High Court · 2023

SHRI OMKAR LAL, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS A.S.I. IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI MANASA (MADHYA PRADESH) PRABHU LAL KUSHWAHA S/O SHRI R.L. KUSHWAHA, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS A.S.I. IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI KHARGONE DISTRICT (MADHYA PRADESH) DILIP SINGH PACHLAIYA S/O SHRI BHAGWAN PACHLAIYA, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS A.S.I. SAMITI IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI (MADHYA KHARGONE PRADESH) DISTRICT VIJAY SINGH DAMAR S/O SHRI TITIYAJI 35 YEARS, DAMAR, AGED ABOUT OCCUPATION: AORKING AS A.S.I. IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI, THANDLA DISTRICT (MADHYA PRADESH) DINESH PATEL S/O SHRI SHIVNARAYAN PATEL, AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WOTKING AS A.S.I. IN KRISHI SAMITI, SAMWER,DISTRICT (MADHYA PRADESH) MANDI UPAJ

18. .....PETITIONER (BY SHRI AJAY KUMAR SHUKLA - ADVOCATE) AND

2. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH THE SECRETARY VALLABH BHAWAN BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH) SECRETARY , THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH OF AGRICULTURE MANTRALAYA, VALLABH BHAWAN, (MADHYA PRADESH) DEPARTMENT

3. MANAGING DIRECTOR MADHYA PRADESH STATE OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING BOARD, 26, AREA HILLS KISAN BHAVAN (MADHYA PRADESH) 4 (BY SHRI G.P.SINGH – GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS/STATE) (SHRI PRANAY CHOUBEY – ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.3) .....RESPONDENTS WRIT PETITION No. 1379 of 2012 BETWEEN:- JITENDRA KUMAR MISHRA S/O SHRI SITA RAM MISHRA, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, OCCUPATION: CLERK KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI (MADHYA PRADESH) .....PETITIONER (BY SHRI K.C.GHILDIYAL – SENIOR ADVOCATE WITH SHRI ADITYA VEER SINGH - ADVOCATE) AND

2. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT, VALLABH BHAWAN, BHOPAL M.P. (MADHYA PRADESH) DEPTT. OF SECRETARY AGRICULTURE MANTRALAYA VALLAB BHAWAN BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)

3. MANAGING DIRECTOR M.P. STATE OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING BOARD 26 ARERA HILLS KISAN BHAWAN BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)

4. SECRETARY KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI (MADHYA PRADESH) (BY SHRI G.P.SINGH – GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS/STATE) (SHRI PRANAY CHOUBEY – ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.3) (SHRI R.S.THAKUR – ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.4) .....RESPONDENTS WRIT PETITION No. 16367 of 2012 5 BETWEEN:-

1. NARENDRA KUMAR PATIDAR S/O SHRI SANTILAL JI PATIDAR, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, OCCUPATION: PEON KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI RAJGARH (MADHYA PRADESH)

2. MAHENDRA KUMAR SONI S/O RADHE SHYAM JI SONI , AGED ABOUT 41 YEARS, OCCUPATION: PEON KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI RAJGARH (MADHYA PRADESH)

4. BALRAM YADAV S/O KEHSAR SINGH YADAV , AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, OCCUPATION: PEON KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI RAJGARH (MADHYA PRADESH) ABDUL NAUSAD KHAN S/O ABDUL KADIR KHAN , AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, OCCUPATION: CLERK KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI RAJGARH (MADHYA PRADESH) (BY SHRI AJAY KUMAR SHUKLA - ADVOCATE) AND

2. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPT. BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH) THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THR. THE SECRETARY DEPTT. OF MANTRALAYA AGRICULTURE VALLABH (MADHYA PRADESH) BHAWAN

3. MANAGING DIRECTOR MADHYA PRADESH STATE OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING BOARD 26 AREA HILLS .....PETITIONER 6 KISAN BHAWAN (MADHYA PRADESH)

4. KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI RAJGARH (MADHYA THR. THE SECRETARY PRADESH) (BY SHRI G.P.SINGH – GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS/STATE) (SHRI PRANAY CHOUBEY – ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.4) .....RESPONDENTS WRIT PETITION No. 16369 of 2012 BETWEEN:- SHEKH SHEKH MUBARAK SALAMAT, AGED ABOUT 43 YEARS, OCCUPATION: DRIVER KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI TIKAMGARH (MADHYA PRADESH) SHRI S/O .....PETITIONER (BY SHRI AJAY KUMAR SHUKLA - ADVOCATE) AND

4. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPT. BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH) THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH SECRETARY DEPARTMENT VALLABH OF BHAWAN, (MADHYA PRADESH) AGRICULTURE BHOPAL THE MANAGING DIRECTOR M.P. STATE OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING BOARD 26, ARERA HILLS, KISAN (MADHYA BHOPAL BHAWAN, PRADESH) KRISHI THROUGH PRADESH) UPAJ MANDI SECRETARY SAMITI (MADHYA 7 (BY SHRI G.P.SINGH – GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS/STATE) (SHRI R.S.THAKUR– ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.3) (SHRI PRANSHU MALVIYA – ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.4) .....RESPONDENTS WRIT PETITION No. 16673 of 2012 BETWEEN:- DINESH CHANDRA ACHARYA S/O SHRI MAHESH CHANDRA ACHARYA, AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, OCCUPATION: ASSISTANT SUB INSPECTOR KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI, RATLAM (MADHYA PRADESH) (BY SHRI AJAY KUMAR SHUKLA - ADVOCATE) AND .....PETITIONER

4. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH THE SECRETARY GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPT. BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH) THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THROUGH SECRETARY DEPARTMENT VALLABH OF BHAWAN, (MADHYA PRADESH) AGRICULTURE BHOPAL THE MANAGING DIRECTOR M.P. STATE AGRICULTURE MARKETING BOARD 26, ARERA HILLS, KISAN (MADHYA BHOPAL BHAWAN, PRADESH) KRISHI THROUGH DISTT. RATLAM (MADHYA PRADESH) UPAJ MANDI SECRETARY SAMITI RATLAM (BY SHRI G.P.SINGH – GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS/STATE) (SHRI PRANAY CHOUBEY – ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.4) .....RESPONDENTS 8 WRIT PETITION No. 18839 of 2013 BETWEEN:-

7. YOGESH YADAV S/O SHRI KISHORI LAL YADAV, AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS, AS OCCUPATION: ASSISTANT SUB INSPECTOR IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI SANAWAD DISTT. KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH) WORKING S/O SURENDRA MUKATI SHRI LAXMAN MUKATI , AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS, OCCUPATION: ASSISTANT SUB INSPENTOR KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH) BHAWANI PRASAD MEHRA S/O SHRI PURAN SINGH MEHJRA , AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, OCCUPATION: ASSISTANT SDUB KHARGONE INSPENTOR (MADHYA PRADESH) DILEEP SOLANKI S/O SHRI HARE , AGED ABOUT 37 SINGH SOLANKI YEARS, OCCUPATION: ASSISTANT SUB INSPECTOR KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH) RADHE SHYAM CHOUDHARI S/O SHRI SAJJAN SINGH CHOUDHARI , AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, OCCUPATION: PEON IN DIRSHI UPAJ MANDI KHARGONE (MADHYA PRADESH) DEEPAK RANDWA S/O SHRI AMRAJI RANDWA , AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, OCCUPATION: PEON IN DIRSHI UPAJ MANDI (MADHYA PRADESH) KHARGONE ASHOK SAWANER S/O SHRI JAGDISH , AGED ABOUT 36 SINGH SWNER YEARS, OCCUPATION: PEON IN KIRSHI UPAJ MANDI KHARGONE (MADHYA .....PETITIONER 9 PRADESH) (BY SHRI AJAY KUMAR SHUKLA - ADVOCATE) AND

3. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH GENERA TH:SECRETARY ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT BHAWAN,BHOPAL VALLABH (MADHYA PRADESH) THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPT. VALLABH BHOPAL. BHAWAN, (MADHYA PRADESH) THE MANAGING DIRECTOR MADHYA PRADESH AGRICULTURE MARKITING BOARD AREA HILLS KISAN BHAVAN BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH) (BY SHRI G.P.SINGH – GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS/STATE) .....RESPONDENTS WRIT PETITION No. 18843 of 2013 BETWEEN:-

2. AJIT SINGH TANWAR S/O SHRI JASVANT SINGH TANWAR, AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS ASSISTANT SUB INSPECTOR IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI, BADNAWAR, DISTRICT DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH) PRADEEP KUMAR MATHUR S/O SHRI KISHORI LAL MATHUR, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS ASSISTANT SUB INSPECTOR IN SAMITI, UPAJ MANDI KRISHI DHAR DISTRICT BADNAWAR,

8. 10 (MADHYA PRADESH) SHYAM LAL SURYAWANSHI S/O SHRI MANNALAL SURYAWANSHI, AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS CLERK IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI BADNAWAR, DISTRICT DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH) SAMITI, MAHESH CHANDRA PANVAR S/O SHRI BADRILAL PANVAR, AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORIING SUB INSPECTOR KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI, BADNAWAR, DISTRICT DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH) ASSISTANT AS SANJAY KUMAR JOSHI S/O SHRI KANTI LALJI SONI, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS ASSISTANT IN SAMITI, KRISHI DHAR BADNAWAR, (MADHYA PRADESH) UPAJ MANDI DISTRICT INSPECTOR SUB BHAVANI SHANKAR JOSHI S/O SHRI ANANDI LAL JOSHI, AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS SUB INSPECTOR IN KRISHI UPAJ BADNAWAR, MANDI DISTRICT DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH) SAMITI, KAILASH MALI S/O SHRI SHANKAR LAL MALI, AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, OCCUPATION: AS CHOUKIDAR KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI, BADNAWAR, DISTRICT DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH) WORKING SINGH PRADEEP SINGH SANKLA S/O SHRI SANKLA, AGED PARVAT ABOUT 48 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS CHOUKIDAR KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI, BADNAWAR, DISTRICT DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH) 11

12. S/O DEVADA BABULAL SHRI PANNALAL DEVADA OCCUPATION: WORKING AS CLERK IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI, DHAR DISTRICT DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH) YASHWANT SINGH S/O SHRI ROOP SINGH CHOUHAN, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS ASSISTANT IN SAMITI, KRISHI MANAWAR DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH) UPAJ MANDI DISTRICT INSPECTOR SUB PADAM CHAND ALLAVA S/O SHRI KANJI ALLAVA, AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS PEON IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI, DHAR MANAWAR (MADHYA PRADESH) DISTRICT NARAYAN SINGH S/O SHRI MEHTAB SINGH, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, AS OCCUPATION: ASSISTANT IN SAMITI, KRISHI DHAMNOD, DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH) UPAJ MANDI DISTRICT INSPECTOR WORKING SUB

