Criminal Appeal No. 265 of 1990 · The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK Criminal Appeal No.265 of 1990 From the judgment and order dated 22.09.1990 passed by the Special Judge (Vigilance), Sambalpur in T.R. Case No.18 of 1982. --------------------------- G. Dharmarao Patnaik (Dead) through L.R. ……… Appellant -Versus- State of Odisha (Vig.) ……… Respondent For Appellant: - Mr. Basudev Mishra Advocate For Respondent: - Mr. M.S. Rizvi Addl. Standing Counsel (Vig.) …………………………….. P R E S E N T: THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE S.K. SAHOO ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Date of Hearing and Judgment: 06.07.2023 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ S. K. SAHOO, J. This criminal appeal has been filed by G. Dharmarao Patnaik (hereinafter ‘the deceased appellant’) challenging the judgment passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Sambalpur dated 22.09.1990 in T.R. Case No.18 of 1982 in convicting him under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 (hereinafter ‘P.C. Act’) and section 471 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter ‘I.P.C.’) 2 and sentencing him to undergo R.I. for two years and to pay a fine of Rs.2,500/-(rupees two thousand five hundred), in default, to undergo S.I. for a period of six months for the offence under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) of the P.C. Act and to undergo R.I. for a period of six months for the offence under section 471 of I.P.C. and both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. During pendency of the appeal before this Court, the deceased appellant died on 08.12.1991 and his near relatives filed an interim application under section 394(2) Cr.P.C. vide I.A. No.04 of 2020 along with an interim application for condonation of delay vide I.A. No.05 of 2020 in filing such application for grant of leave to continue the criminal appeal by substituting them as appellants for the deceased appellant, who died on 08.12.1991. This Court vide order dated 19.11.2020 in I.A. No.05 of 2020, condoned the delay in filing the application for leave under section 394(2) Cr.P.C. and also on that very day, in I.A. No.04 of 2020, granted leave to the near relatives to continue with the appeal and permitted them to be substituted as the appellants in the appeal. Page 2 of 23 3 2.
Legal Reasoning
The prosecution case, in short, as per the first
Legal Reasoning
information report dated 08.07.1980 lodged by Sri Biswanath Das (P.W.8), Inspector of Police, Vigilance, Nowrangpur before the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, S.D., Berhampur, is that the deceased appellant G. Dharmarao Patnaik, was posted as B.D.O., Nowrangpur Block from 31.01.1970 to 23.10.1973 and retired from Government service. During his incumbency as B.D.O. at Nowarangpur, it was found that an amount of Rs.2,220/- (rupees two thousand two hundred twenty) was disbursed by him on 27.05.1971 to one Sunadhar Nag (P.W.4), Naib Sarpanch and an executant of Sanakumuli M.I.P. under a stamped receipt purported to have been signed by P.W.4. The above amount was shown to have been paid to P.W.4 as an advance towards execution of construction work of the above M.I.P. and the receipt was treated as voucher no.44/71-72 dated 25.07.1971. It is the further prosecution case as per the F.I.R. that P.W.4 had neither applied for the alleged advance nor he had actually received Rs.2,220/- (rupees two thousand two hundred twenty) which was disbursed by the appellant. The signature stated to be that of P.W.4 in the alleged stamped receipt and his specimen signatures and writing were sent to the Page 3 of 23 4 Govt. Examiner, who on examination opined that the disputed signature available in the said receipt was not that of P.W.4. It is the further prosecution case that R.B. Raman Rao (P.W.2) who was the cashier of the Nowrangpur Block Office did not make the purported payment to P.W.4 and the deceased appellant deliberately misappropriated a sum of Rs.2,220/- (rupees two thousand two hundred twenty) from the said panchayat samiti fund by manipulating the stamped receipt in the name of P.W.4 showing the payment to him. 3. On the basis of such F.I.R., Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, Berhampur directed to register a case under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) of the P.C. Act and sections 471/465 of I.P.C. against the deceased appellant and directed P.W.8 to take up investigation of the case. During the course of investigation, P.W.8 examined the witnesses, seized the panchayat office cash book, receipt voucher, case record of M.I.P., Sanakumuli and other documents from the office of the B.D.O., Nowrangpur. The deceased appellant was already retired from service for which no sanction for his prosecution was obtained and on completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted under section 5(2) Page 4 of 23 5 read with section 5(1)(c) of the P.C. Act and sections 465/471/409 of I.P.C. on 31.05.1982. 