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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.P.(C) No.1346 of 2024 In the matter of an application under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India. ……………… Tusar Kanta Majhi …. Petitioner -versus- State of Odisha & Ors. …. Opposite Parties For Petitioner :
Legal Reasoning
Mr. J.K. Lenka, Advocate For Opp. Parties : Mr. P.K. Panda, ASC PRESENT: THE HON’BLE JUSTICE BIRAJA PRASANNA SATAPATHY --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of Hearing: 05.08.2025 and Date of Judgment: 05.08.2025 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Biraja Prasanna Satapathy, J. 1. This matter is taken up through hybrid mode. 2. Heard Dr. J.K. Lenka, learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Mr. P.K. Panda, learned Addl. Standing Counsel appearing for the Opp. Parties. 3. The present writ petition has been filed inter alia with the following prayer:- // 2 // “It is therefore humbly prayed that let this Hon’ble Court may graciously be pleased to consider the facts stated above, call for the records and issue notice to the Opposite Parties in Rule NISI, calling upon the Opp. Parties to show cause as to why; i) under the disengagement order Annexure-5 shall not be quashed; ii) the order of rejection for reinstatement of the petitioner in service dated 25.10.2019 under Annexure-7 and order dated 18.12.2023 under Annexure-11 shall not be quashed. iii) the Opp. Parties shall not be directed to reinstate the petitioner in forthwith; iv) the Opp. Parties shall not be directed to regularize the service of the petitioner at par with his batch mates and to extend all service benefits accrued in favour of the petitioner pursuant to the Judgment of acquittal under Annexure-8; if the Opp. Parties fail to show cause or show insufficient cause then the Rule shall be made absolute.” 4. It is contended that the Petitioner vide order dtd.13.09.2010 under Annexure-2 on being sponsored by the Committee of Chief Engineers was engaged as a GPTA on contractual basis. However, while so continuing when Petitioner was implicated in a vigilance case and remained in custody for more than 48 hours, he was terminated from his services vide order dtd.28.06.2017 under Annexure-5. 4.1. Challenging such order of termination when Petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 15422 of 2019 and this Court directed for consideration of his prayer for reengagement as GPTA in Rayagada district, the same was rejected vide order dtd.25.10.2019 under Page 2 of 9 // 3 // Annexure-7. It is contended that in the vigilance proceeding basing on which he was terminated vide order dtd.28.06.2017, he was acquitted vide Judgment dtd.31.03.2023 under Annexure-8. After such acquittal in the vigilance proceeding Petitioner made a prayer before Opp. Party No. 1 to reinstate him in service. 4.2. It is contended that when prayer for such reengagement after his acquittal in the vigilance proceeding was not considered, Petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P.(C) No. 37876 of 2023. This Court vide order dtd.23.11.2023 under Annexure-10 when directed for reconsideration taking into account the order of acquittal passed in the vigilance proceeding, the same was again rejected by Opp. Party No. 1 vide order dtd.18.12.2023 under Annexure-11. 4.3. Learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner contended that Petitioner was so terminated while continuing in service on contractual basis because of his implication in the vigilance case and remaining in custody for more than 48 hours. 4.4. It is contended that since the ground on which Petitioner was terminated is the initiation of the vigilance proceeding and in the said proceeding he has now been honourably acquitted vide Judgment dtd.31.03.2023 under Annexure-A, in view of the decision rendered by Apex Court in the case of Ram Lal Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 7935 of 2023) so followed in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh vs. The State of Bihar and Others, (Civil Appeal No. 5497 of 2025), Petitioner is eligible to get the benefit of reinstatement. Page 3 of 9 // 4 // 4.5. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-13, 25 and 30 of the decision in the case of Ram Lal has held as follows:- “13. However, if the charges in the departmental enquiry and the criminal court are identical or similar, and if the evidence, witnesses and circumstances are one and the same, then the matter acquires a different dimension. If the court in judicial review concludes that the acquittal in the criminal proceeding was after full consideration of the prosecution evidence and that the prosecution miserably failed to prove the charge, the Court in judicial review can grant redress in certain circumstances. The court will be entitled to exercise its discretion and grant relief, if it concludes that allowing the findings in the