Kerala High Court · 2012

MANJULA CHELLUR, Ag.C.J & V.CHITAMBARESH, J.----------------------------------------------W.A.No. 1259 of 2007----------------------------------------------Dated this the 14th day of September, 2012JUDGMENTManjula Chellur, Ag.C.J.Appellant herein is before us, aggrieved by the judgmentdated 8.2.2007 of the learned Single Judge in O.P.No.21071 of2001. A departmental enquiry came to be initiated against theappellant herein for the following misconducts:“i) When the contractor Shri.K.Mohanan approachedyou for submitting his bills dated 01.09.1999 inconnection with the above work, you hadadvised him to meet you after collecting thepayments for his bills from the Company.ii. When the contractor Shri.K.Mohanan met you on15th September, 1999 at about 08.30 hrs., youdemanded a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees tenthousand only) from him as bribe or reward forawarding the contract to him and also assuredhim that if this amount was paid, he would beshown the favour of awarding companycontracts in future also.Iii. On the same day i.e. 15th September, 1999 atabout 12.00 hrs. when the contractor came toyour office room with the amount ofRs.10,000/- demanded by you, you advised him WA.1259/072to proceed to the Company car parking areanear the Company main gate and give thisamount to you over there.iv. You then came to the car parking area andentered in your car (reg.No.KL7 K 727) andreceived the amount of Rs.10,000/- offered byShri.K.Mohanan and immediately thereafteryou drove your car and left the Companypremises.v. The CBI officers then followed your car to yourresidence and recovered the bribe amount ofRs.10,000/- from you which was kept insideyour car.”2. Apart from departmental enquiry, a criminal case alsocame to be registered against him for offences punishable underSections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (forshort, “the P.C Act”). When he was dismissed from service, as hewas found guilty of the misconducts referred above inmaintaining absolute integrity, devotion to duty and also acted ina manner unbecoming of an employee of the Company, heapproached the appellate authority, but was unsuccessful. Similarwas the fate so far as his revision is concerned. 3. Aggrieved by the same, he approached learned SingleJudge, seeking quashing of Exhibits P1, P2, P31, P35, P37, P41and P43. Learned Single Judge, after referring to various WA.1259/073contentions raised by the appellant-petitioner, has gone into eachand every aspect of the contentions and ultimately held that thedepartmental enquiry ending with Exhibit P35 dismissal order wasnot arbitrary and violative of articles 14 and 16 of the Constitutionof India, as the detailed report of enquiry at Exhibit P31 is inaccordance with the procedure, therefore, unacceptable. 4. The departmental enquiry was for the misconducts supra,which violated clauses 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 of the CochinRefineries Limited Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules (for short,“the C.R.L Rules”), which read as under: “6.1.1 maintain absolute integrity; 6.1.2 maintain devlotion to duty; and 6.1.3 do nothing which is unbecoming of an employee.”5. Exhibits P1 and P2 indicate, if the allegations were true, itwould amount to misconduct under clauses 27.3, 27.11 and 27.25of the C.R.L Rules, which read as under:“27.3 Theft, fraud or dishonesty inconnection with Company's businessor property or of property of anotherperson within the premises of theCompany.27.11 Breach of any law applicable to theCompany or any service conductdiscipline and appeal rules orinstructions issued by the Company. WA.1259/07427.25 Offer, acceptance or solicitation byemployee (his family or relatives withthe knowledge of the employee) ofany money, favour or any otherreward for retention in theCompany's service or for any otherspecial consideration.”6. At the time of the disciplinary proceedings against him, hewas admittedly a Manager (Projects) under the first respondent,Cochin Refineries Limited, Ambalamugal. He was placed undersuspension followed by chargesheet and show cause notice atExhibit P2 dated 23.9.1999. In the Original Petition, apart fromseeking quashing of the exhibits mentioned above, he had alsosought for a direction against the respondents to treat theappellant-petitioner as continuing in service, ignoring Exhibits P35and P37 and grant him all benefits including pay, allowances etc.for the entire period. 