MR. JUSTICE D. DASH MR. JUSTICE v. NARASINGH Date of hearing
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK JCRLA No.50 of 2009 In the matter of an Appeal under Section 383 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and from the judgment dated 03.07.2009 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in Sessions Trial No.144 of 2007. Laulina Achariya …. Appellant -versus- State of Odisha …. Respondent For Appellant : Mr. J.R. Dash, Advocate For Respondent : Mr. P.K. Mohanty, ASC CORAM: MR. JUSTICE D. DASH MR. JUSTICE V. NARASINGH Date of hearing : 01.10.2024: Date of judgment : 09.10.2024 V. Narasingh, J. 1. The appellant has called in question the judgment of conviction under Section 302 IPC and order of sentence dated 03.07.2009 to undergo R.I for life and to pay a fine of Rs.5,000/- in default to undergo further R.I for a period of six months passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in Sessions Trial No.144 of 2007. PROSECUTION CASE. 2. It is the case of the prosecution that on 28.05.2007 at about 2.15 P.M, the appellant accused went to Town Police Station, JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 1 of 18 Sundargarh and one Rajendra Munda (P.W.21) was in-charge of the station diary of the said Police Station at the relevant time. She stated before him that she had committed the murder of her husband Surendra Bag (deceased) by means of an axe. She had further stated that after commission of murder, she left the axe by the side of the dead body and covered the dead body with one blanket. Such intimation was entered into Station Diary Entry No.567 dated 28.05.2007 (Ext.16) and telephonically conveyed to one S.I Rajesh Chhatria (P.W.6) of Rajgangpur Police Station, since the appellant resided within the jurisdiction of Rajgangpur Police Station. P.W.6 entered such information in Station Diary Entry No.762 dated 28.05.2007 and left the Police Station for investigation along with
Legal Reasoning
OLR (SC) 744 and of this Court in the case of Gedu @ Parameswar Patra vrs. State of Orissa, 2016 (Supp.-II) OLR 755. 7. Learned counsel for the State Mr. P.K. Mohanty, on the other hand, fully supported the impugned judgment and sentence awarded by the learned trial court and submitted that there is clinching material to complete the chain of circumstance proving the guilt of the accused. The contention as advanced by the defence is fanciful and there being no infirmity in the impugned judgment of conviction, the appeal does not merit consideration and sought confirmation of the judgment of conviction and sentence awarded. Learned counsel for the State pressed into service the judgment of the Kerala High Court dated 25.08.2020 in the case of Subhash @ Ansari vrs. State of Kerala in Criminal Appeal No.1134 of 2016. ANALYSIS OF THE INCRIMINATING CIRCUMSTANCES 8. So far as the death of the deceased is concerned as already noted and rightly held by the learned trial court the same was homicidal. 9. As regards second circumstance i.e. last seen theory is concerned, the prosecution has heavily relied upon the evidence of P.W.11 who is a neighbour and according to her, she used to address the accused appellant as ‘Didi’ on account of village courtesy. She stated thus: JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 5 of 18 “….before leaving for work, accused and her husband with their child were inside their house” xxx xxx xxx In her cross-examination by the said defence counsel she stated thus: “Police personnel had brought the key from the accused and opened the door…. Police told him that he seized the lock and key and prepared a seizure list.” 10. It is the evidence of P.W.6 who first visited the spot on getting intimation from P.W.21, before whom the accused is stated to have confessed her guilt, that he visited the spot along with one Arun Ray and Krushna Chandra Mahandia (P.W.3) and broke open the lock and in the cross-examination he has further explained that the lock which was broken was seized in presence of the witnesses. It is the evidence of P.W.3 that lock was broke open and the police entered the room and found the dead body of the deceased (Surendra) lying there. 11. It is however curious to note that P.W.6 did not mention about the presence of P.W.11 nor does P.W.3 and the material discrepancy regarding breaking open of the lock and the version of P.W.11 that it was opened using the key taken from the accused has been glossed over by the learned trial court. 12. P.W.15 (SI) who had also visited the spot has stated on recall that he has not mentioned in the case diary that the room was opened or locked at the time of arrival. Thus there arises doubt over the version of the witnesses as to breaking open the lock. 13. P.W.5 although was cited as a witness to the last seen theory, he did not support the prosecution. But while analyzing the JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 6 of 18 evidence relating to last seen theory, learned trial court placed reliance on the statement of the said P.W.5. And, referring to the confession made before P.W.21, the S.I of Police as a disclosure statement arrived at the finding that the second circumstance i.e. last seen theory is established which does not carry the legal sanction. 14. As already noted, there is discrepancy in the statements of P.W.11, P.W.3 independent witness and P.W.6 who visited the spot on getting information from P.W.21 regarding the manner in which the police entered into the spot house inasmuch as P.W.11 states that the police opened the lock having brought the key from the accused. 15. It is borne out from the evidence that the same was broken and the seizure list Ext.4 refers to broken ‘lock’ and ‘sikuli’. 15-A. There is a glaring discrepancy in the statement of PW-6 who went to the place of occurrence i.e. the residence of the accused and deceased, along with the police. 