disciplinary proceedings to stand will be unjust, unfair and oppressive. Each case will turn on its own facts. [See G.M. Tank vs. State of Gujarat & Others, (2006) 5 SCC 446, State Bank of Hyderabad vs. P. Kata Rao, (2008) 15 SCC 657 and S. Samuthiram (supra)] xxx xxx xxx 25. Expressions like “benefit of doubt” and “honorably acquitted”, used in judgments are not to be understood as magic incantations. A court of law will not be carried away by the mere use of such terminology. xxx xxx xxx 30. In view of the above, we declare that the order of termination dated 31.03.2004; the order of the Appellate Authority dated 08.10.2004; the orders dated 29.03.2008 and 25.06.2008 refusing to reconsider and review the penalty respectively, are all illegal and untenable.” 4.6. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para-47 & 50 of the decision in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh has held as follows:- “47. While an acquittal in a criminal case does not automatically entitle the accused to have an order of setting aside of his dismissal from public service following disciplinary proceedings, it is well- established that when the charges, evidence, witnesses, and circumstances in both the departmental inquiry and the criminal Page 4 of 9 // 5 // proceedings are identical or substantially similar, the situation assumes a different context. In such cases, upholding the findings in the disciplinary proceedings would be unjust, unfair, and oppressive. This is a position settled by the decision in G.M. Tank (supra), since reinforced by a decision of recent origin in Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan31. xxx xxx xxx 50. The judgment acquitting the appellant reveals that the prosecution "miserably failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt" as both the informant and PW-2 refused to identify the appellant in court. This discussion confirms that the appellant’s acquittal was based not on mere technicalities. In Ram Lal (supra), this Court held that terms like "benefit of doubt" or "honourably acquitted" should not be treated as formalities. The Court’s duty is to focus on the substance of the judgment, rather than the terminology used.” 4.7. It is accordingly contended that rejection of the Petitioners’ claim vide the impugned order dtd.18.12.2023 under Annexure-11 and the order of disengagement initially passed on 28.06.2017 under Annexure-5 are not sustainable in the eye of law and requires interference of this Court. 5. Mr. P.K. Panda, learned Addl. Standing Counsel on the other hand made his submission basing on the stand taken in the counter affidavit so filed by Opp. Party Nos. 1 & 2. It is contended that since by the time Petitioner was disengaged vide order under Annexure-5 he was continuing as a contractual employee, Petitioner was terminated in terms of the order of engagement issued under Annexure-2. Page 5 of 9 // 6 // 5.1. It is also contended that even though the Petitioner has been acquitted in the vigilance proceeding vide Judgment dtd.31.03.2023 under Annexure-A but his claim for reinstatement is not automatic and considering the materials available against him, the authorities while taking a decision in terms of the earlier order of this Court, came to a conclusion that Petitioner has been rightly terminated. It is also contended that since Petitioner while continuing as a contractual employee involved himself in the vigilance proceeding, he is not eligible for such reinstatement. Reliance was placed to a decision of the Apex Court Imtiyaz Ahmad Malla Vs. State of Jamu Kashmir & Ors. (2023) 19 SCC 588. Hon’ble Apex Court in Para 11 of the said judgment has held as follows:- “11. It was further observed therein that if the Screening Committee’s decision was not mala fide or actuated by extraneous considerations, the same could not be then questioned : (Mehar Singh case [Delhi Police v. Mehar Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685 : (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 669 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 910] , SCC pp. 703-704, paras 35-36) “35. The police force is a disciplined force. It shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in the society. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing to join the police force must be a person of utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable character and integrity. A person having criminal antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge order will have to be examined to see whether he has been completely exonerated in the case because even a possibility of his taking to the life of crimes poses a threat to the discipline of the police force. The standing order, therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee. The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as final unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the police force is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by misusing power are in public domain and are a matter of concern. The Page 6 of 9 // 7 // reputation of the police force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we would not like to dilute the importance and efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that persons who are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force. At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to the importance of the trust reposed in it and must treat all candidates with an even hand. 36. The Screening Committee’s proceedings have been assailed as being arbitrary, unguided and unfettered. But, in the present cases, we see no evidence of this. However, certain instances have been pointed out where allegedly persons involved in serious offences have been recommended for appointment by the Screening Committee. It is well-settled that to such cases the doctrine of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India is not attracted. This doctrine does not envisage negative equality (Fuljit Kaur [Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab, (2010) 11 SCC 455]). It is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud because it embodies a positive concept. If the Screening Committee which is constituted to carry out the object of the comprehensive policy to ensure that people with doubtful background do not enter the police force, deviates from the policy, makes exception and allows entry of undesirable persons, it is undoubtedly guilty of committing an act of grave disservice to the police force but we cannot allow that illegality to be perpetuated by allowing the respondents to rely on such cases. It is for the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to examine whether the Screening Committee has compromised the interest of the police force in any case and to take remedial action if he finds that it has done so. Public interest demands an in-depth examination of this allegation at the highest level. Perhaps, such deviations from the policy are responsible for the spurt in police excesses. We expect the Commissioner of Police, Delhi to look into the matter and if there is substance in the allegations to take necessary steps forthwith so that policy incorporated in the standing order is strictly implemented.”” 6. Having heard learned counsel appearing for the Parties and considering the submissions made, this Court finds that Petitioner was engaged as GPTA vide order of appointment issued on 13.09.2010 under Annexure-2. Because of his implication in the vigilance case and remaining in custody for more than 48 hours, he was terminated vide order dtd.28.06.2017 basing on the show-cause issued on 01.06.2017. Subsequently, when Page 7 of 9 // 8 // Petitioner made a prayer for his reengagement, that was not acceded to vide order dtd.25.10.2019 under Annexure-7. However, in the vigilance proceeding when Petitioner was acquitted vide judgment dtd.3103.2023 under Annexure-8, he made a fresh prayer to reinstate him as the ground on which Petitioner was terminated, no more subsists, but the said prayer was also rejected by the Govt.-Opp. Party No. 1 vide order dtd.18.12.2023 under Annexure-11. 6.1. Since the Petitioner was disengaged because of his implication in the vigilance proceeding and remaining in custody for more than 48 hours and in the meantime he has already been acquitted vide Judgment dtd.31.03.2023 under Annexure-8, placing reliance on the decision in the case of Ram Lal so followed in Maharana Pratap Singh as cited supra, this Court is of the view that the order of disengagement no more subsists and it should have been recalled by allowing reinstatement in favour of the Petitioner. The decision relied on by the learned Addl. Standing Counsel as per the considered view of this Court, is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 6.2. Therefore, this Court while quashing order dtd.18.12.2023 so passed by Opp. Party No. 1 under Annexure-11 and order of disengagement passed by the Collector-Opp. Party No. 3 on 28.06.2017 under Annexure- 5, direct Opp. Party No. 3 to pass an order of reinstatement by reengaging the Petitioner in his post within a period of four (4) weeks from the date of receipt of this order. 6.3. Since this Court is directing an order of reinstatement in favour of the Petitioner, his claim for regularization be considered in terms of the Page 8 of 9 // 9 // Resolution dtd.19.03.2018 so enclosed vide Annexure-A/1 to the counter affidavit and the break period of service be regularized in accordance with law. 7. The writ petition accordingly stands disposed of with the aforesaid observation and direction. Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 5th of August, 2025/Sneha (Biraja Prasanna Satapathy) Judge Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SNEHANJALI PARIDA Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 13-Aug-2025 10:50:21 Page 9 of 9