SRI KISHAN v. TITIONER

Judgment

1. The Petitione ioner is before the Court seeking fo g for the following relie reliefs: a) Issue Mandamu petitione order pa Sukhdev Delhi & 2025) pr re of sue a writ, order or direction in the nature o amus to the respondent No.3 to release the oner from prison forthwith, in view of the t in passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in T of dev Yadav @ Pehalwan v/s State of NCT o 1 of & Others in Criminal Appeal No. 3271 o ) produced as Annexure-C. b) Pass s the facts as to cos ss such other order/s directions considering acts and circumstances of the case togethe costs in the interest of justice. 3 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

2. The petition itioner was convicted for the off offences punishable un le under Section 302, 364A of Indian ian Penal Code and nd awarded death sentence in SC No.463/2003 003 by the IV Additional City Civil Civil and Sessions Cou Court, Mayo Hall Unit, Bengaluru. luru. A challenge havi having been made, this Court in Cri Criminal Appeal No.11 o.1197/2008 vide judgment dated 6.6.

6.6.2013 modified the the death sentence to life imprisonm sonment. The said mod modified order reads as under:- “On thor that the rarest of gruesom been mu does not calls for sentence accused imprisonm thorough consideration of the facts, we fin f the the case does not appears to be one of th is a t of rare case. It may be fact that it is ome murder and two innocent children hav murdered. But none the less, the murde not appear to be rarest of rare case, whic for death sentence. Accordingly, the deat d and nce awarded by the trial court is modified an ed nos.1 sonment. to 3 are sentenced It is furth not be fourteen routine. sentence Section 5 appeals a further directed that accused nos.1 to 3 sha be given commutation after completion o een years of imprisonment as a matter o ne. The accused have to serve the lif nce and they should be in jail in terms o on 57 of IPC. Accordingly, the reference an als are disposed of.” n of er of s of e and

3. The petitione tioner claims to have undergone tw e twenty years of actu actual imprisonment as on 15.1.2025.

025. His conduct bein being satisfactory and there being eing no adverse repo eport as per the Imprisonment Certi ertificate dated 15.1.2 .1.2025, the petitioner claims that at he is entitled to pre premature release. 4 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

4. Sri.Pradeep P ep Patil/Sri.Prathap S.S., learned co counsel for the petit petitioner in this regard relies upon upon the decision of t of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the ca case of Sukhdev Yad Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State of (N (NCT of Delhi) & ot others1more particularly Paras 3.2

3.2, 15,

15.1, 15.2, 1 2, 15.3, 15.4 and 16, which are reprod produced hereunder for r for easy reference: completion

3.2. The 17.02.200 Kavi Nag Section (hereinaft Smt. Nila deceased. investigat and Visha offences Section 3 Additional Court”). T imprisonm under Sec of fine, to They wer years and under Sec fine, to u and rigoro 10,000/- of payme three mon t on The relevant facts of the case are that o t P.S. .2002, FIR No. 192/2002 was registered at P.S Nagar, District Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh und 1860 364/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 186 ed by nafter, “IPC”) on the basis of a complaint filed b f the Nilam Katara i.e. complainant and mother of th n of sed. On 28.05.2008, after Yadav igation and trial, his co-convicts – Vikas Yada on of shal Yadav – were convicted for commission es under Sections 302, 364, 201 read wit y the n 34 of the IPC in SC No. 78/2002 by th onal Sessions Judge (01), New Delhi, (“Session o life ”). Thereafter, they were sentenced to undergo li onment as well as fine of Rs. 1,00,000/- eac Section 302 of the IPC and in default of paymen year. e, to undergo simple imprisonment for one yea r ten were sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for te iction and fine of Rs. 50,000/- each for their convictio ent of Section 364/34 IPC and in default of payment nths, to undergo simple imprisonment of six month of Rs. gorous imprisonment for five years and fine of R efault - each under Section 201/34 IPC and in defau nt for yment of fine, to undergo simple imprisonment fo tly. months. All sentences were to run concurrently.

15. The inter alia, he sentence imposed on the appellant herei lia, is recapitulated as under: erein, “Life impr imprisonm fine of Rs. imprisonment which shall be 20 years of actu onment without consideration of remission, an f Rs. 10,000/-.” actual , and The wor imprisonm “life “li onment”, is an interrogative pronoun, relate “which” used after the words 1Criminal Appeal No.327 3271/2025 dated 29.7.2025 5 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR pronoun previously further in imprisonm actual im twenty y during hi i.e., after 433A of t period o whatsoev make an sentence 15.1. In by Vikas Y 1530 of 2 appellant sentence questione sentence be found State of U 84 of its j Court ob paramete terms sen referring to somethin un and determiner, usly mentioned when introducing a clause givin information. Therefore, the sentence of li onment is determined as twenty years which is l imprisonment. Further, during the period y years, the appellant cannot seek remissio his sentence of twenty years of imprisonmen ter completion of fourteen years as per Sectio of the CrPC but must continue his sentence for remissio twenty years without any oever. Therefore, the appellant has no right any application for remission of the abov nce for a period of twenty years. giving f life is of d of ission ection for a ission ht to In Criminal Appeal Nos. 1531-1533 of 2015 file as Yadav as well as in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1528 1528- y the of 2015 which also included the appeal filed by th lant herein, the imposition of a fixed ter s also nce on the appellants by the High Court was als rm of ioned but this Court observed that such a term ld not nce on the appellants by the High Court could n gh v. nd fault with. Placing reliance on Gopal Singh of Uttarakhand, (2013) 7 SCC 545, at paragrap l, this its judgment in the aforesaid criminal appeal, th observed the aforesa eters, we reiterate that the imposition of fixe sentence is justified.” “Judged on

15.2. In imprisonm imprisonm Soon afte our view, jail provid appellant applicatio completio reason th years of period of any remis of the twe unnecessa sentence imprisonm other han responden contended which wa appellant e life In the instant case, as already noted, the li actual onment twenty ssion. onment was without consideration of remissio ed, in after the period of twenty years is completed, iew, the appellant has to be simply released fro rovided the other sentences run concurrently. Th . The e an lant is not under an obligation to make a e on ation seeking remission of his sentence o r the letion of twenty years. This is simply for th n that the appellant has completed his twen g the of actual imprisonment and in fact, during th led to of twenty years, the appellant was not entitled t letion mission. Thus, in the instant case, on completio twenty years’ of actual imprisonment, it is whol of his essary for the appellant to seek remission of h a life nce on the premise that his sentence is a li n the onment i.e. till the end of his natural life. On th r the hand, learned senior counsel appearing for th ndent-State respondent-complainan over, nded that once the period of twenty years is ove , the was without any consideration of remission, th (life lant had to seek remission of his sentence (li 6 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR imprisonm Sentence accordanc whether appellant cannot be onment) by making an application nce Review Board which would consider ance with the applicable policy and decid er the remission of sentence imposed on th lant has to be granted or not. Such a contentio t be accepted for the following reasons: (i) firstly, life impris actual im completed tly, because, in the instant case, the sentence prisonment has been fixed to be twenty years l imprisonment which the appellant herein ha leted; ce of ars of (ii) secon appellant condly, during the period of twenty years th s the lant was not entitled to seek any remission; and hirdly, on completion of twenty years of actu ed. onment, the appellant is entitled to be released. This is because in this case, instead of grantin penalty, alternative penalty of life imprisonmen een awarded which shall be for a period of twen of actual imprisonment. That even in the absenc of a th penalty being imposed, life imprisonment of ch is term of twenty years was imposed which . The le only for a High Court or this Court to do so. Th ch as of twenty years is without remission inasmuch a f his ppellant is denied the right of remission of h ection nce on completion of fourteen years as per Sectio ead with Section 433-A of the CrPC. Such a righ s not een denied by the High Court but that does n s of ion of d life ife. If it in t has n of for a in its (iii) third imprisonm 15.3. Thi death pen has been years of a of death p fixed term possible o period of the appel sentence 432 read has been that on completion of imprisonm his senten imprisonm that was those ter imposed l of actua remission period of actual im meaning a onment the appellant has to still seek reduction ntence on the premise that he was awarded li onment which is till the end of his natural life. as so, the High Court would have specified it terms. On the other hand, the High Court ha ed life imprisonment which shall be twenty yea sion. The High Court was of the view that for of twenty years, the appellant has to underg l imprisonment which would not take within i ing any period granted for parole or furlough. imprisonment without consideration twenty years

15.4. In twenty ye on 09.03. is so, it w his perio aforesaid completio In the instant case, the actual imprisonment y years was admittedly completed by the appellan .03.2025 which was without any remission. If th it would imply that the appellant has complete eriod of sentence. In fact, the award of th aid sentence was also confirmed by this Court. O letion of twenty years of actual imprisonment o nt of ellant f that f the rt. On nt on 7 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

09.03.202 The relea upon furt released o granted to fact, the S over wha sentence this Court the appel other han for furlou thereafter 25.06.202 then, pen made by sentence incarcerat was illega to have b the sente affirmed b .2025, the appellant was entitled to be release elease of the appellant from jail does not depen further consideration as to whether he has to b ed or not and as to whether remission has to b d to him or not by the Sentence Review Board. I he Sentence Review Board cannot sit in judgmen what has been judicially determined as th nce by the High Court which has been affirmed b ourt. There cannot be any further incarceration ppellant herein from 09.03.2025 onwards. On th hand, in the instant case, the appellant’s praye rlough was refused by the High Court an furlough only o ter, .2025 as he had completed his actual sentence b pending consideration of the amended praye by the appellant herein on completion of h nce on 09.03.2025. Therefore, the continuou eration of the appellant from 09.03.2025 onward legal. In fact, on 10.03.2025, the appellant ough e been released from prison as he had complete entence imposed on him by the High Court a ed by this Court. ased. to be to be rd. In ed by ion of n the and, ce by f his rt as this Court granted

16. A co Registry o States/Un accused/c of senten such accu y the copy of this order shall be circulated by th of the ry of this Court to all the Home Secretaries of th /Union Territories to ascertain whether an ed/convict has remained in jail beyond the perio se of tence and if so, to issue directions for release ase. ccused/convicts, if not wanted in any other case.

4.1. By relyi relying on Sukhdev Yadav @ Pehal ehalwan, learned ned counsel submits that where a sen sentence of life im fe imprisonment is specified to mean a n a fixed term of of actual imprisonment without remis emission, the con convict becomes entitled to be rele released immedia ediately upon completion of the said p id period of actua ctual imprisonment, and such release ase does not dep depend upon any further consideratio ration by the Sen Sentence Review Board or the gra grant of 8 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR remissio ission by the State. He would ther therefore contend end that once the period of sen sentence imposed osed by the Court has been undergo ergone, any continued incarceration w on would be illeg illegal, as held by the Hon’ble Sup Supreme Court in rt in the aforesaid decision.

