Orissa High Court
Case Details
ORISSA HIGH COURT : CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 In the matter of an Application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950 *** Sri Bidyadhar Mallick Aged about 60 years Son of Late Damodar Mallick At/P.O.: Sartha, P.S.: Singla District: Balasore. … -VERSUS- 1. UCO Bank Represented through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director Having its Head Office At 10, BTM Sarani Kolkata. Petitioner 2. General Manager-cum-Appellate Authority Human Resource Management Department 3-4, DD Block, Sector-1 Salt Lake City Kolkata-64. 3. Zonal Manager-cum-Disciplinary Authority UCO Bank, Zonal Office At/P.O.: Kanika Chhak Tulasipur Cuttack-8. … Opposite parties W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 1 of 93 Counsel appeared for the parties: For the Petitioner : Mr. Surendra Nath Panda, Advocate : M/s. Bibekananda Udgata, S.M. Singh and S.K. Jena, Advocates For the Opposite parties P R E S E N T: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN Date of Hearing : 21.03.2025 :: Date of Judgment : 02.04.2025 J UDGMENT Questioning the legality and propriety of Order dated 29.12.2010 of the Disciplinary Authority-Zonal Manager, Zonal Office, UCO Bank, Cuttack vide Annexure-7 as confirmed in Appellate Order dated 25.04.2011 passed by the General Manager, Human Resource Management, Kolkata (Annexure-10), the instant writ petition has been filed to invoke extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under the provisions of Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, with the following prayer(s): “It is therefore, prayed that this Hon‟ble Court may be graciously pleased to: (i) (ii) Admit the writ application, to call for the records; W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 2 of 93 (iii) to issue Rule NISI calling upon the opposite parties to as to why the said Rule shall not be made absolute. Upon return thereto hear the parties and/or their counsels; to quash And for insufficient cause this Hon‟ble Court may be the Order dated further pleased 29.12.2010 imposing major penalty like dismissal from service by the opposite party No.3 vide Annexure-7 and the Order confirming the same dated 25.04.2011 by the Appellate Authority, opposite party No.2 vide Annexure-10. (iv) This Hon‟ble Court may be further pleased to hold that the initiation of proceeding against the petitioner is bad and discrimination has been committed in case of the petitioner And direct the opposite parties to grant monetary benefits as entitled to the petitioner after quashing the Orders vide Annexures-7 and 10. (v) Any other order/orders that may deem fit and proper be passed for the facts and circumstances of the case. And for which act of kindness, the petitioners as in duty bound shall ever pray.” Facts: 2. The career graph of the petitioner as narrated in the writ petition does deserve to be reflected. W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 3 of 93 2.1. Having joined as a Clerk-cum-Cashier in the Branch Office of UCO Bank at Nilgiri on 10.10.1984, the petitioner got promoted to the post of Zonal Manager, Scale-1 Officer on 01.07.1986 and continued as such till 06.02.1988. Being promoted to the post of Assistant Manager (Advance), joined at Oupada Branch on 08.02.1988 where he worked till 28.09.1991. Thereafter, joining at Langaleswar Branch on 30.09.1991, he worked there up to 23.08.1996 as Assistant Manager (Advance). Being promoted to the post of Manager in the year 1996, he was directed to join at Debhog Branch as Manager and accordingly the petitioner took charge of Debhog Branch on 24.08.1996 and worked there up to 25.10.2000. Thereafter the petitioner joined as Assistant Manager (Account) at Baliapal on 27.10.2000, where he worked there up to 31.06.2003. Subsequently on 02.06.2003 he was transferred to Jamsuli Branch of UCO Bank to function as Manager and worked there up to 15.08.2006. From there the petitioner was transferred to Raibania Branch as Manager where he worked from 16.08.2006 to 11.07.2009 and having got transferred to Nilgiri Branch, he joined on 13.07.2009 as Manager. 2.2. While working as Manager at Nilgiri Branch, the petitioner received Letter dated 20.11.2009 from the Disciplinary Authority-opposite party No.3 instructing him to offer explanation against show cause as to why W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 4 of 93 suitable action would not be taken against him for irregularities committed by him at Jamsuli Branch while working as Branch Manager during 02.06.2003 to 17.08.2006. In the said Letter dated 20.11.2009, the opposite party No.2 has alleged seventeen numbers of irregularities committed by the petitioner while working at Jamsuli Branch. The opposite party No.3 by Letter dated 04.12.2009 putting the petitioner under suspension in exercise of power conferred on the Disciplinary Authority by Regulation 12 of the UCO Bank Officers Employees’ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976 (For brevity, “Regulations, 1976”) with immediate effect, ordered that during the period of suspension the Head Quarter of the petitioner would be at Cuttack and he would not leave the Head Quarter without obtaining permission of the Disciplinary Authority. 2.3. In obedience to Letter dated 20.11.2009, the petitioner submitted his explanation point-wise denying all the allegations levelled against him. 2.4. A Letter No.CZ/I&V/2010-11/84, dated 19.05.2011 was served attaching therewith statement of allegations and articles of charges on the petitioner containing therein that while functioning as Manager of Jamsuli Branch during 02.06.2003 to 17.08.2006, he was indulged in W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 5 of 93 various acts of omission and commission for which he is charged as under: “1. Sri B.D. Mallick (PF No.27676) failed to take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence, which is violative of Regulation 3(i) of UCO Bank Officer Employees (Conduct) Regulation 1996 as amended. 2. Sri B.D. Mallick (PF No.27676) in the exercise of powers confirmed on him acted otherwise than in his best judgement, which is violative of Regulation 3(3) (Conduct) of UCO Bank Officer Employees‟ Regulations 1975, as amended.” 2.5. Denying all charges and allegations written statement of defense was furnished, which the Disciplinary Authority, opposite party No.3, did not accept, but instituted an enquiry by appointing one Sri Ananda Chandra Sahu, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Zonal Office, Cuttack, as the Enquiry Officer by notification dated 26.06.2010. 2.6. The Enquiry Officer issued notice to the petitioner to attend the inquiry on 08.07.2010. The petitioner appeared before the Enquiry Officer on 27.07.2010, 04.08.2010, 05.08.2010, 28.08.2010, 14.09.2010 and 08.10.2010, thereby cooperated with the process of inquiry. 2.7. The Enquiry Officer by Letter dated 12.11.2010 submitted Report to the Disciplinary Authority in respect W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 6 of 93 of Charge Sheet dated 19.05.2010 containing therein his opinion on the seventeen allegations as per Statement of Allegations in seriatim and concluded that: “(1) Charge No.1:
Legal Reasoning
Shri B.D. Mallick (PF No.27676, failed to take all possible steps to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence, which is violative of Regulation 3(1) of UCO Bank Officer Employees‟ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976, as amended: Proved. (2) Charge No.2: Shri B.D. Mallick (PF No.27676), in the exercise of powers conferred on him acted otherwise than in his best judgment, which is violative of Regulation 3(3) of UCO Bank Officer Employees‟ (Conduct) Regulations, 1976 as amended: Proved.” 2.8. The Disciplinary Authority attaching copy of the Report of the Enquiry Officer with his Letter dated 19.11.2010, requested the petitioner to submit his comments thereon. In response thereto, the petitioner submitted his comments on 29.11.2010 refuting all the allegations. 2.9. The Disciplinary Authority had passed Order dated 29.12.2010 in respect of the enquiry held against the petitioner arising out of the Charge Sheet dated W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 7 of 93 19.05.2010. The conclusion being arrived at, the following punishment is awarded by the Disciplinary Authority: “In view of the foregoing and considering the gravity of charges, in exercise of the powers conferred on me vide Regulation 4 of the UCO Bank Officer Employees‟ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976, I award the following penalties on Sri B.D. Mallick (PFM No.27676): Charge No.1 (Proved): Mr. B.D. Mallick is dismissed from Bank‟s service, which shall be a disqualification future employment. for Charge No.2 (Proved): Mr. B.D. Mallick be dismissed from Bank‟s service, which shall be a disqualification for future employment.” 2.10. Dissatisfied with the award of punishment/penalty, being not commensurate with the imputations, and major penalty of dismissal from service, the petitioner alleging the same to be grossly and shockingly disproportionate to the allegations levelled against him, an Appeal was preferred before the General Manager, Human Resources Management Department, Head Office (be called “Appellate Authority”) on 27.01.2011. 2.11. The Appellate Authority upholding the penalty imposed upon Shri B.D. Mallick (PFM No.27676) by the W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 8 of 93 Disciplinary Authority vide Order dated 29.12.2010
Decision
disposed of the appeal by Order dated 25.04.2011. 2.12. Against the confirming Order of the Appellate Authority, alleging mechanical acceptance of decision of the Disciplinary Authority, the petitioner is before this Court by way of filing the instant writ petition. Response of the opposite parties: 3. The Appellate Order confirming the Order of the Disciplinary Authority based on the Report of Enquiry Officer being reasoned and speaking orders, there is no need for intervention in exercise of power of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 3.1. Elaborating the factual findings with respect to irregularities committed with reference to the allegations vis-(cid:224)-vis finding of the Enquiry Officer, it is asserted that the charges being proved, the conduct of the petitioner fell within the ambit of the UCO Bank Officer Employees’ (Conduct) Regulations 1975. 3.2. The petitioner not only extended loans in contravention of authority and flouted banking procedure but also acted in violation of guidelines. He recruited strangers/ outsiders without due authority and given them access to the records maintained in the bank. By virtue of such engagement of two persons and allowing them to handle W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 9 of 93 all records and documents the petitioner exposed the bank to grave risk. This apart, on account of irregularities in sanctioning loan and beyond limits, the petitioner was instrumental for huge loss caused to the bank. 3.3. All the charges were proved as a consequence of establishment of seventeen numbers of allegations and the fact finding of the Enquiry Officer was accepted as proved by the Disciplinary Authority, which in turn got confirmed in the Appeal. 3.4. It is affirmed that the Disciplinary Authority before awarding penalty at each stage not only heard the petitioner but also afforded ample opportunities to explain charges vis-(cid:224)-vis allegations. Hearing: 4. Pleadings being completed and exchanged between the counsel for respective parties, on their consent this matter was taken up for hearing on 05.02.2025. 4.1. Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner advanced arguments on 05.02.2025 and on the request of Sri Bibekananda Ugdata, learned Advocate for the Bank the matter stood adjourned for preparation. He was also requested to furnish copy of Enquiry Proceedings Register. After couple of days’ of W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 10 of 93 adjournment, finally hearing was concluded on 21.03.2025. 4.2. On 21.03.2025, while Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate submitted a Memo enclosing therewith copy of relevant rules relating to Conduct and Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned Advocate, serving a copy of affidavit enclosed therewith copy of Enquiry Proceeding Register on the learned counsel for the petitioner, filed the same before this Court. 4.3. On conclusion of hearing, the matter stood reserved for preparation and pronouncement of Judgment/Order. Rival contentions and submissions: 5. Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate commenced his argument by urging that violation of “Procedure for imposing major penalties” as envisaged under Clause (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulation, 1976, vitiates entire proceeding; as such the Orders of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority are liable to be set aside. 