15-B. So far as the recovery of the dead body of the deceased which was held to be admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act by the learned Trial Court the evidence on record is again not at all cogent in as much as the P.W 6 in his evidence has stated that he received a telephonic message at 2 P.M from S.I R.K Munda of Sundergarh P.S (P.W 21) regarding the occurrence and thereafter he proceeded to test the veracity of the same. P.W 3, one of the witnesses to the recovery under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act of Kantha, blanket, broken hook and lock, has stated that he was called by the Police at 11 A.M and in his presence lock of the house was broken. For ready reference the cross examination JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 7 of 18 of P.W 3 at this moment being noteworthy and is quoted hereunder:- “I was called by the police at 11 A.M. In my presence the lock of the house was broken. My house is 50 feet from the spot. Another person was present when the lock was broken but I cannot name that person. Axe was seized at about 3 to 4 P.M. After 11 A.M I returned home and thereafter being called by the police I went to the spot at 4 P.M and signed the seizure lists. My signatures were taken on four papers. Contents of the seizure lists were read over and explained to me. Axe was lying near the dead body when the seizure list was prepared. After the seizure, axe was taken to the possession by the police. I do not remember the shape and size of the tangia seized. The axe was kept in a bag and I have signed thereon. Wearing apparels of the accused were seized at about 4 P.M. I intimated about the incident to the accused’s father and uncle. I have no personal knowledge about the occurrence. I also cannot say who killed the deceased. It is not a fact that I am deposing falsehood. xxx xxx xxx” 15-C. The learned Trial Court while considering the recovery in terms of the statement of the accused has failed to take note of such discrepancy. 16. In view of such material contradictions in the version of P.W.11 relating to manner in which the police personnel entered into the house being viewed with the evidence of P.Ws.3 and 6, this Court is of the considered view that P.W.11 cannot be taken as a trustworthy witness. From the impugned judgment, it can be seen that learned trial court has completely failed to take notice of the same and there is no discussion relating to such vital circumstance whereas at the same time adverse inference has been drawn since JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 8 of 18 accused did not give any explanation in his examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C to question nos.4 and 12 which reads thus: 17. Then again it is seen that P.W.5 who was cited as a witness to the last seen theory did not support the prosecution. P.W.11 is a witness on whose evidence implicit reliance cannot be placed and the other factor which was held to prove the last seen theory was the statement made before the police personnel P.W.21 which is ex facie not admissible being hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. As such the prosecution in our considered view has not been able to establish the last seen theory beyond reasonable doubt. 18. In the case at hand, learned trial court treated the act of the appellant accused instituting the FIR as conduct under Section 8 of the Evidence Act and along with the same the discovery made to be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 9 of 18 19. To assess such approach of the learned trial court, it would be apposite to extract the formal FIR vide Ext.6. “To The Inspector- In-Charge, Rajgangpur P.S Sub:- Enquiry report of Rajgangpur P.S S.D.E No.762 dt.28.05.07. Sir, I Sri Rajesh Chhatria S/o Anadi Chhatria SI of Police Rajgangpur P.S do hereby lodged the report to the effect that, I received a telephonic message from S.I, R.K.Munda of Town P.S, Sundargarh that today i.e. on 28.5.07 at 2 P.M one lady named as Laolin Achariya W/o Rabindra Achariya of Barupada Rajgangpur appeared at Town P.S and stated before him that today at about 7 AM she committed murder of one Surendra Bagh (paramour) in her house by means of an axe and kept the axe by the side of Surendra and covered one blanket over the body and locked the door from outside. On receipt of the message, I entered the fact in SD of Rajgangpur S.D.E No.762 dtd. 28.05.2007 and left P.S along with ASI S.C.Thakur for physical verification. Arrived at Barupada and left for spot along with Krushna Chandra Mohandia 55 years S/o Sombaru Mohandia of Barupada, Arun Ray Age 30 years S/o Ram Gopal Ray of Barupada and others broken the lock and detected the dead body of deceased Surendra Bagh which was lying inside the room on a clothe (Kantha) covered with blanket up to chest with profused bleeding injuries. On verification I found a cut injury on (Torn) side fore head and neck (torn) of depression by means of blunt object and one axe stained with blood is lying by the side of the dead body of the deceased Surendra Bag. As if is a case U/s.302 IPC I directed ASI S.C.Thakur to guard the dead body of deceased Surendra Bag and not to disturb the spot and returned to P.S and submitted this report before you for necessary action. xxx xxx xxx” JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 10 of 18 20. Evidentiary value of an FIR which contains the statement of the accused implicating the himself/herself was the subject- matter of consideration of the Apex Court in the case of Aghnoo Nagesia vrs. State of Bihar, 1965 SCC OnLine SC 109 : AIR 1966 SC 119 (3J). 