4.2. He relie elies on Section 57 of the IPC, which ich reads as unde nder:

57. Fra calculatin imprisonm equivalen Fractions of terms of punishment.— lating fractions of terms of punishmen sonment life shall be reckoned a alent to imprisonment for twenty years. —In ent, d as

4.3. Placing ing reliance on the aforesaid provi provision, learned ned counsel submits that life imprison isonment is to be be reckoned as equivalent to twenty nty years of impri mprisonment, and therefore a convict vict who has bee been sentenced to life imprisonment w nt would be entit entitled to be released upon completi pletion of twenty nty years of imprisonment. It is fu s further contend ended that unless a specific mini minimum period od of incarceration is prescribed in d in the r of conviction, a sentence of imprison risonment must be understood as as being satisfied sfied upon completion of twenty yea years of imprison risonment. On that premise, it is subm ubmitted 9 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR that the the petitioner having completed the the said period o od of incarceration, the continued dete detention is illegal egal and the present petition deserves ves to be ed. allowed.

5. Sri.Pradeep ep C.S., learned Additional Advo Advocate General would ould submit that:

5.1. The inte interpretation sought to be placed b d by the petitione tioner on the operative portion of of the judgmen ment passed in the aforesaid Cri Criminal Appeal eal is wholly misconceived. The petit petitioner was or originally convicted and sentence nced to death, w th, which, in appeal, came to be comm ommuted to life ife imprisonment. The mere referen rence to Section tion 57 of the Indian Penal Code in e in the judgmen ment does not mean that the senten ntence of life imp imprisonment is restricted to a peri period of twenty nty years. A sentence of life imprison isonment ordinari narily means imprisonment remaind ainder of the natural life of the co convict, unless s ss specifically limited by the Court.

5.2. He woul would further submit that it is only in y in cases re the conditions governing prem remature release ase or remission are satisfied that a co a convict may be be released before completion of the e the entire life term term. Normally, a convict becomes el s eligible 10 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR to seek seek premature release after under dergoing fourteen teen years of actual imprisonm sonment. Howeve ever, in the present case, as this Cour Court has made re e reference to Section 57 of the IPC IPC, the petitione tioner would not even be entitled to to seek prematu ature release until completion of tw f twenty years of rs of imprisonment.

5.3. Learned ned Additional Advocate General w al would further her contend that the reliance placed b d by the petitione tioner on the decision of the Ho Hon’ble Suprem reme Court in Sukhdev Yadav misplace laced. In the said case, the Court ourt had specifica ifically sentence imprison risonment to mean twenty years of a of actual imprison risonment without remission, and it w it was on the bas basis of such a judicial determination tion that the Ho Hon’ble Supreme Court held that that the sentenc ence stood completed upon the co convict undergo ergoing twenty actual a imprison risonment.

5.4. In the the present case, however, the sen sentence imposed osed is simple life imprisonment wi t without any jud judicial restriction limiting it to tw o twenty years. S rs. Such a restriction cannot be read read into the judg judgment merely by referring to Sectio ection 57 11 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR of the I he IPC. According to the learned Addi dditional Advocat ocate General, any such interpret pretation ld be erroneous and would defeat feat the purpose ose of sentencing.

5.5. He wou would further submit that while consid nsidering question stions relating to sentence and release ease, the Court m rt must have regard not only to the r he rights of the c he convict, but also to the interests o ts of the victim a im and the society at large. A senten ntence of life impr imprisonment must therefore be under derstood ordinary sense, namely, imprison risonment for the remainder of the na e natural life of t of the convict, unless expressly limite ited by the Cou Court.

5.6. Learned ned Additional Advocate General reite reiterates that Sec Section 57 of the IPC merely provides vides that for the p the purpose of calculating fractions of t of terms of pun punishment, life imprisonment may may be reckone oned as equivalent to twenty years. ars. The said pro provision does not determine the a he actual duration tion of a sentence of life imprisonmen ent, nor does it s it mandate the release of a convict vict after complet pletion of twenty years.

5.7. He further submits that the questio stion of remissio ission or premature release falls en entirely 12 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR within the domain of the approp propriate Governm ernment, in exercise of its powers u rs under Section tion 473 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Sura Suraksha Sanhita, hita, 2023 (earlier Section 432 of the the Code of Crimi riminal Procedure). Therefore, Section tion 57 of the IPC IPC cannot be invoked to restrict or t or alter the peri period of a sentence of life imprisonme nment.

5.8. He relie relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble ’ble Apex Court in rt in the case of Gopal Vinayk Gods odse vs. State o te of Maharashtra and others2, , more particula icularly Paras 8 and 9 which are reprod produced hereund under for easy reference:

8. Brie 26 of be un impris After t in the impris senten author Penal prison law to framed to ear the sa out th life is is only life or one of do no possib

Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before Ac of 1955 a sentence of transportation for life cou undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorou prisonment for life in a designated prison in Indi ter the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt wit the same manner as one sentenced to rigorou prisonment for the same term. Unless the sa ntence is commuted or remitted by appropria thority under the relevant provisions of the India nal Code or the Code of Criminal Procedure, isoner sentenced to life imprisonment is bound to serve the life, term in prison. The rule med under the Prisons Act enable such a prisone earn remissions- ordinary, special and State-an e said remissions will be given credit towards h rm of imprisonment. For the purpose of workin t the remissions the sentence of transportation fo is ordinarily equated with a definite period, but only for that particular purpose and not for an her purpose. As the sentence of transportation fo or its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment, e of indefinite duration, the remissions so earne not in practice help such a convict as it is n ssible to predicate the time of his death. That e Act India. t with priate , a nd in s his on for but it r any n for nt, is is not hat is 21961 SCC OnLine SC 70 C 70 13 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR why th approp Sectio consid period remiss approp admitt Code entire petitio 9. The that if at the that t that h earned service as wel Gover not ex le the y the rules provide for a procedure to enable th propriate Government to remit the sentence unde on a ction 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure on g the nsideration of the relevant factors, including th n of riod of remissions earned. The question f the mission is exclusively within the province of th it is propriate Government; and in this case it mitted that, though the appropriate Governmen f the ade certain remissions under Section 401 of th it the de of Criminal Procedure, it did not remit th tire sentence. We, therefore, hold that th ase. titioner has not yet acquired any right to release. to us The petitioner made an impassioned appeal to u ld be at if such a construction be accepted, he would b t and the mercy of the appropriate Government an at the said Government, out of spite, might no t not result mit the balance of his sentence, with the resu at he would be deprived of the fruits of remission useful rned by him for sustained good conduct, usef tution rvice and even donation of blood. The Constitutio r the well as the Code of Criminal Procedure confer th cutive wer to remit a sentence on the executiv . We vernment and it is in its exclusive province. W t will nnot assume that the appropriate Government w ner. t exercise its jurisdiction in a reasonable manner.

5.9. By relyi relying upon Gopal Vinayak Go Godse, learned ned Additional Advocate General su submits that a s a sentence of life imprisonment ordi ordinarily ns imprisonment for the remainder o er of the natural ral life of the convict, unless the sen sentence is comm ommuted or remitted by the approp propriate Governm ernment in exercise of its statutory po y powers. He woul ould further submit that the said judg judgment clearly l rly lays down that the reference to tw to twenty years in rs in Section 57 of the IPC is only fo y for the limited p ted purpose of calculating fractions of t of terms of puni unishment, and cannot be construe trued as 14 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR fixing t g the duration of a sentence of of life imprison risonment at twenty years. There herefore, accordin rding to him, the petitioner cannot not claim release ase merely on completion of twenty nty years of impri prisonment.

5.10. He relie relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble ’ble Apex Court in rt in the case of Mohinder Singh vs. vs. State of Punja unjab3, more particularly Paras 26 an and 27, h are reproduced hereunder for for easy referenc rence: Life imprisonment cannot be equivalent 26. prisonment for 14 years or 20 years or even 3 impris ars, rather it always means the whole natural lif years, is Court has always clarified that the punishmen This C a fixed term of imprisonment so awarded wou of a f subject to any order passed in exercise be su mency powers of the President of India or th vernor of the State, as the case may be. Pardon Gover prieves and remissions under Article 72 or Artic repriev 1 of the Constitution of India are granted 161 o ercise of prerogative power. As observed in Sta exerci U.P. v. Sanjay Kumar [(2012) 8 SCC 537 : (2012 of U.P SCC (Cri) 970] (SCC p. 546, para 24) there is n 3 SCC ope of judicial review of such orders except o ry limited grounds such as the non-application very l ind while passing the order, non-consideration levant material, or if the order suffers fro releva bitrariness. The power to grant pardons and arbitra mmute sentences is coupled with a duty ercise the same fairly, reasonably and in terms exerci restric strictions imposed in several provisions of th de. Code. nt to en 30 l life. se of r the dons, rticle ed in State 2012) is no pt on ion of ion of nd to ty to ms of f the

27. In Code i (2) to In order to check all arbitrary remissions, th de itself provides several conditions. Sub-section ) to (5) of Section 432 of the Code lay down bas , the ctions 3(2013) 3 SCC 294 15 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR for making an application ocedure proced ission propriate Government for suspension or remissio approp n his sentence either by the convict or someone on h of sen er by half. We are of the view that exercise of power b behalf n (1) e appropriate Government under sub-section (1 the ap tu for Section 432 of the Code cannot be suo motu fo of Sec e simple reason that this is only an enablin the si ect to ovision and the same would be possible subject provis lfilment of certain conditions. Those conditions ar s are fulfilm entioned either in the Jail Manual or in statuto mentio les. This Court in various decisions has held th rules. rcised e power of remission cannot be exercise the p bitrarily. In other words, the decision to gran arbitra e and mission has to be well informed, reasonable an remiss e laid ir to all concerned. The statutory procedure la fair to s this wn in Section 432 of the Code itself provides th eck on the possible misuse of power by th y this propriate Government. As rightly observed by th approp SCC urt in Sangeet v. State of Haryana [(2013) 2 SC Court is a 2 : (2012) 11 Scale 140] 452 isconception that a prisoner serving life sentenc miscon ion of s an indefeasible right to release on completion has an nt. A her 14 years' or 20 years' imprisonment. either ed to nvict undergoing life imprisonment is expected convic ect to main in custody till the end of his life, subject remain priate y the appropria ich in vernment under Section 432 of the Code which Gover n is subject to the procedural checks mentione turn is eck in the said provision and further substantive check in the ction 433-A of the Code. Sectio remission granted by ,

5.11. By relyi relying upon Mohinder Singh, lea learned Addition itional Advocate General submits tha that the law is w is well settled that life imprisonment m nt means imprison risonment for the remainder of the na e natural life of of the convict, unless the senten tence is commut muted or remitted by the approp propriate Governm ernment in exercise of its statutor utory or constitu titutional powers. Therefore, accordin ording to 16 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR him, the , the petitioner cannot claim an auto utomatic right of t of release merely on completion of tw of twenty years of rs of imprisonment.

