The High Court
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF ORISSA AT CUTTACK CRLA No.181 of 2010 Ratikanta Satpathy …. Appellant Mr. L. Mishra, Advocate -versus- State of Orissa (Vigilance) …. Respondent Mr. M. S. Rizvi, ASC Vigilance CORAM: THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE CHITTARANJAN DASH Date of Judgment: 13.10.2025 Chittaranjan Dash, J. 1. This Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 27.03.2010, passed by the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Cuttack, in T.R. Case No.55 of 1996 (Sambalpur) / T.R. Case No.134 of 2004 (Bhubaneswar) / T.R. Case No.281 of 2007, arising out of Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.59 of 1995, wherein the Appellant, Ratikanta Satpathy, was found guilty of offences under Sections 7/13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (hereinafter, “the P.C. Act”). The Appellant was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine of Rs.500/-, in default, to undergo R.I. for seven days for the offence under Section 7 of the P.C. Act, and R.I. for one year and a fine of Rs.1000/-, in default, to undergo R.I. for fifteen days for the offence under Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act, with the further direction that the sentences shall run concurrently. CRLA No.181 of 2010 Page 1 of 15 2. The factual matrix giving rise to the Appeal is that, the Appellant, while posted as S.D.O. (Electrical) at Kamakshyanagar in the district of Dhenkanal, being a public servant, committed criminal misconduct by corruptly obtaining a pecuniary advantage of Rs.300/- as gratification to supply electrical connection to the L.I. Point to a farmer under the scheme meant for the SC & ST Society, intended for supply of free water to 160 cultivators of village Jaladharpur under Kamakshyanagar P.S. According to the prosecution, one of the cultivators, Rabinarayan Patra (the Informant) requested the Appellant to supply electrical connection to the L.I. Point to facilitate free water supply to his land. The Appellant demanded a sum of Rs.600/- as bribe and informed the complainant that the electrical connection cannot be supplied unless the bribe would be paid. On the request of the Informant, the Appellant asked him to come to his office the next morning with Rs.300/-, on the condition that the balance of Rs.300/- would be paid later. Not being acceptable to the informant, he reported the matter in writing to the Additional S.P. Vigilance, Cuttack, who directed the O.I.C. Vigilance P.S., Cuttack, to register the case under Sections 7/13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act (Cuttack Vigilance P.S. Case No.59 of 1995) and to lay a trap. The complainant was directed to attend the revenue Rest Shed of Kamakshyanagar on 20.11.1995, and preparations for the trap were made. Upon completion of the formalities, the trap was laid on 21.11.1995 at 8:20 a.m. The detection report was prepared following the trap and recovery of the tainted bribe money from the Appellant, and the matter was investigated by an Inspector of Vigilance. During CRLA No.181 of 2010 Page 2 of 15 the course of investigation, the I.O. recorded statements of witnesses, seized the tainted money, the collected hand wash samples of the Appellant in a bottle, as well as the wash solution of the magisterial witness, The Appellant’s won wearing apparels and the wash solution from its pocket preserved in bottles too was seized besides the Personal money of the Appellant amounting to Rs.20/- kept in his undergarment pocket, copies of the preparation report, and the concerned L.I. Point electric supply file under different seizure lists. The hand wash solution bottles were sent for chemical examination to S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar, and the chemical examination report was obtained. Sanction for prosecution against the Appellant was obtained from the G.A. Department, Government of Orissa, and upon completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted for the offences mentioned above. 3.
Legal Reasoning
The plea of the Appellant before the trial court was one of complete denial, contending that the case against him had been falsely initiated. 4. In order to establish its case, the prosecution examined six witnesses: P.W.1, the magisterial witness; P.W.2, the overhearing witness; P.W.3, the Informant; P.W.4, the Scientific Officer, S.F.S.L., Rasulgarh, Bhubaneswar; P.W.5, the Junior Engineer (Electrical) at Kamakshyanagar, where the Appellant was working as S.D.O.; and P.W.6, the Investigating Officer. No evidence was adduced on behalf of the defence to support the Appellant’s case. 5. The learned Trial Court, having relied upon the prosecution evidence, more particularly the testimonies of P.Ws. 1, 2, 4, and 5- together with the surrounding circumstances of the case, and taking CRLA No.181 of 2010 Page 3 of 15 into account the portions of evidence of P.W.3 supporting the prosecution version, held the Appellant guilty of the offences charged and accordingly convicted and sentenced him as discussed above. 6.