20-A. The fact of the said case is somewhat akin to the present one. In the said reported judgment, the accused went to the police and confessed about his murder committed by him and basing upon his confessional statement, weapon of offence and the dead body were recovered, the Apex Court held that the entire confession is hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and in view of the same if the statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act is made, it is also hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act and as such the entire confession and leading to discovery is inadmissible. In this context, Paragraph-18 of the said judgment is extracted hereunder: “18. If the first information report is given by the accused to a police officer and amounts to a confessional statement, proof of the confession is prohibited by Section 25. The confession includes not only the admission of the offence but all other admissions of incriminating facts related to the offence contained in the confessional statement. No part of the confessional statement is receivable in evidence except to the extent that the ban of Section 25 is lifted by Section 27.” 21. To get over the rumbler of Section 25 of the Evidence Act the prosecution has tried to lead the evidence that when the accused appellant made the confessional statement owning the guilt she was not taken into custody and the learned trial court in appreciating the evidence relating to evidentiary value of Section 27 of the Evidence Act has allowed itself to be led into such trap. JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 11 of 18 22. For convenience of reference Section 27 of the Evidence Act is extracted hereunder: “27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.- Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.” 23. Such contention militates against the concept of custody as reiterated by the Apex Court in the case of Perumal Raja alias Perumal vrs. State, Rep. By Inspect of Police, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 12. In the said case the Apex Court has succinctly explained the connotations of “person accused of an offence” and “in the custody of a police officer” 24. In the said judgment the Apex Court reiterated the view taken in Aghnoo Nagesia (supra) and Paragraphs 28 and 29 of the said judgment relating to import of statement purportedly under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, when a person accused of committing an offence is not taken into custody as being claimed in the case at hand, having direct bearing on the point at issue, is culled out hereunder: “28. The words “person accused of an offence” and the words “in the custody of a police officer” in Section 27 of the Evidence Act are separated by a comma. Thus, they have to be read distinctively. The wide and pragmatic interpretation of the term “police custody” is supported by the fact that if a narrow or technical view is taken, it will be very easy for the police to delay the time of filing the FIR and arrest, and thereby evade the contours of Sections 25 to 27 of the Evidence Act. Thus, in our JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 12 of 18 considered view the correct interpretation would be that as soon as an accused or suspected person comes into the hands of a police officer, he is no longer at liberty and is under a check, and is, therefore, in “custody” within the meaning of Sections 25 to 27 of the Evidence Act. It is for this reason that the expression “custody” has been held, as earlier observed, to include surveillance, restriction or restraint by the police. in custody and persons not 29. This Court in Deoman Upadhyay (supra), while rejecting the argument that the distinction between persons in custody violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India, observed that the distinction is a mere theoretical possibility. Sections 25 and 26 were enacted not because the law presumed the statements to be untrue, but having regard to the tainted nature of the source of the evidence, prohibited them from being received in evidence. A person giving word of mouth information to police, which may be used as evidence against him, may be deemed to have submitted himself to the “custody” of the police officer. Reference can also be made to decision of this Court in Vikram Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab, which discusses and applies Deoman Upadhyay (supra), to hold that formal arrest is not a necessity for operation of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. This Court in Dharam Deo Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh, has held that the expression “custody” in Section 27 of the Evidence Act does not mean formal custody, but includes any kind of surveillance, restriction or restraint by the police. Even if the accused was not formally arrested at the time of giving information, the accused is, for all practical purposes, in the custody of the police and the bar vide Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act, and accordingly exception under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, apply. Reliance was placed on the decisions in State of A.P. v. Gangula Satya Murthy and A.N.Vekatesh and Anr. v. State of Karnataka.”. 25-A. At the same time the caveat of the Apex Court that “evidentiary value to be attached on evidence produced before the Page 13 of 18 JCRLA No.50 of 2009 court in terms of Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot be codified or put in a straightjacket formula” is also respectfully noted. 26. It is indeed baffling to note in the present case that no attempt whatsoever has been made by the prosecution to record 164 Cr.P.C. statement of the accused who was all along present in the police station and there is no explanation as to why, even such statement was not recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act as already noted. 27.
