The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 (Arising out of the Judgment and Order of Acquittal dated 26th of February, 2002 passed by Sri S. P. Raju, 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Cuttack, in Sessions Trial No.70 of 1998, arising out of G.R. Case No.421 of 1997, for the offence under sections 498- A/302/304-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860) State of Orissa … Appellant Ms. B. L. Tripathy, Addl. Standing Counsel -versus- Maheswar Barik & Ors. … Respondent Mr. A. Das, Advocate CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE B. P. ROUTRAY THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH Date of Judgment: 16.05.2025 Chittaranjan Dash, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order of Acquittal dated 26.02.2002 passed by learned 1st Addl. Sessions Judge, Cuttack, in Sessions Trial No.70 of 1998, arising out of G.R. Case No.421 of 1997, whereby all the Respondents were acquitted of the charges under Sections 498-A/302/304-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, hereinafter referred to as “IPC”). During the pendency of the present appeal, it is placed on record that the appeal as against Respondent Nos. 1 and 4 stands abated, vide order dated GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 1 of 22 09.02.2021. Accordingly, the present Appeal is confined to the challenge against the acquittal of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 2. The prosecution case in brief is that the deceased Bharati Rout was married to accused-Respondent No.3, Kartik Barik, approximately 2½ years prior to her death. About 1 year and 4 months after the marriage, the deceased was found dead by hanging in the kitchen of her matrimonial home. It is alleged that prior to and during the marriage, the accused persons, including Kartik Barik and his family members, demanded dowry comprising ₹30,000/- in cash, gold ornaments, and a scooter. Although part of the dowry was allegedly paid, the scooter remained undelivered, leading to persistent mental and physical torture upon the deceased by her in-laws. On 21.09.1997, the Informant, P.W.4, father of the deceased, upon hearing of his daughter's death, proceeded to her matrimonial home and discovered the body hanging with signs of external injuries, indicating foul play. A written report was lodged at Athgarh Police Station, pursuant to which P.S. Case No. 182/97 was registered vide Ext.1. 3. In course of the investigation, P.W.8, the Investigating Officer, visited the spot on the same day and in the presence of the Executive Magistrate, conducted the inquest vide Ext.5, and prepared the spot map marked as Ext.6. The I.O. seized articles allegedly given as dowry from the house of the accused under the seizure list marked as Ext.7, which were later given in zima to the Informant vide Ext.3. Gold ornaments recovered from the dead body were seized under Ext.8 and similarly released in zima vide Ext.2. On 22.09.1997, the wearing apparels of the deceased were seized from the constable under Ext.8. Accordingly, the Respondents, namely, Maheswar Barik, GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 2 of 22 Mala Barik, Kartik Barik, and Basanta Barik were arrested the same day at 5 P.M. and forwarded to the SDJM, Athgarh. Upon completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the Respondents. 4. 5. The case of the defence is one of complete denial. To bring home the charge, the prosecution examined 8 witnesses in all. P.W.1 and 6 are co-villagers. P.W.2 is the co-villager who also mediated the wedding of the deceased and the accused, P.W.3 is the mother of the deceased, P.W.4 is the father of the deceased, also the Informant, P.W.5 is the cousin of the deceased, P.W.7 is the doctor who conducted the P.M. examination, and P.W.8 is the I.O. 6. The defence, on the other hand, examined one witness, D.W.1, who is the neighbour of the accused. 7. The learned trial Court, upon consideration of the materials and evidence brought on record, found that the prosecution could not establish the charge against all the Respondents beyond all reasonable doubt and, accordingly, were granted the benefit of doubt and acquitted henceforth. 8.
Legal Reasoning
prima facie case that would call upon the accused to explain specific incriminating circumstances within the meaning of Section 106. While silence or denial may in some cases attract adverse inference where foundational facts are first proved by the prosecution, that threshold has not been crossed in the present case. Thus, reliance on Section 106 to reverse the burden onto the accused in this case would amount to speculative overreach in the absence of an evidentiary substratum to support it. It is further made clear that the provision is intended to supplement, not supplant the prosecution’s obligation to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. Section 106 does not relieve the prosecution of its primary burden of establishing the foundational facts necessary to connect the accused to the crime. The prosecution, having failed to GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 20 of 22 prove direct or circumstantial involvement of Respondent No.3 in the commission of the offence, cannot now shift the responsibility onto him to prove his innocence. Such an approach would be contrary to the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that the prosecution must prove it’s case beyond all reasonable doubt. 