5.12. He relie relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble ’ble Apex Court in rt in the case of Life Convict Bang angal @ Khoka @ ka @ Prasanta Sen vs. B.K.Srivastava tava and others ers4, more particularly Para 17, whi which is reprodu ce: oduced hereunder for easy reference: therein, length of duration

17. Th similar of Ind The s Article petitio impris impris remiss pointe liable Benga Explan Correc of 19 equate said e hand. the W the de [(1944 PC 64 Bench 600 : thus: SCC (C The last decision which is directly on the poin Union ilar to the case on hand is Mohd. Munna v. Unio 88] . India [(2005) 7 SCC 417 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1688] e said case arose in a writ petition filed unde ticle 32 of the Constitution. According to th n of titioner years' prisonment for life is equivalent to 20 year furthe prisonment and that too subject to mission admissible under law. It was furthe e was inted out that on completion of this term, he wa West ble to be released under Rule 751(c) of the We ngal Jail Code. The petitioner relied on th planation to Section 61 of the West Beng ct 32 rrectional Services Act, 1992 (West Bengal Act 3 1992) whereunder imprisonment for life t. As uated to a term of 20 years' imprisonment. A se on id earlier, it is a case identical to the case o 61 of nd. Here again, the Explanation to Section 61 After e West Bengal Act was pressed into service. Afte ing into the very same provisions and considerin l case e decision of the Privy Council in Kishori Lal cas 1945 944-45) 72 IA 1 : (1945) 58 LW 251 : AIR 194 tution 64] as well as the decision of the Constitutio 1 SC nch in Gopal Vinayak Godse case [AIR 1961 S 0 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 736] , this Court conclude 2005 us: (Mohd. Munna case [(2005) 7 SCC 417 : 200 C (Cri) 1688] , SCC pp. 425-27, paras 13-17) “13. T 751(c)

3. The counsel contended that by virtue of Ru 1(c) of the West Bengal Jail Code, the petitione Rule tioner 4(2013) 3 SCC 425 17 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR was li twenty Sectio Act, 1 impris years' remiss Penal fourte Sectio s liable to be released from jail on completion enty years. He also relied on the Explanation ction 61 of the West Bengal Correctional Service t, 1992 (W.B. Act 32 of 1992) wherein th prisonment for life is equated to a term of twen ars' simple imprisonment for the purpose mission. But there is no provision either in th nal Code or in the Code of Criminal Procedur ereby life imprisonment could be treated a urteen years or twenty years without there being rmal remission by the appropriate Governmen ction 57 of the Penal Code reads as follows: ion of on to rvices se of n the d as ing a ment. ‘57.Fr calcula impris to imp terms of punishment.— 7.Fractions of lculating terms of punishmen prisonment for life shall be reckoned as equivalen imprisonment for twenty years.’ —In ment, fractions of se of y the . This 1945 IA p. The a remiss Gover very p of the [(1944 PC 64 10 : A ‘… Ass one o good c to en applica but in years, remiss e above section is applicable for the purpose mission when the matter is considered by th vernment under the appropriate provisions. Th ry plea was placed before the Judicial Committe the Privy Council in Kishori Lal v. King Empero 944-45) 72 IA 1 : (1945) 58 LW 251 : AIR 194 64] and the Privy Council held as under: (IA : AIR p. 67) Assuming that the sentence is to be regarded a e of twenty years, and subject to remission fo od conduct, he had not earned remission sufficien entitle him to discharge at the time of h plication, and it was therefore rightly dismisse t in saying this, Their Lordships are not to b ken as meaning that a life sentence must and in a ses be treated as one of not more than twen ars, or that the convict is necessarily entitled mission.’ ed as n for icient f his issed, to be in all ed to

14. Th Act an author only p for th Theref or the specia . The Prisons Rules are made under the Prison t and the Prisons Act by itself does not confer an thority or power to commute or remit sentence. ly provides for the regulation of the prisons an r the terms of the prisoners confined therei erefore, the West Bengal Correctional Services A the West Bengal Jail Code do not confer an ecial right on the petitioner herein. risons r any ce. It s and erein. s Act r any

15. In LJ 736 that th . In Godse case [AIR 1961 SC 600 : (1961) 1 C 736] , the Constitution Bench of this Court he at the sentence of imprisonment for life is not fo 1 Cri ot for 18 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR any d must, the w person as foll y definite period and the imprisonment for li ust, prima facie, be treated as imprisonment fo e whole of the remaining period of the convicte rson's natural life. It was also held in AIR para follows: (AIR p. 603 : SCR pp. 444-45) r life nt for victed ara 5 . … It does not say that transportation for life sha ‘5. … I deemed to be transportation for twenty years fo be dee purposes; nor does the amended section whic all pu bstitutes the words “imprisonment for life” fo substi “trans ansportation for life” enable the drawing of an nsportation for life or imprisonment for life mu transp transportation o treated as prisonment for the whole of the remaining perio impris the convicted person's natural life.’ of the . Summarising the decision, it was held in AI 16. S ra 8 as under: (AIR pp. 603-04 : SCR p. 447) para 8 rs for ” for f any n or all-embracing fiction. A facie be sentence AIR ‘8. Bri 26 of be un impris After t in the impris senten author Code senten the P remiss said re of imp remiss ordina only f life or one of do no possib death. to ena senten Proced includ questi . Briefly stated the legal position is this: Before A of 1955 a sentence of transportation for life cou undergone by a prisoner by way of rigorou prisonment for life in a designated prison in Indi ter the said Act, such a convict shall be dealt wit the same manner as one sentenced to rigorou prisonment for the same term. Unless the sa ntence is commuted or remitted by appropria thority under the relevant provisions of the Pen de or the Code of Criminal Procedure, a prisone ntenced to life imprisonment is bound in law rve the life term in prison. The Rules framed unde e Prisons Act enable such a prisoner to ear missions—ordinary, special and State—and th id remissions will be given credit towards his ter imprisonment. For the purpose of working out th missions the sentence of transportation for life dinarily equated with a definite period, but it ly for that particular purpose and not for an her purpose. As the sentence of transportation fo or its prison equivalent, the life imprisonment, e of indefinite duration, the remissions so earne not in practice help such a convict as it is n ssible to predicate (sic predict) the time of h ath. That is why the Rules provide for a procedur enable the appropriate Government to remit th ntence under Section 401 of the Code of Crimin ocedure on a consideration of the relevant factor luding the period of remissions earned. Th estion of remission is exclusively within th re Act India. t with priate Penal aw to t the life is it is r any n for nt, is is not f his it the iminal ctors, The 19 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR provin Gover 401 o the p releas ovince of the appropriate Government; and in th se it is admitted that, though the appropria vernment made certain remissions under Sectio 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it did n mit the entire sentence. We, therefore, hold th e petitioner has not yet acquired any right lease.’ n this priate ection d not ht to We ar Consti impris fourte the pe y the e are bound by the above dicta laid down by th nstitution Bench and we hold nt for prisonment is not equivalent to imprisonment fo ed by urteen years or for twenty years as contended b e petitioner. . Thus, all the contentions raised by the petitione 17. Th il and the petitioner is not entitled to be release fail a any of the grounds urged in the writ petition s on an g as there is no order of remission passed by th long a propriate Government in his favour. We make approp ar that our decision need not be taken a pression of our view that the petitioner is n expres titled to any remission at all. The appropria entitle vernment would be at liberty to pass an Gover propriate order of remission in accordance wit approp .” law.” tioner on so y the ake it n as s not priate

5.13. By relyi relying upon Bangal @ Khoka @ Pra Prasanta , Sen, learned Additional Advocate Ge General submits mits that the legal position is well se ll settled that life life imprisonment cannot be equated ated to a fixed te d term of fourteen or twenty years, ars, and unless ss there is a specific judicial dire direction limiting ting the sentence or an order of rem remission by the the appropriate Government, a co convict undergo ergoing life imprisonment cannot ot claim release ase merely on completion of twenty nty years of impri prisonment 20 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

5.14. On the the basis of the aforesaid judgm dgments, learned ned Additional Advocate General su submits that the the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme me Court in Sukh Sukhdev Yadav would have no applic pplication to the he facts of the present case, as in s in that matter ter the sentence of life imprisonmen ent had been sp n specifically restricted by the Cou Court to twenty nty years of actual imprisonment wi t without remissio ission.

5.15. In the the present case, however, the sen sentence imposed osed upon the petitioner is simple mple life imprison risonment without any judicial restr estriction limiting ting it to a fixed term. Therefore, acco according to him him, the petitioner cannot claim laim an automat matic right of release upon completi letion of twenty ye nty years of imprisonment.

5.16. He wou would further submit that the questi estion of remissio ission or premature release lies withi ithin the exclusive domain approp propriate Governm ernment, to be considered in accord cordance with th the applicable statutory provisions ions and policy. C . Consequently, there can be no que question of direct irecting the release of the petitioner m er merely on the the basis that he has completed tw d twenty 21 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR years of rs of imprisonment, as contended on b on behalf of the p e petitioner.