Arguments
A.S.I., Sri S.C. Thakur. On arriving at the village Barupada, it is stated that he broke open the lock from outside, detected the dead body of the deceased Surendra lying inside the room on a Kantha covered with a blanket upto the chest with profuse bleeding injury. He noticed a cut injury on his right side forehead, neck and an axe (M.O.I) stained with blood lying by the side of the dead body. P.W.6 directed A.S.I., Sri S.C. Thakur to guard the dead body and he returned to the Police Station and lodged the FIR which was registered as Rajgangpur P.S. Case No.137 dated 28.05.2007 mentioning the occurrence on the same day at about 7 A.M and citing the present appellant as the sole accused. From the recitals in the FIR Ext.6, it is seen that P.W.6 went to the spot house along with one Krushna Mahandia (P.W.3) and one Arun Ray (not examined). It is further stated that after institution of the FIR, S.I. Pratap Chandra Tripathy (P.W.15) registered the same vide Ext.6 and in the absence of the I.I.C, he took up the investigation in right earnest. After completion of JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 2 of 18 investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the accused under Section 302 IPC. 3. To establish the charge prosecution has examined 21 witnesses. P.Ws.1, 2 and 8 are the uncle, father and mother of the deceased respectively. P.Ws.3 and 11 are the neighbours of the deceased. P.Ws.4,12, 13 and 19 are the witnesses to different seizure lists. P.W.5 is the wife of the owner of the house where the accused was staying with the deceased on rent. As already stated, P.W.6 was the S.I who was informed by his counterpart of Sundargarh Town P.S. about the surrender of the accused appellant and her confession. P.W.7 is an independent witness who did not support the prosecution. P.Ws.9 and 10 are witnesses who saw the dead body with injury lying on the rented house of the accused. P.Ws.15 is the I.O as noted. P.W.16 is an advocate from the first husband of the accused who did not support the prosecution. P.W.17 is the then I.I.C, Sundargarh P.S. who proved the station dairy book Ext.16. P.W.18 is the Scientific Officer who visited the spot. P.W.20 is the doctor who conducted post-mortem examination, examination of the weapon of offence and submitted his report. P.W.21 is the S.I before whom accused is stated to have surrendered and made confession of her guilt. 4. The doctor P.W.20 conducted the post-mortem examination of the deceased on police requisition and found the following external injuries: “1. Incised wound of the size 2” x 1/ 2” over right forehead, laterally. 2. Incised wound of the size 3” x 1/ 2” x deep over upper part of the neck. 3. The skull was fractured over right frontal bone with clotted blood over right parietal bone. The under lying Page 3 of 18 JCRLA No.50 of 2009 brain tissue were found lacerated. The larynx were broken with fractured hyoid bone.” On examination of the injuries, he has given his opinion that the injuries were ante-mortem in nature and might have been caused by axe (M.O.I). He has opined that the cause of death was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of the injury to vital organ like brain. Post-mortem examination report was marked as Ext.18 and the opinion of the doctor regarding possibility of injuries being caused by M.O. I was marked as Ext.19. The doctor (P.W.20) has opined that the injuries are sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. Hence, there is no iota of doubt that the deceased succumbed to ante-mortem injuries caused by the weapon of offence. 5. As evidently there is no direct evidence to connect the accused with the crime, learned trial court culled out the following circumstances to examine the guilt of the accused. i. Death of the deceased was homicidal. ii. The deceased was last seen in the company of the accused in their rented house. iii. The accused having left the house after locking the door from outside voluntarily surrendered at Town P.S. Sundargarh and made disclosure statement implicating herself in the commission of the crime. iv. The recovery of the dead body, weapon of offence (axe) and other incriminating articles pursuant to the statement made by the accused. v. False explanation offered at the trial by the accused. 6. Mr. J.R. Dash, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted with vehemence relying upon the time tested principle of evaluating the judgment based on circumstantial evidence that the chain of circumstance is not at all complete so far as guilt of the JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 4 of 18 accused is concerned and she has been found guilty on preponderance of probability. Hence, judgment of conviction and sentence awarded by the learned trial court are liable to be set aside. In support of his contention, he has relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in the case Ranvir Yadav vrs. State of Bihar, (2009) 43 OCR (SC) 562 and Sujit Biswas vrs. State of Assam, 2013 (II)
Decision
