AMEER ALI v. STATE OF KERALA

W.P.(C).No.18032/2012: 2 :3. To substantiate his contention that the secondrespondent is an other authority within the meaning ofArticle 12 of the Constitution and thus amenable to the writjurisdiction of this Court, the learned counsel for thepetitioner invited my attention to the provisions of Ext.P2.Section 5 of Ext.P2, provides for the election of OfficeBearers. As per this provision, the District Collector shallbe the ex-officio President and the District Superintendentof Police shall be the ex-officio Vice President. According tohim, the very fact that the District Collector and the DistrictSuperintendent of Police permanently occupied the post ofthe President and Vice President evidences the pervasiveState Control over the affairs of the Association.4. He also contended that the Association is gettinggrant in Aid from the State. Further, it was also submittedthat members of the second respondent are eligible for therelaxation as provided in Section 3(3) of the Arms Act.Counsel also contended that in terms of the provisions of W.P.(C).No.18032/2012: 3 :the Kerala Sports Act, the second respondent is entitled tohave its elected representative as a member of the DistrictSports Council. These facts, according to the learnedcounsel for the petitioner, satisfy the tests laid down by theApex Court to render the second respondent an otherauthority amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court.5. In the judgment in K.S. Sofhi v. Fertilisers &Chemicals Travancore Ltd. and others (1984 KLT 32),this Court examined the requirements for an organization tobe an other authority as contemplated in Article 12 of theConstitution of India and finally the tests were enumeratedthus in the judgment. (a). The entirety or a massive majority of theshare capital in the hands of the Governmentis a penetrating index that it is an instrumentor agent of the Government.(b) “Deep and pervasive” state control is anaffirmative assurance that it is Governmentagency or instrumentality. This can begathered from the following surrounding W.P.(C).No.18032/2012: 4 :circumstances as well:(i) Domination in the composition of theSociety or company by therepresentatives of the Government.(ii) Subjection of the directions of theGovernment for the performance of itsfunctions.(iii) The concurrence or approval of theGovernment for making rules andregulations.(iv) The accounts requiring scrutiny andsatisfaction of the Government.(v) The effective control of the affairs of theSociety/Corporation by the Government.(c) Substantial financial assistance by theGovernment meeting practically the entireexpenditure of the Company gives an addedcolour and flavour of Governmental agency.(d) The public importance of the functions, in itsnature allied to Governmental activity, is alsoyet another vital indication.(e) Monopoly status of the Corporation eitherconferred or protected by the State.(f) Statutory origin of the Corporation/Companymay be the hall mark of “State”, but the W.P.(C).No.18032/2012: 5 :absence of this birth mark need not exclude itfrom the expansive area of 'State' withinArticle 12.6. Clause(b) shows that what is required is deep andpervasive State control over the organisation in question. Inmy view, if the bye laws of an organisation nominates aState Government Official as its office bearer, that by itselfdoes not reflect any deep pervasive State control over theorganisation. Therefore, fact that the District Collector orthe District Superintendent of Police are the President andVice President of the second respondent does not by itselfindicate any deep and pervasive State control. 7. Insofar as the grant in aid allegedly received by thesecond respondent is concerned, reading of the aboveparagraphs show that there should be substantial financialassistance by the Government. In this writ petition, apartfrom a passing statement, there is no materials regardingthe grant in the aid allegedly received by the second W.P.(C).No.18032/2012: 6 :respondent. Therefore, with the materials available, thisCourt is unable to conclude that there is any substantialfinancial assistance from the Government to satisfy one ofthe tests laid down by the Apex Court. Insofar as the ArmsAct are concerned, the provisions of the Act only providedfor certain concessions to the members of the secondrespondent. Similarly, the Kerala Sports Act provides for anelected representative of the second respondent to be amember of the District Sports Council. These do not in anymanner reflect satisfaction of any of the tests enumeratedby this Court in the judgment referred to above. 8. Apart from all these, this very question wasconsidered by the Apex Court in the case of the Institute forConstitutional and Parliamentary Studies in its judgment inTekraj Vasandi alias, K.L.Basandhi v. Union of Indiaand others(AIR 1988 SC 469) where after going throughall the relevant precedents on the subject, the Apex Courtheld that the institute does not answer the tests to be a the W.P.(C).No.18032/2012: 7 :State or an other authority. The principles laid down in thesaid judgment, in my view is a complete answer to thecontentions raised by the petitioner. Therefore, I am of theview that the second respondent cannot be a State or otherauthority to maintain a writ petition. Further, in thejudgment in W.P.(c) No.18253 of 2011, this has also heldthat the Kerala State Rifle Association is not a State or another authority.9. In such circumstances, the writ petition is notmaintainable and it is dismissed. However, this judgment shall be without prejudice tothe contentions raised and the remedies that are availableto the petitioner. Sd/- ANTONY DOMINIC, JUDGEln