22. Upon careful consideration of all the evidence on record, it reveals that the prosecution has failed to establish a consistent and unbroken chain of circumstances that points unerringly to the guilt of the accused, as mandated in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, (Supra). The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution do not form a complete chain; rather, they leave substantial gaps and are marred by contradictions, hearsay assertions, and a lack of independent corroboration. The essential link connecting the accused with the act of smothering which the medical evidence confirms as the cause of death is conspicuously absent. There is no proof of last seen, no forensic linkage, no eyewitness, and no circumstantial evidence placing the respondents at the scene at the material time. 23. Moreover, the prosecution has failed to prove the ingredients necessary under Sections 498-A, 302, 304-B, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The alleged dowry demand is vague, uncorroborated by neutral witnesses, contradicted by the FIR itself, and unsupported by any documentary or contemporaneous evidence. The evidence of cruelty or harassment “soon before death,” which is a sine qua non for conviction under Section 304-B IPC, is not established. Equally, there is no material suggesting a common intention or overt act on part of either Respondent No.2 or No.3 to GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 21 of 22 attract culpability under Section 34 IPC. The cause of death i.e. smothering, is neither connected to nor attributed to any specific individual through admissible evidence. 24. In view of the above discussions, this Court finds no infirmity in the well-reasoned judgment of acquittal dated 26.02.2002 passed by the learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Cuttack. The appreciation of evidence is neither perverse nor legally unsustainable. Accordingly, the Appeal stands dismissed, and the order of acquittal is upheld. (Chittaranjan Dash) Judge B.P. Routray, J. I agree. (B. P. Routray) Judge A.K.Pradhan/Bijay Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: BIJAY KETAN SAHOO Reason: Authentication Location: HIGH COURT OF ORISSA Date: 16-May-2025 18:39:21 GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 22 of 22
Arguments
Ms. B. L. Tripathy, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State, submits that the deceased died under unnatural circumstances within a short span of her marriage, which raises a strong presumption of dowry death under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act. She contended that the deceased had been subjected to cruelty and harassment by the accused, in connection with unlawful demands for dowry, as reflected in the depositions of P.Ws.1, 3, 4, and 5. Ms. GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 3 of 22 Tripathy further submitted that since the incident occurred within the matrimonial home, and the husband had special means of knowledge regarding the circumstances of his wife’s death, the burden of explanation squarely lay on him under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which he failed to discharge. She urged that the trial Court has erred in giving undue weight to minor inconsistencies in prosecution evidence and in rejecting the prosecution case despite the clear indicators of dowry-related cruelty and an unnatural death, and thus prays for reversal of acquittal and conviction of the Respondents. 9. Mr. A. Das, learned Advocate, appearing on behalf of Respondent Nos. 2 & 3, in course of the hearing, contended that the prosecution failed to establish the essential ingredients of Sections 304-B, 498-A, 302, or 34 of the IPC. He was pointed out that the alleged dowry demand lacks independent corroboration, as all material witnesses P.Ws.1, 3, 4, and 5 are related to the deceased, and their testimonies are repetitive. He added that, Respondent No.3, the Husband, was not named in any of the complaints, and no specific act of cruelty or harassment has been attributed to him at any point with sufficient clarity. Mr. Das further submits that P.W.2, the only purportedly independent witness, admitted to having no direct knowledge of any dowry demands, as well as the prosecution also failed to examine available and material independent witnesses, including signatories to the inquest report. Mr. Das asserts that the cause of death, as per the post-mortem report and medical expert P.W.7, was smothering and not hanging, yet the prosecution neither proved who committed the act nor placed either respondent at the scene. He concludes his argument by stating that in the absence of any GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 4 of 22 credible chain of circumstances or direct evidence linking either respondent to the alleged offence, and given the inconsistencies and deficiencies in the prosecution's case, the trial Court has rightly acquitted the Accused-Respondents. 