7. Heard Sri.Pr ri.Pradeep Patil learned counsel for for the petitioner and Sri.Pradeep C.S., AG AAG respondents. nts. Perused papers. The points th s that would arise for consideration are are: (i) Whe hether the judgment passed by Cour ourt in Criminal Appeal No.1197/2 hile commuting the death senten ife imprisonment and directing tha life i ccused shall serve the sentence erms of Section 57 of the IPC”, ca onstrued as restricting the senten ife imprisonment to a fixed term wenty years of imprisonment? by this 7/2008, tence to that the ence “in , can be tence of term of (ii) Whe Pena Hon’ Yada Delh hether the petitioner is entitle laim release from prison merely on round that he has completed tw ears of imprisonment, by pla eliance on Section 57 of the In enal Code and the judgment of on’ble Supreme Court in Suk adav @ Pehalwan vs. State (NC elhi)? titled to ly on the twenty placing Indian t of the Sukhdev (NCT of hether, in the absence of a spe (iii) Whe udicial direction restricting the dur f the sentence, a sentence of of t mprisonment must be understoo mprisonment for the remainder o atural life of the convict, subjec specific duration of life tood as r of the bject to 22 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR ommutation or remission in accord ith law? cordance (iv) Whe the petitioner has hether released nforceable legal right to be rele ears of pon completion of twenty year question mprisonment, or whether the que ase lies f remission or premature release of re of the ithin the exclusive domain of ppropriate Government under ns and pplicable statutory provisions olicy? (v) Whe hether the continued incarceratio he petitioner after completion wenty years of imprisonment ca aid to be illegal, so as to warran ssuance of a writ of manda irecting his release? ration of tion of can be rant the andamus (vi) Wha hat is the scope of interference by ourt under Articles 226 and 227 o Cour onstitution of India in matters rela Cons o remission, prema elease and executive powers exerc y the appropriate Government? by th e by this 7 of the relating emature xercised sentence (vii) Wha hat Order

8. I answer the a he above points as follows

9. Answer to P passed by No.1197/200 sentence to l the accused of Section 5 restricting th a fixed term to Point No. (i):Whether the judgm by this Court in Criminal Ap /2008, while commuting the d to life imprisonment and directing sed shall serve the sentence “in t n 57 of the IPC”, can be construe g the sentence of life imprisonme rm of twenty years of imprisonmen udgment Appeal e death ting that in terms trued as ment to ment? 23 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

9.1. Sri. Pra Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for for the petitione tioner, submits that the petitioner ner was originall inally convicted and sentenced to dea death by the IV A IV Additional City Civil and Sessions C ns Court, Mayo H o Hall Unit, Bengaluru in SC No.463/2 63/2003, for offen offences punishable under Sections 302 302 and 364A A of Indian Penal Code, e, 1860 (hereina einafter referred to as 'IPC'). He su submits that on on appeal, this Court in Criminal A al Appeal No.1197 197/2008, vide judgment dated 6.6.2

6.6.2013, commut the death sentence imprison risonment, while further directing that that: (a) the acc accused 'shall not be given commut mutation r completion of fourteen years ears of imprison risonment as a matter of routine'; an ; and (b) 'the acc accused have to serve the life sen sentence and the they should be in jail in terms of Se f Section 57 of IP f IPC.'

9.2. The lear learned counsel submits that the phra hrase 'in s of Section 57 of IPC' is a ju judicial direction ction that restricts and defines the the life sentenc tence as a sentence of twenty yea years of actual i al imprisonment. He submits that Se t Section 57 of t of the IPC equates imprisonment fo t for life 24 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR imprisonment twenty years 'in calculat ulating fractions of terms of punishm ishment', and tha that when the Court expressly directe ected the accused sed to serve the sentence 'in term terms of Section tion 57 of IPC', the Court judicially fixe y fixed the life sent sentence at twenty years — the equiva quivalent period s od specified by Section 57.

9.3. The lea learned counsel places heavy relianc liance on the dec decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Cou Court in Sukhde hdev Yadavand submits that the Ho e Hon'ble Suprem reme Court held that where a life sen sentence is expr xpressed as being equivalent to tw o twenty years o rs of actual imprisonment, the sen sentence stands fully completed upon the co convict undergo ergoing twenty years, and the convi onvict is entitled tled to be simply released from jail wi il without any fur further application for remission to n to the Sentenc tence Review Board.

9.4. Sri. Pra Pradeep Patil submits that the petit petitioner has, as , as on 15.01.2025, completed twenty nty years of act actual imprisonment with satisfa tisfactory conduct duct and no adverse report, as certifi rtified in the Imp Imprisonment Certificate dated 15.01.2 .01.2025. He subm submits that the sentence imposed by d by this 25 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR Court rt stands fully undergone, and continue tinued detention of the petitioner is i is illegal and unc unconstitutional, warranting the imme mediate issuance ance of a writ of mandamus directin cting his ase. release.

9.5. He relie elies on Section 57 of the IPC, which r ch reads: 'Fraction ctions of punishmen ent.—In calculat ulating fractions of terms of punish ishment, imprison risonment for life shall be reckone oned as equivale ivalent to imprisonment for twenty y ty years.' He subm submits that this provision, when re read in conjunc junction with the judgment of this Co Court in Crimina inal Appeal No.1197/2008, means tha that the petitione tioner's sentence stands satisfied ed upon complet pletion of twenty years, and that that any further her incarceration is illegal.

9.6. Sri. Pra Pradeep C.S., learned Additional Advo Advocate General eral (hereinafter 'AAG'), appearing with Sm Smt. K.P. Yashodha, learned Addi dditional Governm ernment Advocate (hereinafter 'AGA'), 'A submits mits that the interpretation placed b d by the petitione tioner on the operative portion of of the judgmen ment in Criminal Appeal No.1197/20 /2008 is 26 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR wholly lly misconceived and contrary to to well- settled l led law.

9.7. The lea learned AAG submits that the oper operative portion ion of Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008 008 does fix or restrict the sentence of imprison risonment to twenty years. The substa bstantive sentenc tence awarded is 'life imprisonment', , these are the the exact words used. The subseq bsequent direction ction 'in terms of Section 57 of IPC' is ' is not a convers version of the life sentence into a a fixed twenty nty-year sentence. It is, at mos most, a specifica cification that the accused must unde ndergo a minimum imum period of actual imprison isonment equiva ivalent to the period under Sectio ction 57 before question remission commut mutation arises. The expression 'life sentenc tence' remains the operative term.

9.8. The lear learned AAG submits that if this Cour ourt had intended nded to restrict the sentence of imprison risonment twenty years of a f actual imprison risonment, it would have done so in in clear and exp express terms, as the High Cou Court in Sukhde hdev Yadav did, using the formu rmulation 'Life im imprisonment which shall be 20 yea years of 27 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR actual i al imprisonment without consideratio ration of remissio ission.' No such language was use used in Crimina inal Appeal No.1197/2008. In the ab absence of such such specific language, the directio ction 'in terms o s of Section 57 of IPC' cannot be cons onstrued as havi having judicially fixed the sentenc tence at twenty ye nty years.

9.9. The lea learned AAG relies on 'Gopal Vin Vinayak Godse', se', a Constitution Bench decision o n of the Hon'ble 'ble Supreme Court.which holds tha that the equating ating of life imprisonment with a de definite period the purpose of working king out remissio issions is 'only for that particular pu purpose and not not for any other purpose.' He submits mits that this bi binding Constitution Bench prec recedent settles t les the scope of Section 57 of the IPC IPC and negates ates the petitioner's interpretation.

9.10. He also also relies on 'Mohinder Singh' gh' and 'Banga ngal @ Khoka', both of which conclu nclusively hold tha that life imprisonment means the w he whole natural ral life and cannot be equated with a h a fixed term of of fourteen or twenty years. He su submits that the the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme me Court in Suk Sukhdev Yadav is factually and le d legally 28 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR distingu inguishable, being premised on a sp specific and exp explicit judicial direction fixing the the life sentenc tence at twenty years, which is en entirely absent i ent in the judgment of this Court in Cri Criminal Appeal N eal No.1197/2008.

9.11. I have ve heard learned counsel for both p h parties with ca care and have perused the re record, includin ding the judgment in Criminal A l Appeal No.1197 197/2008, the relevant paragraph raphs of Sukhde hdev Yadav, the Constitution B Bench decision ision in Gopal Vinayak Godse, and and the decision isions in Mohinder Singh and Bang angal @ Khoka ka. The central question arising u g under Point (i) t (i) is one of pure construction: doe does the phrase se 'in terms of Section 57 of IPC' i C' in the judgmen ment of Criminal Appeal No.1197/2 97/2008, read in in its full context, amount to a ju a judicial restricti riction of the life sentence to a fixed te d term of twenty ye nty years of imprisonment?

9.12. The op operative portion of the judgmen ment in Crimina Appeal No.1197/2008,

6.6.201 2013, reads: 'the death sentenc modified ified and accused nos.1 to 3 are sente entenced to life i ife imprisonment. It is further directed cted that 29 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR accused sed nos.1 to 3 shall not be e given commut mutation after completion of fourteen een years of impr mprisonment as a matter of routine tine. The accused sed have to serve the life sentence ence and they sh should be in jail in terms of Section ion 57 of IPC.' Th This is the sentence imposed that mu t must be interpre rpreted.

9.13. The firs first and foundational observation is n is that the sen sentence imposed is expressed as as 'life imprison risonment' and then further and separ eparately as 'the the life sentence.' The Court used the the term 'life sen sentence' as the substantive and gove overning term of of the punishment. The sentence i ce is not describe cribed as a sentence 'which shall be tw e twenty years' rs' or 'of twenty years of a f actual imprison risonment.' The use of the term 'life sentenc tence' as the operative description ion is of decisive isive significance.

9.14. The se second observation is structural. ral. The judgmen ment in Criminal Appeal No.1197/ contains tains two distinct and sequential direct irections: Directio ction (A): The accused shall not be be given commut mutation after completion of fourteen een years imprisonment as a matter of rou routine. 30 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR Directio ction (B): The accused have to serve erve the life sent sentenceand they should be in jail in t in terms of Secti ection 57 of IPC. These are two sep separate and co complementary directions. Direction ction (A) deals w ls with the period of fourteen ye n years, prohibit ibiting routine commutation at that s at stage. Directio ction (B) uses the expression 'life sent sentence' as the o he operative term and adds the Sectio ection 57 referenc rence as the specification of the min minimum period o od of actual imprisonment.

9.15. The com combined reading of both Directions is s is this: (a) the the accused must serve a life sentence ence; (b) they mu must be in jail, and their period of a of actual imprison risonment for the purpose of Sectio ction 57 equivale ivalent is twenty years, meaning tw g twenty years i rs is the minimum actual imprison isonment before question remission commut mutation can arise, replacing the othe otherwise applicab licable fourteen-year period under Se r Section 433-A C A CrPC. This reading gives full effe effect to directions and maintains internal consiste sistency in the judgment. On the con contrary, the peti petitioner's reading, that the life sen sentence was fixe fixed at twenty years, would re render Directio ction (A) redundant and unnecessary, ary, since 31 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR if the se e sentence was fixed at twenty years, ars, there would b ld be no question of commutation ion even after fou fourteen years at all.

9.16. The rul rule against surplusage in statutory tory and judicial cial interpretation is well-established. ed. Every word in d in a judgment or order is presum umed to have b e been used deliberately and to to carry meaning ning. Courts are not to be understoo rstood as having ing used words without purpose. I . If the petitione tioner's reading were accepted, Dire Direction (A) wou would become meaningless, for why w hy would a Court ourt prohibit commutation after fou fourteen years if rs if the sentence itself was fixed at tw at twenty years a rs and would automatically end at at that point? T t? This internal incongruity is sufficie ficient to demolis olish the petitioner's interpretation.