In view of the above, this Court is of the considered view that the discovery to be made under Section 27 of the Evidence Act cannot come to the aid of the prosecution and as such there is no material to connect the accused appellant with the alleged recovery of the M.Os and the superstructure of complicity of the accused appellant built on such fragile foundation crumbles. 28. There is no cavil about the submission of the learned counsel for the State that the appellant going to the police station to give intimation can be treated as conduct in terms of Section 8 of the Evidence Act, 1872 but the approach of the learned trial court relying upon her oral statement relating to owning of her guilt is in our view inadmissible as discussed above. 29. At the cost brevity, it is apt to note that in the case at hand no statement of the accused was recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872. And, there is discrepancy as to whether the accused-appellant was at all taken to the place of occurrence. Inasmuch as P.W.15 in Para-3 states thus: “I visited the spot and prepared a spot map. This is that spot map marked Ext.11 and this is my signature thereon marked Ext.11/1. On that day at 4.30 P.M A.S.I B.B. JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 14 of 18 Patel along with Scientific Team reached the spot and inspected the same. Accused was also brought by A.S.I B.B. Patel along with lady constable Prema Hasti…” 30. The said B.B Patel is examined as P.W.19. He however does not depose regarding the accused being brought to the place of occurrence. Even P.W.15 in Para-10 of his cross-examination states thus: “…. I did not sent (sic) any requisition to S.I. B.B. Patel to produce the accused before me. I did not contact the I.I.C., Sundargarh Town P.S. for sparing the accused for investigation….” 31. The evaluation of evidence in a case which is based on circumstantial in nature needs no emphasis. The Apex Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1984 SC 1622 have laid down the following tests: “152. Before discussing the cases relied upon by the High Court we would like to cite a few decisions on the nature, character and essential proof required in a criminal case which rests on circumstantial evidence alone. The most fundamental and basic decision of this Court is Hanumant v. State of Madhya Pradesh [(1952) 2 SCC 71 : AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1952 SCR 1091 : 1953 Cri LJ 129]. This case has been uniformly followed and applied by this Court in a large number of later decisions up-to-date, for instance, the cases of Tufail (Alias) Simmi v. State of Uttar Pradesh [(1969) 3 SCC 198: 1970 SCC (Cri) 55) and Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 4 SCC 625: AIR 1972 SC 656]. It may be useful to extract what Mahajan, J. has laid down in Hanumant case [(1952) 2 SCC 71: AIR 1952 SC 343: 1952 SCR 1091: 1953 Cri LJ 129] : "It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should in the first JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 15 of 18 instance be fully established, and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused." 153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned "must or should and not "may be established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between "may be proved" and "must be or should be proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793: 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033: 1973 Crl LJ 1783] where the observations were made: [SCC para 19, p. 807: SCC (Cri) p. 1047] "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency, (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 16 of 18 (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence.” 32. In the impugned judgment learned trial court has unfortunately not tested the evidence on record on the touchstone of the “Panchasheel” as it is often referred to in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda (supra). 33. On an in-depth analysis of the evidence on record, this Court is unable to persuade itself to arrive at a hypothesis that only the accused who is the author of the crime. 34. This Court is constrained to observe that the case at hand is a glaring instance of miscarriage of justice where the accused has been fastened with the guilt on preponderance of probability and losing sight of vital aspect of the evidence of the witnesses if considered in its proper perspective would have turned the scale against the prosecution. 35. Hence, on a thorough analysis of the evidence on record, this Court arrives at the conclusion that the impugned judgment of conviction and the sentence awarded by the learned trial court are not based on just and proper analysis of the evidence; rather on surmises and conjectures and the result being the outcome of perverse appreciation of evidence on record thus is liable to be set aside. JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 17 of 18 36. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 03.07.2009 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sundargarh in Sessions Trial No.144 of 2007 are hereby set aside. Since the appellant is on bail, her bail bonds stand cancelled. (V. Narasingh) I agree. Judge (D. Dash) Judge Orissa High Court, Cuttack Dated the 9th October, 2024/Pradeep Signature Not Verified Digitally Signed Signed by: PRADEEP KUMAR SWAIN Reason: Authentication Location: Orissa High Court, Cuttack Date: 14-Oct-2024 13:20:20 JCRLA No.50 of 2009 Page 18 of 18