10. Having regard to the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties, it is incumbent to deal with the testimonies of the relevant witnesses for better appreciation of the case. P.W.1, a co-villager of the accused, stated that during the marriage of the deceased with the accused, Maheswar Barik had demanded dowry, and in compliance with the said demand, the Informant, Suryamani Rout (father of the deceased), gave Rs.30,000/- in cash and utensils. The Informant had also assured the delivery of a scooter, which, however, could not be fulfilled. One month prior to the death of the deceased, while P.W.1 was passing by the road adjacent to her matrimonial house, the deceased requested him to convey a message to her parents stating that she was being assaulted due to the non-fulfilment of the scooter demand and urged that the scooter be delivered at the earliest. The witness further deposed that the Informant visited his daughter’s matrimonial house about a month prior to her death and subsequently informed P.W.1 that he had assured the accused family that the scooter would be given shortly to prevent further torture. In cross-examination, P.W.1 admitted that the police station is situated approximately 17 kilometres from his village, yet he did not report the incident to the police or to any village elders or authorities, including the Dowry Prohibition Cell. He revealed that he shared the deceased’s message only with the Informant. He also GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 5 of 22 stated that his oral statement was recorded by the Officer-in-Charge, Athgarh Police Station, on 21.09.1997, at about 4:00 p.m., and that he remained present as an inquest witness from 12:00 noon to 4:00 p.m. He acknowledged his awareness that dowry demand constitutes an offence. He denied the suggestion that he had not disclosed the allegation of dowry demand before the police during his examination. He also admitted that his house is located approximately 500 cubits from the accused’s house and that the Informant is his relative, whom he refers to as “mousa”. P.W.2, a co-villager and the person who mediated the marriage between the deceased and the accused, stated that he had brought the marriage proposal to the Informant. According to him, Maheswar Barik had demanded dowry in the form of cash and a scooter at the time of the marriage. While the cash component was complied with, the scooter could not be provided immediately, and the Informant sought approximately four months’ time to arrange for the same. In his cross-examination, P.W.2 admitted that he had not intimated the dowry demand to the police, any village elder, or the local sarpanch. He stated that Maheswar Barik was about 80 years old and claimed no knowledge of whether Maheswar suffered from asthma or whether his son-in-law, Ramesh Ch. Jena, was managing all household affairs. He admitted that although he met the police during their visit to the village on the date of inquest, he was not examined at that time, nor did he voluntarily disclose the incident to them. He was later examined two to four days after the incident at the Athgarh Police Station, at about 12:30 p.m., after being called by the Deputy GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 6 of 22 Superintendent of Police. He further admitted that he had no personal knowledge about the alleged demand for a scooter and cash. P.W.3, the mother of the deceased, deposed that, 15 days prior to the marriage, the accused persons Maheswar and Basanta had demanded Rs.30,000/- in cash and one scooter as dowry. The family paid the cash but sought some time to arrange for the scooter. She stated that after the marriage, the deceased visited her parental home on three occasions, during which she reported being assaulted by her father-in-law, her husband’s brother, and her husband’s brother’s wife, due to the non-delivery of the scooter. About a month prior to her death, the deceased again visited her parental home and informed them that she was being denied entry into her matrimonial house unless the scooter was delivered as earlier agreed. Following this, the Informant went to the matrimonial home of the deceased and assured the accused that the scooter would be provided soon, while also requesting them not to assault the deceased. However, he himself was not allowed entry into their house without the scooter. P.W.3 further deposed that certain villager from Balisahi, who frequented the market, informed them that the deceased had stopped going for her routine bath and that there had been quarrels in her matrimonial home concerning the scooter. These villagers later informed them about the deceased’s death, upon which they proceeded to the village of the accused. In cross-examination, P.W.3 stated that the house of the accused persons was about 25 to 30 kilometres from their own. She admitted that she did not inform anyone else about the dowry demand. She further stated that on hearing about the death, her husband left for the accused’s village at about 7:30 a.m. She denied the suggestion that GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 7 