The High Court · 1997
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK CRA No.41 of 2001 An appeal from judgment and order dated 17.02.2001 passed by the Sessions Judge, Bolangir in Sessions Case No.72-B of 1999. ----------------------------- Laxman Suna ....... Appellant -Versus- State of Odisha ....... Respondent For Appellant: - Mr. B.S. Dasparida For Respondent: - Mr. Sonak Mishra Addl. Standing Counsel ----------------------------- P R E S E N T: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Date of Hearing and Judgment: 25.01.2024 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- S.K. SAHOO, J. The appellant Laxman Suna along with his elder brother Hiralal Suna faced trial for commission of offences under sections 302/304-B/498-A/34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter, „I.P.C.‟) and section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (hereinafter „D.P. Act‟) in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Bolangir in Sessions Case No.72-B of 1999 on the accusation that on 14th March 1997 in their cowshed at village Dungripali- [ 2 ] Darlipada, Chandrama Suna (hereinafter, „the deceased‟) died of burn injuries, otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and that her death was caused in furtherance of their common intention by subjecting her to cruelty and harassment soon before her death for non-fulfillment of demand of dowry of a scooter. The learned trial Court vide impugned judgment and order dated 17.02.2001 while acquitting the co-accused Hiralal Suna of all the charges so also the appellant of the charges under sections 302 and 304-B of the I.P.C., found the appellant guilty of the offences punishable under sections 498-A/306 of the I.P.C. and section 4 of the D.P. Act and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years and three years for the offences under section 498-A and 306 of the I.P.C. respectively and to undergo R.I. for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/-(rupees five thousand), in default, to undergo R.I. for two months for the offence under section 4 of the D.P. Act and all the substantive sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. The father of the victim, namely, Debarchan Chhura (P.W.6) lodged a written report (Ext.3) on 14.03.1997 before P.W.9, the officer-in-charge of Belpada police station, Bolangir, CRA 41 of 2001 Page 2 of 26 [ 3 ] which was registered as U.D. Case No. 03 of 1997. In the said written report, P.W.6 stated that he had given in marriage of his deceased daughter with the appellant in the year 1990 and the couple was blessed with two children and then the deceased had undergone family planning operation. Ten months thereafter, the son of the appellant and the deceased expired and the appellant was insisting for his second marriage since then and was also threatening the deceased. On 14.03.1997 at about 1 p.m., one person from the village of the appellant gave information to P.W.6 that the deceased had died in the cowshed of the house of the appellant and it was a suspicious death. During inquiry of the said U.D. Case, P.W.9 examined P.W.6 and in presence of the Magistrate and witnesses held inquest over the dead body as per the inquest report (Ext.4), visited the spot and seized one kerosene bottle and another empty bottle and three pieces of broken bangles and a match box from the cowshed of the appellant as per seizure list (Ext.8), dispatched the dead body to the Sub-divisional Hospital, Patnagarh for post-mortem examination and received the P.M. report as per Ext.6 and examined the witnesses. On 23.04.1997 P.W.6 lodged another written report (Ext.5) which was treated as F.I.R. and registered as Belpada CRA 41 of 2001 Page 3 of 26 [ 4 ] P.S. Case No.20 dated 23.04.1997 under sections 304-B/34 of the I.P.C. by P.W.9 against the appellant and others and the U.D. case inquiry was closed. As per the F.I.R. and the other evidence on record, it is the prosecution case that on 01.03.1990 marriage between the appellant and the deceased was solemnized and there was a scooter demand from the side of the bridegroom relating to which there was a hot discussion between
Legal Reasoning
the parties and it was assured by the informant that the demand would be fulfilled after his financial condition was improved. After the marriage, out of their wedlock, a daughter, namely, Barsharani was born. Sometimes thereafter, they were blessed with a male child, after which they decided to have a family planning operation and accordingly, the deceased undergone tubectomy operation, but unfortunately sometimes after, their male child died for which the appellant insisted for his second marriage having believed that there was no possibility of getting a male child through the deceased. It is the further prosecution case that on account of such background, the deceased led a sorrowful life in the house of her in-laws where she was ill- treated and tortured several times by her husband and his elder brother co-accused Hiralal Suna. The deceased came to her father‟s place several times on account of such ill-treatment and CRA 41 of 2001 Page 4 of 26 [ 5 ] she was compelled by the appellant with a threatening to assault in case of refusal to bring the scooter. The parents of the deceased apprehending further torture on their daughter, had to tolerate such ill-treatment and to satisfy the appellant, they visited the house of the appellant with gifts and sweets. However, P.W.6 got information on 14.03.1997 that the deceased died due to burn injury inside the cowshed of her in- laws‟ house. On getting such information, P.W.6 went to the house of the appellant and found that the deceased was lying dead in the cowshed with burn injuries. P.W.9 took up investigation of the case. During the course of investigation, he prepared the spot map (Ext.10), arrested the accused persons and forwarded them to judicial custody. He seized the Green Card issued in favour of the deceased vide seizure list Ext.11, made a query to the doctor who conducted the post mortem as per query report Ext.7 and received the opinion and on completion of investigation, submitted charge sheet against the appellant and co-accused Hiralal Suna under sections 498-A/304-B/494/34 of the I.P.C. and under section 4 of the D.P. Act on 07.04.1998. 