4. The deceased appellant was charged under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) of the P.C. Act on the accusation that while he was working as B.D.O., Nawarangpur from 31.01.1970 to 23.10.1973, he dishonestly and fraudulently misappropriated or otherwise converted to his own use a sum of Rs. Rs.2,220/- (rupees two thousand two hundred twenty) on 27.05.1971 entrusted to him under his control as a public servant. He was further charged under section 465 I.P.C. on the accusation that in the official capacity, he forged one stamped document with an intent to misappropriate a sum of Rs.2,220/- (rupees two thousand two hundred twenty) and he was also charged under section 471 I.P.C. on the accusation that in his official capacity, he fraudulently used a stamped document as genuine which he knew to be a forged one. 5. In order to prove its case, the prosecution examined eight witnesses. P.W.1 K.C. Rao, who was working as Vigilance Inspector, Nawarangpur squad stated that he took the specimen signatures and a passage writing with the signature of P.W.4 duly attested by the Asst. Surgeon, P.H.C., Dabugaon vide Ext.2 Page 5 of 23 6 to Ext.2/5 and Ext.3 respectively and thereafter he handed over the charge of investigation to P.W.8 on his transfer. P.W.2 R.B. Raman Rao was working as a Clerk in the B.D.O. Office, Nowarangpur. He stated to have wrote the cash book on 27.05.1971 in the absence of the Head Clerk (P.W.3) vide Ext.4 and he further stated that the deceased appellant handed over the voucher (Ext.1) to him and wanted him to take into account which he did. He further stated that the money was not paid in his presence by the deceased appellant and he handed over Ext.1 to the Head Clerk after he resumed duties. P.W.3 Dasarathi Naik was the Head Clerk of Nawarangpur Block from 1971 to 1974 and stated that P.W.2 handed over Ext.1 to him. P.W.4 Sunadhar Nag was working as the contractor to execute the minor irrigation project at Sanakumuli. He denied to have received Rs.2,220/- under Ext.1 on 27.05.1971 and also disputed his signature thereon. P.W.5 Daitari Mishra was the B.D.O., Nawarangpur who took charge from the deceased appellant. He stated that on noticing from the Advance Register that P.W.4 was shown to have received an advance of Rs.2,220/- towards execution of Sanakumuli M.I.P. and the advance was not adjusted, he served Page 6 of 23 7 notice on P.W.4 for refund of the advance or to complete the work but P.W.4 came to the office and denied to have received the amount in question and also disputed the signature on the voucher. P.W.6 T. Suryanarayan was working as Assistant Surgeon and attached to Dabugaon P.H.C. He stated about the I.O. taking specimen signature and writing of P.W.4 in his presence as per Exts. 2 to 2/5 and Ext.3. P.W.7 N.S. Bhanu Patnaik is the hand writing expert, who examined the questioned documents along with specimen signatures and admitted writing with signature of P.W.4 and proved his report vide Ext.9. .W. P.W.8 Biswanath Das was Inspector of Vigilance, Nawrangpur who is the Investigating Officer of the case. The prosecution exhibited ten documents. Ext.1 is the disputed receipt. Ext.2 is the specimen signature of Sunadhar Nag. Ext.3 is the specimen writing and signature of Sunadhar Nag, Ext.4 is the Entry at Page 16 of the Cash Book, Ext.5 is the Case record of M.I.P., Sanakumuli, Ext.6 is the requisition for examination of documents, Ext.7 is the negative photograph, Exts.8, 8/1 and 8/2 are the enlarged photographs, Ext.9 is the opinion of P.W.7 and Ext.10 is the reasoning of P.W.7. Page 7 of 23 8 6. The defence plea of the deceased appellant is that the payment was made under the stamped receipt by P.W.2 as the cashier obtaining the pay order from him and that a false case has been foisted in connivance with P.W.2. 7. The learned trial Court after assessing the oral as well as documentary evidence on record has been pleased to hold that the work of the project was not completed by 27.05.1971, and from the contents of Ext.3/2 and 3/4, it appeared that the work was not even completed by P.W.4 by 10.04.1972 and 11.04.1972. It has been further held that the completion or non- completion of the project is a corroborative substance and it would not materially affect the forgery if the project is found incomplete. It has been further held that the evidence of P.W.5 is quite in conformity with the evidence of P.W.4 except to the fact that according to P.W.4, in presence of P.W.5 and others, the appellant promised to make payment of the amount to P.W.4 which is not supported by P.W.5. It has been further held that the specimen handwritings and signatures and admitted handwritings and signatures of P.W.4 vide Ext.3/3 to Ext.3/5 being examined by P.W.7, he came to the opinion that the person who put the specimen and admitted signatures did not put the signature