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IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK OJC No.12957 of 2000 Debata Construction Company Private Ltd., represented through the Director, Sri Judhistir Debata, aged about 51 years, S/o. Sudarsan Debata, At/P.O./P.S. Madhupatna, Dist-Cuttack. -Versus- …Petitioner 1. State of Odisha, represented through hits Secretary, Revenue Secretary, At-Secretariat Building, Bhubaneswar, Dist-Khurda. 2. Collector, Cuttack, At/P.O. Chandinchowk, Town/Dist- Cuttack. 3. Member, Board of Revenue, Orissa, At/P.O. Chandinchowk, Town/Dist-Cuttack. 4. Tahasidlar, Cuttack Sadar, At/P.O. Chandinchowk, Town/Dist-Cuttack. 5. Cuttack Development Authority, Cuttack, At-Arunodoya Bhawan, Link Road, Cuttack. …Opposite Parties Advocates appeared in the case: For the Petitioner : Mr. N.K. Sahoo, Advocate For Opposite Parties No.1 to 4 : For Opposite Party No.5 : Mr. D.K. Mohanty, Addl. Govt. Advocate Mr. Dayananda Mohapatra, Advocate OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 1 of 19 CORAM: HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE MURAHARI SRI RAMAN JUDGMENT 30.10.2024 Chakradhari Sharan Singh, CJ. 1. In the present writ application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India presented on 08.12.2000, the petitioner has put to challenge an order dated 05.05.1987 passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, Odisha, Cuttack in OEA Revision Case i.e. O.E.A.R.C No.78 of 1983 under Section 38-B of the Odisha Estate Abolition Act, 1951 (in short, „OEA Act‟) which was instituted based on a reference made by the Collector, Cuttack in connection with OEA Case No.664 of 1970 corresponding to Mutation Case No.2496 of 1975 in relation to one Nityananda Bharati. 2. The petitioner claims to be a company incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. It is the precise case of the petitioner that said Nityananda Bharati (hereinafter referred to as the vendor) was a stitiban tenant as an exclusive owner of the property in dispute, including Ac 20.00 decimals of land which the petitioner had purchased from him through a registered sale deed dated 07.06.1980 on payment of a consideration amount. It is the petitioner‟s case that since the date of purchase, it is possessing the disputed land as the absolute owner and, thus, it has acquired the stitiban right over the suit land by virtue of the said registered sale deed. OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 2 of 19 3. When the petitioner was in continuous possession of the land in question; the Collector, Cuttack had referred the matter to the Member, Board of Revenue for starting a suo motu revision case under Section 38-B of the OEA Act for cancellation of the settlement made in favour of the vendor, Nityananda Bharati, in OEA Case No.664 of 1970 and the mutation made in his favour in a Mutation Case No.2496 of 1975, on the ground that the settlement made in favour of the vendor was irregular. Based on the said reference made by the Collector, Cuttack, OEA Revision Case i.e., O.E.A.R.C. No.78 of 1983 came to be disposed of by the impugned order dated 05.05.1987. Learned Member, Board of Revenue opined in his impugned order that the land was not settled in favour of the vendor in accordance with the lease principles as per the instructions of the Government and that the OEA Collector, without verifying the records, had passed the impugned order dated 20.12.1971 to defeat the provisions of the Act. Accordingly, the Member, Board of Revenue set aside the order dated 20.12.1971. 4. The petitioner, thereafter, filed a title suit which was registered as T.S. No.640 of 1988 challenging the said order of the Member, Board of Revenue dated 05.05.1987. In the title suit, the petitioner claimed declaration of his right, title and interest over the suit land, in his capacity as the purchaser of the property from Nityananda Bharati, the vendor. 5. The issues were framed in the title suit and after contest, the suit was dismissed by a judgment and decree dated 09.05.2000. The

Decision

petitioner has asserted in the writ petition that from the year 1988 till OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 3 of 19 02.05.2000 it was prosecuting the civil proceedings with due diligence and good faith. However, since the Civil Court dismissed the suit on the ground that it did not have any jurisdiction to sit as an appellate Court over the order passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, finding no other alternative and efficacious remedy, it approached this Court by invoking extraordinary jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India by way of present application. 6. This is how the petitioner has attempted to explain the delay in filing the present writ application challenging the order passed by the Member Board of Revenue, as for bona fide reason, it was pursuing the remedy before the Civil Court. 7. It is pertinent to note that against the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 09.05.2000 passed in T.S. No.640 of 1988, the petitioner had preferred a title appeal registered as T.A. No.43 of 2000 in the Court of the District Judge, Cuttack which was pending on the date when the writ petition was filed. The petitioner chose not to disclose the fact that it had filed an appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, in the writ petition. 