13. MOHAN SINGH CHOUHAN S/O SHRI LAL SINGH CHOUHAN, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, OCCUPATION: WORKING AS PEON IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI, DHAMNOD, DISTRICT DHAR (MADHYA PRADESH) (BY SHRI AJAY KUMAR SHUKLA - ADVOCATE) AND

1. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH THR. GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPT. VALLABH (MADHYA BHOPAL BHAWAN, SECRETARY .....PETITIONER 12 PRADESH)

2. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH TH. OF SECRETARY MANTRLAYA, AGRICULATURE, VALLABH BHAWAN, B (MADHYA PRADESH) DEPTT.

3. MANAGING DIRECTOR MADHYA PRADESH STATE OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING BOARD 26, AREA HILLS, KISAN BHAWAN, BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH) (BY SHRI G.P.SINGH – GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENTS/STATE) (SHRI PRANAY CHOUBEY – ADVOCATE FOR RESPONDENT NO.3) .....RESPONDENTS WRIT PETITION No. 3866 of 2014 BETWEEN:- LAL GANDHI BHARAT SHRI RAMESHWAR DAYAL GANDHI, AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, OCCUPATION: ASSISTANT SUB INPECTOR IN KRISHI UPAJ MANDI SAMITI DATIYA (MADHYA PRADESH) S/O .....PETITIONER (BY SHRI AJAY KUMAR SHUKLA - ADVOCATE) AND

2. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH GENERAL SECRETARY ADMINISTRATION DEPT. VALLABH BHAWAN (MADHYA PRADESH) DEPARTMENT OF SECRETARY AGRICULTURE MANTRALAYA, VALLABHA BHAWAN DISTT. BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH)

3. MANAGING DIRECTOR MADHYA 13 PRADESH STATE OF AGRICULTURE MARKETING BOARD 26, AREA HILLS, KISAN BHAWAN DISTT. BHOPAL (MADHYA PRADESH) (BY SHRI G.P.SINGH – GOVERNMENT ADVOCATE) .....RESPONDENTS These petitions coming on for admission this day, the court passed the following: ORDER

1. By this common order, W.P.No.14607/2016, W.P.No.1379/2012, W.P.No.16367/2012, W.P.No.16369/2012, W.P.No.16673/2012, W.P.No.18839/2013, W.P.No.18843/2013 and W.P.No.3866/2014 shall be disposed of. For the sake of convenience, facts of W.P.No.14607/2016 shall be considered.

2. This petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been filed seeking the following reliefs :- i) A writ order or direction in the nature of certiorari thereby quashing the condition of determining the eligibility in reference to 10.04.2006 as contained in circular dated 16.05.2007 issued by Respondent No. 1 (Annexure "P-1") and the order dated 23.07.2011 and 08.11.2011 issued by Respondent No. 3 (Annexure "P-3".). ii) A writ order or direction in the nature of mandamus thereby directing the Respondents to regularize the petitioner in service w.e.f. the date when his juniors were regularized I service with all benefits including continuity in service, seniority and salary. iii) Any other appropriate writ order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem just and proper in the nature and circumstances of the case including cost of the litigation. 14

3. By this petition, the petitioner has challenged the circular No.F 5- 3/2006/1/3 dated 16.5.2007 by which it has been held that the eligibility of the daily wages employees for regularization shall be considered in reference to 10.4.2006. It is submitted that although the date 10.4.2006 has been fixed on the basis of judgment pronounced by the Supreme Court in the case of Secretary, State of Karnataka and others Vs. Umadevi (3) and others, reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1 but the said aspect has been taken note of by the Supreme Court in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari and others etc. Vs. The State of Jharkhand & ors. etc. decided on 1.8.2018 in Civil Appeal No.7423- 7429/2018 in which it has been held that the relevant date would be the date of promulgation of the Regularization Rules and not the date on which the judgment was passed in the case of Umadevi (supra) dated

10.4.2006, therefore, the circular dated 16.5.2007 is bad in law.

4. Per contra, the petition is vehemently opposed by counsel for the State. It is submitted that it is clear from the judgment pronounced by the Supreme Court in the case of Uma Devi (supra), one time measure was directed to be taken within a period of six months from the date of judgment pronounced by the Supreme Court, therefore, the cut-off date, i.e. 10.4.2006 has been rightly provided in circular dated

16.5.2007.