5.1. He referred to the following fact as mentioned in the rejoinder affidavit filed by the petitioner: Allegation No. Date of irregularity 1. October, 2004 Date of charge sheet 19.05.2010 No. of years passed from incident After 5 years W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 11 of 93 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. Date of sanction of advance 20.10.2005 Date of sanction of advance 09.08.2006 Date of sanction of advance 01.03.2005 Date of sanction of advance 18.12.2004 Date of sanction of advance 07.10.2005 Date of sanction of advance 09.08.2006 Date of sanction of advance 02.11.2005, 10.12.2005, 17.05.2006 Date of sanction of advance 22.12.2004 Date of sanction of advance 11.12.2004 Date of sanction of advance 15.02.2004 Date of sanction of advance 17.01.2006 Date of sanction of advance 17.11.2005 Date of sanction of advance 06.06.2005 Date of sanction of advance 05.11.2005 Date of sanction of advance 20.07.2006 Date of sanction of advance 23.06.2005 19.05.2010 After 4 years 19.05.2010 After 4.6 years 19.05.2010 After 5 years 19.05.2010 After 5 years 19.05.2010 After 4 years 19.05.2010 19.05.2010 After 3 years and 4 months After 4 years 19.05.2010 After 5 years 19.05.2010 After 5 years 19.05.2010 After 4 years 19.05.2010 After 4 years 19.05.2010 After 4 years 19.05.2010 After 4 years 19.05.2010 After 4 years 19.05.2010 19.05.2010 After 3 years and 8 months After 4 years 5.2. He, therefore, submitted that the incidents/events or transactions alleged being more than 4 years prior to service of Charge Sheet on the petitioner, the initiation of disciplinary proceeding is hit by limitation as specified in Paragraph 22 of the “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-(cid:224)-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” which was made effective from 25.08.1998. Stressing on the same, he W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 12 of 93 submitted that limitation set forth for initiation of disciplinary proceeding in the said document, this Court is competent to intervene in the matter. 5.3. The last plank of argument of Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate stemmed on the quantum/nature of punishment imposed. He submitted that such penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority ought to have been interfered with by the Appellate Authority considering that the major penalties imposed are disproportionate to the charges framed and allegations levelled against the petitioner. 6. Per contra, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned Advocate for the opposite parties refuting the questions raised by Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner, submitted that the principles of natural justice have been followed at every stage— by the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. No prejudice has been demonstrated by the petitioner to have suffered on account of such lapses, if any. Merely setting up technical pleas at the time of hearing of the matter cannot give scope for this Court to adjudicate upon such aspects. 6.1. Justifying the initiation of disciplinary proceeding based on Report of the Enquiry Officer, the learned Advocate W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 13 of 93 for the opposite parties, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, drew attention of this Court to the copy of Enquiry Proceeding Register being enclosed to affidavit dated 19.03.2025. He has taken this Court to proceeding dated 20.07.2010 when the petitioner was provided with list of management witnesses for examination on 27.07.2010. On 27.07.2010, 04.08.2010, 05.08.2010, 28.08.2010, 14.09.2010 and 15.09.2010 the enquiry proceeded. The learned counsel for the Bank has referred to proceeding dated 15.09.2010 when after examination and cross- examination got completed with respect to Management Witness-1 and Management Witness-2, the Presenting Officer asked questions to the petitioner and the defence counsel also examined the petitioner on the said date. 6.2. For illustration, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned Advocate has referred to following statements made by the petitioner during the course of enquiry on the examination and cross-examination, which is extracted herein below from Enquiry Proceeding dated 15.09.2010: “PO to CSOE Allegation-1 *** 12. You have told that Zonal Officer has told you to engage a computer literate from outside. Can you show the letter of Z.O. Verbal Instruction was given W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 14 of 93 Allegation-2 *** 2. Is it a loan policy or you yourself are telling Allegation-4 *** I no have knowledge of loan policy 5. What is your delegated power I do not know for sanction of a TL (MMGS-II Officer) Allegation-6 *** 1. You have sanctioned a TL of Rs.6.50 Lacs to Sri Bijay Kumar Mohanty on 07.10.2005. Whether you have exceeded your delegated power which is Rs.4.00 lacs Delegated is Power not known to me” 6.3. The learned counsel for the opposite parties submitted that against each of the allegations questions were put to the petitioner and, therefore, he contended that there is no doubt that there was irregularities committed by the petitioner and finally the petitioner on the said date before the Enquiry Officer has stated thus: “The P.O. told that he has completed cross-examination of the CSOE (petitioner). Then the E.O. asked the CSOE it has anything to tell regarding the allegations/charges W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 15 of 93 levelled against him; The CSOE told that “I was the single officer at the branch and was under tremendous work pressure. Whatever I have done are only for interest of the Bank.” The hearing of enquiry process is over. The EO asked the P.O. to submit his written brief within two weeks‟ time. The E.O. requested the DC to submit his defence brief within a week in receiving the PO‟s brief.” 6.4. With the above factual details on record, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned counsel submitted that the petitioner having been given such opportunity and was given scope to examine himself during the course of enquiry, the contention of the petitioner that there was infraction of Regulation 6(17) of the Regulations, 1976 is without any foundation. 6.5. With respect to point of limitation, Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned counsel would submit that the document based on which the learned counsel for the petitioner pleaded such mixed question of fact and law has no statutory support, more particularly when “fraud” has been alleged and proved. He further submitted that being not pleaded ever before the Authorities or this Court in the writ application, the same is not liable to be adjudicated upon. In this connection it is submitted that beyond pleadings this Court need not travel and may not allow the petitioner to argue the matter on the principles laid down in State of Karnataka Vrs. C. Lalitha, (2006) 1 SCR 971. Wherein it W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 16 of 93 has been stated that in absence of pleading, any amount of evidence will not help the party. Analysis and discussion: 7. At the stage of hearing of the present matter, the learned counsel for the petitioner has heavily contested that the Enquiry Officer has violated the procedure envisaged in Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976. 