8. This Court passed an interim order on 12.03.2001 in this case to the following effect:- “Let there be interim stay of operation of the order dated 05.05.1987 passed in OEA Revision No.78 of 1983 under Annexure-9 until further orders.” 9. Apparently when the said interim order dated 12.03.2001 was passed, this Court was kept in dark about the fact that the petitioner had OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 4 of 19 preferred a title appeal against the order passed by the trial Court, which was pending on that date. The title appeal was thereafter allowed to be dismissed for want of prosecution, by an order dated 28.09.2005, which fact too was not brought to this Court‟s notice. 10. On 03.03.2014, the following order was passed in this case:- “Heard Mr. Sahoo, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Mohanty, learned counsel appearing for the C.D.A. Hearing is continuing. The Registry is directed to urgently obtain the records of T.A. No.43 of 2000 disposed of on 28.09.2005 from the Registry of the District Judge, Cuttack. Learned counsel for the petitioner also undertakes to file an affidavit before this Court indicating the date on which the aforesaid appeal was filed and admitted. List this matter on 06.03.2024.” 11. No affidavit has been filed by the petitioner in terms of the undertaking recorded in the order dated 03.03.2024. 12. There is statement made in paragraph 15 of the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Cuttack Development Authority-CDA (opposite party No.5) that after dismissal of the title suit, the petitioner had filed another T.S. No.292 of 2001 in the Court of Civil Jude (SD), Cuttack for permanent injunction simplicitor. In the aforesaid suit, an application was also filed for grant of ad interim order of injunction registered as Misc. Case No.268 of 2001. In reply to the said statement, the petitioner in its rejoinder affidavit has stated that since the Cuttack Development Authority (CDA in short) was not a party in title suit i.e. OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 5 of 19 T.S. No.640 of 1988, it was compelled to file T.S. No.292 of 2001 seeking relief of permanent injunction, permanently restraining the CDA from interfering with the possession of the petitioner in respect of the suit land. It has been stated that after filing of T.S. No.292 of 2001, the CDA filed an application in the present proceeding to be impleaded as one of the opposite parties, which has been allowed. After the Secretary, CDA was impleaded as opposite party No.5 in the present case, the petitioner filed a Misc. Case No.2879 of 2002 seeking injunction against the opposite party No.5. This Court by an order dated 29.04.2002 directed for maintaining status quo in respect of the disputed land. In view of the changed circumstances, T.S. No.292 of 2001 filed by the petitioner has become infructuous and that the petitioner does not want to proceed with the said suit any further. In the said connection, it has filed a petition for withdrawal of T.S. No.292 of 2001 and the miscellaneous case filed for injunction. 13. It is evident, thus, that the impugned order of the Member, Board of Revenue was challenged by the petitioner in a title suit which was dismissed. The petitioner preferred a title appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial Court in the title suit. During the pendency of the title appeal, the petitioner filed the present writ application suppressing the fact that it had preferred a title appeal. Further during the pendency of the present writ petition the petitioner filed T.S. No.292 of 2001 seeking permanent injunction against opposite party No.5 without bringing to the Court‟s notice about filing of the said suit. The petitioner was, thus, pursuing his case before three Courts in three proceedings, simultaneously, independent of each OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 6 of 19 other, with respect to the same dispute, namely, the present writ petition, the title appeal No.43 of 2000 and the T.S. No.292 of 2001. 14. At the outset, we opine that such conduct of the petitioner in suppressing the facts in the present writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is strongly reprehensible. The conduct of the petitioner, on our view, is no less than a case of forum hunting. By his conduct, the petitioner has lost its right to seek equitable discretionary remedy under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. 