SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH) v. This petition coming on for admission this day, the court passed

Judgment

1. ANKUSH JAIN S/O ANIL KUMAR JAIN, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, OCCUPATION: PRIVATE JOB, R/O 709, SARAFA WARD, THANA KOTWALI, JABALPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)

2. ANIL KUMAR JAIN D/O LATE MEGHCHAND AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS, JAIN, OCCUPATION: BUSINESS, R/O 709, SARAFA WARD, JABALPUR (MADHYA PRADESH) THANA KOTWALI,

3. KIRAN JAIN W/O ANIL KUMAR JAIN, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, OCCUPATION: HOUSE WIFE, R/O 709, SARAFA WARD, THANA KOTWALI, JABALPUR (MADHYA PRADESH)

4. (BY SHRI SACHIN JAIN- ADVOCATE) AND

1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH POLICE STATION GHANSORE, .....PETITIONER 2 W.P. No. 17694/2022 SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)

2. SARIKA JAIN, W/O ANISH JAIN, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, R/O NEAR CHOTE JAIN MANDIR, GAHNSORE, SEONI (MADHYA PRADESH)

(BY SHRI YASH SONI- GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE) .....RESPONDENTS This petition coming on for admission this day, the court passed the following: ORDER Heard on the question of admission and interim relief. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking the following reliefs:- “1. For the issuance of writ/direction in nature of certiorari for quashing the impugned FIR No.237/22, registered in Police station Ghanshur, District Seoni and all its consequential proceeding including the chargesheet dated 13.07.2022 and RCT no. 45/2022 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Ghansore, District Seoni.

2. Any other order or direction be made which this Honorable Court may deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

2. The brief facts leading to filing of the case are that respondent No. 2 is the wife of the petitioner No. 1. Their marriage was solemnized on 09.02.2017 3 W.P. No. 17694/2022 at Agrawal Baarat Ghar, Baldeobhag, Jabalpur. Out of the aforesaid wedlock, respondent No. 2 and petitioner No. 1 are having two children. The petitioners No. 3 and 4 are father-in-law and mother-in-law of the respondent No. 2 and the petitioner No. 1 is her brother-in-law. From the initial days of the marriage, the behavior of respondent No. 2 was not good with her husband and his family members. Respondent No. 2 used to pressurize the petitioner No. 1 to leave his parents and live separately with her. She further doubt the character of the petitioner No. 1 and use to make false allegations of extra marital affair. The respondent No. 2 lodged an FIR in the Police Station Kotwali, District Jabalpur which is registered as Crime No.81/22 for the offence punishable under Sections 342, 323, 294, 506 and 34 of the IPC. In the present FIR respondent No. 2 has alleged that due to extra marital affair of the petitioner No. 1 she did not report a single incident of demand of dowry or cruelty. The charge-sheet was filed on 06.03.2022 in respect of the aforesaid offences. Only with the motive to harass the petitioners, the respondent No. 2 lodged another FIR at Police Station, Ghansore, District Seoni on 11.05.2022 wherein, she again reported the same incident of causing voluntary hurt but this time she narrated a different story of dowry and cruelty wherein, the petitioners alleged to have demanded Rs. 30 lacs for purchasing shop. On the basis of the aforesaid, crime for the offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 506 and 34 of the IPC 4 W.P. No. 17694/2022 read with Section 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1981 was registered. Hence this petition.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that charge-sheet in both the cases have been filed. The subsequent prosecution on the basis of same alleged offence amounts to double jeopardy and is in violation of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India, therefore, the petitioner is compelled to file the writ petition seeking quashment of the aforesaid FIR. The subsequent FIR is violative of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 including Sections 177 to 183 of the Cr.P.C.. The subsequent FIR has been lodged with the false and malicious intention to cause mental agony to the petitioners and further to pressurize the petitioner No. 3 to give share to the respondent No. 2 in his property. The Police Station at Ghansore is having no jurisdiction to register and investigate the alleged crime, which is alleged to have been committed in Jabalpur. The First FIR has been lodged in Kotwali, District Jabalpur, whereas the second FIR has been lodged at Ghansore, District Seoni with regard to the same occurrence or incident which gives rise to one or more alleged cognizable offence, cannot be lodged or investigated/prosecuted separately.