7. According to learned Senior Counsel appearing for theappellant, the judgment of learned Single Judge is vitiated onmany grounds, both legal and factual. According to the appellant,learned Judge was not justified in considering extraneous matterswhile considering the merits of the case and especially withregard to acquittal of the appellant in the criminal appeal. WA.1259/0758. It is not in dispute that though in the criminal case underthe P.C Act, admittedly, he was convicted for offences punishableunder the P.C Act, but however, under Sections 7 and 13 of theP.C Act, he was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for aperiod of two years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000/- so far asSection 7 is concerned, and similar punishment was indicated sofar as offences punishable under Section 13(2) of the P.C Act.Crl.A.No.474 of 2000 appeal came to be allowed on 6.1.2003setting aside the conviction and sentence ordered against theappellant acquitting him giving benefit of doubt. According tolearned Senior Counsel for the appellant, the learned Judge wasnot justified in holding that the acquittal of the appellant was notclean and honourable acquittal, as the acquittal was based onbenefit of doubt.9. Similarly, according to learned Senior Counsel arguing forappellant, the proceedings initiated in the departmental enquiryby memorandum of charges and the charge sheet framed againstthe appellant before the Special Judge II, C.B.I Court are not oneand the same. Such opinion of learned Single Judge is erroneousand also illogical and perverse. This opinion is on account offailure to examine whether the facts and the misconducts alleged WA.1259/076in both the proceedings are one and the same. So far as thisaspect of the matter, the learned counsel relies upon severaljudgments, especially Capt.M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat GoldMines Ltd. And another [(1999) 3 SCC 679] to contend that inthe absence of considering the judgment in Crl.A.No.474 of 2000,both by the appellate authority and the revisional authority, thoseorders become erroneous, as the dismissal order was passed onlyon Exhibit P31 enquiry report. He relies upon following judgmentsreported in G.M.Tank v. State of Gujarat and others [(2006)5SCC 446), Union of India v. Jayaram (AIR 1960 Madras 325)and Shaik Kasim v. Superintendent of Post Offices (AIR1965 Madras 502). He has also raised a contention that theenquiry report is vitiated for not extending assistance of a legalpractitioner to the appellant in the domestic enquiry. He relies onUnion of India v. Karunakaran Nair (1985 KLT 680) in supportof this contention. According to him, the enquiry is vitiated by nonsupply of documents relied on, as photostat copies were relied onand therefore, the enquiry is vitiated by violation of principles ofnatural justice. He relies on Subarna Bark v. State of Orissaand others (AIR 1976 Orissa 236), State of U.P. v.Shatrughan Lal and another [(1998) SCC 651) and South WA.1259/077Bengal State Transport Corporation v. Sapan Kumar Mitraand others [(2006)6 SCC 584] to substantiate the abovecontentions. 10. As against this, learned counsel for the respondentscontends, memo of charges and show cause notice were issued,as the action of the appellant amounted to misconduct, as heacted in utter violation of C.R.L Rules. So far as non supply ofdocuments or placing reliance on photostat copies, learnedcounsel for the respondents explains that a detailed counteraffidavit was filed and especially paragraphs 14 and 15 of thecounter affidavit refer to the same, which was taken intoconsideration by the learned Single Judge. According to him, nonexamination of all the witnesses has not caused any prejudice tothe appellant and there is no violation of principles of naturaljustice. Further, strenuously argues that the judgment in theCriminal Appeal indicates, it was not an honourable acquittal,therefore, learned Single Judge was justified in denying the reliefs.He relies upon Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. M.G.Vital Rao(2012-I LLJ 320 (SC), State of Haryana and another v. RattanSingh [(1977)2 SCC 491, State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v.Nemi Chand Nalwaya (2011-III LLJ 13 (SC)), Suresh Kumar v. WA.1259/078Travancore Devaswom Board (2006-I LLJ 401) andCommissioner of Police v. Narender Singh [(2006)4 SCC265) so far as the argument how departmental enquiry has to beproceeded, where acquittal in criminal trial was an honourableacquittal and where the acquittal in criminal case was on benefitof doubt. He also relies upon decisions reported in State of U.Pand others v. Ramesh Chandra Mangalik [(2002)3 SCC 443],Chandrama Tewari v. Union of India [(1987) Supp. SCC 518)so far as augment of supply of documents and no prejudice beingcaused for non supply of irrelevant documents and materials. Healso places reliance on Tata Oil Mills Co. v. Its Workers (1964-II LLJ 113) and Tata Engineering and Locomotive CompanyLtd. v. Prasad (1969-II LLJ 799) with regard to summoningwitnesses to substantiate the argument that in a domesticenquiry, the officer holding the enquiry cannot take valid oreffective steps to compel attendance of any witness. Learnedcounsel for the respondents contends that the enquiry officer tookall possible steps to summon the witnesses.11. The arguments of learned Senior Counsel appearing forthe appellant is the departmental enquiry report is vitiated byvirtue of acquittal of the appellant in criminal case as WA.1259/079per Exhibit