5. Considered the submissions made by counsel for the parties.

6. The Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (supra), has held as under :-

53. One aspect needs to be clarified. There may be cases where irregular appointments (not illegal appointments) as 15 explained in S.V. Narayanappa [(1967) 1 SCR 128 : AIR 1967 SC 1071] , R.N. Nanjundappa [(1972) 1 SCC 409 : (1972) 2 SCR 799] and B.N. Nagarajan [(1979) 4 SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : (1979) 3 SCR 937] and referred to in para 15 above, of duly qualified persons in duly sanctioned vacant posts might have been made and the employees have continued to work for ten years or more but without the intervention of orders of the courts or of tribunals. The question of regularisation of the services of such employees may have to be considered on merits in the light of the principles settled by this Court in the cases abovereferred to and in the light of this judgment. In that context, the Union of India, the State Governments and their instrumentalities should take steps to regularise as a one-time measure, the services of such irregularly appointed, who have worked for ten years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of orders of the courts or of tribunals and should further ensure that regular recruitments are undertaken to fill those vacant sanctioned posts that require to be filled up, in cases where temporary employees or daily wagers are being now employed. The process must be set in motion within six months from this date. We also clarify that regularisation, if any already made, but not sub judice, need not be reopened based on this judgment, but there should be no further bypassing of the constitutional requirement and regularising or making permanent, those not duly appointed as per the constitutional scheme.

7. From the aforesaid direction it is clear that the Supreme Court had directed the authorities to put the process in motion within six months from this date, i.e. the date on which the judgment was pronounced. Furthermore, the said aspect came for consideration before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Karnataka and others v. M.L. Kesari and others, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 247.

8. In the aforesaid case, it has been held as under :- 16 several commence departments Consequently,

9. The term “one-time measure” has to be understood in its proper perspective. This would normally mean that after the decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , each department instrumentality should undertake a one-time or each exercise and prepare a list of all casual, daily-wage or ad hoc employees who have been working for more than ten years without the intervention of courts and tribunals and subject them to a process verification as to whether they are working against vacant posts and possess the requisite qualification for the post and if so, regularise their services. 10. At the end of six months from the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , cases of several daily- wage/ad hoc/casual employees were still pending before courts. instrumentalities did not the one-time regularisation process. On the other hand, some government departments or instrumentalities undertook the one-time exercise excluding several employees from consideration either on the ground that their cases were pending in courts or due to sheer oversight. In such circumstances, the employees who were entitled to be considered in terms of para 53 of the decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , will not lose their right to be considered for regularisation, merely because the one-time exercise was completed without considering their cases, or because the six-month period mentioned in para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] has expired. The one-time exercise should consider all daily-wage/ad hoc/casual employees who had put in 10 years of continuous service as on 10-4-2006 without availing the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals. If any employer had held the one-time exercise in terms of para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , but did not consider the cases of some employees who were entitled to the benefit of para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , the employer concerned should consider their cases also, as a continuation of the one-time exercise. The one-time exercise will be concluded only when all the employees who 17 are entitled to be considered in terms of para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1], are so considered. 11. The object behind the said direction in para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] is twofold. First is to ensure that those who have put in more than ten years of continuous service without the protection of any interim orders of courts or tribunals, before the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] was rendered, are considered for regularisation in view of their long service. Second is to ensure that the departments/instrumentalities do not perpetuate the practice of employing persons on daily- wage/ad hoc/casual basis for long periods and periodically regularise them on the ground that they have served for more than ten years, thereby defeating the constitutional or statutory provisions relating to recruitment and appointment. The true effect of the direction is that all persons who have worked for more than ten years as on 10- 4-2006 [the date of decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] ] without the protection of any interim order of any court or tribunal, in vacant posts, possessing the requisite qualification, are entitled to be considered for regularisation. The fact that the employer has not undertaken such exercise of regularisation within six months of the decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] or that such exercise was undertaken only in regard to a limited few, will not disentitle such employees, the right to be considered for regularisation in terms of the above directions in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] as a one-time measure. 12. These appeals have been pending for more than four years after the decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] . The appellant (Zila Panchayat, Gadag) has not considered the cases of the respondents for regularisation within six months of the decision in Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] or thereafter. 13. The Division Bench of the High Court has directed that the cases of the respondents should be considered in accordance with law. The only further direction that needs to be given, in view of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , is 18 that the Zila Panchayat, Gadag should now undertake an exercise within six months, as a general one-time regularisation exercise, to find out whether there are any the Zila daily-wage/casual/ad hoc employees serving Panchayat and if so whether such employees (including the respondents) fulfil the requirements mentioned in para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] . If they fulfil them, their services have to be regularised. If such an exercise has already been undertaken by ignoring or omitting the cases of Respondents 1 to 3 because of the pendency of these cases, then their cases shall have to be considered in continuation of the said one-time exercise within three months. It is needless to say that if the respondents do not fulfil the requirements of para 53 of Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1] , their services need not be regularised. If the employees who have completed ten years' service do not possess the educational qualifications prescribed for the post, at the time regularisation in suitable lower posts. they may be considered their appointment,

9. Therefore, it has been held by the Supreme Court that the date of judgment of Umadevi (supra), i.e. 10.4.2006 will be the cut-off date for considering the cases of the employees for regularization.

10. So far as judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra) is concerned, it has been passed under peculiar facts. The State of Jharkhand came into existence on

15.11.2000 and thus it is clear that not a single employee of State of Jharkhand had completed 10 years of service on 10.4.2006. Under those circumstances, it was observed that the High Court as well as the State of Jharkhand ought to have considered the entire issue in a contextual perspective and not only from the point of view of the interest of the State, financial or otherwise. The interest of the 19 employees is also to be required to be kept in mind and, therefore, in para 11 it was mentioned that “under the circumstances, we are of the view that the Regularization Rules must be given a pragmatic interpretation and the appellants, if they have completed 10 years of service on the date of promulgation of the Regularization Rules, ought to be given the benefit of the service rendered by them. If they have completed 10 years of service they should be regularized unless there is some valid objection to their regularization like misconduct etc.”.