7.1. Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976, copy of which is made available by the petitioner by Memo dated 15.01.2025, read thus: “(13) On the date fixed for the enquiry, the oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charge are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority shall be examined by the Presenting Officer. The witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer shall be examined by the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the officer employee. The Presenting Officer shall be entitled to re-examine his witnesses on any points on which they have cross-examined, but not on a new matter, without the leave of the Inquiry Authority. The Inquiry Authority may also put such questions to the witnesses as it thinks fit. (17) The Inquiry Authority may, after the officer employee closes his evidence, and shall, if the officer employee has not got himself examined, generally question W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 17 of 93 him on the circumstances appearing against him in the evidence for the purpose of enabling the officer employee to explain any circumstances appearing in the evidence against him.” 7.2. Scrutiny of the copy of the Enquiry Proceeding Register forming part of affidavit dated 19.03.2025 of the opposite parties-Bank, as referred to herein supra, it is surfaced that after examination and cross-examination of the Management Witnesses are completed, the Enquiry Officer has asked questioned to the petitioner on each of the allegations/charges on 15.09.2010 and thereby given opportunity to the petitioner to examine himself and be cross-examined. 7.3. In the writ petition the petitioner craves to challenge the Order of the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority on the following grounds: “16. That the petitioner has challenged the order of the opposite party Nos.2 and opposite party No.3, which are annexed herewith as Annexure-7 & 10 to this writ application on the following amongst other grounds: i) ii) The findings are based on prosecution document, which are abided to all and not admitted during the course of inquiry. The Inquiry Officer while dealing with the inquiry, he deliberately has not perused certain documents filed by the petitioner. W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 18 of 93 iii) That the petitioner has put to serve under the Bank for 30 years in various capacities and always tried his best to serve the bank with utmost devotion and with an unblemished record. Due to acute shortage of staffs, heavy pressure of work some irregularities might have been procedural committed without any ulterior motive cannot be awarded with the punishment of dismissal from service. The petitioner left with lurch with a stigma of dismissal from service at the fag end of his career, which he has to carry on the rest of his life with bereaved heart. iv) For the allegation No.1 the petitioner most humbly submitted that since the engagement of a person was of dire necessity and within the knowledge of the Zonal Office, the petitioner cannot be singularly held responsible for the lapse on his part. v) the allegation No.2 further For submitted that he cannot be responsible for the non- recovery of loan after his relief from the said Branch and the allegation is un-founded. the petitioner vi) For the allegation No.3 the petitioner submitted that he was relieved from the Nilgiri Branch on 16.8.2006 7 days after sanction of loan and disbursement of only Rs.45,000/- of loan amount, he cannot be held responsible on subsequent disbursement any account and for non-repayment in the loan account. vii) The petitioner further submitted that he was not aware of his delegated power, which was a definite lapse on his part as Branch Manager, but there was no deliberate breach of authority on his part as other sanction was being promptly W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 19 of 93 reiterated to the Zonal Office and the Zonal Office has never pointed out him that his action was not in accordance with law, therefore his appeal to take a lenient view has not been properly considered and so far as the allegations Nos.5 to 17 are concerned very specifically he has denied all the allegations, but neither the appellate authority has dealt with the same in its proper prospective and awarded major penalties against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer has held upon and supported the irrelevant material of the prosecution charges, which are not alleged in the charge sheet, but shows that the Inquiry is not conducted in impartial manner. the disciplinary authority nor viii) That the opposite party No.2 has not either lapses on the part of opposite party No.3 and on the other hand in a mechanical manner and in a non-speaking order dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner.” 7.4. Though such grounds were taken in the writ petition, the petitioner could not establish factual perversity in the finding of the Disciplinary Authority nor the Appellate Authority. The pleadings/grounds of attack are silent about challenge as to procedural lapses as contended during the course of hearing with respect to infraction of Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976. 7.5. This Court may take notice of well-settled principles as propounded in the case laws cited at the Bar. W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 20 of 93 In Abubakar Abdul Inamdar Vrs. Harun Abdul Inamdar, (1995) 5 SCC 612 the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India observed that if the party has not raised a plea regarding adverse possession in its pleadings, it cannot substitute the pleadings with the evidence as pleadings form the foundations of the claim of a litigating party. In this connection, a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India titled Ram Sarup Gupta (dead) by LRs Vrs. Bishun Narain Inter College and others, (1987) 2 SCC 555, is relevant, wherein it has been held that “*** all necessary and material facts should be pleaded by the party in support of the case set up by it. In the absence of pleadings, evidence, if any, produced by the parties cannot be considered. No party should be permitted to travel beyond its pleading. The object and purpose of pleading is to enable the adversary party to know the case it has to meet. In order to have a fair trial it is imperative that the party should state the essential material facts so that other party may not be taken by surprise. The pleadings however should receive a liberal construction; no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities. Sometimes, pleadings are expressed in words which may not expressly make out a case in accordance with strict interpretation of law. In such a case it is the duty of the court to ascertain the substance of the pleadings and not the form to determine the case and the issues upon which they went to trial. Once it is found that in spite of deficiency in the pleadings parties knew the case and they proceeded to trial on those issues by producing evidence, it would not W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 21 of 93 be open to a party to raise the question of absence of pleadings in appeal. The substance of the pleading in the present case was clear. The plaintiff went to trial knowing fully well that defendant‟s claim was that the licence was irrevocable.” 