SRI. NARASIMHAIAH v. EQUITY AND ETC

Legal Reasoning

2. We have heard Shri. Sunil S. Rao for Shri. T. Sheshagiri Rao, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, and Smt. Pramodhini Kishan, learned Additional Government Advocate appearing for respondents No.1 and 2, and Shri. Chandan, learned counsel and Shri. Abhishek Patil, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.4.

3. It is submitted by the learned counsel appearing

Decision

for the appellant that the writ petition filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Rural District, dated 12.11.2021 has been dismissed on the short ground that his application under Section 5 of the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, ('PTCL Act' for short) was filed belatedly and therefore, it - 4 need not be considered. It is submitted that the finding that the appellant had slept over his rights for a period of twelve years and that the cases covered by the judgments of the Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka and Another1 and Vivek M. Hinduja Vs. M. Aswatha2, is completely misconceived.

4. It is submitted that the PTCL Act is a piece of beneficial legislation, which is intended to check exploitation the vulnerable backward classes and that an interpretation which is beneficial to the original grantee, who belong to a backward class is to be adopted by this Court.

5. It is further submitted that a transfer or an alienation of a granted land, without prior permission of the Government, is null and void. It is therefore contended that Section 5 of the PTCL Act provides only the consequences of nullity, which is declared under Section 4(2) of the PTCL Act and that the transaction being totally void, the sale deed could not have resulted in passing of title and rejection of 1 (2020) 14 SCC 232 2 (2019) 1 Kant LJ 819 SC - 5 application filed under Section 5 of the PTCL Act on the ground that it is belated, was completely unwarranted.

6. Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on several judgments of this Court as well as the Apex Court in support of his contentions. • • • • • • • A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak and Another reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602; U.P. State Electricity Board v. Pooran Chandra Pandey and Others reported (2007) SCC 92; Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala and Another reported in (2000) 6 SCC 359; State of Rajasthan and Others v. D.R Laxmi and Others reported in (1996) 6 SCC 445; B.K. Muniraju v. State of Karnataka and Others reported in (2008) 4 SCC 451; Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi (3) and Others reported in (2006) 4 SCC 1; Mamleshwar Prasad and Another v. Kanhaiya Lal (DEAD) Through Lrs reported in (1975) 2 SCC 232; - 6 • • • • • • • • • • U.P. Jal Nigam and Others v. Prabhat Chandra Jain and Others reported in (1996) 2 SCC 363; V. Kishan Rao v. Nikhil Super Speciality Hospital and Another reported in (2010) 5 SCC 513; Union of India and Another v. Major Bahadur Singh reported in (2006) 1 SCC 368; Guntaiah and Others v. Hambamma and Others reported in (2005) 6 SCC 228; Official Liquidator v. Dayanand and Others reported in (2008) 10 SCC 1; Pyare Mohan Lal v. State of Jharkhand and Others reported in (2010) 10 SCC 693; Shanker Raju v. Union of India reported in (2011) 2 SCC 132; U.P. State Brassware Corporation Limited and Another v. Uday Narain Pandey reported in (2006) 1 SCC 479; State of Uttar Pradesh and Another v. Synthetics and Chemicals Limited and Another reported in (1991) 4 SCC 139; Bhadrappa (Dead) By LRs v. Tolacha Naik reported in (2008) 2 SCC 104; - 7 • • • • • • • • • • Union of India and Another v. Raghubir Singh (Dead) by LRs. ETC reported in (1989) 2 SCC 754. Chinde Gowda v. Puttamma reported (2007) 12 SCC 618; Krishena Kumar v. Union of India and Others reported in (1990) 4 SCC 207; Santoshkumar Shivgonda Patil and Others v. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Others reported in (2009) 9 SCC 352; K.T. Huchegowda v. Deputy Commissioner and Others reported in (1994) 3 SCC 536; State of Gujarat v. Patil Raghav Natha and Others reported in (1969) 2 SCC 187; Waman Rao and Others v. Union of India and Others reported in (1981) 2 SCC 362; Hemaji Waghaji Jat v. Bhikhabhai Khengarbhai Harijan and Others reported in (2009) 16 SCC 517; T. Anjanappa and Others v. Somallingappa and Another reported in (2006) 7 SCC 570; G. Krishnareddy v. Sajjappa (Dead) by LRs. and Another reported in (2011) 13 SCC 226; - 8 • • • • • • • • • • Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v. Fatmabai Ibrahim reported in (1997) 6 SCC 71; Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India and Others reported in (2004) 10 SCC 779; Central Bureau of Investigation v. Keshub Mahindra and Others reported in (2011) 6 SCC 216; Harishchandra Hegde v. State of Karnataka and Others reported in (2004) 9 SCC 780; R. Chandevarappa and Others v. State of Karnataka and Others reported in (1995) 6 SCC 309; Gaya Prasad Dikshit v. Dr. Nirmal Chander and Another reported in (1984) 2 SCC 286; A.R. Antualy v. R.S. Nayak and Another reported in (1988) 2 SCC 602; Thakur Kishan Singh (Dead) v. Arvind Kumar reported in (1994) 6 SCC 591; G.M. Venkatareddy and ANR v. The Deputy Commissioner, Kolar District and Others reported in ILR (2012) KAR 3168; Asha John Divianathan v. Vikram Malhotra and Others reported in (2021) 1 SCR 953. - 9

7. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3, on the other hand, submits that the grant is of the year 1960 and the first sale made in the year 1996 is by the appellant himself and his brother. An order of conversion was granted on 12.08.1997 and further sales were effected in the year 2007. It is only after lapse of 12 long years and after the first sale took place in 1996, that the application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act is filed by the petitioner himself. It is submitted that petitioner's brother who was also a party to the first sale deed has not chosen to file any application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act.

8. It is further contended that the Apex Court in Nekkanti Rama Lakshmi (supra) has specifically considered the question of delay and has held that the remedy under Section 5 is available only if it is availed within some reasonable time and a belated application under Section 5 cannot be entertained. It is specifically held in paragraph 8 of the said judgment as follows; "8. However, the question that arises is with regard to terms of Section 5 of the Act which enables any interested - 10 person to make an application for having the transfer annulled as void under Section 4 of the Act. This section does not prescribe any period within which such an application can be made. Neither does it prescribe the period within which suo motu action may be taken. This Court in Chhedi Lal Yadav v. Hari Kishore Yadav, and also in Ningappa v. Commr., reiterated a settled position in law that whether statute provided for a period of limitation, provisions of the statute must be invoked within a reasonable time. It is held that action whether on an application of the parties, or suo motu, must be taken within a reasonable time. That action arose under the provisions of a similar Act which provided for restoration of certain lands to farmers which were sold for arrears of rent or from which they were ejected for arrears of land from 1-1-1939 to 31-12-1950. This relief was granted to the farmers due to flood in Kosi River which make agricultural operations impossible. An application for restoration was made after 24 years and was allowed. It is in that background this Court upheld it was unreasonable to do so. We have no hesitation in upholding that the present application for restoration of land made by respondent Rajappa was made after an unreasonably long period and was liable to be dismissed on that ground. Accordingly, the judgments of the Karnataka High Court, namely, R. Rudrappa v. Commr., Maddurappa v. State of Karnataka and G. Maregouda v. Commr. holding that there is no limitation provided by Section 5 of the Act and, therefore, an application can be made at any time, are overruled. Order accordingly." - 11

9. Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Smt. M. Manjula & Ors. Vs. The Deputy Commissioner & Ors3. This Court considered the question of delay in making the application under Section 5 of PTCL Act and the judgments of the Apex Court, and has specifically held that even when no period of limitation is provided under the statute, the application has to be preferred within a reasonable time, failing which, laches could be presumed as against the applicant. The implication of the amendment dated 27.07.2023, by which, sub clauses (c) and (d) were inserted in Section 5 has also been considered by the Bench in W.A.No.210/2023. After considering all these aspects, it was held that an application for restoration filed after 12 years of the initial alienation, cannot be allowed and that it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to grant any relief to the original grantee by permitting restoration of the land after 12 years and it was specifically held as follows; 3 W.A. No.210/2023 - 12 "6. In light of the above discussion and the position of law that would emerge, in the facts of the case, the restoration of the land cannot be permitted after 12 years. The question of laches would come into play. 12 years having been passed, it would be highly unreasonable, unjust and inequitable, as well as against law to grant any relief to the original grantee-the petitioner-appellant, permitting restoration of the land and to treat the transfer of the land taken place long back to be null and void."

10. Though exhaustive arguments have been raised by the learned counsel for the appellant on the principles of law, we are of the opinion that in facts of the instant case, it stands squarely covered by the judgment of the Co-equal Bench of this Court and we are in respectful agreement with the views expressed therein.

11. The appellant himself was a party to the sale deed dated 17.04.1996. The vendors were the appellant and his brother. After 12 long years, the application under Section 5 of the PTCL Act has been preferred by the appellant alone. No tangible reason for the long delay of 12 years is available in this instant case. We are therefore of the view that the application filed by the appellant was hit - 13 by laches and the order of the learned Single Judge declining interference in the order of the Deputy Commissioner was therefore, completely just and proper. We find no good grounds to interfere with the order passed by the learned Single Judge in this intra-Court appeal. The appeal fails and same is accordingly, dismissed. All pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. Sd/- (ANU SIVARAMAN) JUDGE Sd/- (DR. K.MANMADHA RAO) JUDGE PN