11. Even in the case of Narendra Kumar Tiwari (supra), the Supreme Court has considered the object behind the direction given by the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (3) (supra) in para 53 and has held as under :-

8. The purpose and intent of the decision in Umadevi (3) was therefore two-fold, namely, to prevent irregular or illegal appointments in the future and secondly, to confer a benefit on those who had been irregularly appointed in the past. The fact that the State of Jharkhand continued with the irregular appointments for almost a decade after the decision in Umadevi (3) is a clear indication that it believes that it was all right to continue with irregular appointments, and whenever required, terminate the services of the irregularly they were appointed employees on irregularly appointed. This is nothing but a form of exploitation of the employees by not giving them the benefits of regularisation and by placing the sword of Damocles over their head. This is precisely what Umadevi (3) and Kesari sought to avoid. the ground

12. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and others Vs. Ilmodevi and another, decided on 7.10.2021 in C.A.No.5689- 5690/2021 has held as under :- 20

2.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal dated 17.01.2007 passed in O.A. No. 886/CH/2005 both, the Union of India and the respondents herein – parttime employees filed their respective writ petitions before the High Court being CWP Nos. 9167 of 2007 and 6854 of 2008. At this stage, it is required to be noted that pursuant to the judgment and order passed by the learned Tribunal, the Department/Government was required to formulate the regularization scheme, which was not formulated and, therefore, the contempt proceedings were initiated. By its order dated 19.05.2014, the High Court issued a notice in the contempt proceedings to the Secretary (Post) and directed to place the scheme before the Court by 04.07.2014. In view of the abovesaid directions dated 19.05.2014, the Department formulated a policy for regularization of observations made by this Court in the case of Umadevi (supra) and subsequent to the O.M. of DoPT dated 11.12.2006 (referred to hereinabove) for the welfare of the casual labourers. 2.3 That by order dated 06.08.2014, the High Court directed the appellants to reconsider the claim of the respondents as per the new policy dated 30.06.2014. The authorities rejected the claim by order dated 11.09.2014 for the reasons that; (i) there are no sanctioned posts and (ii) employees have not completed 10 years of service as on 10.04.2006 namely, the date of decision of this Court in Umadevi (supra). 2.4 By the impugned common judgment and order, the High Court has disposed of the aforesaid writ petitions with the following directions:- considering labourers casual “[22] We, thus, direct the petitioner-authorities to re- visit the whole issue in its right perspective and complete the exercise to re-formulate their policy and take a decision to sanction the posts in phased manner within a specified time schedule. Let such a decision be taken within a period of six months from the date of receiving a certified copy of this order. [23] Till the exercise as directed above, is undertaken, the respondents shall continue in service with their 21 current status but those of them who have completed 20 years as part-time daily wagers, shall be granted 'minimum' basic pay of Group 'D' post(s) w.e.f. 1.4.2015 and/or the date of completion of 20 years contractual service, whichever is later.”

2.5 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court, the Union of India and others have preferred the present appeals. 3. At this stage, it is required to be noted that while issuing notice in the present appeals on 22.07.2016, this Court passed the following order:- “On hearing Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned Solicitor General appearing on behalf of the petitioners, we are not inclined to interfere with the directions of the High Court in paragraph 23 for granting minimum basic pay to Group 'D' posts from a particular date to those who have completed 20 years of part-time daily wage service. The petitioners should carry out that direction. Insofar as the directions of the High Court to re-visit the whole issue of sanction of posts etc. and reformulation of policy are concerned, there appears some merits in the submission that the High Court should not have interfered in policy matters. Issue notice on the special leave petition in that respect as well as on the application for condonation of delay. The direction contained in paragraph 22 of the impugned order shall remain stayed until further orders.”