of 22 it was Maheswar Barik who informed them about the death. She stated that she reached Balisahi by 9:00 a.m. along with her nephew, Pabitra. She did not go to the Athgarh Police Station herself; instead, her husband and son lodged the FIR, following which the police arrived at the scene. She was examined by the police between 12:00 noon and 2:00 p.m., and she left the village by 2:00 p.m., noting that it takes around two hours to travel from their village to that of the accused. P.W.4, the Informant and father of the deceased, stated that his daughter was married to accused Kartik Barik approximately 2½ years ago and that she died about 1 year and 4 months after her marriage, in her matrimonial house. He corroborated the earlier witnesses regarding the demand of Rs.30,000/- in cash, gold ornaments, and a scooter as dowry by the accused persons, including Maheswar and Kartik Barik. He further stated that the deceased had visited their house 3 to 4 times after marriage and had informed them about the harassment being meted out to her in connection with dowry demands. During investigation, certain articles were handed over to him by the police under zimmanama. He stated that photographs of his daughter’s dead body were taken by the police in his presence as well as in the presence of the Officer-in-Charge and the Magistrate while the body was found hanging. P.W.4 further deposed that before solemnisation of the marriage, he had inquired into the financial background of the accused family. He admitted that in the FIR, there was no endorsement that its contents were read over and explained to him, and that the scribe’s name was not mentioned, nor had the scribe signed the document. He stated that he had gone to the Police Station at around 11:00 a.m. with his nephew Bamadev and one Pabitra Rout and sat in the verandah to write out the FIR. The OIC was present, but GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 8 of 22 they did not meet him. The paper for the FIR was purchased from a nearby shop, though the shopkeeper’s name could not be recalled. He stated that the FIR was lodged and he was examined by the police thereafter. He left the Police Station by 11:30 a.m. He admitted not disclosing to the police that Bamadev had scribed the FIR, and that neither Bamadev nor Pabitra was examined by the police. He informed the Magistrate during the inquest about the dowry demands made by the accused. He further stated that although he was aware that dowry demand is an offence, he made no attempt to report the same to the village elders or to the Dowry Prohibition Cell. He claimed that his elder brother also knew about the dowry demand but did not attend the wedding. P.W.4 denied the suggestion that he had not mentioned the dowry demand or the visits of the deceased to their house in the FIR or in his Section 161 Cr.P.C. statement. He stated that he was incapable of reading the FIR due to poor vision and had been unable to read for the past 4 to 5 years. He deposed that after learning about the death from unnamed villagers, he rushed to the house of the accused. Upon arrival, accused Maheswar Barik informed him that the deceased was inside the kitchen. On proceeding to the kitchen, he found the door chained from the outside. Upon unfastening the chain, he found the dead body of his daughter hanging by a rope. He observed that the right eye of the deceased was bulging, there were marks of violence on her nose, bleeding from the leg, and her legs rested on a small wall of about 2 to 2½ feet height. He also noticed a teeth bite mark on her lower lip. He alleged that the accused persons had murdered his daughter and hanged her dead body to make it appear as a case of suicide. He denied the suggestions that the deceased had peptic ulcer or that she was under Ayurvedic treatment GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 9 of 22 from one Dr. Gokulananda Patri. He denied that his daughter was unwilling to marry Kartik or that she lost mental balance due to stomach pain and committed suicide. He also denied the defence suggestions that no dowry demand was ever made, no torture was inflicted, and that the FIR was a fabrication made after demanding money from the accused. He refuted the suggestion that household affairs of Maheswar and his wife, being aged and infirm, were managed solely by their son-in-law, Ramesh Ch. Jena. P.W.5, Bamadev Rout, cousin of the deceased, deposed that the deceased was married to accused Kartik Barik about 2½ years prior to her death and that she died 1 year and 4 months after her wedding, at her matrimonial home. He corroborated the testimonies of P.Ws. 3 and 4 regarding the dowry demands of Rs.30,000/-, gold ornaments, and a scooter, as well as the deceased's visits to her parental home 3 to 4 times. He stated that upon receiving news of the death, he went to the house of the accused and found accused Maheswar sitting in the courtyard. Upon being asked, Maheswar informed them about the deceased’s body being inside the kitchen. P.W.5 corroborated P.W.4’s version regarding the condition in which the body was found, adding that the rope used for hanging was tied to the thatched roof of the kitchen. He