The High Court
Case Details
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLA No.325 of 2006 (In the matter of an application under Section 374 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973) Sanatan Panda ……. Appellant -Versus- State of Orissa ……. Respondent For the Appellant : Mr. Jiban Ranjan Dash, Advocate For the Respondent : Mr. Sarathi Jyoti Mohanty, Additional Standing Counsel CORAM: THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA Date of Hearing: 28.10.2025 :: Date of Judgment: 11.11.2025 S.S. Mishra, J. The present Criminal Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 24.07.2006 passed by the learned Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Koraput, at Jeypore in Criminal Trial No.193 of 2003 (arising out of G.R. Case No.743 of 2002 corresponding to Machkund P.S. Case No.90 of 2002). The learned trial Court found the appellant, Sanatan Panda, guilty of offences punishable under Section 294 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (for short “the Act”) and sentenced him to undergo Simple Imprisonment for one month and six months respectively, both sentences to run concurrently with the benefit of set-off under Section 428 Cr.P.C. 2.
Legal Reasoning
community. It is settled law that unless the abusive words make specific reference to the caste or tribe of the complainant, the provisions of Page 8 of 13 Section 3(1)(x) of the Act are not attracted. The learned trial Court, in paragraph 9 of its judgment as reproduced above, erred in holding that any insult or humiliation to a member of SC/ST by a non-SC/ST person automatically attracts the provision, which is a clear misinterpretation of the law. 14. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the occurrence took place in public view. No independent persons from the alleged market area were examined. Hence, the prosecution failed to establish the foundational facts required to invoke the penal provisions under the Act. 15. It is a well-settled principle that every incriminating circumstance appearing against an accused must be put to him during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., so as to afford an opportunity to explain. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, reported in (AIR 2013 SC 3817), reiterated that the circumstances not put to the accused cannot be used against him and must be excluded from consideration. It was held that: - “12. It is a settled legal proposition that in a criminal trial, the purpose of examining the accused person Page 9 of 13 under Section 313 Cr.P.C., is to meet the requirement of the principles of natural justice, i.e. audi alterum partem. This means that the accused may be asked to furnish some explanation as regards the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the court must take note of such explanation. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the same is essential to decide whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete. No matter how weak the evidence of the prosecution may be, it is the duty of the court to examine the accused, and to seek his explanation as regards the incriminating material that has surfaced against him. The circumstances which are not put to the accused in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., cannot be used against him and must be excluded from consideration. The said statement cannot be treated as evidence within the Evidence Act, as the accused cannot be cross-examined with reference to such statement.” the meaning of Section 3 of This principle is also further affirmed in several judgments, such as State of Odisha vs. Shrinibash @ Anama Dehury, reported in 2020 (Suppl.) OLR 936 and Basanta Kumar Das vs. State of Odisha, reported in 2022(II) OLR 651. In the case at hand, the record reveals that the statements of P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 6 forming the basis of conviction were not specifically put to the appellant during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Therefore, reliance on such unconfronted evidence to sustain Page 10 of 13 conviction amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice, rendering the conviction unsustainable in law. 16. To attract Section 294 IPC, the prosecution must establish (i) that the accused uttered obscene words in a public place, and (ii) that such words caused annoyance to others. The term “obscene” has not been defined in the Code, and therefore, its import depends on the context, time, and social standards of morality. 17. In the present case, the prosecution alleged that the appellant used the abusive words “MAGIA RANDI DESIANI” in public. However, none of the witnesses could specify whether the place of occurrence was indeed public or whether such utterance caused annoyance to the public. No spot map was prepared, and no independent witnesses from the market or locality were examined. The so-called witnesses P.W.2 and P.W.6 were subordinates to the informant and therefore interested. Moreover, their versions varied, P.W.2 claimed the words “DESIANI ADIVASI TUI KEE SARAPANCH” were used, differing from the F.I.R. version. These inconsistencies go to the root of the matter. Page 11 of 13 18. The learned trial Court, without evaluating these contradictions, accepted the prosecution's case mechanically. Given the absence of corroboration from independent persons and the lack of evidence to establish that the words were uttered at a public place causing annoyance, conviction under Section 294 IPC cannot be sustained. 19. From the above discussion, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant uttered obscene words in a public place causing annoyance or that he insulted or humiliated the informant by making reference to her caste or tribe. The inconsistencies in the statements of prosecution witnesses, absence of independent corroboration, non-examination of spot witnesses, unexplained delay in F.I.R., and non-compliance with Section 313 Cr.P.C. cumulatively create reasonable doubt as to the veracity of the prosecution case. 20. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered opinion that the conviction of the appellant under Section 294 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act cannot be sustained. The judgment of conviction Page 12 of 13 dated 24.07.2006 passed by the learned Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Koraput at Jeypore in Criminal Trial No.193 of 2003 is hereby set aside. Bail bonds, if any, stand discharged. 21. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. (S.S. Mishra) Judge The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Dated the 11th November, 2025/ Swarna Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SWARNAPRAVA DASH Designation: Senior Stenographer Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa Date: 13-Nov-2025 10:08:54 Page 13 of 13
Arguments