4. Ms. Madhvi Divan, learned ASG has appeared on behalf of the appellants and Shri Rahul Gupta, learned counsel has appeared on behalf of the respondents. 5. Ms. Madhvi Divan, learned ASG has vehemently submitted that the High Court has not properly appreciated the facts that in the Post Office where the respondents were working, there are no sanctioned posts and that the 22 respondents were serving as part-time contingent Safaiwalas for five hours a day and their wages were paid even from the contingent fund. It is submitted that neither the O.M. dated 11.12.2006 nor the subsequent regularization policy dated 30.06.2014 shall be applicable to the facts of the case at hand. 5.1 It is further submitted that even in the impugned judgment also, the High Court has observed that the respondents were working as part-time daily wages sweepers. It is submitted, therefore, in absence of the sanctioned posts in the Post Office where the respondents were working as part-time Safaiwalas, there services cannot be regularized. 5.2 It is further submitted that the directions issued by the High Court to sanction the posts can be said to be a policy decision, and, therefore, the High Court is not justified in issuing the Mandamus and/or direction to create and sanction the posts. It is submitted that the High Court has not properly appreciated the facts that even the O.M. dated 11.12.2006 and subsequent regularization policy dated 30.06.2014 were absolutely in consonance with the decision of this Court in the case of Umadevi (supra). It is submitted that in the case of Umadevi (supra) it has been specifically observed that the High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, should not ordinarily issue direction for absorption, regularization or permanent continuance unless the recruitment was itself done regularly and in terms of constitutional scheme. 5.3 It is submitted that as per the dictum of this Court in the case of Umadevi (supra), the services of only those employees are to be regularized as a one-time measure, who are irregularly appointed and otherwise who are duly qualified persons in terms of the statutory requirement rules for the post and who have worked for 10 years or more in duly sanctioned posts but not under cover of the orders of courts or tribunals. It is submitted that, thereafter, the Department came out with the regularization policy dated 30.06.2014. It is submitted that even the High Court has also 23 in the impugned judgment observed that there are no sanctioned posts in the office where the respondents were working. It is submitted further that the High Court has directed to create and sanction the posts, which is beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court in exercise of power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5.4 It is further submitted that the High Court has not taken note of the Recruitment Rules, 2002, which were replaced by 2010 Rules, however, the same shall not be applicable to the Postal Department as specifically mentioned in the said rules. It is further submitted that even the High Court has observed that it is no doubt true that a part-time employee cannot seek parity with full-time worker but despite the same the High Court has observed that whatever benefits, authorities decide to confer on the full-timers, the same can be extended to part-timers as well, of course, on such additional and stringent conditions like double the length of contingent service and/or other conditions which the authorities may deem fit. It is submitted that the aforesaid observations are also beyond the scope and ambit of exercise of the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. 5.5 It is further submitted that even the High Court has also materially erred in observing that though the respondents are working for four to five hours as part-time daily wagers, they must have worked for full day. It is submitted that aforesaid is absolutely without any basis and the same is not supported by any evidence. It is further submitted that even the observations made by the High Court in paragraph 9 that it is true that these employees are working on “part-time basis only”, the ground realities of which a Court can take judicial notice, leave no room to doubt that once the respondents come to their respective work place to perform duties, may be for four to five hours, it is nearly impossible for them to secure another job for the rest of the day. It is submitted that the aforesaid observation is on surmises and the entire conjunctures only. reasonable and is submitted It 24 observations made in paragraph 9, thus, are on surmises and conjunctures, which has no factual basis at all. 5.6 Ms. Madhvi Divan, learned ASG has relied upon the decisions of this Court in the cases of Union of India and Ors. Vs. A.S. Pillai and Ors., (2010) 13 SCC 448; State of Rajasthan and Ors. Vs. Daya Lal and Ors., (2011) 2 SCC 429 and Secretary, Ministry of Communications and Ors. Vs. Sakkubai and Anr. (1997) 11 SCC 224 in support of her submission that services of a part-time worker working on the post of a full-time worker cannot be regularized. She has also relied upon the decision of this Court in the cases of Dr. Ashwani Kumar Vs. Union of India and Anr., (2020) 13 SCC 581; State of Karnataka and Anr. Vs. Dr. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684; Anuradha Bhasin Vs. Union of India and Ors., (2020) 3 SCC 637; Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Vs. Krishan Gopal and Ors., (2020) SCC Online SC 150; State of Maharashtra and Anr. Vs. R.S. Bhonde and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 751 in support of her submission that in judicial review, a Court has no right to direct the Government to review the policy of appointment; in judicial review the Court cannot interfere in the administrative matters and that in the absence of a regular sanctioned post, the Court cannot direct to create one. 6. Present appeals are opposed by Shri Rahul Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents. It is submitted that by the impugned judgment and order the High Court has decided as many as nine petitions, however, two out of nine are being challenged before this Court. It is submitted, therefore, that qua other seven writ petitions, the Union of India has accepted the verdict and it has become final as the same have not been challenged. It is further submitted that while issuing notice in the present appeals on 22.07.2016, this Hon’ble Court made it clear that it was not inclined to interfere with the directions of the High Court in paragraph 23 of the judgment and, therefore, the scope of present case now confines to the directions contained in paragraph 22 of the impugned judgment. It is submitted that in the present case, the respondent No.1 – Ilmo Devi, who 25 was working continuously since 1982 as a sweeper has already attained the age of retirement and the other respondent Babli, who was working continuously since 1991 as a sweeper is of around 53 years of age and, therefore, this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and the present appeals be dismissed keeping the question of law open. 6.1 On merits, Shri Gupta, learned counsel has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of Umadevi (supra) and in the case of Mineral Exploration Corpn. Employees’ Union Vs. Mineral Exploration Corpn. Ltd. and Anr., (2006) 6 SCC 310. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at length. 8. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the respondents original applicants were working as contingent paid part-time sweepers (Safai Karamcharies working for less than five hours a day) in a Post Office at Chandigarh. It is not in dispute and cannot be disputed that there are no sanctioned posts of Safaiwalas in the Post Office in which the respondents were working. There is no documentary evidence on record that the respondents were working continuously. Even otherwise as observed hereinabove, they were working as contingent paid part-time sweepers. Even it is not the case on behalf of the respondents that their appointment was done after following due procedure of selection and to that extent, it cannot be said that their appointments were irregular. As such in the absence of any sanctioned posts in the Post Office in which the respondents were working, there was no question of appointing the respondents after following due procedure. In light of the above, the directions issued by the High Court in the impugned judgment and order are required to be considered. 8.1 In the present case, pursuant to the order passed by the learned Tribunal and the order passed in the contempt proceedings, the appellants came out with a regularization to establish and prove 26 policy dated 30.06.2014. In the said regularization policy, it has been provided as under:- “(i) Regularization of all the Casual Labourers, who have been irregularly appointed, but are duly qualified persons in terms of statutory requirement rules for the post and was engaged against a sanctioned post, shall be done if they have worked for 10 years or more but not under the covers of orders of courts or tribunals as on the date of Hon’ble Apex Court’s ibid judgment, i.e., 10.04.2006. (ii) A temporary contractual, casual or daily wage worker shall not have a legal right to be made permanent unless he/she fulfills the above criteria. (iii) A Casual Labourer engaged without following the due process or the rules relating to appointment and does not meet the above criteria shall not be considered regularization, their absorption, permanency in the Department. (iv) If a Casual Labourer was engaged in infraction of the rules or if his engagement is in violation of the provisions of illegal engagement shall not be regularized.” the Constitution, the said