Legal Reasoning
Mr. L. Mishra, learned counsel appearing for the Appellant, while assailing the impugned judgment, argued that the prosecution has failed to bring home the charges and that the learned trial court erred both in appreciating the evidence and in applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, thereby arriving at an erroneous conclusion in holding the Appellant guilty. It was further submitted that the very genesis of the case i.e. the demand of bribe has not been proved. He emphasized that the Informant (P.W.3) has categorically stated that the Appellant never demanded nor accepted the tainted money; rather, the Informant forcibly thrust the money into his pocket, to which the Appellant not only protested but also shouted at him. Thus, the primary evidence with regard to demand and acceptance, which requires corroboration, does not support the prosecution version, particularly when the star witness, P.W.3, himself does not support the case. It was further contended that the trial court misconstrued the evidence of P.W.2, who had never stated before the I.O. during his examination in his earlier recorded statement, that the Appellant made a demand or that he witnessed the acceptance of money. Learned Counsel argued that the trial court overlooked the fact that the supply of electrical energy to the L.I. Point, which had been entrusted to the Agro-Industrial Corporation by the Government of Orissa for providing free irrigation water to farmers, did not rest CRLA No.181 of 2010 Page 4 of 15 entirely with the Appellant in his capacity as S.D.O. The said supply was contingent upon the completion of several other formalities such as the installation of the L.I. Point, installation of the meter, and submission of the testing report. On this note, it was further argued that as per the evidence of P.W.5, electrical energy could not have been supplied without a valid testing report, and it stood established that the said report was submitted only on 20.11.1995. Moreover, the electrical line could not have been charged without prior instruction from the Executive Engineer. Consequently, the allegation that the Appellant deliberately delayed the supply of electrical energy to the L.I. Point for illegal gratification cannot be sustained, as the essential formalities had not been completed to enable the Appellant to take action. It was further submitted that the responsibility entrusted to P.W.5 by the Agro-Industrial Corporation had already been discharged, and completion of the remaining work was beyond the control of the Appellant. Hence, the very question of demand of bribe does not arise. Learned counsel placed his reliance on the decision in Jamuna Choudhury and Others vs. State of Bihar, (1974) 3 SCC 774, followed by the State of Orissa vs. Manogovinda Sahoo, ILR (2009) 1 Cuttack 606. Drawing attention to these precedents and to the mandate of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, learned counsel submitted that the impugned judgment suffers from illegality, being contrary to the evidence on record, and therefore deserves to be set aside. 7. Mr. Rizvi, learned counsel for the State (Vigilance), on the other hand, contended that ample evidence has been adduced CRLA No.181 of 2010 Page 5 of 15 through the witnesses substantiating the factum of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. He further argued that in order to prove the factum of demand and acceptance of gratification, it is not always necessary that such facts be proved by direct evidence; they may also be established by circumstantial evidence. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hazari Lal vs. State (Delhi Administration), (1980) 2 SCC 390. He further submitted that P.W.1, the magisterial witness, P.W.2, the overhearing witness, and P.W.5 have consistently deposed about the manner in which the trap was laid, and that the demand and acceptance of bribe money by the Appellant that stood corroborated through their testimonies. This, according to him, gives rise to the application of Section 20 of the P.C. Act, where the statutory presumption operates in favour of the prosecution, and it becomes obligatory on the part of the Appellant to rebut the same. Mr. Rizvi also submitted that the defence plea of the Appellant-that the tainted money was forcibly thrust into his pocket by the decoy-remains unsubstantiated, inasmuch as no suggestion to that effect was put to any other witness except P.W.3, the complainant. He further contended that even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Appellant was not directly dealing with the particular work, that by itself does not exonerate him from criminal liability in view of the Explanation (d) to Section 7 of the P.C. Act. The said provision makes it explicit that a person who receives gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend to do, or is not in a position to do, or has not done, would CRLA No.181 of 2010 Page 6 of 15 nevertheless fall within the mischief of the section. Mr. Rizvi, therefore, urged that in light of the above statutory provision, the defence plea raised by the Appellant cannot withstand judicial scrutiny, and the prosecution evidence is sufficient to implicate him in the offences alleged. He submitted that the learned trial court has rightly appreciated the evidence on record and has reached a just and proper conclusion in holding the Appellant guilty. Hence, the impugned judgment, according to him, calls for no interference. 