The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK W.A. No.191 of 2025 Paradip Port Trust and another …. Appellants Mr. Gautam Misra, Senior Advocate -Versus- Keshab Chandra Sethy …. Respondent Mr. Swapnil Roy, Advocate CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN Order No. ORDER 23.06.2025 02. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 17th December, 2024 passed by the single Bench in
Decision
W.P.(C) No.14144 of 2016 filed by the writ petitioner-respondent seeking the issuance of writ in the nature of mandamus upon the appellants to issue the letter of appointment to the post of Attendant which was earmarked for the candidate belonging to a reserved category. 2. It is beyond cavil of doubt that pursuant to the advertisement floated by the appellants to fill up the post of Attendant, the writ petitioner-respondent offered his candidature Page 1 of 9 within the time stipulated therein. The conditions enshrined in the said advertisement includes the submission of a First-Aid Certificate as well as the Caste Certificate as the said post was kept for a reserved category, which according to the writ petitioner- respondent, was duly complied with. The writ petitioner- respondent was adjudged as a suitable candidate, but it was subsequently detected that the First-Aid Certificate submitted by the writ petitioner-respondent being one of the requisite condition in the said advertisement has lapsed by passage of time and a letter was issued on 13th May, 2016 by the Secretary, Paradip Port Trust to submit the renewed/updated First-Aid Certificate within fifteen days from the date. 3. Indubitably, the renewed/updated First-Aid Certificate was produced, but later on, the appellants proceeded to reject the candidature of the writ petitioner-respondent on the score that the certificate subsequently submitted by the writ petitioner- respondent was issued beyond the last date of submission of the application and, therefore, the candidature of the writ petitioner- respondent is liable to be cancelled and/or rejected. Page 2 of 9 4. The single Bench proceeded on the footing that the moment the time to file the certificate is extended by the recruiting authority, it cannot take a rebound and reject the application thereof. The single Bench further found that there has been an unjust enrichment upon the legal right accrued in favour of the writ petitioner-respondent at the behest of the appellants and, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be allowed with exemplary costs of Rs.5,00,000/-. 5. The bone of contention in the instant appeal on behalf of the appellants is restricted to a point that there was no occasion to extend the period for submission of the certificate issued subsequent to the last date of submission of an application and, therefore, even if the authorities have permitted the writ petitioner- respondent to submit the renewed/updated First-Aid Certificate, it does not confer any right into him for being considered to such post. It is further submitted that the single Bench has wrongly construed the letter dated 13th May, 2016 as an extension of the period for submission of the application or the certificate being the requisite conditions in terms of the said advertisement and, therefore, the impugned judgment is liable to be interfered with. Page 3 of 9 6. The certificate which was appended along with the original application issued by the competent authority with regard to the First-Aid was valid for a period of three years from the date of the examination. The said certificate reveals that the examination was conducted on 31st October, 2007 and, therefore, the validity of the said certificate is three years from the said date, which admittedly expired in the midnight of 30th October, 2010. Though the advertisement does not specifically indicate that the certificate to be submitted must be valid as on the date of last date of the submission of the application by the intending candidates, but normally the certificate having a lifespan must remain alive as on the date of offering the candidature by the intending candidates. Precisely for such reason, the appellants caused a letter dated 13th May, 2016 inviting the attention of the writ petitioner-respondent in this regard and permitting him to deposit the renewed/updated First-Aid Certificate within fortnight from the said date. None of the intending candidate has approached the Court challenging such letter issued by the appellants, but subsequently, the appellants proceeded to reject the candidature solely on the ground that the certificate submitted within the extended period cannot be termed Page 4 of 9 as a due compliance of the conditions enshrined in the said advertisement. 7. An authority cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. The moment the authority detected that the certificate submitted along with an application has a limited duration and expired by efflux of time, the decision may be taken to reject the candidature of the writ petitioner-respondent. The moment the authority decided to extend the time for submission of the said certificate and a due compliance is secured by the intending candidate, it is too late in a day to take a rebound and reject the candidature of a candidate who ultimately emerged successful in the recruitment process. 8. We do not find any express fetter having put in the advertisement in extending the period for submission of the certificates and, therefore, the moment the recruiting agencies have extended the time to submit the said certificate, it cannot take a contrary view and, therefore, is estopped by their own conduct and representation. The doctrine of estoppel has received recognition in the legal parlance and the authorities cannot be permitted to act contrary to the stand already taken and duly communicated either Page 5 of 9 by their conduct or representation. The single Bench has construed the letter dated 13th May, 2016 as an extension of time for valid participation in the recruitment process which cannot be said to be infirm and/or opposed to the legal jargon. 9. We appreciate the contention raised by the appellants that the imposition of the exemplary costs in a routine manner should be eschewed and sufficient safeguard should be taken in this regard. We have been reminded of the observations made by the Supreme Court in Satyapal Singh v. Union of India and another, (2010) 12 SCC 70 that the imposition of the exemplary costs could only be made in the event the claim is founded upon a falsity or an outcome of a fraud, misrepresentation or suppression of the fact, but when a debatable point is raised inviting the adjudication by the Court which does not appear to be vexatious or of such magnanimity amounting to a wastage of the judicial hours, the Court should not venture to impose an exemplary costs. The enlightening observation of the above report is reproduced as under: “8. Exemplary costs are levied where a claim is found to be false or vexatious or where a party is found to Page 6 of 9 be guilty of misrepresentation, fraud or suppression of facts. In the absence of any such finding, it will be improper to punish a litigant with exemplary costs. When the appellate court did not choose to levy any costs while dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner after nine years of pendency with interim stay, the High Court, while dismissing the writ petition at preliminary hearing, ought not to have levied exemplary costs with reference to the period of pendency before the appellate Court. We do not find any ground on which the exemplary costs of Rs.50,000 could be sustained. 9. Levy of exemplary costs on ordinary litigants, as punishment for merely approaching courts and securing an interim order, when there was no fraud, misrepresentation or suppression, is unwarranted. In fact, it will be a bad precedent. Even if any costs are to be levied on a petitioner, for any default or delaying tactics, where the respondents have entered appearance, costs should be ordered to be paid to the respondents, who were the affected parties on account of the litigation. There is no justification for levying costs of Rs.50,000 on the petitioner payable to the High Court Legal Services Committee. There is also no justification for directing the State Government to act as the collecting agent for the costs payable to the Legal Services Committee. Page 7 of 9 Directing a government servant, an ordinary employee, to pay Rs.50,000 as costs within one month and further directing the use of coercive process for recovery of costs as arrears of land revenue was unwarranted.” 10. In view of the legal pronouncement in the above noted decision, we have no hesitation that the single Bench ought not to have imposed an exemplary costs while allowing a writ petition filed by the writ petitioner-respondent. We hasten to add that at times when the claim is defeated by a delay, the Court may impose costs as a compensatory measure, but after recording the proper reasons relating to the conduct and the action of the authorities which resulted into a deprivation without any reasonable cause or the grounds. 11. We do not find any such element in the instant matter and, therefore, we are unable to persuade ourselves to countenance the imposition of exemplary costs against the appellants. The order impugned is modified to the extent that the portion by which the costs is imposed upon the appellants, the same is hereby set aside. Page 8 of 9 The remaining portion of the order impugned in the instant appeal is hereby affirmed. 12. The writ appeal is accordingly disposed of. (Harish Tandon) Chief Justice (M.S. Raman) Judge S.K. Guin/PA Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SUBASH KUMAR GUIN Designation: Personal Assistant Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Date: 25-Jun-2025 11:05:47 Page 9 of 9