9.17. I now tu w turn to the decision in Sukhdev Ya v Yadav, upon w n which the petitioner strongly relie relies. In Sukhde hdev Yadav, the sentence imposed b ed by the High C Court was expressed in the follo following terms: s: 'Life imprisonment which shall b ll be 20 actual imprisonment wi without consider sideration of remission, and fine of Rs.10,0 0,000/-.' The Hon'ble Supreme Cou Court at 32 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR Para 15 15 of the said judgment analysed ysed the word 'w d 'which' used after 'Life imprisonment ent' and held tha that it is 'an interrogative pronoun, re n, related pronoun determiner, referring somethi ething previously mentioned introduc oducing a clause giving further inform ormation' that th the sentence of life imprisonme ment is 'determ ermined as twenty years which is of a of actual imprison risonment.'

9.18. The cri critical and material distinction bet between Sukhde hdev Yadav and the present case se is as follows. ws. In Sukhdev Yadav, the High gh Court specifica cifically n formulation 'Life imprison risonment which shall be 20 years of a of actual imprison risonment', here, the word 'which' links links 'Life imprison risonment' directly and definitionally t lly to '20 years o rs of actual imprisonment,' convertin rting the nature re of the sentence from an indeterm terminate one to to a determinate one. The sentence ence was fixed, n d, not merely described. In the pr present case, n , no such definitional linkage exists xists. The words u ds used are 'life sentence' and 'in term terms of Section tion 57 of IPC', these are not wor words of definitio nition but words of duration reference nce. The contrast trast is stark and unmistakable. Suk Sukhdev 33 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR Yadav av is, therefore, clearly distinguishab hable on the lang language and facts.

9.19. I shall all now examine Section 57 of the I e IPC in detail. S il. Section 57 reads: 'Fractions of ter terms of punishm ishment.—In calculating fractions of of terms of puni unishment, imprisonment for life sha shall be reckone oned as equivalent to imprisonmen ment for twenty nty years.' The marginal headin 'Fraction ctions of terms of punishment.' nt.' The languag uage of Section 57 is clear and its sco scope is express ressly limited. It applies 'in calcu alculating fraction tions of terms of punishment.' It doe does not say tha that life imprisonment shall be deem eemed to be twen twenty years for all purposes, or th r that a convict vict sentenced to life imprisonment sh t shall be released ased after twenty years. It is a specifi ecific and limited p ion. ted provision for arithmetic calculation.

9.20. This lim limited scope of Section 57 of the IPC IPC has been d n definitively established by the Ho Hon'ble Suprem reme Court of India. In Gopal Vin Vinayak Godse sewherein the Hon’ble Constitution B on Bench held: : 'For the purpose of working ou out the remissio issions the sentence of transportatio tation for life is o is ordinarily equated with a definite p te period, 34 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR but it is it is only for that particular purpose an e and not for any any other purpose.' The Constitution B on Bench elaborat orated sentence imprison risonment 'is one of indefinite duration ation, the remissio issions so earned do not in practice tice help such a h a convict as it is not possible to pred predicate the time time of his death.' This is a binding de decision of a Co Constitution Bench. It cannot be dep departed from.

9.21. In Moh Mohinder Singh, the Hon'ble Sup Supreme Court r rt reiterated, in unambiguous terms: ms: 'Life imprison risonment cannot equivalent imprison risonment for 14 years or 20 years or s or even 30 yea years, rather it always means the he whole natural ral life.' This statement leaves no roo room for the cont contention that a reference to Section tion 57 of the IPC IPC in a judgment, or that Section 57 57 itself, fixes th s the duration of life imprisonmen ment at twenty ye nty years.

9.22. In Ban Bangal @ Khoka, the Hon'ble Sup Supreme Court, rt, after a comprehensive surve rvey of precede edent, concluded: 'We are bound b d by the ve dicta laid down by the Consti nstitution Bench a ch and we hold that life imprisonment ent is not 35 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR equivale ivalent to imprisonment for fourteen en years or for for twenty years as contended by by the petition tioner.' This Court is more bound by d by this dicta.

9.23. The su submission of Sri. Pradeep Patil atil that Section tion 57 of the IPC operates as a sent entence- defining ning provision, fixing life imprisonme nment at twenty nty years, is directly contrary to y to the consiste sistent interpretation of the Ho Hon'ble Suprem reme Court in Gopal Vinayak Go Godse, Mohind hinder Singh and Bangal @ Khoka. T . These decision isions are binding on this Court. urt. The argume ment must be and is rejected.

9.24. A cont contextual reading of the judgmen ment in Crimina inal Appeal No.1197/2008 also sup supports the abo above interpretation. The case involve volved the gruesom some murder of two innocent children dren. The original inal sentence was death. This Court fou t found it was no not the 'rarest of rare' case warra arranting death, th, but did not treat it as a routine tine case either. er. The judgment imposed a specific ecific bar against nst routine commutation and dir directed service ice of the life sentence 'in terms of Se f Section 57 of IP of IPC.' These directions reflect this C is Court's 36 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR intentio ntion that the accused must ser serve a substan stantial minimum period before even en being eligible ible for any remission consideration, th they do not refle reflect an intention to cap the senten ntence at twenty ye nty years. Reading the directions as ca s capping the sen sentence at twenty years would be w e wholly inconsis nsistent with the gravity of the offence ence and the evid evident purpose of the directions.

9.25. For the the foregoing reasons, I answer Poin Point No. (i) by h y holding that the judgment passed b d by this Court in rt in Criminal Appeal No.1197/2008, 08, while commut muting the death sentence imprison risonment and directing that the acc accused shall ser ll serve the sentence 'in terms of Sectio ection 57 of the I he IPC', cannot be construed as restr estricting the sen sentence of life imprisonment to a a fixed term of of twenty years of imprisonment. ent. The direction ction specifies the minimum period of a of actual imprison risonment; it does not convert or fix th ix the life sentenc tence as a twenty-year sentence.

10. Answer to Po is entitled to on the grou years of imp Section 57 o o Point No. (ii): Whether the petiti d to claim release from prison m round that he has completed tw imprisonment, by placing relianc 57 of the Indian Penal Code and etitioner merely twenty iance on and the 37 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR judgment o Sukhdev Yad Delhi)? t of the Hon'ble Supreme Cour Yadav @ Pehalwan vs. State (NC Court in (NCT of

10.1. Sri. Pra Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for for the petitione tioner, submits that the petitioner ner has served ed twenty years of actual imprisonme nment as on 15

15.01.2025. He contends t upon complet pletion of twenty years, the sen sentence imposed osed by this Court 'in terms of Section tion 57 of IPC' sta ' stands fully served, and the petition itioner is entitled tled to be released forthwith, exactly a tly as the Hon'ble 'ble Supreme Court directed in Suk Sukhdev Yadav av.

10.2. Learned rned counsel relies on Para 15.2 of Sukh Sukhdev Yadav, av, which holds that 'on completion o on of the twenty nty years of actual imprisonment, nt, it is wholly lly unnecessary for the appellant to t to seek remissio ission of his sentence on the premise mise that his sent sentence is a life imprisonment i.e. e. till the end of of his natural life.' He submits that that this principle ciple applies directly to the petitio titioner's case, si , since this Court's direction 'in term terms of Section tion 57 of IPC' is, according to him, ide , identical in subst ubstance to the direction 'Life imprison isonment which sh shall be 20 years' in Sukhdev Yada adav. 38 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

10.3. He subm submits that any other interpretation w ion would require ire the petitioner to make an applic pplication for rem remission before the Sentence Re Review Board, rd, which would be unreasonable ble and contrary trary to the spirit of the judgmen ment in Crimina inal Appeal No.1197/2008. Since sentenc tence has been served, the questio estion of remissio ission simply does not arise.

10.4. Sri. Pra Pradeep C.S., learned AAG, submits mits that the peti petitioner is not entitled to claim auto utomatic release ase upon completion of twenty years years. He submits ts that Section 57 of the IPC is n is not a provisio ision that mandates the release of of a life convict vict after twenty years. Its operati ration is confined fined to calculating fractions of punishm ishment. This limited purpose of Section 5 57 establish blished by the Constitution Bench in n Gopal Vinaya ayak Godse and confirmed in Mohi ohinder Singh and Bangal @ Khoka.

10.5. The lea learned AAG submits that the rel reliance placed b ed by the petitioner on Sukhdev Yad Yadav is misplace placed, as already submitted under der Point (i). He r He reiterates that Sukhdev Yadav is b is based entirely rely on the specific language used b d by the 39 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR High C Court in that case,'Life imprison isonment which s ch shall be 20 years of actual imprison isonment without out consideration of remission' whi which is materia erially different from the language us e used in Crimina inal Appeal No.1197/2008. The rat ratio of Sukhdev hdev Yadav cannot be imported into into the present ent case by a strained reading o g of the direction ction 'in terms of Section 57 of IPC.'

10.6. The lea learned AAG submits that the questi estion of prematu ature release lies within the excl exclusive domain ain of the appropriate Government u nt under Section tion 432/433-A CrPC (now Sec Sections /474 BNSS). In the absence of an ord order of remissio ission by the appropriate Government ent, the petitione tioner has no legal right to release, an , and no writ of m of mandamus can be issued.

10.7. Under P er Point (ii), I must determine whethe ether the petitione tioner is entitled to claim release mere erely on the gro ground of completion of twenty yea years of imprison risonment, relying on Section 57 of th f the IPC and Su Sukhdev Yadav. The analysis is must proceed eed on the foundation already laid u id under Point (i) t (i), namely, that the judgment in Cri Criminal 40 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR Appeal eal No.1197/2008 did not fix the the life sentenc tence at twenty years.

10.8. Section tion 57 of the IPC must be analysed ysed first. The pro provision reads: 'Fractions of term terms of punishm ishment.—In calculating fractions of of terms of puni unishment, imprisonment for life sha shall be reckone oned as equivalent to imprisonmen ment for twenty nty years.' The marginal note — 'Frac 'Fractions of term erms of punishment' — is the key t y to the purpose ose of the provision. It applies only nly when fraction tions of terms of punishment are req required to be c e calculated, typically for the purpo rpose of computi puting remissions admissible under nder the prison rules or relevant statutory provisio isions. It does not operate as a provi provision determi rmining when a life sentence s stands complet pleted.

10.9. The Co Constitution Bench in Gopal Vin Vinayak Godse se (Para 8) specifically addressed this this. The Court re rt referred to the practice of equatin ating the life sen sentence with a definite period 'fo 'for the purpose ose of working out the remissions' ions' and held th that such equating is 'only for for that particula icular purpose and not for any ny other 41 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR purpose ose.' This restriction is plain: Sectio ction 57 operate rates only for calculating remissions ions and fraction tions; it does not determine the a e actual duration tion of the sentence. Reliance on Se n Section 57 to to claim that the sentence has as been complet pleted upon serving twenty year is, therefor efore, contrary to this binding Constit nstitution Bench d ch decision.

