(In the matter of an application under Section 374 of Criminal Procedure Code) v. Manmath Rao
Case Details
THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRA No. 201 of 1996 (In the matter of an application under Section 374 of Criminal Procedure Code) V. Manmath Rao ……. Appellant(s) -Versus- The State ……. Respondent(s) For the Appellant : Mr. Satyabrata Mohanty-1, Amicus Curiae For the Respondent : Ms. Suvalaxmi Devi, ASC CORAM:
Legal Reasoning
THE HONOURABLE SHRI JUSTICE SIBO SANKAR MISHRA Date of Hearing: 22.07.2025 : Date of Judgment: 31.07.2025 S.S. Mishra, J. The sole appellant in the present case has challenged the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.07.1996 passed by the learned Second Addl. Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Ganjam, Berhampur in T.R. No.1/96 (72/95 GDC), corresponding to G.R. Case No.27/94 (V), whereby the appellant has been convicted for offence punishable under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (E.C. Act) and sentenced him to undergo R.I. for six months. 2. The appeal is pending since 1996. When the matter was called repeatedly, none appeared for the appellant. Therefore, this Court appointed Mr. Satyabrata Mohanty-1, as Amicus Curiae vide order dated 03.07.2025 to assist the Court in the matter. 3. Heard Mr. Satyabrata Mohanty-1, learned Amicus Curiae and Ms. Suvalaxmi Devi, learned counsel for the State. 4. The prosecution case in terse is that the appellant was running a business in the name and style M/s Mahalaxmi Floor Mill. On 10.08.1994 at 2.00 P.M. the officers of Vigilance Department and Commercial Department conducted a joint raid on the mill. In the absence of the appellant, his brother was found present at the spot, who could not produce the document relating to the license of milling business. Physical verification of stock was made by the raiding party. They found that the appellant had stored ten bags of gram-dal each Page 2 of 13 weighing 100 kg in the mill premises. It was also found that the appellant has stored eleven bags of gram-dal each weighing 100 kg and fifty-eight packets of peas dal each weighing 50 kg. Since the appellant was not having retailer license, he has violated the provisions of Storage Control Order and the Licensing Order. 5. On the basis of the aforementioned allegation, Vigilance P.S. Case No.27/1994 was registered against the appellant. After investigation, charge sheet was filed for commission of offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act (E.C. Act) on the allegation of violation of the provisions of the Pulses, Edible Oil Seeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Order, 1977 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Storage Order’) and the Orissa Pulses, Edible Oil Seeds and Edible Oils Dealer (Licensing Order), 1967 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Licensing Order’). The appellant took a stand of denial and claimed trial. Accordingly, he was subjected to trial for the offence charged under Section 7 of the E.C. Act. Page 3 of 13 6. The prosecution in order to establish its case examined as many as five witnesses, whereas six witnesses were examined by the defence. The defence has also exhibited various documents. 7. After threadbare analysis and appreciation of evidence, the trial court arrived at the following conclusion and findings:- “7. P.W.7 the Inspector of Police Vigilance claimed that at the time of his visit the mill was running. This has not been challenged by the defence in cross examination. While the mill was running ten quintals of gram dal were found stored in the mill. D.W.1 to 6 claimed that they had taken their stock of gram dal and peas dal to the mill of the accused for milling and production of BESAN. D.W.1 in his cross examination admitted that accused had been doing milling business for the last 7 to 8 years. Thus the accused comes within the meaning of the term as “Producer” as defined in Clause-2(j) of the storage control order and he is also a producer within the meaning of clause 2(ii) of the Licensing order. Both the orders prohibit doing of business as a producer without a licence. Clause 3 of the licensing order and Clause 3 of the storage control order lay down that no person shall carry on business as a producer without a licence. The accused by acting as a producer, therefore, contravened both the orders and thus is liable under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. During argument the learned counsel for the accused took me through the case of Balasa Venkatesa Parumal vrs. State reported in 1990 (1) Crimes 74. In this decision His Lordship of Andhra Pradesh High Court held that Mensarea is an important ingredient for offences U/s 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. His Lordship also held that where the accused claims that he bonadife believed that he would be Page 4 of 13 granted a permit after submitting the necessary application absence of mensrea is to be presumed. The facts and circumstances of this reported case are quite different from those in the case at hand. In the instant case the accused did not take this plea of bonafide belief. On the other hand, he manufactured false registers Ext.14 and 15 to circumvent the provision of law. On a simple look at these registers Ext.14 and 15 it is clear that the registers were prepared on the same day by one man in the same ink only for the purpose of this case. Such conduct of the accused rebuts presumption of bonafides. The accused set up six other persons to lay false claim on the seized stock of pulses. This is yet another ground to show that the action of the accused was not bonafide. I therefore hold the decision relied on by the defence does not come to the protection of the accused.” 