Orissa High Court
Case Details
Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.2332 of 2022 (In the matter of an application under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, 1950). M/s. Central Electronics Limited & Anr. …. -versus- Petitioner (s) M/s. Surya International …. Opposite Party (s) Advocates appeared in the case through Hybrid Mode: For Petitioner (s) For Opp. Party (s) : : Mr. D.P. Nanda, Sr. Adv. Along with Mr. Rupesh Kumar Kanungo, Adv. Mr. S.S. Padhy, Adv. On behalf of Mr. Gouri Mohan Rath, Adv. CORAM: DR. JUSTICE SANJEEB K PANIGRAHI DATE OF HEARING:-31.07.2025 DATE OF JUDGMENT:-20.09.2025 Dr. Sanjeeb K Panigrahi, J. 1. The present Writ Petition has been preferred seeking quashing of the order dated 26.11.2021 passed by the learned District Judge, Cuttack in ARBP No.7/2021 to the extent that the Ld. District Judge has rejected the Petition filed by the present Petitioners under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and thereby declined to entertain the application filed under Section 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 read with Section 34 of the A & C Act. Page 1 of 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 I. FACTUAL MATRIX OF THE CASE: 2. That, the Petitioner No. 1 namely, M/s Central Electronics Limited is a Govt. of India Enterprise under Department of Scientific & Industrial Research (DSIR), Ministry of Science &. Technology. It was established in 1974 with an objective to commercially exploit the indigenous technologies developed by National Laboratories and R&D Institutions in the country. 3. The Container Corporation of India Ltd., a Public Sector Enterprise under the Ministry of Railways (hereinafter, referred to as “CONCOR/ Employer”) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter, referred to as “MOU”) with the Petitioner No. 1 for Solar Electrification of 106 Households in Badil Bigha and 305 Households in Bahsa Pipra, along with 3 Solar Water Pumps and drip irrigation systems in Badil Bigha in Gaya District of Bihar. 4. Pursuant to the MOU dated 23.6.2015, the Petitioner No. 1 issued Tender Call Notice No. C-2(b) /RC/0700/4325/2015 dated 14.7.2015 (hereinafter, referred to as “Tender Notice”), for the “Supply of Balance of System, Installation, Commissioning and AMC of 5 years for Solar Mini Grid Power Plant in Gaya Bihar”. 5. Vide purchase order dated 29.9.2015, the present Opposite Party was allotted the work of supply of balance system, installation, testing, commissioning, warranty (including annual maintenance) for five years for a complete/composite work of 1 Nos. of Solar Mini grid Power- plants for Badil Bhiga village and 2 Nos. 15 KW Solar mini grid power
Legal Reasoning
plant for Bahsa Pipra village adhering to the standardized norms. The Page 2 of 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 total value of the work allotted was Rs. 1,68,90,500/-. In the Purchase order, dated 29.9.2015, it was specified that, all specifications, terms and conditions will be followed as per Tender Notice and that payment will be made on “back to back basis”. 6. After installation and commissioning of 12KWP Solar Mini Grid at Badil Bigha Village Gaya-Bihar, on 12.8.2016, a Joint Site Survey was conducted by the Representatives of CONCOR and Petitioners, pursuant to which a Joint Inspection Certificate, dated 28.01.2017 was issued. As the Solar Power plant at Badil Bigha Village was commissioned and was working properly, the requisite payment of Rs. 65,95,750/-(Rupees Sixty Five Lakh Ninety Five Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty only) as against this portion of the purchase order was made to the Opposite Party. 7. Disputes arose between the party qua the remaining portion of work, i.e. 2 Nos. 15 KW Solar mini grid power plant for Bahsa Pipra village. Resultantly, the present Opposite Party filed a claim application before the MSEFC, Odisha, Cuttack on 11.3.2019 which was registered as MSEFC Case No. 19 of 2019. 8. Upon receiving notice dated 5.4.2019, the present Petitioners appeared before the MSEFC and submitted their reply in May, 2019. The parties were notified by the MSEFC on 24.7.2019 to appear on 3.8.2019 for ‘settlement of case’. 9. On 3.8.2019, the MSEFC was pleased to observe that the claim of the present Opposite Party is admitted and payable by the present Petitioner and that the present Petitioner is liable to pay outstanding Page 3 of 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 dues to the present Opposite Party. The matter was thereafter adjourned to 20.9.2019. 10. On 20.9.2019, the present Opposite Party submitted before the Council that their unit is in financial crunch due to an amount of Rs.1,01,56,030.00 towards principal and Rs.1,07,44,861.53 towards interest were laying outstanding upon the present Petitioner. The present Petitioner agreed to it and submitted that the reconciliation process is going on to clear up the dues of the Petitioner. The Council directed both the parties to make an amicable settlement with each other within 15 days and report its outcome for final hearing on 16.11.2019. 