in Ext.1 and thus, regarding the non-execution Page 8 of 23 9 of Ext.1 by P.W.4, the evidence of P.W.4 got corroborated by P.W.5 and P.W.7. It has been further held that the question of suspecting the genuineness of Ext.1 did not arise for P.W.2 and thus, he should not be treated as an accomplice. Learned trial Court further held that in spite of summons being issued to P.W.2 till 08.12.1986 for his appearance for cross-examination, he did not appear. Thereafter, the appellant having been represented by an able lawyer of his choice after 12.03.1984 and he having filed two petitions on 4.3.1986 and 6.7.1986, did not pursue the same after 8.12.1986 and allowed the case to be closed. It was held that the accused did not really intend to further cross-examine P.W.2 although the petitions for that purposes were filed on earlier date. For the sporadic and half hearted act of the accused in the matter, he could not be said to have been prejudiced for not being allowed to further cross-examine P.W.2 and the trial is not vitiated on this account. The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the forgery of Ext.1 was done at the instance of the accused and he misappropriated a sum of Rs.2,220/- showing that it was paid as advance to P.W.4 for execution of M.I.P., Sanakumuli, which was taken by P.W.4 on contract basis. The learned trial Court came to the conclusion that the appellant had obtained pecuniary Page 9 of 23 10 advantage of Rs.2,220/- by way of this transaction and therefore, the offence under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) of the P.C. Act is established. The learned trial Court further held that there is no evidence on record to show that the appellant put his signature on Ext.1 and therefore, the offence under section 465 of the I.P.C. was not established. It was further held that the appellant had instructed to use Ext.1 as genuine document and in fact it was so used in the books of accounts. Hence, it can be safely deduced that Ext.1 was a forged document which was dishonestly used as genuine document by the appellant and accordingly, offence under section 471 of the I.P.C. is established. 8. Mr. Basudev Mishra, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it is not disputed by the appellant in his 313 Cr.P.C. statement said that the villagers of Sanakumuli applied to B.D.O., Nabarangpur under Ext.5/1 to entrust the M.I.P. at Sanakumuli to P.W.4 and P.W.4 also applied under Ext.5/2 to take up the work by himself. He pointed out that the case record of M.I.P., Sanakumuli (Ext.5) indicates that the work was accordingly entrusted to P.W.4, who executed the work and has been paid the sanctioned amount. The deceased appellant Page 10 of 23 11 succeeded one Biswanath Mishra, who was the B.D.O. and he was succeeded by P.W.5 Daitari Mishra. The evidence of P.W.4 that he had not received a sum of Rs.2,220/- under Ext.1 on 27.05.1971 is not acceptable. It is argued that the leaned trial Court has placed reliance on the evidence of P.W.2 who was working as a clerk in the office of the B.D.O., Nabarangpur at the relevant point of time to convict the appellant, however, the appellant could not get an opportunity to effectively cross- examine P.W.2 on the date of recording of evidence as his counsel filed a memo of no instruction in the case for which the deceased appellant was compelled to put few questions to P.W.2 and when the new counsel was engaged by the appellant and recall petition was filed by his counsel, the same was allowed and in spite of repeated summons to P.W.2, he did not turn up for cross-examination. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.2 should be expunged and it cannot be used against the appellant. The learned counsel further argued that even though it is the prosecution case that specimen signature and writings of P.W.4 was taken in presence of P.W.6, however, P.W.6 has stated that he had no personal knowledge about the identity of P.W.4 and the I.O. identified P.W.4 to him and no question on the evidence of P.W.6 has been put to the appellant in the Page 11 of 23 12 accused statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel further argued that the evidence of the witnesses are contradictory and no implicit reliance can be placed on such evidence. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of conviction should be set aside. 