8.2 The aforesaid regularization policy has been framed considering the decision of this Court in the case of Umadevi (supra). That thereafter pursuant to the interim order passed by the High Court dated 06.08.2014, the appellant authorities reconsidered respondents herein as per the regularization policy dated 30.06.2014 and the same came to be rejected vide communication dated 11.09.2014 mainly on the ground that there are no sanctioned posts and the employees have not completed ten years of service as on 10.04.2006. the claim of

13. Thus, it is clear that the regularization policy to regularize the services of the employees working on temporary status of casual labourers is a policy decision and in judicial review the court cannot issue mandatory directions to do so. 27

14. Furthermore, the policy dated 16.5.2007 is in conformity with the directions given by the Supreme Court in the case of Umadevi (supra).

15. As already pointed out, the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Narendra Kumar (supra) is distinguishable for the reason that the State of Jharkhand itself came into existence on 15.11.2000 and thus not a single employee would have completed 10 years of his service on the cut-off date, i.e. 10.4.2006 whereas the facts of the present case are completely distinguishable as the State of M.P. is in existence right from the year 1956.

16. In some of the writ petitions, it was submitted by counsel for the petitioners that some of the juniors have been regularized and, therefore, the petitioners cannot be treated differently by denying regularization which amounts to discrimination.

17. Considered the submission made by counsel for the petitioners.

18. So far as question regarding regularization of the juniors is concerned, this Court is of the considered opinion that this Court cannot apply the principle of negative equality.

19. The Supreme Court in the case of Union of India and Another v. International Trading Co. & Another, reported in (2003) 5 SCC 437 has held as under : thirty “13. What remains now to be considered, is the effect of two vessels. As permission granted highlighted by learned counsel for the appellants, even if it is accepted that there was any improper permission, that may render such permissions vulnerable so far as the thirty two vessels are concerned, but it cannot come to the aid of the respondents. It is not necessary to deal with that aspect 28 because two wrongs do not make one right. A party cannot claim that since something wrong has been done in another case direction should be given for doing another wrong. It would not be setting a wrong right, but would be perpetuating another wrong. In such matters there is no discrimination involved. The concept of equal treatment on the logic of Article 14 of the Constitution of India (in short “the Constitution”) cannot be pressed into service in such cases. What treatment presupposes is existence of similar legal foothold. It does not countenance repetition of a wrong action to bring both wrongs on a par. Even if hypothetically it is accepted that a wrong has been committed in some other cases by introducing a concept of negative equality the respondents cannot strengthen their case. They have to establish strength of their case on some other basis and not by claiming negative equality.” the concept of equal

20. The Supreme Court in the case of Directorate of Film Festivals and Others v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain & Others reported in (2007) 4 SCC 737 has held as under : “22. When a grievance of discrimination is made, the High Court cannot just examine whether someone similarly situated has been granted a relief or benefit and then automatically direct grant of such relief or benefit to the person aggrieved. The High Court has to first examine whether the petitioner who has approached the court has established a right, entitling him to the relief sought on the facts and circumstances of the case. In the context of such examination, the fact that some others, who are similarly situated, have been granted relief which the petitioner is seeking, may be of some relevance. But where in law, a writ petitioner has not established a right or is not entitled to relief, the fact that a similarly situated person has been illegally granted relief, is not a ground to direct similar relief to him. That would be enforcing a negative equality 29 by perpetuation of an illegality which is impermissible in law. The principle has been stated by this Court in Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [(1995) 1 SCC 745] thus: (SCC pp. 750-51, para 8) “Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent Authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent Authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent Authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law—indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law—but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent Authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if 30 in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners' case is similar to the other persons' case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course—barring exceptional situations—would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well- accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual legal, principles.” in accordance with relevant

21. The Supreme Court in the case of Haryana State Electricity Board and Another v. Gulshan Lal & Others, reported in, (2009) 12 SCC 231 has held as under : “32. The appellant is State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. For holding a public office, the requisite prescribed an employee must possess qualification, in absence whereof the additional reliefs could not have been granted to them relying on or on the basis of the judgment passed in the earlier cases. 31