15. Since, however, arguments have made at length by Mr. Sahoo, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in the present case with reference to the facts asserted in the pleadings to question the correctness of the impugned order, we have considered it desirable to address them too. 16. It is the petitioner‟s case that the disputed property admeasuring Ac 20.00 appertaining to Khata No.326/225, Plot No.1845/2220 is a part of mutation Khata No.326/1, Plot No.34/1854 admeasuring Ac 30.00 corresponding to CS Khata No.235, CS Plot No.35 area Ac 111.00, which was a part of intermediary interest of Radhakrushna Bharati and others. The name of Radhakrushna Bharati and other intermediaries were recorded in 2nd part Bahel Khewat published on 29.03.1932, where in respect of the entire intermediary estate Radhakrushna Bharati had 6 anna interest. The concerned CS Plot No.13 was also part of the aforesaid intermediary estate. The petitioner has relied on Annexure-1, which is said to be a photostat OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 7 of 19 copy of the RoR published in the year 1932. In the year 1959, the intermediary interest of the land in question vested in the State Government by virtue of the notification under Section 3A of the OEA Act. Because Radhakrushna Bharati was bed ridden, he could not filed an application under Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act, though he was in possession of Ac 33.00 of land out of the aforesaid CS plot towards his share on the date of vesting. According to the petitioner, Radhakrushna Bharati was entitled to Ac 41.00 towards his 6 anna share in the aforesaid plot. The rent roll was submitted by the vendor, Nityananda Bharati, son of Radhakrushna Bharati stating therein that he was in possession of Ac 33.00 of land which was in possession of Radhakrushna Bharati. The vendor, Nityananda Bharati also could not file his claim application to settle the land under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act before the OEA Collector within the time stipulated. 17. The vendor, Nityananda Bharati being ignorant about the provisions of law, filed an application before the Tahasildar, Cuttack on 21.09.1970 under Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act for settlement of the aforesaid land. Though the application was filed under Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act, the Tahasidlar, Cuttack correctly treated the application to be an application under the lease principles and initiated OEA Case No.664 of 1970 directing the intermediary to deposit salami equivalent to three years of rent and arrears of rent from the date of vesting till then. 18. It is peculiar to note that it has been stated in the writ application that on 02.08.2000, the petitioner had applied for certified copy of the order sheet of OEA Case No.664 of 1970 and the OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 8 of 19 application filed by the vendor but the certified copy of the same had not been granted to him. It has been stated that a notice was duly published in the OEA Case No.664 of 1970 in the locality inviting public objections. The Tahasildar, Cutack Sadar had called for a report from the Amin and verified the same as well as the documents submitted by the vendor regarding his possession over the said land, setting the land in the vendor‟s favour on the basis of the lease principles, applying the provisions under G.O. No.1435/R dated 02.03.1964 appertaining to Sabik Khata No.235 Plot No.13 admeasuring Ac 30.00 decimals of land. Accordingly, the lease was settled in favour of the vendor under the lease principles. The vendor was duly recognized as the occupancy tenant by the State Government in respect of the land. Later, the vendor filed a Mutation Case on 17.10.1975 before the Tahasildar with a prayer to reconcile the settlement records in his favour. Accordingly, the Revenue Authority corrected the settlement records of rights and allotted separate khata in the name of the vendor. This is how a separate Khata was allotted in favour of the vendor and a separate Plot No.34/1984 measuring an area of Ac 30.00 under stitiban status. It is the petitioner‟s case that a total area of Ac 20.00 dec purchased by the petitioner from the vendor, is a part of the said recorded land. While the petitioner was in possession over the said land pursuant to execution deed dated 07.06.1980, the Collector, Cuttack by an order dated 22.06.1980 moved the Board of Revenue for cancellation of occupancy raiyati status of the petitioner‟s vendor. 19. The Member, Board of Revenue thereafter passed the impugned order. The petitioner has also asserted that after purchasing OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 9 of 19 the land in 1980, had filed an application for mutation vide Mutation Case No.1587 of 1998 which was allowed vide order dated 10.09.1998 and accordingly, a separate patta was issued in favour of the petitioner- company and, thus, the petitioner has been recognized as a stitiban tenant by the State. Based on the statements to the aforesaid effect made in the writ petition, the petitioner is seeking to challenge the impugned order passed by the learned Member, Board of Revenue. 