4. The subsequent FIR is bad in law and contrary to the judicial principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in several cases including the case of 5 W.P. No. 17694/2022 Amish Devgan Vs. Union of India and Other, reported in 2021 (1) SCC 1 wherein it has been held as under:- “there can be no second FIR, where the information concerns the same cognizable offence alleged in the first FIR or the same occurrence or incident which gives rise to one or more cognizable offence. This is due to the fact that the investigation covers within its ambit not just the alleged cognizable offence, but also any other connected offences that may be found to have been committed.”

5. In another case the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of T.T. Antony Vs. State of Kerala and Ors. reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under:- “It is quite possible and it happens not infrequently that more informations than one are given to a police officer in charge of a police station in respect of the same incident involving one or more than one cognizable offences. In such a case he need not enter every one of them in the station house diary and this is implied in Section 154 of Cr.P.C” It is further held in the aforesaid case that- “there can be no second FIR and consequently there can be no fresh investigation on receipt of every subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or the same occurrence or incident giving rise to one or more of the cognizable offences” 6 W.P. No. 17694/2022

6. It is further submitted that the aforesaid FIR deserves to be quashed in light of the principles laid down in the in the case of State of Haryana & Others Vs. Bhajan Lal & Others reported in 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335.

7. Per contra, the petition is vehemently opposed by the counsel for the State.

9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties. So far as the allegation with regard to lodging of two FIRs is concerned, the same cannot be treated to be in continuance of the FIR lodged earlier against the petitioners. On perusal of both the FIRs, it can be clearly seen that in the FIR registered at Crime No. 81/2022 relates to a different incident altogether. So far as the second FIR registered at Crime No. 237/2022 is concerned, the said incident occurred after the petitioners got the knowledge of registration of the first FIR and started demanding of Rs.30 lacs for purchasing shop from respondent No. 2.

10. It is clear from the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 that if the allegations made in a complaint discloses the commission of cognizable offence, then an F.I.R. has to be registered. It is not the case of the petitioner that even if the entire allegations are accepted, still no cognizable offence would be made out. Admittedly, on 7 W.P. No. 17694/2022 perusal of the both FIRs, the incidents reported are altogether different and discloses the commission of cognizable offence, therefore, the FIRs cannot be quashed at the initial stage.

11. So far as the question of quashment of the FIR is concerned, the law is very settled.

12. The Supreme Court in the case of State v. N.S. Gnaneswaran, reported in (2013) 3 SCC 594 has held as under : “11. The High Court has not recorded the finding that if the contents of the FIR registered against the respondent are taken on its face value, they do not disclose the cognizable offence and thus, the FIR was liable to be quashed. Rather it has been quashed merely on technical ground that the copy of the said FIR after being lodged had not been given to the informant. The judgment impugned herein is required to be examined as to whether giving the copy of the FIR to the informant is mandatory and if not what is the prejudice caused to the respondent-accused as the informant has not raised the grievance of non-supply of the copy of the FIR nor has it been the case of the respondent that he sought the copy of the FIR and was not given.

12. The issue also requires to be examined on the touchstone of doctrine of prejudice. Thus, unless in a given situation, the aggrieved makes out a case of prejudice or injustice, some infraction of law would not vitiate the order/enquiry/result. In judging a question of prejudice, the court must act with a broad vision and look to the substance and not to technicalities. (Vide: Jankinath Sarangi v. State of 8 W.P. No. 17694/2022 Orissa, State of U.P. v. Shatrughan Lal, State of A.P. v. Thakkidiram Reddy and Debotosh Pal Choudhury v. Punjab National Bank.)”

13. The Supreme Court in the case of Shakson Belthissor v. State of Kerala, reported in (2009) 14 SCC 466 has held as under : “14. The scope and power of quashing a first information report and charge-sheet under Section 482 CrPC is well settled. The said power is exercised by the court to prevent abuse of the process of law and court but such a power could be exercised only when the complaint filed by the complainant or the charge-sheet filed by the police did not disclose any offence or when the said complaint is found to be frivolous, vexatious or oppressive. A number of decisions have been rendered by this Court on the aforesaid issue wherein the law relating to quashing of a complaint has been succinctly laid down.

15. “5. … In Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi it was held that the Magistrate while issuing process against the accused should satisfy himself as to whether the allegations [made] in the complaint, if proved, would ultimately end in the conviction of the accused. It was held that the order of the Magistrate for issuing process against the accused could be quashed under the following circumstances: (SCC p. 741, para 5) ‘(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential 9 W.P. No. 17694/2022 ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like.’