11. On 16.11.2019, the MSEFC recorded that conciliation has failed and on the self-same date proceeded to pass the award directing the present Petitioner to pay the principal amount as well as interest as calculated up to 31.1.2019 within 30 days to the present Opposite Party. A copy of the order dated 16.11.2019 is alleged to have been received by the present Petitioners on 16.12.2019. 12. Aggrieved, the present Petitioners had approached this Court on 16.2.2020 vide W.P.(C) No. 6776 of 2020 challenging the order dated 16.11.2019 for having been passed during the conciliation process without affording a proper opportunity of hearing to the present Petitioners. Vide order dated 16.3.2021, this Court was pleased to direct the present Petitioners to prefer an appeal u/s 19 of the Act along with a petition for condonation of delay within three weeks, in which case the petition for condonation of delay would be disposed of in accordance with law ‘liberally’ as the matter was pending before this Court. Page 4 of 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 13. The present Petitioners preferred a Special Leave Petition (SLP(C) No. 6627 of 2021) before the Apex Court against the order dated 16.3.2021 in W.P.(C) No. 6776 of 2020, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 13.5.2021. 14. Thereafter, the present Petitioners preferred ARBP No. 7 of 2021 before the Court of the Ld. District Judge, Cuttack u/s 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 r/w S. 34 of the A&C Act on 18.6.2021. The Petition was accompanied by an I.A. u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 465 days in preferring the Petition as the matter was sub-judice before this Court and the Apex Court for a large period of the alleged delay and meanwhile, the Apex Court had also periodically extended the period of limitation in Suo Moto W.P.(C) No. 3/2020. 15. Vide the impugned order, the Ld. District Judge was pleased to reject the I.A. u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 465 days in preferring the Petition and consequently, the petition u/s 19 of the MSMED Act, 2006 r/w S. 34 of the A&C Act was dismissed as not admitted. 16. Aggrieved, the present petition has been preferred. 17. Now that the facts leading up to the instant Appeal has been laid down, this Court shall endeavour to summarise the contentions of the Parties and the broad grounds that have been raised. II. PETITIONERS’ SUBMISSIONS: 18. The Ld. Counsel for the Petitioner submitted that the arbitral award in question cannot trigger limitation under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, unless and until a signed copy of the award Page 5 of 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 was duly delivered to the Petitioner. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has consistently held that delivery of a signed copy to the party itself is not a mere formality but a substantive requirement, and limitation begins only from such date of receipt. In the present case, the award was received by the Petitioner only on 16.12.2019, and therefore any computation of limitation must commence from that date. The learned District Judge gravely erred in treating the earlier date of receipt by counsel as sufficient compliance with Section 31(5). 19. Without prejudice, even assuming some delay in filing the application under Section 34, the Petitioner is entitled to the benefit of the orders of the Supreme Court in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re, whereby the period from 15.3.2020 to 28.2.2022 stood excluded for the purposes of computation of limitation. The Petitioner was diligently prosecuting remedies before this Court and the Apex Court, including a writ petition and a Special Leave Petition, challenging the arbitral award on jurisdictional grounds. In such circumstances, Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 squarely applies, as the Petitioner acted in good faith and with due diligence before forums which were ultimately held to lack jurisdiction. Hence, rejection of the condonation application on technical grounds gravely prejudices the Petitioner’s rights. III. OPPOSITE PARTY’S SUBMISSIONS: 20. Per contra, the Ld. Counsel for the Opposite Party submits that the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is hopelessly barred by limitation. The certified copy of the arbitral award was admittedly obtained by the Petitioner’s advocate on 9.12.2019. In view of the settled law, knowledge and possession of the Page 6 of 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 award by an advocate duly authorised to act on behalf of a party is sufficient notice to the party itself. The Petitioner cannot artificially extend limitation by claiming receipt at its office on a later date. Accordingly, as the limitation period commenced on 9.12.2019, and the application filed thereafter is beyond the statutory period of three months and the further condonable period of thirty days. 21. It was further contended that, the reliance of the Petitioner on the Supreme Court’s suo motu orders in Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, In re is misplaced. The said orders were never intended to revive causes of action or cure