7.6. Nonetheless, this Court examined the extended averment of learned counsel for the petitioner. Sri Surendra Kumar Panda, learned Advocate submitted in his written note filed before this Court on 15.01.2025, which reads as follows: “The Enquiry Officer conducted the Enquiry Proceeding from 08.07.2010 to 08.10.2010. The following witnesses on behalf of Bank were presented by the Presenting Officer in the Enquiry Proceeding: Management Witness (MW 1) Susil Kumar Das (MW 2) Subash Chandra Mishra On behalf the CSO (Charge Sheeted Employee) Defence Representative (DR) was present along with Charge Sheeted Employee. No witness was produced from Defence side. According to Regulation 6 sub-regulation (17) of the UCO Bank Conduct and Discipline and Appeal Regulations, 1976, under Heading “Procedure for imposing major penalty” the following provisions are to be followed. *** As this provision of the Regulation has not complied, the enquiry has been vitiated. Hence the Order of Dismissal passed by the Disciplinary Authority as well as confirmed by the Appellate Authority need to be quashed.” W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 22 of 93 7.7. In order to test the veracity of such expanded argument, this Court requested the counsel for the Bank to furnish Enquiry Proceeding Register, responding to which an affidavit dated 19.03.2025 being sworn to by Zonal Manager of UCO Bank, Balasore Zonal Office has come to be filed enclosing therewith complete set of Enquiry Proceeding Register. 7.8. Cursory glance at the record available it is manifest that each of the allegations/charges as explained by the petitioner was taken into consideration. The Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority have carefully considered every explanation with reference to allegations/charges. 7.9. When no mala fide or bias is alleged against the authorities and the Enquiry Proceeding Register depicts correct position of fact that the petitioner was given scope to examine and be cross-examined during the course of the Enquiry Proceeding, the allegation of non- compliance of Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations would not hold water. 7.10. This Court in the case of Bhaskar Chandra Mohapatra Vrs. The Disciplinary Authority, UCO Bank, 2015 (II) OLR 1042 made the following observations: “To the above facts pleaded by the parties, it appears that in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 19 of W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 23 of 93 called the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970, the Board of Directors of UCO Bank in consultation with the Reserve Bank and with previous sanction of the central Government framed regulation “UCO Bank Officer Employees‟ (Discipline and Appeal) Regulations, 1976”. Regulation 4 deals with penalties wherein it has been stated penalties imposed on an officer- mentioned therein may be employee for act of misconduct or for any other good and sufficient reasons and entire penalties have been in Sub- classified as minor penalties as Regulations (a) to (e) and major penalties has been classified from Sub-Regulation (f) to (j). Dismissal which future shall ordinarily be a disqualification employment has been classified under sub-clause (j) of Regulation 4, which has been imposed on the present petitioner by the Disciplinary Authority in the impugned order and has been confirmed by the Appellate Authority. indicated for The apex Court time and again in State Bank of India Vrs. Ram Lal Bhaskar and another, (2011) 10 SCC 249, State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vrs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011) 4 SCC 584 and State Bank of India and others Vrs. Ramesh Dinkar Punde 2006 (7) SCC 212 has held that the Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority over the orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the Appellate Authority. Therefore, in exercise of judicial review, this Court can only examine whether there is infraction of any statutory provision governing the field while following the procedure and if there is procedural lapses, in that case, the Court can interfere with the same.” 7.11. Having observed thus, this Court in said reported case in Bhaskar Chandra Mohapatra (supra) went on to W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 24 of 93 analyse the scope of Clause (13) of Regulation 6 of Regulations, 1976, in the following manner: the Presenting Officer and “6. On perusal of the above mentioned provisions, it appears that on the date fixed for enquiry, oral and documentary evidence by which the articles of charges are proposed to be proved shall be produced by or on behalf of disciplinary authority, shall be examined by the witnesses produced by the Presenting Officer shall be examined by the Presenting Officer and may be cross-examined by or on behalf of the officer employee. Therefore, in the present context no such evidence, oral or documentary, has been produced by or on behalf of the Disciplinary Authority before enquiry was conducted against the petitioner. On the basis of the materials available with the Presenting Officer, the proceeding was continued resulting thereby that the enquiring officer has not complied with the provisions as mentioned in sub- Regulation (13) of Regulation 6, which is in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. Though several documents have been relied upon in course of enquiry but such documents have not been produced on the date fixed for enquiry so as to enable the delinquent officer to go through the same and to either dislodge this evidence by adducing rebuttal documents or adducing oral evidence, as the case may be. 7. It also appears that the charges basing upon which the proceeding has been initiated against the petitioner