9. Mr. M.S. Rizvi, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the Vigilance Department on the other hand supported impugned judgment and argued that when P.W.4 himself has stated that he had not received the advance money of Rs.2,220/- and the signature appearing on Ext.1 was not his signature and the handwriting expert corroborates the statement of P.W.4, it can be said that the learned trial Court has rightly came to the conclusion that Ext.1 is a forged document. He further argued that in view of the evidence of P.W.2 that the appellant gave him the forged Ext.1 and wanted him to take into account, which he did and since the evidence of P.W.2 has remained almost unchallenged in the cross-examination and the learned defence counsel appearing for the appellant appearing in the trial Court did not insist for recalling P.W.2 for further cross- examination, which was allowed by the learned trial Court, it cannot be said that the appellant was prejudiced in any manner for non-appearance of P.W.2 for further cross-examination. Page 12 of 23 13 It is further argued that the evidence of P.W.4 also indicates that on being confronted, the appellant admitted that he had made no payment to P.W.4 and he himself would be responsible for the amount can be used as an admission of the appellant and therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly placed reliance on this part of the evidence in arriving at the guilt of the appellant. It is further argued that there was no earthly reason on the part of a Government servant like P.W.6, who was a doctor attached to Dabugaon P.H.C. to tell falsehood regarding specimen signature of P.W.4 being taken in his presence and when the opinion of handwriting expert (P.W.7) indicates that the person who wrote the specimen and admitted signatures and writings did not write the disputed signature, it strengthens the prosecution case and in view of the oral as well as documentary evidence, the learned trial Court was justified in convicting the appellant and the appeal being devoid of merit should be dismissed. 10. Coming to the evidence of P.W.2 R.B. Raman Rao, who was working as a clerk in the office of the B.D.O., Nabarangpur at the relevant point of time, he has stated that on 27.05.1971 in the absence of Head Clerk, he wrote the cash book (Ext.4) and the appellant gave him the voucher (Ext.1) and Page 13 of 23 14 wanted him to take the same into account. He took the voucher into account by entering the same in red ink and the said voucher (Ext.1) was purported to have been executed by Sunadhar Nag (P.W.4). P.W.2 further stated that the appellant has maintained the case record of the project vide Ext.5 and money was not paid in his presence by the appellant and he handed over the receipt Ext.1 to the Head Clerk after the latter resumed his duties. The witness was declared hostile and was cross- examined by the prosecution on 12.03.1984. The order-sheet dated 12.03.1984 of the learned trial Court indicates that the advocate for the deceased appellant filed a petition for adjournment of the case on the ground stated therein, which was rejected by the learned trial Court. Then the concerned advocate filed a memo of no instruction and submitted that he had no objection if the accused engaged somebody else to conduct his case. The deceased appellant then filed a petition for grant of time to engage another advocate, but time was granted to him till 2.00 p.m. The appellant filed a petition at 2.00 p.m. praying to fix another date as no lawyer was ready to file vakalatnama to take up the case. The said petition was rejected and the deceased appellant was asked to cross-examine the witness Page 14 of 23 15 (P.W.2). Accordingly, the deceased appellant put a few questions to P.W.2. It appears that the appellant engaged another counsel to conduct his case and the newly engaged counsel filed a recall petition to recall P.Ws.2 & 3 for further cross- examination on the ground that the appellant being not assisted by legal expert could not effectively cross-examine the witnesses. The petition was allowed and summons were issued to P.W.2 and P.W.3. Though P.W.3 appeared and was cross- examined, but P.W.2 did not appear in spite of repeated summons. Ultimately the prosecution evidence was closed, accused statement was recorded and after hearing argument from both the sides, impugned judgment was pronounced. There is no dispute that P.W.2 is a material witness and a number of questions on his evidence have been asked to the appellant in his accused statement. When such an important witness could not be effectively cross-examined by the accused himself after his advocate filed no instruction memo on the date of recording of evidence of P.W.2 and subsequently the petition for recall of P.W.2 was allowed and summons were issued to P.W.2 repeatedly and he was an official witness and working as Senior Clerk in the I.T.D. office on the date of his deposition, it was the Page 15 of 23 16 duty of the prosecution to ensure the attendance of P.W.2 before the learned trial Court to give an opportunity to the learned defence counsel to cross-examine him. The same having not been done, it can be said that the appellant was seriously prejudiced and he could not get an effective chance to cross- examine P.W.2 whose evidence, inter alia, was utilized for convicting him. The Criminal Procedure Code ensures that an accused gets a fair trial. It is essential that the accused is given a reasonable opportunity to defend himself in the trial. He