delays which had already occurred prior to 15.3.2020. Therefore, the Petitioner cannot seek shelter under the blanket extension of limitation. Furthermore, the plea of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is untenable as the Petitioner’s writ proceedings and SLP were tactical attempts to bypass the statutory remedy under Section 34. Hence, the District Judge rightly dismissed the condonation application, and no interference is warranted. IV. ISSUE FOR CONSIDERATION 22. Having heard the parties and perused the materials available on record, this court here has identified the following solitary to be determined: A. Whether, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay in filing the Petitioner’s application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging the award passed by the Facilitation Council, deserves to be condoned in view of the statutory framework, the Supreme Court’s orders extending limitation during the Covid-19 pandemic, and the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963? Page 7 of 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 V. ISSUE A: WHETHER IN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, THE DELAY IN FILING THE PETITIONER’S APPLICATION UNDER SECTION 34 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT, 1996, CHALLENGING THE AWARD PASSED BY THE FACILITATION COUNCIL, DESERVES TO BE CONDONED IN VIEW OF THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK, THE SUPREME COURT’S ORDERS EXTENDING LIMITATION DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC, AND THE APPLICABILITY OF SECTION 14 OF THE LIMITATION ACT, 1963? 23. On a careful perusal of Section 31(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it is apparent that the statute mandates the delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award to each party. The significance of such delivery lies not merely in authenticating the correctness of the award, but also in ensuring that the limitation period, whether for enforcement under Section 36 or for filing objections under Section 34, commences. A “signed copy” within the meaning of Section 31(5) clearly denotes a copy bearing the signature of the Arbitrator. 24. Further, on a close reading of Section 36, this Court finds that an arbitral award becomes enforceable only when the time prescribed for making an application to set aside the award under Section 34 has elapsed. Section 34(3) provides that such an application must be made within a period of three months from the date on which the party making the application has received the signed copy of the award. The proviso to Section 34(3) authorises the Court to condone a delay of up to 30 days beyond the original three months, provided sufficient cause is shown. However, the outer limit of condonation cannot exceed 30 days. The limitation period of three months is triggered only upon the receipt of Page 8 of 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 the signed copy of the arbitral award, and such receipt necessarily means receipt by the party of a signed copy. 25. Section 32 of the Act contemplates the termination of arbitral proceedings, which termination necessarily follows compliance with Section 31, including the delivery of a signed copy of the award to each party. In a recent judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Limited v. Navigant Technologies Pvt Ltd.1, their Lordships held that the termination would take place only when there is a complete compliance of Section 31 of the Act which would include the delivery of a signed copy of the award to each party. 26. It follows, therefore, that it is mandatory for the sole Arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal to ensure delivery of a signed copy of the award to each party so that the limitation period prescribed under Section 34 may begin to run. In the absence of such delivery, the statutory period of three months does not commence. 27. The next issue that arises for consideration is the permissible modes of delivery of such signed copies. One method is to summon the parties on the date of pronouncement of the award and hand over signed copies at that time, with appropriate endorsement on the original record signed by the parties. Where this may not be feasible, the Arbitrator may insist on the presence of authorised representatives of each party at the time of pronouncement. Alternatively, signed copies may be transmitted through registered or speed post with acknowledgment due, ensuring proper delivery to each party. Copies may also be sent 1 2021 SCC OnLine SC 157 Page 9 of 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 via email or handed to the parties’ counsel, though the safest course is delivery directly to the parties or their authorised representatives at the time of pronouncement, to preclude disputes. 28. At this stage, it is important to notice that Supreme Court in various judgments while interpreting Section 31 has held that delivery of a signed copy to the party is not a mere formality. The Court while interpreting the phrase “a signed copy shall be delivered to each party” has held that the delivery of a signed copy is not only mandatory but it has to be delivered to a responsible officer representing the party. If the party is a large organization, then the delivery of copy to the counsel or clerk has been found to be not sufficient. In this regard, reliance can be placed on the judgment in Union of India v. Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors2, where the Supreme Court has held as under: “8. The delivery of an arbitral award under sub-section (5) of Section 31 is not a matter of mere formality. It is a matter of substance. It is only after the stage under Section 31 has passed that the stage of termination of arbitral proceedings within the meaning of Section 32 of the Act arises. The delivery of arbitral award to the party, to be effective, has to be “received” by the party. This delivery by the Arbitral Tribunal and receipt by the party of the award sets in motion several periods of limitation such as an application for correction and interpretation of an award within 30 days under Section 33(1), an application for making an additional award under Section 33(4) and an application for setting aside an award under Section 34(3) and so on. As this delivery of the copy of award has the effect of conferring certain rights on the party as also bringing to an end the right to exercise those rights on expiry of the prescribed period of limitation which would be calculated from that date, the 2 (2005) 4 SCC 239 Page 10 of 27 Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 delivery of the copy of award by the Tribunal and the receipt thereof by each party constitutes an important stage in the arbitral proceedings. xxxxxx 12. The learned Single Judge of the High Court as also the Division Bench have erred in holding the application under Section 34 filed on behalf of the appellant as having been filed beyond a period of 3 months and 30 days within the meaning of sub-section (3) of Section 34. There was a delay of 27 days only and not of 34 days as held by the High Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay in filing the application deserves to be condoned and the application under sub-section (1) of Section 34 of the Act filed on behalf of the appellant deserves to be heard and decided on merits.” 29. Next judgment is in State of Maharashtra v. ARK Builders Pvt. Ltd.3 where the Apex Court has held as under: “17. In light of the discussions made above we find the impugned order of the Bombay High Court unsustainable. The High Court was clearly in error not correctly following the decision of this Court in Tecco Trichy Engineers and Contractors [(2005) 4 SCC 239 : (AIR 2005 SC 1832)] and in taking a contrary view. The High Court overlooked that what Section 31(5) contemplates is not merely the delivery of any kind of a copy of the award but a copy of the award that is duly signed by the members of the Arbitral Tribunal. 18. In the facts of the case the appellants would appear to be deriving undue advantage due to the omission of the arbitrator to give them a signed copy of the award coupled with the supply of a copy of the award to them by the respondent claimant but that would not change the legal position and it would be wrong to tailor the law according to the facts of a particular case.” 3 (2011) 4 SCC 616 Page 11 of 27 30. Next judgment on the subject is in Banarsi Krishan Committee v. Karamyogi Settlers Pvt. Ltd.4 where the Supreme Court has held that: Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BHABAGRAHI JHANKAR Reason: Authentication Location: ORISSA HIGH COURT, CUTTACK Date: 25-Sep-2025 16:24:47 “15. Having taken note of the submissions advanced on behalf of the respective parties and having particular regard to the expression “party” as defined in Section 2(1)(h) of the 1996 Act read with the provisions of Sections 31(5) and 34(3) of the 1996 Act, we are not inclined to interfere with the decision [Karmyogi Shelters (P) Ltd. v. Benarsi Krishna Committee, AIR 2010 Del 156] of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court impugned in these proceedings. The expression “party” has been amply dealt with in Tecco Trichy Engineers case [(2005) 4 SCC 239 : (AIR 2005 SC 1832)] and also in ARK Builders (P) Ltd. case [(2011) 4 SCC 616 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 413 : (AIR 2011 SC 1374)], referred to hereinabove. It is one thing for an advocate to act and plead on behalf of a party in a proceeding and it is another for an advocate to act as the party himself. The expression “party”, as defined in Section 2(1)(h) of the 1996 Act, clearly indicates a person who is a party to an arbitration agreement. The said definition is not qualified in any way so as to include the agent of the party to such agreement. Any reference, therefore, made in Section 31(5) and Section 34(2) of the 1996 Act can only mean the party himself and not his or her agent, or advocate empowered to act on the basis of a vakalatnama. In such circumstances, proper compliance with Section 31(5) would mean delivery of a signed copy of the arbitral award on the party himself and not on his advocate, which gives the party concerned the right to proceed under Section 34(3) of the aforesaid Act.