10.10. Para 9 9 of Gopal Vinayak Godse is also instructi ructive. The petitioner therein mad made an 'impassi assioned appeal' contending that if if a life sentenc tence means imprisonment for the w he whole natural ral life, he would be 'at the mercy o cy of the appropr ropriate Government' which 'out of of spite, might n ht not remit the balance of his sente entence.' The Co Constitution Bench acknowledged ged this concern cern but held: 'The Constitution as w s well as the Co Code of Criminal Procedure confer nfer the power t er to remit a sentence on the exec executive Governm ernment and it is in its exclusive provi province. We ca cannot assume the approp propriate Governm ernment will not exercise its jurisdicti diction in a reaso asonable manner.' This reasoning ap g applies with equ equal force in the present case. 42 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

10.11. In Moh Mohinder Singh (Para 27), the Ho Hon'ble Suprem reme Court specifically addressed sed and rejected cted the claim of a convict serving rving life imprison risonment to 'indefeasible right to re o release on com completion of either 14 years or 20 20 years imprison risonment.' The Court stated clearl early: 'A convict vict undergoing imprisonmen expecte ected to remain in custody till the end nd of his life, sub subject to any remission granted b d by the appropr ropriate Government under Section 4 n 432 of the Co Code.' The expectation of natur atural-life imprison risonment, subject only to exec executive remissio ission, is the settled legal position ition. No amount unt of reliance on Section 57 of the the IPC alters th rs this.

10.12. In Ban Bangal @ Khoka (Para 17), the Ho Hon'ble Suprem reme Court, applying the ratio of of Gopal Vinaya ayak Godse and Mohd. Mu Munna, categori gorically rejected a similar claim and and held: 'We ho imprisonment is not equivale ivalent to imprisonment for fourteen en years or for for twenty years as contended by by the petitione tioner.' The petitioner therein was was not entitled tled to be released 'on any of the gro grounds urged in d in the writ petition so long as there ere is no 43 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR order o r of remission passed by the approp propriate Governm ernment in his favour.'

10.13. On the the reliance placed on Sukhdev Yad Yadav, I have alr e already held, under Point (i), that the t the said decisio ble. factually distinguishable. In Sukhde Yadav, sentence e was definitio nitionally fixed at 'Life imprisonment w nt which shall b ll be 20 years of actual imprison isonment without out consideration of remission.' n.' The complet pletion of twenty years in that case wa e was the complet pletion of a judicially-fixed sentence. I e. In the present ent case, no such judicially-fixed sen sentence exists. ts. The petitioner has completed tw d twenty years of rs of imprisonment pursuant to a conti ontinuing life sen sentence, he has not completed eted the sentenc tence. The ratio of Sukhdev Yadav dav has, therefor efore, no application.

10.14. Para 1

15.2 of Sukhdev Yadav, which hich the petitione tioner particularly relies upon, must be t be read in conte ontext. The Hon'ble Supreme Court ourt was address ressing the specific situation where here the sentenc tence had already been judicially fixe y fixed at twenty ty years of actual imprisonment an and the convict vict had completed those twenty years ears. The 44 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR observa ervation that 'it is wholly unnecessar ssary for the app appellant to seek remission' was as made because ause the sentence had been complete pleted by judicial cial design. The same observation n cannot be trans ransplanted into a case where the sen sentence is a con continuing life sentence and has not not been fixed at d at twenty years.

10.15. Accordin rdingly, I answer Point No. (ii) by ho y holding that th the petitioner is not entitled to to claim release ase from prison merely on the groun und that completed twenty imprison risonment. Section 57 of the IPC doe does not mandat date or authorise release after tw r twenty years; rs; the decision in Sukhdev Yada adav is distingu inguishable and not applicable to the the facts of this c his case; and the three binding decisio ions of the Hon Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gopal Vin Vinayak Godse se, Mohinder Singh and Banga angal @ Khoka im. ka, conclusively negate such a claim.

11. Answer to absence o restricting sentence o understood of the natu to Point No. (iii): Whether, in of a specific judicial dire ng the duration of the sentenc imprisonment must e of od as imprisonment for the remai natural life of the convict, subjec , in the direction tence, a ust be mainder bject to 45 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR commutatio law? ation or remission in accordance nce with

11.1. Sri. Pra Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for for the petitione tioner, does not directly contend tha that the general eral principle, life imprisonment m t means imprison risonment for remainder of natural li al life, is incorrec rrect. His contention is that in the pr e present case, th , this Court has given a specific ju c judicial direction ction (viz., the direction 'in terms of Se f Section 57 of IP f IPC') that restricts and fixes the dur duration of the s he sentence. He submits that this sp s specific judicial l direction takes the case outside tside the e of the general principle, makin aking it governe erned by the Sukhdev Yadav prin principle ead. instead.

11.2. He sub submits that Sukhdev Yadav itself recognis gnises that courts have the power to f to fix the duration tion of a life sentence at a specific c term, and tha that where such a direction exists xists, the general eral principle does not apply. He argues gues that this Co Court's judgment in Criminal A l Appeal No.1197 197/2008 contains such a direction.

11.3. Sri. Prad Pradeep C.S., learned AAG, submits th ts that in the abs absence of a specific judicial dire direction 46 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR restrictin ricting the duration of a life sentence nce to a fixed te d term, the sentence must be unders derstood, in acc accordance with well-settled law, as imprison risonment for the remainder of the na e natural life of th of the convict. He submits that this prin principle is estab tablished by the Constitution Benc Bench in Gopal al Vinayak Godse, reaffirmed by by the Hon'ble 'ble Supreme Court in Mohinder Si r Singh and Ban Bangal@ Khoka, and is not departed rted from in Sukh Sukhdev Yadav. He submits that in t in the present ent case, there is no specific ju judicial direction ction fixing the sentence at twenty ye ty years. The gen general principle therefore applies, an , and the sentenc ence is imprisonment for the remaind ainder of natural ral life.

11.4. Point (i t (iii) raises a question of general ral legal principle ciple that has a direct bearing on on the outcome ome of this case. The question: m must a sentenc ence of life imprisonment, in the absen bsence of a spec pecific judicial direction restricting duration tion, be understood as imprisonmen ment for the rem remainder of the natural life of the con convict?

11.5. The ans answer is provided by a long, cons onsistent and unb unbroken line of decisions of the Ho e Hon'ble 47 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR Suprem reme Court of India. The Constitution B on Bench in Gopa opal Vinayak Godse (Para 8) declare clared: 'A sentenc transportation imprison risonment for life must prima faci facie be treated ted as transportation or imprisonmen ment for the wh whole of the remaining period o of the convicte victed person's natural life.' The use o se of the phrase ' se 'must prima facie be treated' estab tablishes this as as the default rule — the starting po point of any ana analysis of life imprisonment.

11.6. The qua qualification 'unless the said senten ntence is commut muted or remitted by appropriate auth authority' in Gopa opal Vinayak Godse identifies the the only legitima imate routes by which the sentence nce may end befo before the natural death of the convic nvict: (a) commut mutation or remission by the approp propriate Governm rnment under the CrPC (now BNSS) SS); (b) commut mutation or remission by the Preside sident of India or a or the Governor of the State in exerc xercise of the pre prerogative powers under Articles 72 s 72 and 161 of t of the Constitution of India respective tively; or (c) a a specific judicial direction fixing xing the sentenc ence at a definite term (as discuss ussed in Sukhde hdev Yadav). In the absence of an f any of 48 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR these r e routes, the sentence continues fo s for the remaind ainder of the convict's natural life.

11.7. In Moh Mohinder Singh (Paras 26 and 27) 27), the Hon'ble 'ble Supreme Court reaffirmed principle ciple: 'Life imprisonment cannot not be equivale ivalent to imprisonment for 14 years ars or 20 years or rs or even 30 years, rather it always m ys means the who whole natural life.' The Hon'ble Sup Supreme Court al rt also explained the constitutional sch scheme: pardons ons and remissions under Articles 72 s 72 and 161 of t of the Constitution are prerogative po ve powers of the the executive, subject to limited ju judicial review. ew. The power of remission under Se r Section 432 CrP CrPC is also vested in the executive tive. The power o er of courts is to impose sentence nce; the er to subsequently alter or remit emit the sentenc ence (except in specific circumstances nces) lies with the the executive.

11.8. In Bang Bangal @ Khoka (Para 17), the prin principle was re ity: restated with the same clarity: 'life imprison risonment is not equivalent to imprison isonment for four fourteen years or for twenty years. ars.' The Hon'ble 'ble Supreme Court clarified that the petitione tioner therein would not be entitle titled to 49 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR release ase 'so long as there is no orde order of remissio ission passed approp propriate Governm ernment in his favour.'

11.9. It is als also appropriate to note Article 21 o 21 of the Constitu stitution of India, which guarantees th s that no person on shall be deprived of his life or per personal liberty except according rocedure establish blished by law. The continued incarcer rceration of the p e petitioner pursuant to a valid senten ntence of life imp imprisonment is in full conformity ity with Article cle 21 — f is deprivation of liberty accordin rding to a procedure established by by law, ely, namely, the procedure of conviction tion and sentenc encing under the IPC and CrPC C by a compete petent court. The general principle tha that life imprison risonment means imprisonment for for the whole n le natural life is, therefore, constitutio tutionally valid an and cannot be challenged on the gr e ground of violat iolation of Article 21.

11.10. Regardin arding the petitioner's contention tha that this case fall falls outside the general principle by vi by virtue of a spe specific judicial direction (the directio ection 'in terms o s of Section 57 of IPC'), this Cour ourt has already ady held under Point (i) that the the said 50 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR direction ction does not restrict or fix the durati ration of the sen sentence at twenty years. The sp specific judicial cial direction exception recognise Sukhde hdev Yadav (and discussed in the co e context of sen sentences specifically worded as 'Life imprison risonment which shall be 20 years of a of actual imprison risonment') does not apply in the abs absence of such uch specific language. The general prin principle therefor efore operates in full force in the pr present case.

11.11. Accordin rdingly, I answer Point no. (iii) by ho y holding that in in the absence of a specific ju judicial direction restricting the duration of sentenc ence, the sentence of life imprison isonment imposed osed on the petitioner must be under derstood as imp imprisonment for the remainder o r of his natural life, subject to commutation ation or remissio ission in accordance with law.