3. The defence plea of the appellant was one of denial and it was pleaded that his marriage with the deceased was a CRA 41 of 2001 Page 5 of 26 [ 6 ] love marriage and he was a teacher and present in the school on the date of occurrence and that he has been falsely entangled in the case. 4. During course of the trial, in order to prove its case, the prosecution examined as many as nine witnesses. P.W.1 Banita Chhura is the mother of the deceased and she stated that during the marriage of her deceased daughter with the appellant, the latter demanded a scooter, which could not be fulfilled due to poverty. She further stated that the deceased had no peaceful living in her in-laws‟ house and on all the days, there was quarrel and misunderstanding with her in-laws‟ family members and sometimes, she was assaulted by them. She further stated that the appellant was assaulting the deceased and the other co-accused Hiralal was also insisting her deceased daughter to bring the scooter. P.W.2 Hirabati Boi, who is a neighbour of the informant (P.W.6) has stated that at the time of marriage, the appellant demanded a scooter and did not agree to go to the marriage pandal if it was not fulfilled. She further stated that on promise being made by P.W.6 to fulfil the demand after marriage, the appellant agreed for the marriage. She further stated that six months after the marriage, when the deceased CRA 41 of 2001 Page 6 of 26 [ 7 ] came to her father‟s place, she disclosed about the misunderstanding with her in-laws due to non-fulfilment of demand of scooter. P.W.3 Pyarilal Boi, who is a relative of P.W.6 has stated that she attended the marriage of the deceased with the appellant and at the time of marriage, she gifted a wrist watch to the appellant. P.W.4 Bijaya Kumar Das was the Headmaster of Boromal U.P. School where the appellant was working as a teacher. He stated that on 14.03.1997 the appellant after working in the first hour, made an application to remain on leave for the rest of the day, which was allowed by him. He also proved the said application marked as Ext.1. P.W.5 Bijaya Kumar Mishra, who was working as Asst. Teacher in Boromal U.P. School, is a witness to the seizure of leave application of the appellant as per seizure list Ext.2. P.W.6 Debarchan Chhura, who is the father of the deceased and informant in the case, supported the prosecution case. P.W.7 Chandan Kumar Chhura, who is the brother of the deceased, has stated that at the time of marriage when his CRA 41 of 2001 Page 7 of 26 [ 8 ] father (P.W.6) gave a wrist watch and a ring to the appellant, the latter got annoyed for not being given a scooter and refused to marry unless he was given a scooter. He further stated that at the intervention of gentlemen, the appellant was convinced and marriage was solemnized. He further stated that at times, there was quarrel with her deceased sister by her in-laws‟ family members. He further stated that prior to one day of her death, he along with his friend Bharat visited the in-laws‟ house of his sister with some articles and after giving those articles, they stayed for an hour and came back. He further stated that at that time, the appellant was present in the house and he talked with his sister who was sifting the grain from the chaff. P.W.8 Dr. S.C. Meher was the Assistant Surgeon, S.D. Hospital, Patnagarh, who conducted the post mortem over the dead body of the deceased, proved his report as per Ext.6. He also proved the query report made by the I.O as per Ext.7. P.W.9 Sibaram Naik, was the Sub-Inspector of Police at Belpada police station, who not only registered U.D. Case on the report of P.W.6 and enquired into it but also registered the case as per the written F.I.R. lodged by P.W.6. He is also the investigating officer of the case. CRA 41 of 2001 Page 8 of 26 [ 9 ] The prosecution also exhibited eleven documents. Ext.1 is the C.L. application of the appellant dated 14.03.1007, Ext.2 is the seizure list of leave application, Ext.3 is the first report of P.W.6 on the basis of which U.D. case was registered, Ext.4 is the inquest report, Ext.5 is the written F.I.R. of P.W.6 dated 23.04.1997, Ext.6 is the post mortem report, Ext.7 is the opinion of the doctor to the query made by the I.O., Ext.8 is the seizure list of kerosene bottle, empty bottle, broken bangles and match box, Ex.9 is the dead body challan, Ext.10 is the spot map and Ext.11 is the seizure list of green card of the deceased. 5. The learned trial Court after analyzing the oral and documentary evidence on record came to hold that the death of the deceased had occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances. It was further held that from the evidence of the witnesses, it appeared that the deceased had no peaceful living in her in-laws‟ house and the appellant not only physically and mentally tortured the deceased but also threatened her to have a second marriage because of her incapability to give birth to a male child. Learned trial Court further held that all these events added salt to the injury, i.e. the helplessness of her parents to fulfill the demand of a scooter. It is further held that the deceased committed suicide in consequence of cruelty or torture CRA 41 of 2001 Page 9 of 26 [ 10 ] meted out to her by the appellant and such act of the appellant was sufficient to constitute the offence of abetting suicide punishable under section 306 of the I.P.C. Accordingly, while acquitting the co-accused of the all the offences charged and the appellant of the charges under sections 302 and 304-B of the I.P.C., found him guilty under sections 498-A and 306 of the I.P.C. read with section 4 of the D.P. Act. 6.