Heard Mr. Jiban Ranjan Dash, learned counsel, for the appellant and Mr. Sarathi Jyoti Mohanty, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 02.08.2002, one Smt. Sanjukta Majhi, Sarapanch of Anakadeli Gram Panchayat, lodged an F.I.R. alleging that on 29.07.2002, while she was near the local market area, the appellant, who was then serving as Secretary of the Panchayat, abused her in filthy language on the road near the hotel of Dushmant and Page 2 of 13 thereby insulted and humiliated her. On such report, Machhkund P.S. Case No.90 of 2002 was registered under Sections 294/506 IPC read with Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. 4. The Officer-in-Charge took up investigation, examined witnesses, visited the spot, and submitted charge sheet against the appellant for the aforesaid offences. The accused denied the allegations in toto and claimed to be falsely implicated due to enmity with the informant arising out of Panchayat affairs. 5. During the trial, the prosecution examined seven witnesses (P.Ws.1 to 7) and proved certain documents, including the F.I.R. (Ext.1) and caste certificate of the informant (Ext.2). The defence examined two witnesses (D.W.1 and D.W.2) in support of its case that no such incident had occurred and that the allegations were motivated. 6. After evaluating the evidence, the learned trial Court found inconsistencies among the prosecution witnesses regarding the exact abusive words and the place of occurrence but nonetheless concluded that the appellant had indeed used abusive language in a public place Page 3 of 13 against the informant. While acquitting him of the charge under Section 506 IPC for want of proof of criminal intimidation, the trial court held that the abusive words amounted to an offence under Section 294 IPC. 7. The learned trial Court further held that since the appellant, admittedly not belonging to the Scheduled Tribe community, had insulted the informant, a member of Scheduled Tribe, such conduct fell within the ambit of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST (POA) Act, even though no specific caste name was used. On that reasoning, the appellant was convicted and sentenced as stated. The relevant portion of the aforesaid judgment is extracted herein below for ready reference:- “(8) Keeping in mind the above when the case in hand is appreciated it is seen in this case the accused abused the Sarpanch saying MAGIYA RANDI DESI ANI. The Sarpanch is a lady, uttering of word MAGI YA which is associated with sex and 'RANDI thereby meaning prostitute. In our conservative society that too in this part of country that could very well be said to be obscene words. The informant has also stated that she was annoyed and felt insulted by the aforesaid uttering. Even in absence of her such evidence of annoyance, utterance of the absurd words in a public place undoubtedly must have caused annoyance to the person present including the informant. In such circumstances I have no hesitation Page 4 of 13 to say that the accused uttered the obscene words in a public place which caused annoyance to others including the informant. So on appraisal of the aforesaid evidence would go to show that prosecution in this case has been abled to establish the charge under Section 294 I.P.C. (9) Furthermore, as stated earlier the victim is a member of Scheduled Tribe and the accused is neither belong to Scheduled Caste nor Scheduled Tribe. When the aforesaid abuse is hurled at the informant injured coupled with EA KUNO SARPANCH HOICHI TO UNDER RE MU ROHIBI", in my opinion it can very well be said that the aforesaid act of the accused was in order to insult the informant injured who is a Sarpanch with intention to humiliate her in the view of the public. Of course, the learned counsel for the accused argued that since the aforesaid abuse was not hurled at the victim injured taking her tribe or caste into consideration, the ingredients of the offence charged is not made out. I am afraid such a contention has any sanction of law. Once the insult and humiliation is proved on a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe by an member of non-scheduled caste or Scheduled Tribe the same attracts the ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe, as there is nothing to show that unless the accused taking the tribe and caste into consideration does any act on a member of Scheduled caste or Scheduled Tribe, though he is not a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe the offence is not made out. So the contention advanced in this regard must fail. Page 5 of 13 (10) Hence, the aforesaid apprisal of the evidence on record leads me to draw an irresistible conclusion in this case to hold that prosecution has proved the charge under Section 294 I.P.C. and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (prevention of Atrocities) Act, but it has failed to establish the charge under Section 506 I.P.C. (11) Resultantly, the accused is held not guilty of the charge under Section 506 I.P.C. but guilty of the charge under Section 294 I.P.C. and 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of atrocities) Act. So while acquitting the accused of the charge under Section 506 I.P.C. I convict him of the charges under Section 294 I.P.C. and 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (prevention of Atrocities) Act.” 8. Mr. Dash, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the impugned judgment suffers from serious infirmities, both in fact and law. It was urged that the prosecution failed to prove the basic ingredients of Section 294 IPC, inasmuch as no evidence was led to show that the alleged abusive words were uttered at a public place causing annoyance to others. It was further argued that the trial court erred in convicting the appellant under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, despite the absence of any allegation or evidence that the appellant used Page 6 of 13 the caste name of the informant or intentionally humiliated her on the ground of caste. 9. Mr. Dash, the learned counsel, also highlighted the delay of four days in lodging the F.I.R. without any explanation and the perfunctory investigation wherein no spot map was prepared. Also, no independent witnesses from the alleged market area were examined. 10. A further submission was made that several incriminating statements relied upon by the trial court were never put to the appellant during his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C., thereby violating the mandate laid down in State of Odisha vs. Shrinibash @ Anama Dehury, reported in 2020 (Suppl.) OLR 936 and Basanta Kumar Das vs. State of Odisha, reported in 2022(II) OLR 651, and hence the conviction cannot sustain. It was lastly urged that the trial Court failed to appreciate the defence evidence, which clearly demonstrated that the allegations were false and borne out of personal rivalry. 11. I have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the Page 7 of 13 State, and perused the entire lower Court records, including the depositions of the prosecution witnesses and the reasoning assigned by the learned trial Court. 12. To constitute an offence under Section 3(1)(x) (as it stood at the time of occurrence), three elements must be satisfied: the victim must be a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, the accused must intentionally insult or intimidate the victim, and the insult or intimidation must occur in public view and reference the victim's caste name. 13. In the present case, the F.I.R., as well as the deposition of P.W.1 (informant), are completely silent on any utterance of caste-related words. The alleged abusive terms, even if accepted, do not relate to or make reference to her caste or tribe. Exhibit-2, the caste certificate produced by the prosecution, shows that P.W.1 belongs to the “Gadba” tribe. The expression “Adivasi” used in evidence does not denote any specific caste or tribe but is a generic reference to a tribal person or