P39 by this Court. It is seen from the records, whenthe representation at Exhibit P3 was not considered by intimatingthe appellant as per Exhibit P4, the appellant approached thisCourt in O.P.No.26054 of 1999 to drop the departmental enquiryon the ground that a criminal investigation is proceeded againsthim on the same set of facts and allegations. As per Exhibit P5judgment, this Court disposed of the Original Petition directing theappellant to approach the enquiry officer by filing appropriatepetition for stay of the disciplinary proceedings. A representationwas made before the enquiry officer, but the same came to berejected holding, the management would be placing reliance onwitnesses and documents other than those proposed to beexamined and relied on by the CBI in the criminal case. It wasfurther held that the nature of domestic enquiry is entirelydifferent from the allegations made in the criminal case. Again heapproached this Court in O.P.No.29286 of 1999 and by Exhibit P9,the Original Petition came to be dismissed holding that the natureof charges in the criminal case and the nature of charges in thedomestic enquiry were not identical. An appeal, W.A.No.2766 of1999 came to be filed and the same was disposed of by ExhibitP10 judgment holding, domestic enquiry proceedings against the WA.1259/0710appellant-petitioner could continue, but based on domesticenquiry report, no final order could be pronounced till the closureof the proceedings initiated in C.C.No.15 of 1999, on the file of theSpecial Judge II, C.B.I, Ernakulam. With this, so far as the effort ofthe appellant to stall departmental enquiry pending disposal ofthe criminal case against him, reached finality.12. Now the only point that has to be considered is whetherthe acquittal of the appellant by virtue of judgment inCrl.A.No.474 of 2000 would lead to quashing of the enquiryreport, thereby vitiating the dismissal order. The learned Judgeproceeded to hold as under in Crl.A.No.474/2000: “14. On a consideration of the evidence and othercircumstances in this case, I am of the view that theprosecution has not succeeded in proving the guilt of theappellant beyond reasonable doubt. It follows that theappellant is entitled to an acquittal. According to me, thecourt below has not properly considered the broadprobabilities which are brought in evidence. As statedearlier, there are inherent improbabilities andinconsistencies in the case set up by the prosecution.In the result, the order of conviction and sentencepassed against the appellant is set aside. He is found notguilty of the offences and he is acquitted. This appeal isthus allowed.”13. The gist of the decisions relied is as under: Simultaneous WA.1259/0711continuance of criminal proceedings and departmental enquiry,normally can be continued, evidently, as the scope of these twoproceedings is different and are independent of each other. InCapt.M.Paul Anthony's case [(1999) 3 SCC 679] such factswere present. Based on the same set of facts sought to be provedby the same witnesses, there was acquittal of accused byrejecting the prosecution story, therefore, Their Lordships heldthat ex-parte disciplinary enquiry could not be sustained againstthe delinquent. It is settled position, once an employeehonourably acquitted in criminal trial during the pendency ofdepartmental proceedings, finding contrary in the departmentalenquiry, is unjust and unfair. The onus of establishing the guilt ofthe accused is on the prosecution and if it fails to establish theguilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to beacquitted. Their Lordships of the Madras High Court, by dealingwith the words 'honourable acquittal', said, there is no legalsignificance of an expression like 'honourable acquittal', as suchwords do not find a place in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. The gist of the case relied upon by learned SeniorCounsel appearing for the first respondent is as under: As thestandard of proof and scope of two proceedings, i.e., criminal case WA.1259/0712and departmental enquiry are entirely different from each other,acquittal in a criminal case cannot be a ground for holdingdismissal of workman in departmental proceedings. Departmentalenquiry proceeding is not born by strict rules of Evidence Act andit is mainly by fair play and natural justice. If there is no fair playand principles of natural justice violation exists, then, thedepartmental enquiry proceedings can be interfered with, but notfor sufficiency of evidence before the Tribunal. Evidence Act donot apply to domestic enquiry or before Administrative Tribunal.Acquittal of an employee in a criminal case will not have anyeffect of previously concluded domestic enquiry, especially whenthe domestic enquiry is challenged after several years only on theground of acquittal. If disciplinary proceedings are conducted inaccordance with the principles of natural justice and even anacquittal in criminal case on same set of facts could not be aground to interfere with the