Legal Reasoning
Mr. B.S. Dasparida, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the doctor who conducted post mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased has stated that he found no smell of any chemical like kerosene on the body of the deceased and the death was due to extensive burn injuries, which were ante mortem in nature and no evidence of violence could be found on the body of the deceased. The doctor opined that as the body of the deceased was extensively burnt with charring, it was not possible to say definitely whether it was accidental, homicidal or suicidal in nature. He further stated that there was no injury on the burnt parts of both the legs and right hand. It is argued that in view of absence of specific medical evidence so also lack of circumstantial evidence that it is a case of suicidal death of the deceased, the conviction of the appellant under section 306 of I.P.C. is unwarranted, particularly when the CRA 41 of 2001 Page 10 of 26 [ 11 ] prosecution has failed to establish any proximate link between the conduct of the appellant with the death of the deceased. He argued that P.W.7 who is the brother of the deceased, visited the in-laws‟ house of the deceased on the previous day of the death of the deceased and found everything was normal and there was no complaint made by the deceased before him regarding the conduct of the appellant. Learned counsel further submitted that the evidence adduced by the parents of the deceased that the appellant came to their house while the deceased was staying there and threatened her to accompany him, otherwise, she would be assaulted for which the deceased was sent to her in- laws house, has not been stated before the police by any of these witnesses during investigation and therefore, no reliance can be placed on such statements, which were being made for the first time in Court. It is further argued that in view of the time gap between the marriage and death of the decaesed, which was for more than seven years and absence of any clinching evidence relating to the ill-treatment of the deceased by the appellant or demand of scooter and particularly when no previous report has been lodged in any police station and there was no complain made before anybody in that respect, the ingredients of the offence under section 498-A of I.P.C. so also CRA 41 of 2001 Page 11 of 26 [ 12 ] section 4 of the D.P. Act are not attracted and therefore, benefit of doubt should be extended in favour of the appellant. He placed reliance on the decisions of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the cases of Madan Mohan Singh -Vrs.- State of Gujarat and another reported in (2010) 8 Supreme Court Cases 628, M.Mohan -Vrs.- State represented by Deputy Superintendent of Police reported in (2011) 48 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 961 and of this Court in the case of Rabindranath Deo -Vrs.- State of Odisha reported in (2017) 66 Orissa Criminal Reports 862. Mr. Sonak Mishra, learned Additional Standing Counsel, on the other hand, supported the impugned judgment and argued that even though the doctor (P.W.8) was not sure whether it was a case of suicidal death, but the body of the deceased was found in the cowshed of her matrimonial house and one kerosene bottle and one empty bottle were found and from the circumstantial evidence coupled with the fact that it was a case of burn injuries as per the evidence of the doctor, it can be said that the prosecution has established that the deceased committed suicide. Even though there is no evidence of homicidal death of the deceased, but the accidental death is completely ruled out. Learned counsel further submitted that in CRA 41 of 2001 Page 12 of 26 [ 13 ] view of the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.6, it appears that there was consistent ill-treatment on the deceased and there was also a demand of scooter and the possibility of the deceased committing suicide on account of such ill-treatment or demand cannot be completely ruled out and therefore, the learned trial Court has not committed any illegality in convicting the appellant under sections 498-A and 306 of the I.P.C. so also under section 4 of the D.P. Act. Whether the conviction of the appellant under section 306 of I.P.C. is justified?: 7. Adverting to the contentions raised by the learned counsel for both the parties and to adjudicate the cause of death of the deceased, it appears that the doctor (P.W.8) conducted post mortem examination over the dead body of the deceased on 15.03.1997 at S.D. Hospital, Patnagarh and he noticed the following injuries:- (i) Pugilistic attitude of the body-skin and hair of the whole scalp and entire body burnt black except skin of both the feet and