is allowed the assistance of a lawyer of his choice and if he is unable to afford one, he is given a lawyer for his defence. Before accepting the evidence of a witness, his veracity is to be judged and for that purpose, cross-examination is an acid test. It tests the truthfulness of the statement made by a witness on oath in examination-in-chief. A guiding hand of the counsel at every step in the proceeding is needed for fair trial. When the defence counsel filed memo of no instruction on the date of examination of P.W.2, the appellant filed an application for adjournment, but the learned trial Court granted time till 2.00 p.m. The appellant filed a petition at 2.00 p.m. indicating therein that no counsel was agreeable to take up the case at that time and accordingly, adjournment was sought Page 16 of 23 17 for, but the same was rejected by the learned trial Court. How could have been a lawyer ready within such a short time to go through the entire case records, prepare the case so as to effectively cross-examine P.W.2? The learned trial Court should not have been reluctant to adjourn the case to another date for cross-examination of P.W.2 as by that time, chief examination was already over. Merely because under a compelling circumstance, the appellant put four to five questions to P.W.2 on being pressurized by the learned trial Court, the same is not enough to put a stamp of fair trial. The observation of the learned trial Court that in view of sporadic and half hearted act of the appellant in the matter, he cannot be said to have been prejudiced for not being allowed to further cross-examine P.W.2 and the trial is not vitiated, is not proper and justified. After recall petition filed by the learned defence counsel was allowed, P.W.2 was summoned repeatedly by the learned trial Court to appear before the Court for further cross- examination but he did not turn up. The accused is not expected to pursue the same on every date by filing petition after petition, rather it was the duty of the prosecution to ensure the attendance of P.W.2, who was an official witness. In spite of Page 17 of 23 18 receipt of summons, when P.W.2 did not appear before the Court for further cross-examination, the learned trial Court should have taken coercive steps against him for ensuring his appearance after giving intimation to his higher authority. Neither the prosecution nor the learned trial Court took any concrete step in that regard. Therefore, shifting the entire blame on the appellant for being sporadic and half hearted cannot be accepted and in my humble view, since the appellant was deprived of getting fair opportunity to cross-examine a vital witness like P.W.2 effectively, the evidence of P.W.2 is to be expunged and it cannot be utilized against the appellant. 11. Coming to the evidence of P.W.6, no doubt he is the Assistant Surgeon and stated that the specimen signatures and handwriting of P.W.4 was taken in his presence and he proved those documents as Exts.2 to 2/5 and Ext.3, but in the cross- examination, he has stated that he had no personal knowledge about the identity of P.W.4 and he could not say whether that man was really Sunadhar Nag. The I.O. produced that person before him and as per his identification, he took the specimen signatures and handwritings. No doubt P.W.4 has stated that his signatures vide Ext.2 to 2/5 were taken in presence of the medical officer of PHC and his writings marked as Ext.3/1 was Page 18 of 23 19 also made in the presence of the said medical officer and the evidence of P.W.6 has also been utilized against the appellant by the learned trial Court in the impugned judgment, however, no question on the evidence of P.W.6 has been put to the deceased appellant in the accused statement. Law is well settled that every incriminating evidence must be put to the accused separately. Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. is based on the fundamental principle of fairness. The attention of the accused must specifically be brought to inculpatory pieces of evidence to give him an opportunity to offer an explanation if he chooses to do so. Therefore, the Court is under a legal obligation to put the incriminating circumstances before the accused and solicit his response. When the incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence of prosecution are not put to the accused in his statement recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C., the same cannot be utilized against him. Since the evidence of P.W.6 has not been put to the deceased appellant in his statement recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C., the learned trial Court erred in utilizing his evidence against the deceased appellant. 