8. Eventually, the appellant was found guilty of offence under Section 7 of the E.C. Act and was sentenced to R.I. for six months. The appellant in this appeal has challenged the aforementioned findings on the basis of which he has been convicted and sentenced. 9. Mr. Mohanty, learned Amicus Curiae has taken me to the evidence of the prosecution in a detail, apart from reading out the testimony of the defence witness. He submitted that conjoint reading of the entire evidence lead to the conclusion that the prosecution version regarding seizure of the articles from the premises of the appellant is proved on record, on the basis of which the trial court has convicted him. Page 5 of 13 However, mere proving of the fact that there was seizure of stock and the appellant could not produce the license is not enough for recording guilt of the appellant. The trial court has indeed missed the real point to the effect that the appellant through his evidence as well as from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses could proof the fact that he had applied for the license, which was not made available to him. To establish the fact that the appellant had applied for license, he has relied upon the prosecution evidence as well as the defence evidence, apart from the statement of the appellant recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. While answering to the question nos.3 and 4 in the statement of the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C., he has very categorically stated that he has applied for license. Relevant is to reproduce the answers:- “Question No.3- It also appears from the evidence of the above named witnesses that you had stored such large quantity of pulses for business purpose in your mill premises and godown premises without any required lincece and that violated clase-3(1)(ii) of the Orissa Pulses, Edible Oil Seeds and Edible Oil Dealers Lincesing Order, 1977 and Clause 3(i) of the Orissa Pulses, Edible Oil Seeds and Edible Oils (Storage Control) Order, 1977. What have you got to say? Ans- I have applied for the license which is pending. Page 6 of 13 Question No.4- What else have you got to say? Ans. The above articles are not mine. Others have kept the articles for the purpose of milling in the mill.” 10. It is also proved on record by the appellant by exhibiting the original application made by him for obtaining producers’ license, i.e., Ext.10 and the original application filed by the appellant for the wholesale license, i.e., Ext.11. In the aforementioned scenario, the fact that the appellant had applied for license cannot be doubted. The said fact is also germinating from his statement recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and also the evidence of the defence witnesses he has examined. The trial court appears to have not appreciated this aspect of the matter, which is evident from paragraph-6 of the judgment, which reads as under:- “6. Once the evidence of D.W.1 to 6 is discarded the conclusion is irresistible that the accused was in possession of huge quantity of pulses much beyond the permissible quantity of ten quintals. Clause3 (2) of the licensing order lays down that any persons who stores any one or all of the pulses taken together in quantity exceeding ten quintals at any one time shall unless the contrary is proved, he deemed to be carrying on business as a dealer. In the instant case the accused was in possession of and had stored 21 quintals of gram dal and 26 quintals of peas dal which is far above the permissible limit. Page 7 of 13 the licensing order. D.W.1 Thus it must be presumed that he was a dealer within the meaning of in his cross examination admitted that accused had been doing milling business for the last 7 to 8 years. This admission of D.W.1 coupled with statutory presumption leaves no room for doubt that the accused was a dealer within the meaning of licensing order. Clause 3 of the storage control order and Clause 3 (1) of the licensing order lays down that no person shall carry on business as a dealer in pulses except under or in accordance with the terms and conditions of license granted in this behalf by the Licensing Authority. Admittedly the accused did not have any license to act as a dealer on the date of seizure of pulses from his godown. Thus he was clearly guilty of contravention of clause-3 of the licensing order. Since clause- 3 of the storage control also prohibits possession of ten quintals of pulses taken together at one time. Thus he also contravened the clause 3 of the storage control order.” 11. The reading of the conclusion drawn by the trial court while dealing with the defence witnesses appears that the trial court has not appropriately appreciated the evidence led by the accused appellant in the light of the settled position of law. At this stage, it is apt to rely upon the judgment of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Criminal Appeal No.753 of 1988 in the matter of Balasa Venkatesa Perumal vrs. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in MANU/AP/0354/1989. The Hon’ble Court in the said judgment in paragraph-6 has held as under: Page 8 of 13 “6. In view of this position of law as regards mens rea, it is to be seen whether the appellant herein has successfully discharged the burden of proving that he did not have the mens rea, viz, culpable mental state in hulling the paddy of the foodgrain dealers without the permit under clause 10 of the AP Rice Procurement (Levy) Order for being punished under sec. 7 of the Essential Commodities Act. In this case there is no dispute as regards the actual hulling of the paddy of the food grain dealers by the accused. But the contention of the accused is that he bona fide believed that he would be granted the permit required under clause 10 of the order, for which he made the necessary application long before Even at the time when he was examined under sec. 313 Cr.PC. the accused stated that he submitted the necessary application for grant of permit under Cl. 10 of the order and was pursuing it. True copies of the said applications were also filed by the accused. Further the accused appellant was regularly submitting 'C' forms. Apart from all this there is no order rejecting the applications put in for grant of permit by the accused. In the appellant had: bonafide these circumstances, believed that the permit would be granted at any time and that it was only getting delayed on account of official reasons. It is under that hope that he was hulling the rice of foodgrain dealers. Thus, the accused has proved beyond all reasonable doubt that he did not have the culpable mental state while hulling the paddy of the foodgrains for the act to amount to an offence punishable under sec, 7 of the Act. Accordingly, there is no offence made out by the prosecution against the accused for purposes of upholding the conviction and sentence under sec. 7 of the Act. The conviction and sentence are accordingly set aside and the accused- Page 9 of 13 appellant is acquitted. The appeal, thus is allowed and the fine amount, if any paid may be refunded to the appellant.” 12. Similarly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Nathulal vrs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 1966 SC 43 has held as under: the trial “9. But the appellant at the material time did store foodgrains considerably in excess of hundred maunds and held no licence to carry on the business as a dealer under the Licensing Order. His defence at for contravention of Section 3 of the Order was that he had applied for a licence and had deposited the requisite fee for obtaining a licence and had submitted an application in that behalf and had since that date continued to submit fortnightly returns of receipts and sales of foodgrains regularly. He also submitted that he had "made efforts for two months to get the licence" and the Inspector had assured him from time to time that he (the appellant) "need not worry and the licence would be sent to him at his residence". This clearly amounts the appellant knowingly carried on business as a dealer without a licence. It is true that he carried on the business as a dealer in the expectation based on assurances given to him by the Inspector that a licence will be issued to him, but in carrying the business as a dealer he contravened Section 3 of the Order, because he held no licence. The authorities under the Order are not bound to issue a licence merely because it is applied for, nor is there any provision in the Order, as is to be found in certain statutes relating to administration of Municipalities, that permission shall be deemed to be issued if for a period specified in the statute no reply is given by the to an admission that Page 10 of 13 prescribed authority permission.” to an application for grant of 13. Mr. Mohanty, learned Amicus Curiae submitted that the case of the present appellant is directly covered by the judgment as cited above. On the contrary, Ms. Suvalaxmi Devi, learned counsel appearing for the State has vehemently argued that the evidence of the prosecution is unimpeachable, trustworthy and all the witnesses have sustained extensive cross examination, but defence could not elucidate anything which could create doubt to the prosecution version and benefit could be given to the accused. 14. I have carefully gone through the evidence brought on record by the parties and also taken into consideration the argument advanced by both the parties. True is that the prosecution could prove the seizure of huge quantity of pulse from the possession of the appellant from his mill run by him and the godown. But it is also emanating from the record that the appellant had already applied for the license by then. Ext.10 and Ext.11, which have been proved on record in addition to the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. coupled with the defence Page 11 of 13 evidence, makes it undoubtedly clear that at the time of raid the application of the appellant for grant of license was pending before the authority. Therefore, the appellant is covered by the ratio of the judgments cited by Mr. Mohanty. By extending the benefit of doubt to the appellant in the light of the ratio of the judgments in Nathulal (supra) and Balasa Venkatesa Perumal (supra), I am inclined to give indulgence to the appellant and set aside the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 05.07.1996 passed by the learned Second Addl. Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Ganjam, Berhampur in T.R. No.1/96 (72/95 GDC), corresponding to G.R. Case No.27/94 (V). 15. Accordingly, the appellant is acquitted of all the charges. The bail bond furnished by him stands discharged. 16. The Criminal Appeal is allowed. 17. This Court acknowledges the effective and meaningful assistance rendered by Mr. Satyabrata Mohanty-1, learned Amicus Curiae in this case. Learned Amicus Curiae is entitled to an honorarium of Rs.7,500/- Page 12 of 13 (Rupees seven thousand five hundred) to be paid as a token of appreciation. (S.S. Mishra) Judge The High Court of Orissa, Cuttack Dated the 31st July, 2025/Ashok Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: ASHOK KUMAR JAGADEB MOHAPATRA Designation: Secretary Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa Date: 01-Aug-2025 11:38:15 Page 13 of 13