20. The entire statements of facts mentioned in the writ petition are supported by an affidavit of the following nature:- “AFFIDAVIT I Sri Judhistir Debata, aged about 62 years, S/o. Late Sudarsan Debata, At/PO/PS Madhupatana, Town/Dist- Cuttack, do hereby solemnly affirm and state as follows: (i) That I am the petitioner in the aforesaid case. (ii) That knowledge. Identified by Advocate’s clerk facts stated above are to my true the Certificate Certified that due to non-availability of catridge papers this petition has been typed in thick white papers. DEPONENT Advocate” 21. It is noteworthy that Part-II of Chapter-VI of the Rules of the High Court of Orissa, 1948 („1948 Rules‟ for short) lays down the general rules regarding applications and affidavits. Sub-Rule (iv) of Rule 3 of Chapter-VI states that affidavits shall be filed in the following format:- “FORM OF AFFIDAVIT IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA, CUTTACK OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 10 of 19 xxx xxx xxx (5) If the facts stated are true to the best of the knowledge and belief of the deponent/ declarant/ petitioner/ Advocate or otherwise. (Declaration in the following pro forma) “I……………….the Appellant/Respondent/Petitioner/Opposite Party/ Deponent above named do hereby solemnly affirm that the facts stated in Paragraph …………….and……………. are true to my own knowledge and in paragraph ……… and ……….. are true to the best of my information which I obtained from the following sources …………………………………………. I believe the information to be true for the following reasons: ………………………. Solemnly declare at …………….the above said this ..............day of ……….20..... SIGNATURE BEFORE ME COMMISSIONER OF OATH Solemnly affirmed before me by ………………who is identified before me by ………………….. whom I personally know.” 22. It can be easily noticed from such pleadings in the writ application that they refer to various factual aspects which cannot be within the personal knowledge of the petitioner. The petitioner has not disclosed the source of information. In that background, the petitioner‟s failure to disclose the source of information in the affidavits/verification portion of the writ application is a serious impediment in entertaining the writ application based on the complete facts asserted in the writ application. 23. The writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India are decided primarily on the facts asserted by the parties duly supported by an affidavit in accordance with the procedure prescribed. The importance of setting out the source of information in affidavits OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 11 of 19 was noted by a Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in case of Padmabati Dasi v. Rasik Lal Dhar reported in (1910) ILR 37 Cal 259, which came to be endorsed by the Supreme Court in case of State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik reported in (1952) 2 SCC 14. In case of A. K. K. Nambiar v. Union of India reported in 1970 SCR (3) 121, the Supreme Court has stated that the importance of verification is to test the genuineness and authenticity of the allegation and also to make the deponent responsible for the allegations. The Supreme Court in case of Virendra Kumar Saklecha v. Jagjiwan and others reported in (1972) 1 SCC 826 (See-Para 13) has noticed the Supreme Court‟s decision in case of Barium Chemicals Ltd., v. Company Law Board reported in 1966 Supp SCR 311, wherein the practice of slip shod verifications in an affidavit has been deprecated. 24. In our opinion, the writ application containing facts not duly supported by an affidavit in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the 1948 Rules should not be entertained. 25. Thirdly, the petitioner filed the present writ application without impleading the CDA as an opposite party. The CDA filed an intervention application, which was allowed and thus CDA came to be impleaded as opposite party No.5. In the counter affidavit which has been filed on behalf of the CDA, it has been stated that the CDA had made a motion before the Government for providing adequate lands and accordingly the Government had made a requisition for acquiring land situated in ten villages including the village Bidyadharpur where the disputed lands are located. On the basis of such requisition, the Additional District Magistrate, Cuttack had directed that effectual steps OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 12 of 19 be taken for immediate acquisition of the lands by publication of appropriate notification under the Land Acquisition Act („LA Act‟ for short). The State Government of Odisha, in the Revenue Department had issued a notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act, which was published in Odisha Gazette (Extra ordinary) bearing No.984 dated 25.07.1983. The notification reveals that an area of Ac.780.76 decimal was subject matter of acquisition including the land in question. The lands delineated in the schedule of the notification were required to be acquired for a public purpose namely for implementation of Bidanasi Plotted Development Scheme in Mouza Bidyadharpur. The said notification further clearly revealed that an area of Ac.78.78 decimal from out of Plot No.34 of Khata No.330 corresponding to CS Khata No.235 and CS Plot No.13 had been acquired. After publication of the said notification under Section 4(1) of the LA Act, another notification was published under Section 17 of the said Act on 03.08.1983, which enjoined that the provision of Section 17 of the said Act is applicable in respect of the land sought to be acquired vide notification dated 25.07.1983. Another notification dated 18.10.1984 was published under Section 6 of the LA Act which would reveal that an area of Ac.78.78 decimal out of Plot No.34 appertaining to Khata No.330 in Mouza Bidyadharpur corresponding to CS Khata No.235, CS Plot No.13 was the subject matter of acquisition. After publication of the said notification and completion of formalities, the competent authority delivered the possession of land in favor of the CDA on 20.09.2000. 