disciplinary proceedings .15. As already stated above, in the present case, by virtue ofExhibits P5 and P9, similar challenge that there cannot besimultaneous proceedings against the appellant on the same setof facts came to be questioned, but were held against theappellant. Admittedly, though the appellant was convicted by the WA.1259/0713trial court, he came to be acquitted by the High Court in CriminalAppeal. Whether this judgment at Exhibit P39 would come in theway of dismissal of the appellant by virtue of disciplinaryproceedings ? It is well settled that the nature of proceedings in acriminal case is entirely different from the nature of proceedingsin a departmental proceedings. Standard of proof and scope oftwo proceedings are entirely different from each other. In acriminal case, the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyondreasonable doubt, whereas in the departmental enquiry, it isbased on preponderance of probabilities. Strict sophisticated rulesof evidence do not apply to domestic enquiry as long as principlesof natural justice is followed by giving fair opportunity of beingheard to the delinquent. If there is no procedural illegality inholding the domestic enquiry, normally the Courts should resistfrom interfering with the departmental enquiry. Termination ofdepartmental enquiry is not at all based on what happens in acriminal case. The imputations and the charges framed againstthe appellant in the departmental enquiry have to be consideredon its own to arrive at a conclusion whether he is guilty ofmisconduct as per the C.R.L Rules as indicated above. Apparently,in the criminal case, against the appellant, in the opinion of WA.1259/0714learned Judge, the prosecution was not able to establish the guiltof the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It was not a case wherethe acquittal was on account of false prosecution or foistedprosecution against the appellant. As there was insufficiency ofmaterial before the Court in the criminal proceedings, benefit ofdoubt was extended to the appellant. In that view of the matter,respondents' counsel contends that it was not an honourableacquittal, but it was a case of benefit of doubt. Even otherwise,as already stated above, the departmental enquiry was allowed tobe continued but no action to be taken till termination of thecriminal investigation, which is strictly followed by the firstrespondent. Only after completion of the criminal case, adecision in the departmental enquiry was made.16. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion, the firstargument that both the proceedings were on same set of facts,therefore, acquittal in Crl.A.No.474 of 2000 would come to thebenefit of the appellant, has to be rejected. 17. Then coming to the argument of non supply ofdocuments and supply of photostat copies of relevant documentswithout the originals, a detailed counter came to be filed by therespondent Management before learned Single Judge explaining WA.1259/0715the entire circumstances at paragraphs 14 and 15 of the counteraffidavit, which read as under:“14. In answer to the allegations in paragraph 16 it issubmitted that the petitioner requested for theEnglish translation of the Malayalam documents on18.02.2000 and the same were furnished to thepetitioner on 25.2.2000, as can be seen from Ext.P31report of the Enquiry Officer. The examination ofSri.Mohanan started only after this and Sri.Mohananwas cross examined by the petitioner one monththereafter and therefore the petitioner's complaintthat the opportunity given for cross examination wasreduced to an empty formality is incorrect anddenied. With respect o the allegations in paragraph17 it is submitted it is true that Exts.P17 and P18 thepetitioner sought the change f the Enquiry Officer,which were rejected vide letter dated 7.9.2000. Aperusal of these requests itself will show that theattempt of the petitioner was only to stall theprogress of the enquiry and he had no specificgrievance against the conduct of the enquiry or theEnquiry Officer. In answer to the allegation inparagraph 18 it is submitted after initially producinglist of documents, the Presenting Officer decided notto rely on some of them and proceeded with theenquiry relying on the remaining documents.Moreover the petitioner had also objected to relyingon these documents. This does not in any waycontradict the stand of the 4th respondent ascontained in Ext.P11.15. With respect to the allegations in paragraph 19 it issubmitted it is true that the petitioner submitted WA.1259/0716Ext.P19 requesting the Enquiry Officer to requisitionthe documents mentioned therein and the EnquiryOfficer had advised the petitioner to address theDisciplinary Authority for the same. Accordingly thepetitioner submitted his representation dated22.03.2000 to the Disciplinary Authority, a copy ofwhich is produced herewith and marked asExhibit.R1(a) for identification. Ext.P20 is theresponse given by the Disciplinary Authority. As canbe seen from the same, serial