also affirmed that he was the scribe of the FIR and was present during the inquest proceedings. In cross-examination, he stated that he was a B.A. graduate. Despite being informed about the incidents of dowry-related torture by the deceased, he admitted that he had not taken any steps to report the matter to the police or attempt any reconciliation with the accused. He confirmed that every statement made by him was in consonance with that of P.W.4. GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 10 of 22 P.W.6, a co-villager, stated that as per the dowry demand made by accused Maheswar Barik, the Informant, Suryamani Rout, had paid Rs.30,000/- in cash at the altar during the marriage ceremony. The Informant had also assured the delivery of a scooter at a later date. He stated that about one month prior to the death of the deceased, he met her in their village and upon inquiry, the deceased informed him about the torture she was subjected to by her in-laws, including the elder brother’s wife. She further disclosed that her husband, Kartik (Respondent no. 3), did not maintain any conjugal relationship with her. That was the last occasion he saw the deceased in the village. He later came to know about her death through persons from Balisahi who had come to their village for paddy-related business. Upon hearing this, he went to Balisahi and found the deceased’s body in the same condition as described by P.W.3. In cross-examination, P.W.6 admitted that he had never been to Athgarh Police Station. When he arrived at Balisahi, the Officer-in-Charge and the Executive Magistrate were already present. He was not examined by the police. He stated that he was a matriculate. Despite being aware of the torture being faced by the deceased, he conceded that he did not make any effort to report the matter to the police or intervene to resolve the issue with the accused. He also answered questions relating to his caste, the caste of the Informant, and the respective occupations of the Informant and himself. D.W.1 deposed that she was a neighbour of the accused persons and was on cordial terms with the deceased during her stay in the matrimonial home. She stated that Respondent No.3 was the husband of the deceased, and Respondent No.2 was his elder brother. According to her, she used to interact with the deceased at the village GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 11 of 22 bathing ghat, where the deceased confided that she was suffering from peptic ulcer and was in severe pain. D.W.1 stated that the deceased allegedly told her that, unable to bear the pain, she took her own life. She asserted that the present case was not one of dowry death. She further stated that she was aware of the Informant bringing medicines for the deceased and that Respondent No.3 frequently took the deceased to consult Dr. Pati for treatment. It was her claim that the marriage of the deceased had taken place against her will. In cross- examination, she admitted that the deceased died one and a half years after the marriage but could not specify the medications or produce any prescription. While she claimed to have seen the deceased taking medicines and visiting Dr. Pati, she could not recall the year of such visits. She acknowledged that this was the first instance in the village where someone allegedly died by suicide due to stomach pain. She professed ignorance regarding the arrest of the accused and also admitted to having good relations with the accused family. She stated that she had come to depose upon being called by the defence. Before concluding, she informed the Court that she had personally seen the deceased visit Dr. Pati for treatment approximately two months prior to her death. 11. In order to appreciate the aforesaid submissions, the relevant provisions with respect to the charges are required to be referred to – Indian Penal Code, 1860 300. Murder. —Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or— 2ndly. —If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused, or— GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 12 of 22 3rdly. —If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, or— 4thly. —If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death, or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. 302. Punishment for murder.—Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death or [imprisonment for life], and shall also be liable to fine. 304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death. Explanation.— For the purposes of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 13 of 22 grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. 34. Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.—When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. 