were framed on the irregularities pointed W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 25 of 93 out in the name of commission and omission in course of due discharge of duty during inspection by the competent authority and inspection report dated 09.12.2005 of the very Branch of Faujadari (1702) reveals that the same have been rectified and there was recommendation for closure of the inspection report dated 09.12.2005 by the authority vide Annexure-12 dated 31.10.2007. If the commissions or omissions have been rectified by the authority and it has been reflected in the inspection report itself, for the self-same cause of action, the present proceeding as against the petitioner is unwarranted, rather it smacks of malafide against the authority concerned. The track record of the petitioner clearly indicates that he has got an unblemished service career for last 35 years and at the fag end of his career, he has been put to some difficulties and on the basis of irrational and unreasonable allegations made against him, he has been dismissed from service, otherwise he would have superannuated from service from 01.11.2010 on attaining the age of superannuation. Even though the lapses revealed in course of enquiry conducted by the enquiring officer with regard to non-application of sub-Regulation (13) of Regulation 6 had been brought to the notice of the Disciplinary Authority, the same had not been taken into consideration and therefore, the order of punishment so inflicted on the petitioner may not be sustained.” 7.12. However bearing in mind such analysis of Clause (13) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations 1976, and reading of Clause (17) thereof alongside in order to construe the W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 26 of 93 effect of such provisions harmoniously, on examination of the record it could factually be discerned that the Enquiry Officer has afforded opportunity to the petitioner to proffer explanation and the petitioner also offered his explanation which was taken into consideration. The Disciplinary Authority had given scope to the petitioner to rebut all the allegations/ charges vis-(cid:224)-vis findings contained in the Report submitted by the Enquiry Officer. It is transparent from the Enquiry Proceedings Register that on 15.09.2010 it is recorded as follows: “The DC (defence counsel) asked to examine the CSOE (Charge Sheeted Officer Employee-the petitioner). It was allowed by EO (Enquiry Officer).” 7.13. Minute scrutiny of Enquiry Proceeding Register would go to show that the defence counsel has cross-examined the Management Witnesses-1 and 2 on behalf of the petitioner. The Defence Counsel/Defence Representative also examined the petitioner on 15.09.2010. On the very date the Presenting Officer also cross-examined the petitioner, certain relevant portions of which have been culled out supra. The above procedural safeguards under Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976, provided in favour of the petitioner have been followed. W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 27 of 93 7.14. During the course of hearing of instant case, Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate alleged that lapses in adhering to procedure laid down in Clause (17) of Regulation 6 of Regulations, 1976 would vitiate entire proceeding. Though not conceded by the counsel for the opposite parties-Bank that there was procedural defect in conduct of enquiry as alleged by the petitioner, it deserves to be take notice that entire proceeding does not get frustrated in view of what has been spelt out in the case of Chairman, LIC of India Vrs. A. Masilamani, (2013) 6 SCC 530 wherein it has been held that once the Court sets aside an order of punishment on the ground of improper conduct of the enquiry, it must remit the matter to the Disciplinary Authority to conduct the enquiry from the point that it stood vitiated and conclude the same. 7.15. Nevertheless, it is manifest from the Enquiry Proceedings Register that on 15.09.2010, i.e., last date of enquiry proceeding, after closure of examination and cross-examination of the Charge Sheeted Officer- Employee (the petitioner) vis-(cid:224)-vis seventeen numbers of allegations, the Enquiry Officer asked general question on the circumstances appearing against him, to which the petitioner has responded by saying, “I was the single officer at the branch and was under tremendous work pressure. Whatever I have done are only for the interest W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 28 of 93 of the Bank.” Thereafter, the Enquiry Officer has recorded that “The hearing of enquiry process is over. The Enquiry Officer asked the Presenting Officer to submit his written brief within two weeks’ time. The Enquiry Officer requested the defence counsel to submit his defence brief within a week on receiving the Presenting Officer’s brief”. In addition to this, from the grounds as taken in the writ petition (extracted herein above) abundant indication is available to perceive that the petitioner has conceded to have committed irregularities. 7.16. As has already been culled out certain portions of statements/answers of the petitioner during the course of examination before the Enquiry Officer (illustratively), it needs to be highlighted that while admitting to have sanctioned loans, the delinquent has made it clear in his statement in the examination by Presenting Officer with respect to each allegation that on “verbal instructions” he engaged computer literate person from “outside” and that he had “no knowledge of loan policy”, but sanctioned loan beyond his delegated authority. These revelations of the petitioner are tell-tale. 7.17. It is well established proposition of law that rule of evidence does not apply to the departmental proceedings in its strict sense. The Supreme Court in the case of Kanwar Amninder Singh Vrs. The Hon‟ble High Court of Page 29 of 93 W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Uttarakhand at Nainital Through its Registrar General, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 3338 has held as under: “The case diary which the petitioner wants to be exhibited was not permitted by the Enquiry Officer on the ground of lack of proof for the said document as required under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Strict rules of evidence are not applicable to a Departmental Enquiry. There is no prejudice caused to anyone if the case diary is placed on record. The case diary which is shown as exhibit 44 in the application by the petitioner shall be exhibited as a document in the departmental enquiry. The departmental enquiry may be expedited and completed soon.” 7.18. This Court in absence of any rebuttal by the petitioner with respect to facts recorded by the Enquiry Officer in the Enquiry Proceedings Register, accedes to the contention of Sri Bibekananda Udgata, learned Advocate for the opposite parties that there was compliance of Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulations, 1976. Therefore, it seems consciously no ground in this respect has been agitated neither in the writ petition nor was pressed into service before the Appellate Authority. Before the Disciplinary Authority also such plea was absent with respect to procedural slackness with respect to enquiry. 