right hand; (ii) Structure of the face including nose and eye were completely burnt and charred making it impossible to identify the facial appearance; (iii) Rigor mortis was present in all the four limbs. Abdomen was distended; CRA 41 of 2001 Page 13 of 26 [ 14 ] (iv) Tongue protruded oozing reddish fluid. Burn of the scalp and face was deep and that of the other parts of the body were superficial; (v) Redden patches with sticks of blood visible beneath the burn area. Few vesicles were found on both the feet and right hand. The doctor specifically stated that the death was due to extensive burn injuries as evident by antemortem nature of the burn and the same was sufficient to cause the death in ordinary course of nature. However, he did not notice any evidence of violence on the body of the deceased. The post mortem report has been marked as Ext.6. P.W.8 has further stated that the I.O. made a query as to whether the burn of the deceased was homicidal, accidental or suicidal and the extent and degree of the burn and the possibility of the cause of death and whether skin of both the feet and right hand as per post mortem report were not burn and whether it was due to any possible obstruction, to which he opined as follows:- (i) As the body was extensively burnt with charring, it was not possible to say definitely whether it was accidental, homicidal or suicidal in nature. However, he opined that the burn was antemortem in nature. No injury on the remaining part of the skin or deeper sub-tissues CRA 41 of 2001 Page 14 of 26 [ 15 ] or any fracture or dislocation could be found on the body of the deceased; (ii) The burn was extensive and deep in some areas particularly in the upper part of the body, i.e., face, head and neck; (iii) The death was immediate and was due to extensive burn; (iv) As there was no injury on the unburnt part of both the leg and right hand, it was not possible to opine about obstruction. However, nothing suggestive of foul play could be found on these parts of the body. The query report has been marked as Ext.7. Number of witnesses has stated that the body of the deceased was found in the cowshed in a burnt condition and the I.O. (P.W.9) has seized two bottles from the spot, i.e., one was full with kerosene and the other was empty, broken bangles and a match box and the said seizure list was marked as Ext.8. Though the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that accidental death of the deceased on account of burn injuries cannot be ruled out, but since there is no such material on record or any circumstantial evidence that the deceased made any attempt to escape from the spot after receiving the burn injuries and the medical report that the death took place on account of such burn injuries, I am of the humble view that even in absence of any specific medical CRA 41 of 2001 Page 15 of 26 [ 16 ] evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to hold that it was a case of suicidal death. However, merely because the deceased committed suicide while staying in the house of the appellant that too in the cowshed would not ipso facto bring home the offence under section 306 of the I.P.C. against the appellant inasmuch as the prosecution is further required to prove that there was proximate link between the conduct of the appellant and the suicide of the deceased and that the appellant aided or instigated or abetted the deceased to commit suicide. In the case of Madan Mohan Singh (supra), it has been held as follows: “12. In order to bring out an offence under Section 306 IPC, specific abetment as contemplated by Section 107 IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring out the suicide of the concerned person as a result of that abetment is required. The intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for this particular offence under Section 306 IPC. We are of the clear opinion that there is no question of there being any material for offence under Section 306 IPC either in the FIR or in the so- called suicide note. CRA 41 of 2001 Page 16 of 26 [ 17 ] 13. It is absurd to even think that a superior officer like the appellant would intend to bring about suicide of his driver and, therefore, abet the offence. In fact, there is no nexus between the so called suicide (if at all it is one for which also there is no material on record) and any of the alleged acts on the part of the appellant. There is no proximity either. In the prosecution under Section 306 IPC, much more material is required. The Courts have to be extremely careful as the main person is not available for cross examination by the appellant/accused. Unless, therefore, there is specific allegation and material of definite nature (not imaginary or inferential one), it would be hazardous to ask the appellant/accused to face the trial. A criminal trial is not exactly a pleasant experience. The person like the appellant in present case who is serving in a responsible post would certainly suffer great prejudice, were he to face prosecution on absurd allegations of irrelevant nature. In the similar circumstances, as reported in Netai Dutta Vs. State of W.B. [2005 (2) SCC 659], this Court had quashed the proceedings initiated against the accused.” In the case of M. Mohan (supra), it has been held as follows: “45. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a CRA 41 of 2001 Page 17 of 26 [ 18 ] person in doing of a thing. Without a positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained. 