12. Before analysing the culpability of the Appellant, it is incumbent to examine if the prosecution could successfully establish the death of the deceased to be homicidal in nature. P.W.7, the medical officer who conducted the post-mortem examination, has opined the following in the P.M. Report vide Ext.9: i. Body swollen, petrification started, superficial blebs present; skin peeling here and there. ii. Face suffused, upper part of face deeply coloured means bluish. iii. Left eye opened little protruded; right eye closed with sub conjunctival haemorrhage; cornea hazy, pupils diluted. iv. Bloody froth coming out of mouth and nostrils; tongue protruded; lips lived; multiple teeth bites at vestibule of mouth. v. Nose depressed. vi. Rigor mortis present on hand, legs and neck; voiding of faeces present; legs straight; Hands half clinched; fist partially opened. vii. Blood stains at vaginal introitus present. viii. There was no external injury that could be elicited. There is a superficial ligature mark in neck without involving underline structures. All the internal organs are congested; uterus is non-gravid with streaks of blood at cervix and vagina indicating probably a GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 14 of 22 woman is mensurated. The dissection of facial muscles shows extravasation of blood into it confirming local pressure. All injuries teeth bites, subconjunctival haemorrhage, facial extravasation of blood are ante- mortem in nature. Hanging and ligature mark are post- mortem in nature. Cause of death is due to smothering. Time since death within 24 to 48 hours from P.M. examination. Description of ligature-A strong ½” dia.rope made up of jute, about 2 ½ ft. Long, one end having a knot. The ligature was o the neck itself which was cut away from the slipping knot and preserved with the noose. The ligature mark tallies with the rope used. 13. The medical evidence tendered by P.W.7 conclusively establishes that the death of the deceased was homicidal. The autopsy revealed classic signs of smothering, a form of asphyxial death caused by external obstruction of the airways, substantiated by ante-mortem injuries such as subconjunctival haemorrhage, extravasation of blood in facial muscles, and teeth bite marks in the vestibule of the mouth. These injuries point unmistakably to forceful suffocation inflicted prior to death. Notably, the ligature mark on the neck was superficial and post-mortem in nature, suggesting an attempt to simulate hanging after death. Further corroborative indicators, such as internal congestion of organs and voiding of faeces, aligned with death caused by asphyxia and ruled out any possibility of suicide. Though the defence, through D.W.1, attempted to present an alternative explanation namely, that the deceased was suffering from a peptic ulcer and had suicidal tendencies, the prosecution rightly challenged the credibility of this account, particularly as no medical records or testimony from Dr. Pati were produced. In contrast, the consistent and scientific post-mortem findings decisively negate the hypothesis of GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 15 of 22 suicidal death and firmly establish that the death of the deceased is indeed homicidal in nature. 14. Coming to the culpability of the Accused-Respondents, the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence, and it is trite law that in a case of circumstantial evidence, before reaching a conclusion, the Court is required to examine the evidence on the touchstone of the decision reported in the matter of Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 1984 SC 1622 – “3:3. Before a case against an accused vesting on circumstantial evidence can be said to be fully established the following conditions must be fulfilled as laid down in Hanumant’s v. State of M.P. [1953] SCR 1091. 1. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established; 2. The facts so established should be consistent with the hypothesis of guilt and the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty; 3. The circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency; 4. They should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved; and to leave any reasonable ground for 5. There must be a chain of evidence so complete as not the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability act must have been done by the accused. the five golden principles constitute the These panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence and in the absence of a corpus deliciti. GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 16 of 22 Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1952] SCR 1091; Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1969] 3 SCC 198; Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1972 SC 656; and Shivaji Sahabrao Babode & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra [1973] 2 SCC 793 referred to. 3:4. The cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence is that a case can be said to be proved only when there is certain and explicit evidence and no pure moral conviction.” 