26. A plea has been taken in the counter affidavit that the petitioner in its vendor at no point of time questioned the validity of the aforesaid notifications before any competent Court at any point of OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 13 of 19 time. It is the case of the CDA that as a necessary corollary, upon issuance of the notifications under the LA Act, the disputed land and other lands vested absolutely and irrevocably with the State Government and the right, title and interest of the previous land owners and all concerned stood extinguished. It has been reiterated that the publication of notification under Section 4(1) as well as Section 6 of the LA Act in Odisha Gazette (Extra ordinary) were notices to all concerned including the petitioner. 27. It is pertinent to mention that the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the CDA specifically mentions that its deponent is acquainted with the facts of the case and relevant official records and that he had been duly instructed and authorized to swear the affidavit on behalf of the CDA. Further, it has been clearly mentioned in paragraph 40 of the counter affidavit that the facts stated and submissions made in the “foregoing paragraphs are true to the best of my knowledge derived from official records as well as informations received which I believe to be true.” 28. The petitioner in his rejoinder affidavit to the counter affidavit, referring to the averment made in paragraph-8 thereof, has stated that neither the petitioner‟s vendor nor the petitioner had any knowledge about issuance of the notifications under the LA Act. The petitioner has asserted that no notice was served upon him under the LA Act though he had purchased the disputed property by way of a sale deed in 1980. OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 14 of 19 29. There is no disclosed basis for the petitioner‟s averment in paragraph 8 of the rejoinder affidavit that even his vendor did not have any knowledge about the notifications under the provisions of the LA Act. 30. The plea of the petitioner that he was not noticed in accordance with the provisions of the LA Act and, therefore, the land acquisition proceeding was defective is nothing but an attempt to intentionally mislead this Court. This is for the reason that the petitioner is said to have purchased the land on 07.06.1980. According to the statement made in the writ application, the petitioner for the first time filed an application for mutation 18 years thereafter, giving rise to Mutation Case No.1517 of 1998. More than one and half decades before the petitioner filed the mutation application for the first time, notification under Section 4 of the LA Act was issued in 1983. As has been noticed above, notification under Section 6 of the LA Act was issued in 1984 itself. In such background, the petitioner‟s assertion in the rejoinder affidavit that he did not have any knowledge about the acquisition proceeding is nothing but a falsehood. The petitioner in the Court‟s opinion deliberately suppressed this vital fact at the time of filing of the writ application and obtained an interim order without impleading the CDA, which was a necessary party. In the Court‟s opinion, the petitioner, by suppressing material facts in the writ application and taking false stand in the rejoinder affidavit has abused the process of this Court. This is yet another reason why this writ application deserves to be dismissed. OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 15 of 19 31. Mr. N. K. Sahoo, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has made elaborate submissions justifying the delay of 13 years in filing the present writ application because of the pendency of the suit and also on the merits of the case. 32. Mr. Sahoo has assailed the impugned order dated 05.05.1987 passed by the learned Member, Board of Revenue, Cuttack in a proceeding initiated under Section 38-B of the OEA Act after lapse of more than 12 years from the settlement. The said submission finds direct answer in the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in case of State of Orissa and others v. Brundaban Sharma and another reported in 1995 Supp (3) SCC 249, paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 of which read thus:- “16. It is, therefore, settled law that when the revisional power was conferred to effectuate a purpose, it is to be exercised in a reasonable manner which inheres the concept of its exercise within a reasonable time. Absence of limitation is an assurance to exercise the power with caution or circumspection to effectuate the purpose of the Act, or to prevent miscarriage of justice or violation of the provisions of the Act or misuse or abuse of the power by the lower authorities or fraud or suppression. Length of time depends on the factual scenario in a given case. Take a case that patta was obtained fraudulently in collusion with the officers and it comes to the notice of the authorities after a long lapse of time. Does it lie in the mouth of the party to the fraud to plead limitation to get away with the order? Does lapse of time an excuse to refrain from exercising the revisional power to unravel fraud and to set it right? The