8. Keeping in view the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the respective parties, this Court has carefully examined the entire evidence on record. Admittedly, P.W.1, Budhinath Parida, a Dairy Inspector in the office of the Director of Animal Husbandry and Veterinary Services, Cuttack, was examined as an independent witness who had accompanied the Vigilance staff to Kamakshyanagar for the trap proceedings. P.W.2, Prasanna Kumar Swain, a Statistical Assistant in the same office, also accompanied the Vigilance team and was cited as an overhearing witness. P.W.3 is Rabinarayan Patra, the complainant, who allegedly offered a sum of Rs.300/- to the Appellant for facilitating electrical connection to the L.I. Point. P.W.4, Satyananda Maharana, Joint Director, S.F.S.L., Bhubaneswar, proved the chemical examination report marked as Ext.12. P.W.5, Ganesh Chandra Hembram, was serving as Junior Engineer (Electrical) at Kamakshyanagar at the relevant time, while P.W.6, Radhamohan Patra, was the Investigating Officer of the case. 9. The learned defence counsel has laid emphasis on the evidence of the complainant, P.W.3, whose testimony constitutes CRLA No.181 of 2010 Page 7 of 15 the foundation of the prosecution case. In his deposition, P.W.3 stated that on the relevant day, i.e., 21.11.1995, he met the Appellant and requested him to provide electrical supply to the L.I. Point, for which he offered Rs.300/-. The Appellant, however, declined to accept the amount, whereupon the complainant forcibly thrust the money into the shirt pocket of the Appellant, to which the latter objected and shouted at him. It is an admitted position that P.W.3 was declared hostile and was cross-examined by the prosecution. Despite being confronted with leading questions, nothing material could be elicited from him to support the prosecution version. His testimony, even as a hostile witness, remained consistent insofar as he denied any demand or voluntary acceptance of money by the Appellant. This Court finds that the evidence of P.W.3, being the complainant and the only witness to the alleged demand and acceptance, does not substantiate the prosecution case. In the absence of credible proof of demand, which is a sine qua non for establishing an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the very foundation of the prosecution case appears to be shaken. 10. As contended by the learned counsel for the Appellant, the surrounding circumstances of the case also warrant close scrutiny in order to determine whether there was, in fact, any demand or acceptance of illegal gratification. In this regard, the evidence of P.Ws.1, 2, and 5 assumes relevance. Among them, P.W.2 was cited as the overhearing witness, while P.W.5, the Junior Engineer CRLA No.181 of 2010 Page 8 of 15 (Electrical), was examined regarding the procedural aspects connected with supply of electricity to the L.I. Point. 11. Upon careful examination of the deposition of P.W.2, it is found that though he stated in his examination-in-chief that he had witnessed the demand and acceptance of money by the Appellant, in his cross-examination he candidly admitted that he had not made any such statement before the Investigating Officer when his earlier statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. was recorded. When this contradiction was confronted to P.W.6, the Investigating Officer, during his deposition, he confirmed that P.W.2 had indeed not stated before him that he had seen the Appellant demanding or accepting the tainted money. This material omission, therefore, strikes at the root of the credibility of P.W.2’s testimony, rendering his evidence unreliable so far as the core issue of demand and acceptance is concerned. 12. Coming to the testimony of P.W.5, he has deposed only with respect to the official procedure and formalities required for supply of electricity to the L.I. Point. In his evidence, he stated that though all formalities for supply of energy had been completed by March 1995, the essential steps such as submission of the test report, installation of the meter, and receipt of instruction from the Executive Engineer had not yet been complied with. He categorically stated that without these prerequisites, the Appellant, in his capacity as S.D.O. (Electrical), was not competent to order or effect the supply of electricity. In light of the above evidence of P.W.5, when the Investigating Officer (P.W.6) was confronted during cross- CRLA No.181 of 2010 Page 9 of 15 examination as to whether he had verified these aspects either before laying the trap or during the investigation, he answered in the negative. This omission assumes significance, for it raises serious doubt as to whether any work of the complainant was actually pending with the Appellant so as to afford him an occasion to demand illegal gratification. In such a factual scenario, the allegation that the Appellant deliberately withheld the complainant’s file or delayed the supply of electrical energy for want of bribe becomes doubtful. It is trite law that the statutory presumption under Section 20 of the Prevention of Corruption Act cannot be invoked in the absence of proof of the foundational fact of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification. The evidence of P.W.5 unequivocally establishes that as on the date of the alleged trap, the Appellant was not in a position to supply electricity, the necessary procedural formalities being incomplete. This circumstance, viewed in conjunction with the inconsistent and uncorroborated testimony of P.W.2 and the categorical denial by P.W.3, leads this Court to the conclusion that the demand of illegal gratification, which forms the ingredient of the charge under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the P.C. Act, has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. 13. In B. Jayaraj vs. State of A.P. reported in (2014) 13 SCC 55, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that – “7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position CRLA No.181 of 2010 Page 10 of 15