15. A careful and holistic examination of the prosecution evidence reveals significant weaknesses that severely impair the case against Respondent Nos. 2 and 3. At the forefront is the glaring inconsistency and lack of independent corroboration in the oral testimonies. All primary witnesses, such as, P.Ws. 3, 4, and 5 are close family members of the deceased whose statements are generic, repetitive, and devoid of material specificity. P.W.1, a co-villager, though stated about the alleged demand for a scooter and gold ring but later admitted to having no direct knowledge of the same. P.W.3, the deceased’s mother, speaks vaguely of her daughter’s unhappiness but fails to attribute any specific acts of cruelty to the Respondents or to contextualise such cruelty in relation to time or frequency. The only neutral witness, P.W.2, also admits that he had only “heard” about dowry demands, and possessed no firsthand knowledge rendering his testimony hearsay and evidentially hollow. Notably, the prosecution did not examine any independent villagers or the co-signatories to the inquest report, Dharani Rout, Govind Chandra Pratap Singh, and Siba Prasad Swain, whose testimonies could have served to objectively substantiate the circumstances surrounding the death. Their absence GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 17 of 22 from the witness stand leaves a conspicuous gap in the evidentiary chain. 16. Furthermore, the prosecution has conspicuously failed to establish the demand of dowry or cruelty “soon before death” as mandated under Section 304-B IPC. The core witnesses do not narrate any specific act of harassment or attribute any concrete demand to either respondent. Their statements remain broad and unsubstantiated by any documentary or independent material. 17. Moreover, no motive for the alleged murder has been suggested or proved by the prosecution. In the absence of a clear motive, any credible evidence of sustained dowry harassment, or any proximate incident of cruelty preceding the death, the foundational ingredients of both Section 498-A and Section 304-B of the IPC remain wholly unproved. Thus, taken cumulatively, the prosecution’s case is riddled with internal contradictions, suffers from non- examination of key and neutral witnesses, lacks forensic or documentary support, and fails to establish a coherent chain of circumstances ultimately failing to meet the evidentiary threshold required to attribute culpability to the respondents. Even the FIR (Ext.1) weakens the prosecution’s case, as it records that cash and articles were given “voluntarily,” without any coercive demand or threat. No letters, messages, or other contemporaneous evidence of dowry demand have been produced, that consequently, fall short of the evidentiary threshold for conviction under Sections 498-A or 304-B IPC. GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 18 of 22 18. During the course of hearing, the learned Additional Standing Counsel sought to rely upon Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, to argue that Respondent No.3, being the husband of the deceased and thereby presumed to have had special means of knowledge regarding the circumstances leading to her unnatural death within the matrimonial home, bore a corresponding burden to explain the same. 19. While appreciating the above argument, in this regard, reference may be made to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the matter of Satpal vs. State of Haryana reported in (2018) 6SCC 610, para 6, as under: – itself “Criminal jurisprudence and the plethora of judicial precedents leave little room for reconsideration of the basic principles for invocation of the last seen theory as a facet of circumstantial evidence. Succinctly stated, it may be a weak kind of evidence by the same to found conviction upon singularly. But when it is coupled with other circumstances such as the time when the deceased was last seen with the accused and the recovery of the corpse being in very close proximity of time, the accused owes an explanation under Section 106 of the Evidence Act with regard to the circumstances under which death may have been taken place. If the accused offers no explanation, or furnishes a wrong explanation, absconds, motive is established and there is corroborative evidence available inter alia in the form of recovery or otherwise forming a chain of circumstances leading to the only inference for guilt of the accused, incompatible with any possible hypothesis of innocence, conviction can be based on the same. If there be any doubt or break in the link of chain of circumstance, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused. Each case will therefore have to be GCRLA No. 20 of 2002 Page 19 of 22 examined on its own facts for invocation of the doctrine” 20. In the instant case, the prosecution has conspicuously failed to establish a “last seen” circumstance or otherwise demonstrate that the deceased was last seen alive in the company of Respondent No.3 or that he was present in the house at or around the time of the occurrence. No witness has deposed to having seen the deceased and Respondent No.3 together immediately prior to the incident, nor has any circumstantial link been provided to show exclusive presence or custody. In the absence of any “last seen” theory having been set up or proved by the prosecution, the invocation of Section 106 becomes premature and legally untenable. Without the establishment of such a proximate fact, it cannot be presumed that Respondent No.3 alone had knowledge of the events leading to the death. 21. Moreover, the evidence so as to general denial of the allegations levelled against the Respondent No.3 does not reflect any