.05.2019 was never issued to the Petitioner as Petitioner retired from his services on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.10.2015 while continuing at Mumbai nor the show-cause has been enclosed to the counter affidavit so filed by the Bank. 5.1. It is also contended that even if it is admitted that a show-cause was issued on 24.05.2019, but the proceeding since has been initiated in respect of the events which are prior to 4 years of the retirement of the Petitioner, the Proceeding is not maintainable in view of the specific provision contained under Regulation 48(2) of the 1995 Regulation. It is accordingly contended that the impugned proceeding is not maintainable and liable to be quashed by this Court. Page 15 of 17 // 16 // 6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the parties and considering the submission made, this Court finds that Petitioner while continuing under the Opp. Party-Bank and more particularly while continuing in Mumbai Branch, he was allowed to take retirement on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.10.2015. It is not disputed that the Proceeding was initiated on 29.02.2020 under Annexure-1 in respect of the incidents for the period from 17.05.2012 to 31.10.2015. 6.1. Placing reliance on the provisions contained under Regulation 48(2) of the 1995 Regulation and the undisputed fact that the incidents relates back to the period from 17.05.2012 to 31.10.2015, it is the view of this Court that the proceeding is not at all maintainable. The decisions relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the Opp. Party-Bank, as per the considered view of this Court are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 6.2. In view of the clear provision contained under Regulation 48(2) of the 1995 Regulation, this Court is of the view that the proceeding is not maintainable and Page 16 of 17 // 17 // accordingly is inclined to quash the proceeding. While quashing the Proceeding dt.29.02.2020 so issued under Annexure-1 by Opp. Party-Bank, this Court allows the Writ Petition.
Decision
6.3. The Writ Petition accordingly stands disposed of. (Biraja Prasanna Satapathy) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 28th October, 2025/sangita Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANGITA PATRA Reason: authentication of order Location: high court of orissa, cuttack Date: 30-Oct-2025 18:03:15 Page 17 of 17