7.19. Having said thus this Court reaches at the conclusion that no palpable procedural lapse in the Enquiry Proceeding qua Clause (13) and Clause (17) of Regulation 6 of the Regulations, 1976 is found. W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 30 of 93 Therefore, the contention raised by Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner stands dismissed lacking merit on facts. 8. The second limb of argument of Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate proceeds on the basis of new stance taken by way of rejoinder affidavit dated 27.08.2024. It is contended by the learned counsel that the incidents/events or alleged transactions under allegations/charges being beyond more than four years, the enquiry could not have been conducted for such stale allegations being hit by limitation as stipulated in a document titled “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-(cid:224)-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner”. He relied on Clause (22) of said document which reads thus: “Every Bank has evolved a system of credit audit/ inspection for non-borrowal/borrowal accounts under which they are subjected to close scrutiny. This audit/ inspection would scrutinize pre-sanction appraisal, documentation and disbursement of loans/advances and post-sanction follow up. If any irregularity is missed out by auditors/inspections in the first audit/inspection, it is reasonable to expect that the remaining undetected second be detected irregularities will audit/inspection and necessary disciplinary proceeding initiated against the concerned officials in the follow up action. Normally the second audit/inspection would be completed within 3-4 years. The Commission has accordingly approved the proposal that no disciplinary the in W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 31 of 93 proceeding will ordinarily lie against any official for any lapse not detected within two successive internal regular audits/inspections of the same account or 4 years from the date of event, whichever is later. In case any irregularity the second audit/inspection, the auditors/inspectors concerned will be held accountable and be liable for disciplinary proceedings. This time limit will not apply cases of (i) fraud, (ii) other criminal offences, or (iii) cases where mala fides are inferable.” is detected subsequent to 8.1. For the following reasons, this Court is not inclined to entertain such a plea taken at the belated stage: i. Learned counsel for the petitioner failed to explain the authenticity of the document titled “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-(cid:224)-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner”. Complete document is not placed on record by the petitioner. As if said document is made effective from 25.08.1998, heavy reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Rather bare reading of said document reveals “The Commission has been accorded statutory status with effect from 25.08.1998 through the Central Vigilance Commission Ordinance, 1998”. In absence of any material to show that such document as enclosed to rejoinder affidavit has been brought to force by way of valid law and that the document relied upon has been issued in W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 32 of 93 exercise of statutory provisions with duly delegated authority conferred on the competent authority, this Court is not obligated to examine the issue raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner. ii. As such a plea is not available neither before the Enquiry Officer nor the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority or did the petitioner raise the plea of limitation based on such document in the writ application, the same does not deserve examination in view of Rule 10 of Chapter-XV of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948, whereby it is stipulated that “a further reply or counter-affidavit by any party to the proceedings, as the circumstances may require may be filed with the leave of the Court”. No such leave has been sought for by the petitioner before this Court. Therefore, the ground of limitation based on inchoate document “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-(cid:224)-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” without demonstrating the statutory force of such document could not be argued by Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner. Resultantly, such a plea, being vexatious, would have attracted imposition of costs regard being had to the change of stance by the petitioner from time W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 33 of 93 to time, but recognizing the anxiety on behalf of the petitioner and taking note of age of the petitioner who is stated to be about 60 years in the year 2011 and dismissed from service, this Court desists from doing so. iii. Glance at the said document enclosed to rejoinder affidavit does not reveal its statutory support. As it appears, said document relates to the Central Vigilance Commissioner (CVC). iv. It is not cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner whether the enquiry and disciplinary proceeding in question emanates from the audit/ inspection undertaken by the CVC. v. Recital of Clause (22) of the document “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-(cid:224)-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” does not reveal the period of limitation is having statutory force. Careful reading of such clause would suggest that the proceeding is to be drawn up against the auditors/inspectors who were accountable for having not detected irregularity at the first instance, but detected the same subsequently. vi. The words “normally” and “ordinarily” employed in the said document have significance. W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 34 of 93 The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai Vrs. Roshan Kumar, Haji Bashir Ahmed, (1976) 1 SCC 671 held, “The expression „ordinarily‟ indicates that this is not a cast-iron rule. It is flexible enough to take in those cases where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter. That apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject matter of the proceedings will be covered by this rule. The principles enunciated in the English cases noticed above, are not inconsistent with it.” In Commissioner of Customs Vrs. J.D. Orgochem Limited, (2008) 6 SCR 200 it has been held, expression “The „ordinarily‟ may mean „normally‟. It has been held by this Court in India and Kailash Chandra Vrs. Union of Krishangopal Vrs. Shri Prakashchandra and Ors., (1974) 1 SCC 12, that the said expression must be understood in the context in which it has been used and, thus, „Ordinarily‟ may not mean „solely‟ or „in the name‟, and thus, if under no circumstance an appeal would lie to the Principal District Judge, the Court would not be subordinate to it. When in a common parlance the expression „ordinarily‟ is used, there may be an option. There may be cases where an exception can be made out. It is W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 35 of 93 never used in reference to a case where there is no exception. It never means „primarily‟.” This Court in Division Bench in the case of Union of India Vrs. Krishna Chandra Biswas, 2023 SCC OnLine Ori 6002, taking note of aforesaid decision, observed as follows: “49. Taking into account the principles in of construction of meaning of word the provision of a statute, the meaning of the word „ordinarily‟ can be couched as interpreted by In Kailash the Hon‟ble Supreme Court. Chandra Vrs. Union of India, (1962) 1 SCR 374 = AIR 1961 SC 1346; Eicher Tractors Ltd. Vrs. Commissioner of Customs, (2001) 1 SCC 315 = AIR 2001 SC 196; State of Andhra Pradesh Vrs. Sarma Rao, (2007) 2 SCC 159 = AIR 2007 the word the meaning of SC 137, „ordinarily‟ has been given to understand as „in the large majority of cases but not invariably‟. The expression „ordinarily‟ means normally and it is used where there can be an exception. „Ordinarily‟ excludes extraordinary or special circumstances. 50. In Mohan Baitha Vrs. State of Bihar, (2001) 4 SCC 350 the use of the word „ordinarily‟ has been meant to have indicated that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Criminal Procedure Code. That apart, the Court has taken the view that the exceptions implied by the word „ordinarily‟ need not be W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 36 of 93 limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on considerations of convenience or may be law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. from other provisions of implied 51. In Krishan Gopal Vrs. Shri Prakashchandra, (1974) 1 SCC 128, it has been discussed that the word „ordinarily‟ does not indicate that the provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 80-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951, are not mandatory and that relaxation in compliance with those provisions is permissible. The word „ordinarily‟ only qualifies the number of judges who can exercise the jurisdiction, which is vested in the High Court to try an election petition. The said word indicates that normally it would be a single Judge of the High Court who can exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in the High Court, but in appropriate cases, such jurisdiction can also be exercised by two or more judges.” Taking cue from above interpretation of the expression “normally” and “ordinarily”, natural corollary would be that, the limitation specified in Clause (22) of the document titled “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-(cid:224)-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” cannot be the “sole” or “primary” W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 37 of 93 factor to obliterate entire proceeding as suggested by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 8.2. It is trite that limitation being mixed question of fact and law, the same ought to be raised at appropriate stage before the proper authority or the Court having jurisdiction to adjudicate issue on facts. 8.3. For the above reasons as discussed above, this Court is not persuaded to accede to the argument advanced by Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner that the entire disciplinary proceeding including the enquiry proceeding is barred by time and therefore, vitiated. 9. The last ditch attempt valiantly made by Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate to render relief to the petitioner was that imposition of major penalty does not commensurate with the misconduct or irregularities established by the quasi-judicial authorities and such penalty being disproportionate to the material on record, the Orders in Annexures-7 and 10 are liable for intervention of this Court. 9.1. Scanned through the Enquiry Proceeding Register it would reveal that to the questions put by the Presenting Officer on 15.09.2010, the petitioner has responded by saying “verbal instructions was given”, “I have no knowledge of loan policy”, “I do not know” about W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 38 of 93 delegated power for sanction of TL, “Delegated power is not known to me” while sanctioning TL beyond Rs.4 lakhs, “Lien was not marked in the renewed two KYs nor in the related CFD ledgers”. These are viewed very seriously by the Disciplinary Authority. After threadbare discussion factually the Disciplinary Authority justified the finding contained in the Report vis-(cid:224)-vis seventeen allegations in seriatim and imposed major penalty in respect of charges framed. The Disciplinary Authority passed order to dismiss the petitioner. Such finding of fact as also the penalty so imposed has been confirmed by the Appellate Authority after factual discussion with reference to material available on record on the grounds set out before him. 9.2. During the course of hearing in the present case on a query from this Court, Sri Surendra Nath Panda, learned Advocate for the petitioner candidly admitted that no plea was raised before any of the Authorities with respect to infraction of Clauses (13) and (17) of Regulation 6 of Regulations, 1976. The plea with respect to limitation as stated to be contained in “Vigilance Management in Public Sector Banks vis-(cid:224)-vis the Role and Functions of the Central Vigilance Commissioner” has been taken for the first time by way of rejoinder affidavit, which was filed without compliance of Rule 10(2) of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948. It is W.P.(C) No.28648 of 2011 Page 39 of 93 also not the case of the petitioner that fact-finding by the Disciplinary Authority as confirmed by the Appellate Authority is perverse and contrary to record. 9.3. In Rajendra Singh Vrs. State of M.P., (1996) 5 SCC 460 it has been stated thus: “6.