16. In Drugs Inspector v. Dr. B.K. Krishnaiah it was held by this Court that: (SCC p. 455, para 5) “5. In a quashing proceeding, the High Court has to see whether the allegations made in the complaint petition, if proved, make out a prima facie offence and that the accused has prima facie committed the offence.” In the said decision this Court refused the prayer for quashing of the complaint on the ground that there were sufficient allegations in the complaint to make out a case that the accused persons were responsible for the management and conduct of the firm and, therefore, the extent of their liability could be and should be established during trial.

17. In MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi it was held that when on the allegation made in the complaint, a clear case was made out against all the 10 W.P. No. 17694/2022 respondents (the accused persons), the High Court ought not to have quashed the proceedings on the ground that the complaint did not disclose any offence.

18. In MCD this Court observed as follows in para 8: (SCC p. 5) “8. Another important consideration which is to be kept in mind is as to when the High Court acting under the provisions of Section 482 should exercise the inherent power insofar as quashing of criminal proceedings are concerned. This matter was gone into in greater detail in Nagawwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi where the scope of Sections 202 and 204 of the present Code was considered and while laying down the guidelines and the grounds on which proceedings could be quashed this Court observed as follows: [SCC p. 741, para 5 : SCC (Cri) pp. 511-12] ‘5. … Thus it may be safely held that in the following cases an order of the Magistrate issuing process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: (1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused; (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable 8 so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused; 11 W.P. No. 17694/2022 (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like. The cases mentioned by us are purely illustrative and provide sufficient guidelines to indicate contingencies where the High Court can quash proceedings.’ ”

14. The Supreme Court in the case of V. Ravi Kumar v. State, reported in (2019) 14 SCC 568 has held as under : “24. Exercise of the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. It is neither proper nor permissible for the Court to lay down any straitjacket formula for regulating the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC.

25. Power under Section 482 CrPC might be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of law, but only when, the allegations, even if true, would not constitute an offence and/or were frivolous and vexatious on their face.

26. Where the accused seeks quashing of the FIR, invoking inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, it is wholly impermissible for the High Court to enter into the factual arena to adjudge the 12 W.P. No. 17694/2022 correctness of the allegations in the complaint. Reference may be made to the decision of this Court, inter alia, in State of Punjab v. Subhash Kumar and Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary.”

15. The Supreme Court in the case of CBI v. Arvind Khanna, reported in (2019) 10 SCC 686, has held as under : “17. After perusing the impugned order and on hearing the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel on both sides, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the High Court is not sustainable. In a petition filed under Section 482 CrPC, the High Court has recorded findings on several disputed facts and allowed the petition. Defence of the accused is to be tested after appreciating the evidence during trial. The very fact that the High Court, in this case, went into the most minute details, on the allegations made by the appellant CBI, and the defence put forth by the respondent, led us to a conclusion that the High Court has exceeded its power, while exercising its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC.”

16. The Supreme Court in the case of State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, reported in 1987 Supp SCC 89, has held as under : “2. The High Court has, however, not confined its scrutiny to the averments contained in the first information report but has traversed beyond and examined the case in the light of the contentions put forth by the respondents in their petition under Section 482 CrPC. By indulgence in such exercise the High Court has come to the conclusion that the second respondent Cooperative Society cannot be termed a dealer of the alleged adulterated fertilizer distributed 13 W.P. No. 17694/2022 to its members because there was no sale involved in the transaction, that for the same reason the second respondent Society was not bound to obtain a Registration Certificate for selling fertilizer and furthermore the alleged sale of adulterated fertilizer was itself open to serious doubt because of conflicting analysis reports issued by the Chemical Analyst regarding the fertilizer and hence the emergent position is that the first information report does not disclose the commission of cognizable offences. Thus what the High Court has done is to go far beyond the contents of the first information report and enter into a discussion on the merits of the case before the investigating agency had conducted investigation and collected evidence.”

17. The Supreme Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd., reported in (2006) 6 SCC 736, held as under : “12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few - Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692], State of Haryana vs. Bhajanlal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335], Rupan Deol Bajaj vs. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., [(1996) 5 SCC 591], State of Bihar vs. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, [(1999) 3 SCC 259], Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168], M. 14 W.P. No. 17694/2022