answers would be no. OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 16 of 19 17. It is already seen that the proceedings for settlement of the tenure is a quasi-judicial order and it should be guided by authentic and genuine documentary evidence preceding the cut-off date and the date of vesting of the lands under the Act. Since the Act creates a right and interest in the holder of the land as tenant, pursuant to an order making the settlement by the competent authority, the Tehsildar is enjoined to conduct an inquiry in that behalf. It is seen that under first proviso to Section 5(1), if the Collector concludes that the lease, transfer or settlement is not to be set aside, he should obtain prior confirmation from the Board of Revenue. No such approval was, in fact, obtained by the Tehsildar. Though in the first instance, when the the respondent had brought Government of his claim, in 1967 proceedings initiated were got dropped by the Government obviously at the instance of the respondent. Later on the instructions of the Government itself, inquiry was got done; and on receipt of the report from the Additional District Collector on 4-10-1982, proceedings were initiated by the Board and the respondent was given reasonable opportunity of hearing. The order was passed within a reasonable time thereafter. the notice of to it 18. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Board of Revenue exercised the power under Section 38- B after an unreasonable lapse of time, though from the date of the grant of patta by the Tehsildar is of 27 years. It is true that from the date of the alleged grant of patta 27 years did pass. But its authenticity and correctness was shrouded with suspicious features. The records of the Tehsildar were destroyed. Who is to get the benefit? Who was responsible for it? The reasons are not far to seek. They are self-evident. So we hold that the exercise of revisional power under Section 38-B by the Board of Revenue was legal and valid and it brooked no delay, OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 17 of 19 after it had come to the Board's knowledge. That apart as held by the Board of Revenue, the order passed by the Tehsildar without confirmation by the Board is non est. A non est order is a void order and it confers no title and its validity can be questioned or invalidity be set up in any proceeding or at any stage.” (Underlined for emphasis) 33. Mr. Sahoo has attempted to convince the Court that the petitioner‟s vendor had acquired occupancy right by operation of Sections 23 and 24 of the Tenancy Act. Such right could not be taken away invoking suo-motu power under Section 38-B of the OEA Act. 34. Apparently, the petitioner is relying on the right which his vendor had acquired as occupancy rayat. We have already noticed, the said factual aspects as raised in the writ application need not be addressed in the background of the manner in which the present writ application has been filed not supported by any proper affidavit and the fact that the petitioner‟s conduct has been found to be reprehensible as noted above. 35. Lastly, the impugned order dated 05.05.1987 passed by the Member, Board of Revenue, Odisha cannot be said to be unjustified requiring this Court‟s interference. This is for the reason that by the said order, the Member, Board of Revenue found the settlement made in favour of the petitioner‟s vendor as irregular for apparent reasons. The petitioner‟s vendor, according to the petitioner‟s case, had filed an application under Section 6 and 7 of the OEA Act claiming his rights as an intermediary over the homestead land and lands in khas OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 18 of 19 possession which had already vested in the State by operation of 3-A of the OEA Act. The vendor‟s father, who was an intermediary, had not filed any application under Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act. The Tahasildar, who is OEA Collector, treated the vendor‟s application presented under Sections 6 and 7 of the OEA Act to be application under the lease principles for settlement of land and passed the order on 20.12.1971. It was in that background that learned Member, Board of Revenue, in the impugned order dated 05.05.1987 has recorded that the said order of Tahasildar/OEA Collector was passed to defeat the provisions of the OEA Act. The said finding recorded by the Member, Board of Revenue, Odisha, in the background of the facts noted hereinabove, cannot be said to be unsustainable requiring this Court‟s interference. 36. For the reasons noted above, this writ application is dismissed with a cost of Rs.50,000/- to be deposited by the petitioner in the account of Odisha High Court Bar Association Advocate‟s Welfare Fund. The cost must be deposited within three months from today. 37. The interim orders stand vacated. All the interlocutory applications, if any, stand disposed of. (Chakradhari Sharan Singh) Chief Justice M.S. Raman, J. I agree. Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: SANJAY KUMAR JENA Designation: SECRETARY Reason: Authentication Location: High Court of Orissa, Cuttack. Date: 04-Nov-2024 12:52:54 SK Jena/Secy. (M.S. Raman) Judge OJC No.12957 of 2000 Page 19 of 19

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