46. The intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by this court are clear that in order to convict a person under section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and this act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he/she committed suicide. xx xx xx xx 49. In the instant case, what to talk of instances of instigation, there are even no allegations against the appellants. There is also no proximate link between the incident of 14.1.2005 when the deceased was denied permission to use the Qualis car with the factum of suicide which had taken place on 18.1.2005.” In the case of Rabindranath Deo (supra), it has been held as follows: “7. …………..There is no material on record that the petitioner instigated or aided the deceased in committing suicide. There is no nexus or proximate link between the suicide of the deceased and any of the alleged acts on the part CRA 41 of 2001 Page 18 of 26 [ 19 ] of the petitioner which appears to have been performed in due discharge of official duty. No third degree method was adopted against the deceased during his interrogation by the petitioner or during his detention at the Beat House. He was allowed to meet his brother and friend and move freely in the Beat House campus and allowed to take food brought by his brother. In view of the materials on record, it cannot be said that the petitioner had shared common intention in wrongfully confining the deceased at Kalinga Beat House or abated the commission of suicide of the deceased so as to attract the ingredients of the offences under sections 342 and 306 of the Indian Penal Code.” P.W.7 is the brother of the deceased, who visited the house of the appellant on the previous day of occurrence and he has stated that he went with his friend Bharat with some articles and gave all those articles and stayed there for an hour and came back and on that day the appellant was present in his house and the deceased was also sifting grain from the chaff and he talked with the deceased and stayed there for sometime and then came back. He has not stated to have seen any untoward incident or not stated about any complain being made by the deceased before him against the appellant and P.W.1 and P.W.6, who are parents of the deceased, have also not stated that after CRA 41 of 2001 Page 19 of 26 [ 20 ] returning from the house of the appellant, P.W.7 made any kind of complain against the conduct of the appellant. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant is quite justified in his submission that the proximate link between the conduct of the appellant and the suicidal death of the deceased is missing. Why then the deceased would commit suicide? The prosecution is required to prove the same and more particularly, the appellant was responsible for it. Thus, in my humble view, the learned trial Court was not justified in convicting the appellant under section 306 of the I.P.C. and accordingly, he is acquitted of such offence. Whether the learned trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant under section 498-A of I.P.C.: 8. Now coming to the charge under section 498-A of the I.P.C., P.W.1, the mother of the deceased has stated that her daughter was having no peaceful living in the house of the appellant and on all days, there was quarrel and misunderstanding and some times, she was assaulted by the appellant and whenever the deceased was coming to their house, she told about the assault and ill-treatment to her. Though this witness has stated further that in the month of March of the occurrence year, while the deceased was in their house, the appellant came and threatened the deceased to go with him, otherwise she would be assaulted and out of fear, they CRA 41 of 2001 Page 20 of 26 [ 21 ] sent the deceased with the appellant to her in-laws‟ house, but it has been confronted to P.W.1 and proved through I.O. that no such statement has been made by her during the course of investigation, for which it is very difficult to accept such evidence, which was deposed to by P.W.1 for the first time in Court. Similarly, P.W.6, the father of the deceased has stated that the deceased was complaining about the ill-treatment by the appellant and once the appellant was throttling her neck to do away with her life. Therefore, from the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.6, it reveals that the appellant subjected the deceased to physical and mental torture and this part of the evidence has not been shaken in the cross-examination. As per the definition of „cruelty‟ under section 498-A of the I.P.C., it means any willful conduct which is of such nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to her life or person. The cruelty can either be mental or physical. It is to be determined/inferred by considering conduct of the accused, weighing gravity or seriousness of his acts and to find out as to whether it is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide etc. To decide the question of cruelty, the relevant factors are the matrimonial relationship between the husband and wife, their cultural status, temperament, state of CRA 41 of 2001 Page 21 of 26 [ 22 ] health, their interaction in daily life which dominates the aspect of cruelty. The prosecution has to establish willful conduct on the part of the accused and whether conduct would attract cruelty or not is to be adjudicated in the facts and circumstances of each case. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the witnesses have stated that there was no previous report before the police relating to any torture or cruelty meted out to the deceased by the appellant and therefore, the evidence on this aspect should be discarded. It is not to be forgotten that marriage between the deceased and the appellant took place seven years back and they were blessed with children and one of such child had died. Since it was a family dispute, the possibility of thinking that the dispute would subside in due course and everything would proceed smoothly and that lodging of the report with the police might aggravate the situation, the family members of the deceased from her paternal side might not have lodged the report and in my humble view, non-reporting the matter to the police relating to cruelty and ill-treatment on the deceased by the appellant cannot be a ground to disbelieve the evidence adduced by the parents of the deceased, which has remained unshaken. Therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly CRA 41 of 2001 Page 22 of 26 [ 23 ] come to the conclusion that the prosecution has established the charge under section 498-A of the I.P.C. against the appellant. Whether the learned trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant under section 4 of the D.P. Act: 9. Coming to the charge under section 4 of the D.P. Act, P.W.1 has stated that during marriage, the appellant demanded dowry of a scooter, but the demand could not be fulfilled due to poverty and it was assured to give at a later point of time on availability of funds. In cross-examination, she has stated that although there was frequent demand of a scooter, there was no convening of any meeting with the caste men as their daughter was staying in her in-laws‟ house. P.W.2 has also stated that there was some misunderstanding on the marriage day regarding demand of a scooter and for this, the appellant did not agree to come to the marriage pandal unless it was fulfilled and after persuasion by the gentlemen and assurance given by the father of the deceased to give a scooter after arranging funds, he agreed to marry. P.W.2 in the cross-examination has stated that in her presence, the appellant had not demanded the scooter. P.W.6, the father of the deceased has stated that the appellant demanded the scooter prior to the marriage, but due to poverty, he could not fulfill the demand and at the time of marriage, the appellant expressed his unwillingness to go the marriage pandal CRA 41 of 2001 Page 23 of 26 [ 24 ] unless the demand was fulfilled and on being persuaded to the appellant that the scooter would be given at a later point of time on availability of funds, marriage was solemnized. He further stated that whenever the deceased was coming to their house, on all occasions, the appellant was demanding the deceased to bring scooter which was committed earlier. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that P.W.6 in his cross-examination has stated that the appellant had not personally demanded the scooter to him after marriage and he has also not reported about the same before the police and caste men for which the demand of scooter is not acceptable. When the evidence on record indicates that demand was made through the deceased and as discussed earlier that as the parents, they might be expecting that the situation would normalize and bringing the matter to the notice of the police would aggravate the situation, therefore, non-reporting of the scooter demand either before the police or the Panch cannot be a ground to disbelieve such aspect. Even P.W.7 has stated that the appellant was annoyed for not getting a scooter and refused to marry unless demand was fulfilled and then he was convinced and marriage was solemnized. Therefore, from the evidence of these witnesses, it is proved that there was demand of scooter not only at the time of marriage, but also CRA 41 of 2001 Page 24 of 26 [ 25 ] such demand continued for a substantial period and therefore, in my humble view, the learned trial Court is justified in convicting the appellant of the charge under section 4 of the D.P. Act. Conclusion: 10. In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The conviction of the appellant under section 306 of the I.P.C. is hereby set aside. However, the conviction of the appellant under sections 498-A of the I.P.C. and 4 of the D.P. Act stands confirmed. It appears that the appellant was taken into judicial custody during the course of investigation on 26.04.1997 and he was released from custody on 05.07.1997 and again he was taken into judicial custody on the day of pronouncement of the judgment on 17.02.2001 and released from custody on 27.02.2001 on the basis of bail order granted by this Court. The occurrence took place in the year 1997 and more than twenty six years have passed and therefore, while convicting the appellant under sections 498-A of the I.P.C. and 4 of the D.P. Act, the substantive sentence is reduced to the period already undergone. No fine amount is imposed on the appellant. Trial Court Records with a copy of this judgment be sent down to the concerned Court. CRA 41 of 2001 Page 25 of 26 [ 26 ] Before parting with the case, I would like to put on record my appreciation to Mr. B.S. Dasparida, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Sonak Mishra, learned Addl. Standing Counsel for the State for rendering their valuable help and assistance towards arriving at the decision above mentioned. …………………………… S.K. Sahoo, J. Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 25th January 2024/PKSahoo Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: PRAMOD KUMAR SAHOO Designation: Secretary Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 29-Jan-2024 16:52:25 CRA 41 of 2001 Page 26 of 26