Nos.3 to 6 of Ext.R1(a)were produced before the CBI Court on beingsummoned a request made by the petitioner andserial Nos 7,8 and 9 were handed over to the CBI forproduction in Court. In so far as serial Nos. 1 and 12are concerned they were produced in the enquiry on31.03.2000 whereas serial No.2 leave applicationwas not submitted by the petitioner and hence couldnot be produced. Serial No.10 is a non-existingdocument and hence could not be produced. Thiswas informed to the petitioner in the enquiry held on31.0.3.2000. Serial No.11 is the statements recordedby CBI from their prosecution witnesses and thesame was produced by CBI before the CBI Court inthe case against the petitioner. Therefore, theEnquiry Officer or these respondents cannot befaulted for the non-production of the documents,which were not available.”18. Reading of these paragraphs clearly indicate that therelevant documents like FIR, translation of Malayalam documentsetc. were given much prior to the commencement of cross WA.1259/0717examination of one Mr.Mohanan, the person, from whom theaccused said to have received the amount. Therefore, question ofany disability would not arise to the appellant for want oftranslated copies of the documents, i.e., Exhibits P17 and P18.There was also request for change of officer and some of thedocuments sought by the appellant were not relied upon by thePresenting Officer as stated above. The documents at serial Nos.3to 6 of Exhibit R1(a) were produced before CBI Court only at therequest made by the appellant, as those documents weresummoned and handed over to CBI for production in the court.The above material indicates criminal case was proceeded withmuch prior to the domestic enquiry and the copy of thechargesheet was with the appellant. It is not a case where somedocuments were misplaced, but it is a case where relevantdocuments were produced before the CBI Court to the knowledgeof the appellant and he also had copies of those documentsproduced before the Criminal Court. The decisions relied upon bylearned counsel for the appellant so far as photostat copies, i.e.,Subarna Barik v. State (AIR 1976 Orissa 236) and State ofU.P v. Shatrughanlal [(1998)6 SCC 651] have no application tothe facts of the present case, as it is not a case of non supply of WA.1259/0718documents, but supply of photostat copies of documents, whichwere already available before the CBI Court. Copies of documents,which were not relied upon, were not supplied. Hence, there is nojustification in the allegation that the appellant was prejudiced.19. In a departmental enquiry, no doubt, principles ofnatural justice require supply of copies of relevant documents todelinquent. But, to the knowledge of the appellant, if thosedocuments were available before CBI Court, he cannot contendthat there is violation of principles of natural justice. Hence, thisargument is also not available to him. As already stated above,strict compliance of Evidence Act need not be insisted in adomestic enquiry. Concealing the original documents if enquirywas done placing reliance on photostat copies of the documents,it is one thing. Such situation never arose in the present case. 20. The next argument of the appellant is that he was notgiven assistance of a legal practitioner to defend him. Clause29.2.1 of the C.R.L Rules does not envisage sanction of legalassistance as a right. Clause 29.2.1 of the C.R.L Rules reads asfollows:“29.2.1 An employee against whom an enquiry is tobe held will be given a Chargehseet clearly setting forth thecircumstances appearing against him and will be given an WA.1259/0719opportunity to explain the reasons to be recorded in writingby the person holding enquiry. The employee will bepermitted to produce witnesses in his defence, and tocross-examine any witness on whose evidence the chargesrest. He will be given an opportunity to answer the chargesand permitted to be defended only by himself or by a fellowemployee of the Company. Where the Company hasappointed a person for holding an enquiry into the charge,it may, by an order, appoint any Public Servant or a Legalpractitioner to be known as “Presenting Officer” to present,on Company's behalf, the case in respect of the chargealleged against the employee. The employee concernedmay take the assistance of a fellow employee to presentthe case on his behalf, unless the “Presenting Officer” ofthe Company is a legal practitioner; or the Company havingregard to the circumstances of the case, so permits.Employees not involved in the enquiry will not normally beallowed to attend. A concise summary of the evidence onboth sides and employee's plea shall be recorded.”21. The Presenting Officer was not a legally equippedperson, therefore, there was no occasion for providing such legalassistance. Hence, the enquiry officer was justified in decliningsuch request. It is very clear from clause 29.2.1 extracted above,under what circumstances, assistance of a legal practitioner couldbe given. In the absence of circumstances warranting