33. Conditions of service of the employees of the appellants are governed by the statutory rules. Violation thereof is impermissible in law. Whereas the appellants are bound by the doctrine of equality as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is also well settled that unequals cannot be treated as equals. Herein, equality doctrine has been invoked only on the basis of relief granted in the case of Anil Kapoor. 34. In Anil Kapoor's case, a writ petition was also filed for the purpose of grant of designation. The same has rightly or wrongly been allowed. That would not mean that equality can be claimed on the basis thereof which would lead to a wholly anomalous situation. Decree granted by a competent court of law is no doubt binding on the employer. But, when in a subsequent litigation the absurd thereof result emanating from becomes apparent before another court and it is found that the said judgment is illegal, it is well settled, that by application of Article 14 of the Constitution of India alone, similar relief should not be granted. 35. Equality clause carries with it a positive effect. It treating persons equally who are situated signifies similarly. Those who had been occupying the position of Foreman Grade I and/or Foreman Grade II and other employees who were far below them either for the purpose of seniority or otherwise could not have been treated equally. The cascading effect thereof would be that for all intent and purport those who are in the joint seniority list being above Anil Kapoor and others in the seniority list would derive the same benefit irrespective of the fact as to whether they are qualified to hold the post of Foreman Grade I and/or otherwise gained sufficient experience therefor for promotion to that post.” the cascading effect

22. The Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Sports Club & Another v. Union of India & Others, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 705, has held as under : 32 “71. Article 14 of the Constitution declares that: “14. Equality before law.—The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” The concept of equality enshrined in that article is a positive concept. The Court can command the State to give equal treatment to similarly situated persons, but cannot issue a mandate that the State should commit illegality or pass wrong order because in another case such an illegality has been committed or wrong order has been passed. If any illegality or irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court or of this Court and seek a direction that the same irregularity or illegality be committed in their favour by the State or its agencies/instrumentalities. In other words, Article 14 cannot be invoked for perpetuating irregularities or illegalities. In Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [(1995) 1 SCC 745] this Court made a lucid exposition of law on this subject. The facts of that case were that the respondents, who had given the highest bid for 338 sq yd plot in Sector 31-A, Chandigarh defaulted in paying the price in accordance with the terms and conditions of allotment. After giving him opportunity of showing cause, the estate officer cancelled the lease of the plot. The appeal and the revision filed by him were dismissed by the the Chief Commissioner, Chief Administrator and respondent Chandigarh applied for refund of the amount deposited by him. His request was accepted and the entire amount paid by him was refunded. He then filed a petition for review of the order passed by the Chief Commissioner, which was dismissed. However, the officer concerned entertained the second review and directed that the plot be restored to the respondent. The latter did not avail benefit of this unusual order and started litigation by filing writ petition in the High Court, which was dismissed on 18-3-1991. Thereafter, the respondent again approached the estate respectively. Thereafter, 33 officer with the request to settle his case in accordance with the policy of the Government to restore the plots to the defaulters by charging forfeiture amount of 5%. His request was rejected by the estate officer. He then filed another writ petition before the High Court, which was allowed only on the ground that in another case pertaining to Smt Prakash Rani, the Administrator had restored the plot despite dismissal of the writ petition filed by her. While reversing the order of the High Court, this Court observed as under: (Jagjit Singh case [(1995) 1 SCC 745] , SCC pp. 750-51, para 8) to deal with such pleas at a “8. … We are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent Authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent Authority to repeat the to pass another unwarranted order. illegality or (emphasis discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action extraordinary original) The Authority passed 34 must be corrected, if it can be done according to law— indeed, wherever it is possible, the court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law—but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. (emphasis supplied) By refusing to direct the respondent Authority to repeat the illegality, the court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioner's case is similar to the other person's case. But then why examine another person's case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person's case, which other person is not before the case (sic court) nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course—barring exceptional situations—would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme 35 Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world.”

23. The Supreme Court in the case of Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 81 has held as under : “8. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 of the Constitution is not meant to perpetuate illegality or fraud, even by extending the wrong decisions made in other cases. The said provision does not envisage negative equality but has only a positive aspect. Thus, if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some relief/benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such an order does not confer any legal right on others to get the same relief as well. If a wrong is committed in an earlier case, it cannot be perpetuated. Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals or a wrong order has been passed by a judicial forum, others cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality or for passing a similarly wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour of any particular party does not entitle any other party to claim benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even otherwise, Article 14 cannot be stretched too far for otherwise it would make functioning of administration impossible. (Vide Chandigarh Admn. v. Jagjit Singh [(1995) 1 SCC 745 : AIR 1995 SC 705], Anand Buttons Ltd.v. State of Haryana [(2005) 9 SCC 164 : AIR 2005 SC 565] ,K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P.[(2006) 3 SCC 581 : AIR 2006 SC 898] and Fuljit Kaur v. State of Punjab[(2010) 11 SCC 455 : AIR 2010 SC 1937].)” 36

24. Two wrong orders will not result in one correct order. Unless and until the petitioners successfully establish their right, they cannot be extended the benefit of an incorrect order passed in favour of some other persons. Furthermore, the question of regularization is dependent on various factual aspects including the cut-off date, availability of vacancy, qualification etc. Therefore, in the light of the fact that unless and until the petitioners successfully establish their right, they cannot be granted the relief by applying the principle of negative equality, this Court is of the considered opinion that no case is made out warranting interference.

25. Accordingly, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. (G.S. AHLUWALIA) JUDGE HEMANT SARAF 10:33:25 +05'30' HS