12. P.W.4 Sunadhar Nag is a ‘star witness’ on behalf of the prosecution and in his statement, he has stated that he had Page 19 of 23 20 not received a sum of Rs.2,220/- or any amount in connection with the work in question during the period when the deceased appellant was the B.D.O. and when he was noticed by P.W.5 who succeeded the deceased appellant and was asked to refund a sum of Rs.2,220/-, and when he was shown the receipt/voucher marked as Ext.1 by P.W.5, he told to P.W.5 that he had not received the said sum on 27.05.1971. P.W.4 further stated that on being confronted, the deceased appellant admitted that he had not made payment to him (P.W.4) and he (deceased appellant) would be responsible for the amount. Further in the cross-examination, he has stated that he could not say the total amount received by him in connection with the execution of the project in question and he received the payment towards execution of the work through installments but could not say the dates when he received the payments. Though P.W.4 has stated that when he appeared before P.W.5, the Sarpanch Kalimula Khan and Chairman Khalil Khan were also with him, but those two witnesses have not been examined by the prosecution during trial. It has been confronted to P.W.4 and proved through the I.O. (P.W.8) that he had not Page 20 of 23 21 stated that the appellant offered a sum of Rs.1,100/- and promised to pay the balance amount within fifteen days. P.W.5 Daitari Mishra, the B.D.O., Nabarangpur who was the successor of the deceased appellant has stated that when P.W.4 appeared before him, he stated him that he did not receive the advance and also denied his signature in the supporting voucher in respect of Rs.2,220/-. Though P.W.5 stated that P.W.4 gave in writing denying receipt of advance and his signature in the voucher, but such writing has not been proved. He further stated that the deceased appellant came to the office, told him to discuss the matter with P.W.4. However, later on P.W.4 told him that he would refund the advance but he did not refund the said amount. The evidence of P.W.4 that on being confronted the deceased appellant admitted that he had not made any payment to him (P.W.4) and that he (deceased appellant) would be responsible for the amount is not getting any corroboration from the evidence of P.W.5., rather P.W.5 has stated that there was no discussion between the deceased appellant and P.W.4 in his presence. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.4 regarding admission of the appellant and taking the responsibility to pay the amount of Rs.2,220/- is not supported by P.W.5. The other witnesses who according to P.W.4 were Page 21 of 23 22 present at that time were not examined and thus, it cannot be said that the admission part of the appellant has been proved by the prosecution beyond all reasonable doubts. In view of the discrepancies in the evidence of P.W.4 and P.W.5, the learned trial Court should not have utilized this piece of evidence relating to the admission of the appellant as deposed to by P.W.4 as an incriminating circumstance against him. 13. No doubt the evidence of the handwriting expert (P.W.7) indicates that the person who wrote the specimen and admitted signatures and writings did not write the disputed signature, but as per the evidence on record, there is doubt as to who was produced before P.W.6 and whose specimen signature and handwritings were taken as P.W.6 was having no personal knowledge about the identity of P.W.4. Since the evidence of P.W.6 has not been put to the appellant in his statement recorded under section 313 of Cr.P.C., the evidence of P.W.7 is not sufficient to arrive at a conclusion of the guilt of the appellant. Law is well settled that it is unsafe to base a conviction solely on expert opinion without substantial corroboration. This type of evidence, being opinion evidence, is by its very nature, weak and infirm and cannot of itself form the Page 22 of 23 23 basis for a conviction. Handwriting expert’s opinion must always be received with great caution. 14. In view of the forgoing discussions, I am of the humble view that the prosecution has not adduced any clinching evidence that the deceased appellant dishonestly and fraudulently misappropriated or otherwise converted to his own use a sum of Rs.2,220/- on 27.05.1971 which was entrusted to him and that he fraudulently used the disputed document as genuine which he knew at the time of its use to be a forged document. Therefore, the impugned judgment and order of conviction of the deceased appellant under section 5(2) read with section 5(1)(c) of the P.C. Act and section 471 of I.P.C. and the sentence passed thereunder is not sustainable in the eye of law and hereby set aside. The deceased appellant is acquitted of all such charges. Accordingly, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. Trial Court Records with a copy of this judgment be sent down to the concerned Court forthwith for information. ...………………………… S. K. Sahoo, J. Orissa High Court, Cuttack The 6th July, 2023/Amit/Sipun AMIT KUMAR MOHANTY Digitally signed by AMIT KUMAR MOHANTY Date: 2023.07.14 14:00:19 +05'30' Page 23 of 23