12. Answer to to Point No. (iv): Whether r has any enforceable legal right t petitioner h upon completion of twenty year released up ment, or whether the question imprisonme n or premature release lies within remission o approp e exclusive ent under the applicable statu Government provisions a her the ht to be years of stion of ithin the ropriate tatutory ns and policy? domain 51 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

12.1. Sri. Pra Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for for the petitione tioner, submits that the petitioner ha r has an enforcea rceable legal right to be released ed upon complet pletion of twenty years of imprisonm sonment. He sub submits that this right flows from from the judicial direction Criminal Appeal A No.1197 197/2008, read in conjunction with Se h Section 57 of t of the IPC and the principle in Suk Sukhdev Yadav av. He submits that the right to re o release upon co n completion of the judicially-fixed per period is a judicia dicial right, not merely an executive fa ve favour. It is no s not a matter of remission or exec executive discretio retion; it is a matter of the sentence h ce having been co n completed.

12.2. Sri. Pra Pradeep C.S., learned AAG, submits mits that the peti petitioner has no enforceable legal rig l right to automa matic release upon completion of tw f twenty years. H rs. He submits that the power of rem mission and pre premature release is vested exclusive usively in the app appropriate Government under Section ction 432 of the he CrPC (now Section 473 of the BN e BNSS), subject ject to the constraints of Section 4 n 433-A CrPC (n C (now Section 474 BNSS). He extract racts and relies up s upon these provisions. 52 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

12.3. Section tion 473(1) of the BNSS (correspondi onding to Section tion 432(1) CrPC) reads: 'When any p y person has be been sentenced to punishment fo t for an offence, nce, the appropriate Government ma may, at any tim time, without conditions or upon pon any conditio ditions which the person sentenced acc accepts, suspend pend the execution of his sentence or or remit the wh whole or any part of the punishme hment to which h ch he has been sentenced.'

12.4. The use use of the word 'may' in Section 473( 473(1) of the BNS BNSS makes the exercise of the p e power purely ly discretionary with the appro propriate Governm ernment. The convict does not have have an automa matic or absolute right to remissio ission or ase. release.

12.5. The lear learned AAG relies on Para 27 of Mohi ohinder Singh, , which states: 'there is a misconce onception that a a prisoner serving life sentence ha has an indefeas feasible right to release on completi letion of either 1 er 14 years or 20 years imprisonmen ent.' He submits mits that the present case involves pre precisely this m misconception being raised by petitione tioner. He submits that the Sen Sentence Review iew Board, when considers ers any 53 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR applicat lication for premature release, must d st do so in accor ccordance with the applicable policy an y and the statutor utory provisions, and the Court cannot nnot pre- empt or t or substitute that exercise of discreti retion.

12.6. Point ( t (iv) requires this Court to deter etermine whether ther the petitioner has an enforceable able legal right to t to automatic release upon completi pletion of twenty nty years, or whether the questio stion of prematu ature release lies within the excl exclusive domain ain of the appropriate Government.

12.7. As held held under Points (i), (ii) and (iii) (iii), the petitione tioner has no enforceable legal rig right to automa matic release, because: (a) the sen sentence imposed osed is life imprisonment and not a tw a twenty- year se r sentence (Point i); (b) Section 57 o 7 of the IPC doe does not mandate release after tw r twenty years ( rs (Point ii); and (c) life imprison isonment ns imprisonment for the remainde inder of natural ral life (Point iii). These three fin findings collective ctively and conclusively exclude existenc tence of an enforceable legal righ right to automa matic release.

12.8. The sta statutory scheme governing remission ssion and prematu ature release of life convicts is Sec Sections 54 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR 432, 43 , 433 and 433-A of the CrPC (now Sec Sections 473, 47 , 474 and 475 of the BNSS). The sche cheme is as follow ollows: Section 432/473 BNSS vests i sts in the appropr ropriate Government the discretio retionary power t er to suspend or remit the sentence, a e, at any time, w , with or without conditions. Se Section /474 BNSS vests the approp propriate Governm ernment the power to commute imprison risonment rigorous simple s imprison risonment for a term not exce xceeding fourteen en years. Section 433-A/474 4 BNSS imposes oses a restriction: where a sentenc tence of imprison risonment for life has been impose osed on convictio viction for an offence for which death i th is one of the the punishments provided by law, law, the appropr ropriate Government shall not exercis xercise its powers ers of release or commutation unles nless the person on has served at least fourteen yea years of imprison risonment.

12.9. In the p he present case, the original conviction ction was under S er Sections 302 and 364A IPC, bo both of h provide for death as one of of the punishm ishments. Therefore, Section 433-A C A CrPC / Section tion 474 BNSS applies, and the min minimum period o od of actual imprisonment before rem remission 55 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR can eve even be considered is fourteen y n years. Howeve ever, as held, this Court in Criminal A al Appeal No.1197 197/2008 modified threshold twenty nty years by its direction 'in term terms of Section tion 57 of IPC.' Thus, the petitioner wa r was not eligible ible for even consideration of remission sion until he had had served twenty years of a f actual imprison risonment.

12.10. Having ing now served twenty years, the thre threshold for eligi eligibility to apply for remission has has been crossed sed. The petitioner has crossed ineligibi igibility to eligibility. He is now eligib ligible to make a e an application for premature relea elease or remissio ission to the appropriate Governm ernment. Howeve ever, eligibility to apply is different ent from having ing an enforceable t legal right to be released ased. The appropriate Government nt must still con consider the application on its meri erits, in accorda rdance with applicable policy, taking king into account unt all relevant factors. The de decision whether ther to remit the sentence or or grant prematu ature release remains with the approp propriate Governm ernment. 56 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

12.11. The pow power of remission is constitutionally nally and statutor utorily vested in the executive. It is a p s a power coupled pled with a duty to exercise it fairly airly and reasona onably, as held by the Hon'ble Sup Supreme Court in rt in Mohinder Singh (Para 27). The he Court can ens ensure that this power is exercised f ed fairly, reasona onably and in accordance with law, but it cannot not itself exercise the power by dire directing the rele release of the convict. This distin istinction, between een ensuring fair exercise of the p e power and exe exercising the power itself, constitu stitutional boundary between the jud judiciary and the the executive.

12.12. Accordin rdingly, I answer Point No. (iv) by ho y holding that: (a : (a) The petitioner has no enforc forceable l to automatic release e upon complet pletion of twenty years of imprisonm sonment. (b) The The question of remission or prem remature release ase lies within the exclusive domain o in of the appropr ropriate Government under the appli pplicable statutor utory provisions and policy. (c) (c) The petitione tioner, having crossed the min minimum thresho twenty actual a imprison risonment, is now eligible to apply pply for prematu ature release/remission to the approp propriate 57 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR Governm ernment, which consider applicat lication on its merits in accordance nce with applicab licable law and policy.

13. Answer to continued in completion can be said issuance of release? to Point No. (v): Whether d incarceration of the petitioner ion of twenty years of imprisonm said to be illegal, so as to warran of a writ of mandamus directing her the er after sonment rant the cting his

13.1. Sri. Pra Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for for the petitione tioner, submits continued incarcer rceration of the petitioner after comp mpletion of twent enty years of actual imprisonment is i t is illegal and un unconstitutional. He draws the C Court's attentio ntion to Para 15.4 of Sukhdev Ya Yadav, where t re the Hon'ble Supreme Court held: 'T d: 'There cannot not be any further incarceration o of the appellan ellant herein from 09.03.2025 onwa nwards... the con continuous incarceration of the app appellant from 0

09.03.2025 onwards was illegal. gal.' He submits mits that the same logic applies to s to the petitione tioner, since he has completed twenty nty years and the the sentence was specified 'in term terms of Section tion 57 of IPC', the continued detention tion post complet pletion of twenty years is illegal. 58 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

13.2. Learned rned counsel submits that since detentio ntion is illegal, the writ jurisdiction o n of this Court u rt under Articles 226 and 227 of of the Constitu stitution of India is directly attracted, ed, and a writ of of mandamus must issue directing cting the third r d respondent to release the petit petitioner forthwit hwith. He relies on the well-establ tablished principle ciple that a writ of habeas corpu orpus or mandam damus may be issued when a pers person is detained ined without lawful authority.

13.3. Sri. Pra Pradeep C.S., learned AAG, submits mits that the con continued incarceration of the petition titioner is not illeg illegal. The petitioner is detained pur pursuant to a va valid warrant of commitment issued ued by a compete petent court, pursuant to a valid valid and subsistin sisting sentence of life imprisonment. nt. Since the sent sentence of life imprisonment has not not been complet pleted, commuted, or ed, remitted, continue tinued detention is entirely lawful. ful. The analogy logy with Sukhdev Yadav is misconce onceived, in that case the sentence had ad been specifica cifically fixed at twenty years and had had been fully u undergone. No such completio etion of sentenc ase. tence has occurred in the present case. 59 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

13.4. The lea learned AAG submits that a wr writ of mandam damus can be issued only to compe mpel the perform ormance of a mandatory public duty. I ty. In the present ent case, there is no mandatory du y duty on the thir third respondent to release the petiti etitioner. The dut duty of the third respondent is to hol hold the petitione tioner in custody pursuant to the the valid warrant rant of commitment, and that duty is y is being lawfully ully performed. No writ of manda ndamus, therefor efore, can or should issue.

13.5. Point (v t (v) requires determination of whethe ether the continue tinued incarceration is illegal. The answ nswer to this que question flows from the answers al s already given to n to Points (i) through (iv).

13.6. A dete etention is illegal when it lacks ks legal authorit ority, when there is no valid court ord order or warrant rant authorising the detention, or whe when the sentenc tence pursuant to which the detenti ention is maintain ntained has been fully undergone, or or when the de detention violates a constitutiona ional or statutor utory provision. None of these conditio ditions is satisfied sfied in the present case. The petition titioner is detained ined pursuant to a valid warran rrant of commitm mitment, pursuant to a valid and subs ubsisting 60 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR sentenc tence of life imprisonment passed ed by a compete petent court and affirmed in Cri Criminal Appeal eal No.1197/2008. The sentence ha has not been co n completed, commuted, or remitted tted. The detentio ntion is therefore lawful.

13.7. The reli reliance placed by the learned couns unsel on Para 15

15.4 of Sukhdev Yadav is specificall ically and express ressly addressed and rejected for the reasons ons elaborately discussed under Poin Points (i) and (ii). (ii). In Sukhdev Yadav, the sentence ence had n fixed at twenty years of a f actual imprison risonment by a specific judicial dire direction, and the the convict had completed that tw twenty- year se r sentence. The continued incarcer rceration after the r the sentence was specifically and jud judicially fixed at d at twenty years and fully undergone one, that was hel held to be illegal. In the present cas case, no such tw twenty-year sentence was fixed. xed. The sentenc tence is a continuing life sentence. nce. The twenty nty years served are part of the sen sentence but do do not constitute the whole sent sentence. Therefo refore, the continued incarceration is n is not al. illegal. 61 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

13.8. For a w a writ of mandamus to issue, the petit petitioner must de t demonstrate: (a) a clear legal right t ht to the perform ormance of a specific act; and ( d (b) a correspo esponding legal duty in the responde ndent to perform orm that act; and (c) the respond pondent's failure re to perform that duty. As held u ld under Point (i t (iv), the petitioner has no enforc forceable l to automatic release e upon complet pletion of twenty years. Since the the first prerequ equisite legal right is not established hed, the foundat dation for a writ of mandamus is ab s absent. The writ writ cannot issue.

