(BY SRI. PRAVEEN K.UPPAR, AGA) v. The Appellate Authority shall afford reasonable

(BY SRI. PRAVEEN K.UPPAR, AGA) …PETITIONER …RESPONDENTS THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO ISSUE A WRIT OF CERTIORARI OR A DIRECTION IN THE NATURE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI QUASHING THE APPEAL ORDER DATED 01.06.2023 IN APPEAL NO. KVAT/AP-49/2022-23 PASSED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR 2011-12 UNDER KVAT ACT (ANNEXURE- G) IN THE PETITIONERS CASE; AND ETC. MANJANNA E MANJANNA E Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA DHARWAD BENCH +0530 - 2 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2021 WP No. 103984 of 2025 HC-KAR THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY ORDER THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: THE HON'BLE MRS JUSTICE K.S.HEMALEKHA ORAL ORDER The petitioner has approached this court calling in question the appellate order dated 01.06.2023, passed by the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Davanagere, whereby, the appeal filed under Section 62 of the Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (‘Act’ for short), came to be rejected at the threshold on the ground without entering upon the merits of the matter. Brief facts:

The petitioner is a registered dealer under the provisions of Act. Proceeding for assessment year 2011-12 culminated in an endorsement dated 05.04.2022, pursuant to rectification proceedings under Section 69 of the Act, raising a demand towards alleged excess refund along with interest and penalty.

Aggrieved by the said endorsement, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 62 of the Act before the - 3 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2021 WP No. 103984 of 2025 HC-KAR First Appellate Authority, the First Appellate Authority by order dated 01.06.2023, rejected the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the prescribed period of 30 days and held that the appeal was not admissible. Assailing the said order the present writ petition is filed.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Appellate Authority committed a jurisdictional error rejecting the appeal mechanically on limitation. Though there was a short delay about 50 days, the same was well within the condonable period contemplated under Section 62(3) of the Act. It is contended that the Appellate Authority failed to exercise the discretion vested in it under the statute and did not afford an opportunity to the petitioner to explain the delay. The impugned order defeats the statutory right of appeal and contrary to the settled principles governing condonation of delay.

Learned AGA supports the impugned order and contends that the filing of the appeal within 30 days is mandatory. The petitioner did not satisfactorily explain the - 4 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2021 WP No. 103984 of 2025 HC-KAR delay and the Appellate Authority was justified in rejecting the appeal as barred by time.

This Court has carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the material on record. The point that arises for consideration is “Whether the Appellate Authority was justified in rejecting the appeal solely on the ground of limitation, without considering the delay was condonable?”

The scheme of Section 62 of the Act makes it abundantly clear that while an appeal is ordinarily required to filed within 30 days, the statute itself confers a discretionary power upon the Appellate Authority to admit an appeal beyond the said period subject to the outer limit prescribed and upon being satisfied that the sufficient cause exists.

In the present case, the records disclose that the delay in filing the appeal was about 50 days beyond the prescribed period. Such marginal delay squarely falls within - 5 - NC: 2026:KHC-D:2021 WP No. 103984 of 2025 HC-KAR the condonable zone envisaged under the proviso to Section 62(3) of the Act. The Appellate Authority instead of examining whether sufficient cause was made out and whether the delay deserved to be condoned, has proceeded to reject the appeal at the threshold as not maintainable. This approach in the considered view of this Court amounts to a failure to exercise jurisdiction vested by law.

It is well settled that statutory appellate remedies should not be defeated on hyper technical grounds, particularly when the statute itself enables condonation and the delay is neither inordinate nor unexplained. The impugned order does not reflect any application of mind to the statutory provision enabling condonation, nor does it record reason as to why such discretion ought not to have been exercised. Therefore, rejection of the appeal on the ground of limitation cannot be sustained.