suchsituation, the appellant has no ground to contend that denial oflegal assistance is also violation of principles of natural justice.From the records it is seen, several steps were taken by the WA.1259/0720enquiry officer to examine some witnesses. If such effort of theenquiry officer was not fruitful, the appellant cannot blame theprocedure. Nothing prevented the appellant to secure theirpresence, if any of the witnesses relied upon by him were toassist his defence. In the absence of such effort, all efforts madeby the enquiry officer to secure presence of witnesses would showthere was no denial of any right in favour of the appellant.Similarly, it is also noticed from the records, several documents,which were not within the reach of the enquiry officer, were saidto be summoned. Unless the appellant is able to convince thecourt how these documents would assist him in substantiating hisdefence, we cannot opine there was violation of principles ofnatural justice to him. Same principle would apply to summoningwitnesses. 22. In the present case, the very nature of charges wouldindicate that `10,000/-was demanded by the appellant fromMr.Mohanan and the same came to be accepted by him. Narrationof the facts would indicate, the witnesses along with CBI officerwere observing how Mr.Mohanan approached the delinquent andhow he followed the directions of the delinquent. On confirming thatMr.Mohanan had brought money, the appellant went inside the WA.1259/0721office asking Mr.Mohanan to wait outside. The delinquent cameout of his cabin and proceeded towards the car parking areafollowed by Mr.Mohanan. After reaching the car, he sat behind thesteering wheel and opened the left side door and received themoney from left side of the car. This was noticed by witnesseswho are examined before the enquiry officer. They actually sawMr.Mohanan taking out the money from his pocket and handingover the same to the appellant. Immediately after receiving themoney, the appellant left the place. Though Mr.Mohanan couldgive signal to the CBI officers as agreed earlier, on account of thetraffic, they could not go right behind the car of the appellant.However, as there was strike in the canteen of the KochiRefineries Limited, thinking that the appellant must have gone tohis home, the raiding party went to the residence of the appellantand found the car of the appellant was parked outside the house.But the door was locked with the glasses raised up. The evidenceon record indicates, they made personal search of the appellantas well as the residence and they were not able to find themoney. Though on enquiry, receipt of money was denied by theappellant initially, he came out later with the statement, it wastaken as a loan for the purchase of tyres for his car. Hand wash of WA.1259/0722the appellant in accordance with the procedure disclosedpresence of phenolphthalein powder. It was at the instance of theappellant, they went near the car and on the appellant openingthe car, they found the money wrapped in a towel kept in the leftfront seat of the car. Identity of the notes was confirmed. This isthe procedure followed by the raiding party. In the absence of anyprocedural lapses so far as departmental enquiry, thedepartmental enquiry having been conducted in accordance withthe C.R.L procedure there is no violation of principles of naturaljustice. The disciplinary authority proceeded to consider thematerial on record and the entire material placed on record pointsout misconducts committed by the appellant based onpreponderance of probabilities, which attracts the general rulesindicating violation of maintaining absolute integrity, devotion toduty and doing action, which is unbecoming of an employee.Similarly, the dishonest intention of the appellant in connectionwith the business of the Company is also a misconduct asindicated at clause 27.3 of the C.R.L Rules. Clause 27.11 is alsoapplicable to the facts of the present case. Clause 27.25 refers toacceptance or solicitation by employee of any money, favour orany other reward for retention in the Company's service or for any WA.1259/0723other special consideration. The very acceptance of money todischarge his official duty as Manager of the Company wouldattract the above provisions. 23. Having regard to the nature of charges alleged andproved, we are of the opinion, the dismissal of the appellant fromservice is justified. Normally, the punishment imposed shall not beinterfered with by the Courts, unless it is shockinglydisproportionate to the alleged misconduct. Since the misconductalleged in this case is of very grave nature, we are of the opinion,the dismissal order is justifiable.In view of the above reasoning, we are of the opinion, thereare no circumstances warranting interference with the judgmentof the learned Single Judge either on legal aspects or on factualcircumstances. Accordingly, the Writ Appeal is dismissed. MANJULA CHELLUR, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE V.CHITAMBARESH, JUDGEvgs