13.9. It must ust also be noted that issuing a w a writ of mandam damus directing the release of a co a convict whose s se sentence is validly subsisting wou would, in substan stance and effect, amount to this is Court exercisin rcising the power of remission ion and commut mutation, a power vested by Constitu stitution and the statutes in the exec executive Governm ernment and not in the judiciary. Suc Such an exercise rcise would be ultra vires the jurisdicti diction of this Cou Court in writ proceedings. This Cour ourt has no powe ower to direct the release of a life co e convict by assu assuming to itself the power of rem remission that bel belongs to the appropriate Governmen ment. 62 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

13.10. This Co Court is also guided by the princip inciple of judicial restraint in matters of cri criminal sentenc tencing and execution of sentences. ces. The Court's rt's role, in the context of writ jurisdi risdiction, is to en o ensure that the law is applied cor correctly and tha that fundamental rights are protected cted, not to subs substitute its discretion for that o t of the sentenc tencing court or the executive. As lon s long as the det detention is pursuant to a valid sen sentence and the the prisoner's fundamental rights ar s are not violated ated, this Court does not interfere wit with the continue tinued execution of the sentence.

13.11. For the the above reasons, I answer point No t No. (v0 by hold holding that the continued incarcerati ration of the peti petitioner after completion of twenty nty years of impri prisonment is not illegal, and that no t no writ of man mandamus can be issued directing cting his release. ase.

14. Answer to P interference and 227 of relating to release and appropriate to Point No. (vi): What is the scop nce by this Court under Articles of the Constitution of India in ma to sentence remission, prema and executive powers exercised by iate Government? scope of cles 226 matters emature d by the 63 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

14.1. Sri. Pra Pradeep Patil, learned counsel for for the petitione tioner, submits that this Court has ful s full and ample j le jurisdiction under Articles 226 and and 227 of the he Constitution of India to examine mine the legality lity of the petitioner's detention an and to issue a e appropriate directions. He submits mits that the que question before the Court is not on t one of remissio ission or executive discretion, it is a question stion of interpreting a judicial direction ction and enforcin rcing the legal right flowing from i m it. He submits mits that this question is squarely withi ithin the writ juri jurisdiction of this Court.

14.2. He sub submits that where a Court has give given a direction ction, whether expressly or by implica plication, for relea release upon completion of a specific pe ic period, the enfo enforcement of that direction is a ju a judicial function tion, not an executive one. The pr present case, ac , according to him, involves enforcing cing such a directi rection.

14.3. Sri. Pra Pradeep C.S., learned AAG, submits mits that while th le the High Court's writ jurisdiction u on under Articles cles 226 and 227 is wide, it is not unlim nlimited. In ma matters of sentence remission ion and prematu ature release, the Court's jurisdicti diction is 64 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR supervis ervisory and review-based, the Cour ourt can ensure t ure that the appropriate Government a nt acts in accorda rdance with law, but cannot itself exe exercise the exe executive power of remission or subs ubstitute judgment for that of the approp propriate Governm ernment in deciding whether a co convict should b uld be released.

14.4. He subm submits that in the present case, ther there has been no n no application for remission before efore the appropr ropriate Government, no order on on such applicat lication, and no illegality in the cont continued detentio ntion. In such circumstances, the there is nothing ing for this Court's writ jurisdiction t on to act upon.

14.5. The sco scope of this Court's writ jurisdiction u ion under Articles cles 226 and 227 of the Constitutio tution of a India is unquestionably wide. Article i icle 226 empowe owers this Court to issue directions, o s, orders or writs rits, including writs in the nature of ha of habeas corpus, us, mandamus, prohibition, quo war warranto and ce certiorari, to any person or auth authority includin ding the Government, for the enforce orcement fundamental rights and for any y other purpose ose. Article 227 vests in this Cour ourt the 65 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR power o er of superintendence over all courts urts and tribunal unals within its territorial jurisdiction.

14.6. Howeve ever, the breadth of Article 226 jurisd risdiction does no s not mean that this Court is entitle ntitled to exercise all governmental powers. rs. The Constitu stitution carefully distributes power a r among the thr three branches of government, and and the courts a rts are required to act within the do domain assigned gned to them. In matters of cri criminal sentenc tences, the execution and modificatio cation of sentenc tences are matters governed by sta y statute, and the the power to remit or commute sente entences is spec pecifically and exclusively vested in d in the appropr ropriate Government Presiden ident/Governor under Articles 72/161

161. This Court, in rt, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, ca n, cannot arrogate gate to itself the power of remission.

14.7. In the context of the present case and ma matters of this this nature, this Court's writ jurisd risdiction extends nds to the following permissible form forms of interfere rference: (i) examining whether continue tinued detention of the convict is pur pursuant to a val valid court order, if not, a writ of ha f habeas corpus us may issue; (ii) examining whethe ether the 66 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR appropr ropriate Government has failed or re r refused to cons consider an application for remissio ission in accorda rdance with statutory procedure, if if so, a mandam damus may issue directing considerat eration of the app application; (iii) examining whethe ether an order o r of the appropriate Government nt on a remissio ission application is arbitrary, mala fid a fide, or vitiated ted by non-application of mind, if so if so, the order m r may be quashed and fresh consider ideration directed cted; (iv) giving effect to the completi pletion of a judicia dicially-fixed sentence by directing rel release, as was d as done in Sukhdev Yadav.

14.8. In the p he present case, this Court has already eady held that: (a : (a) the continued detention is pursua rsuant to a valid alid life sentence (so no habeas c s corpus issue); e); (b) there is no application for rem remission before re the appropriate Government (s (so no question stion of the Government having faile failed to consider sider); (c) no order of remission has has been passed sed by the appropriate Government (s nt (so no question stion of quashing); and (d) the senten ntence is not a ju a judicially-fixed twenty-year sentenc tence (so Sukhde hdev Yadav category does not ap t apply). None e of the permissible forms of of writ interven rvention is attracted in the present cas case. 67 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

14.9. This Co Court, however, does take note o e of the direction ction of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in rt in Para 16 of of Sukhdev Yadav, which directe rected a circulati ulation to all Home Secretaries of S of States and Uni Union Territories to ascertain whethe ther any convict vict has remained in jail beyond the p he period of his his sentence. This direction was in s in the context text of cases where sentences had ad been specifica cifically fixed by judicial direction. For For cases like the the present, where the sentence nce is a continui tinuing life sentence, the approp propriate Governm ernment's power of remission under Se r Section /474 BNSS is the prescribed mechanis anism for any ear early release.

14.10. The sco scope of this Court's jurisdiction in n in the present ent case is, therefore: (a) to examine mine and confirm firm the legality of the detention ( n (b) to clarify legal position regarding petitione tioner's eligibility to apply for prem remature release; ase; and (c) to direct that if an applic pplication for pre premature release is made by petitione tioner, the appropriate Government ent shall consider sider it on its merits within a reaso asonable time, w , without being bound by the dire direction against inst 'routine commutation at fourteen y en years' 68 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR (which ich direction has been rendered spen spent by the pa passage of twenty years). This is Court cannot, not, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, on, direct the auto automatic release of the petitioner.

15. Answer to P to Point No. (vii): What Order?

15.1. Having ing answered all Points for Determina mination, this Cou Court must now determine the approp propriate order to r to be passed in this writ petition. tion. The findings ings on all six preceding Points, s, taken togethe ther, clearly indicate that the pr primary prayer er, for a writ of mandamus directin cting the immedia ediate release of the petitioner, cann annot be granted ted.

15.2. This Co Court has held that: (a) the life sen sentence was not not fixed at twenty years; (b) Sectio ection 57 IPC doe does not mandate release after tw r twenty rs; years; (c) imprisonment m imprison risonment for the remainder of natura tural life; (d) the there is no enforceable legal righ right to automa release; (e) continued incarcer rceration is not illegal; and (f) this C is Court's writ jur jurisdiction does not extend to dire directing release ase in these circumstances. 69 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR

15.3. In the r he result and for the foregoing reaso easons, I pass the s the following ORDER The w he writ petition is DISMISSED. The p he prayer for a writ of mandamus dire directing (i) (ii) Respo espondent No.3 to release the petit petitioner om prison forthwith is REJECTED. (iii) t is clarified that the direction in It is in the dgment of this Court in Criminal A l Appeal No.11 o.1197/2008, that the accused shall all serve he sentence 'in terms of Section 57 of the s 7 of IPC', oes not restrict the sentence of prisonment to a period of twenty ye ty years. The s he sentence of life imprisonment imp imposed on t n the petitioner is a sentence for for the emainder of his natural life, and remai mains so nless commuted or remitted by ppropriate Government r Presid resident/Governor in accordance with l ith law. (iv) The p he petitioner, having served twenty ty years of ac f actual imprisonment as stipulated i ed in the dgment of this Court in Criminal A l Appeal No.11 o.1197/2008, has crossed the mini minimum 70 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR hreshold specified by this Court for elig eligibility for re r remission consideration. He is accord cordingly entitl ntitled to submit an application remature release or remission to to the ppropriate authority in accordance nce with applic pplicable statutory provisions and State tate's remission policy. (v) f and when such application is made If an ade, the ppropriate Government/Sentence Re Review Board oard shall: (i) consider the same o e on its indivi dividual and case-specific merits; (ii) (ii) take into a to account all relevant factors includin uding the eriod of actual imprisonment, the co conduct of th f the petitioner, the nature of the off offence, interests of the victims, and applic pplicable policy; (iii) not treat the dire direction gainst 'routine commutation ompletion of fourteen years' in Cri Criminal Appe ppeal No.1197/2008 as an absolute b te bar to onsideration of any application made ade after ompletion of twenty years; and (iv) p v) pass a easoned order thereon within ninety ety (90) ays of receipt of the application. 71 NC: 2026:KHC: WP No. 25250 of HC:15413 0 of 2025 HC-KAR (vi) Nothi othing in this judgment constitutes or s or shall be c e construed as an expression of op f opinion petitioner's application remature release, if made, ought to to be or hall be granted. The decision on any any such applic pplication remains entirely within ent. omain of the appropriate Government. (vii) Pendi ending applications, y, any, ismissed. Sd/- (SURAJ GOVINDAR DARAJ) JUDGE Prs o.: 2 List No.: 19 Sl No.: 2